The Effect of Some Insecticides on the Histopathology of the Midgut of Different Stages of Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus Bol (Acrididae : Orthoptera) by Rizvi, Syed Shakil Ahmad
The Effect of Some Insecticides on .the 
Histopathology of the Midgut of Different Stages of 
Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus Bol (Acrididae : Orthoptera) 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE 
OF 
D O C T O R O F P H I L O S O P H Y 
IN THE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH 
By 
Syed Shakil Ahmad Rizvi 
D E P A R T M E N T O F Z O O L O G Y 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
A L I G A R H 
January 20, 1970 
T948 
D E P A R T M E N T O F Z O O L O G Y 
A L I G A R H M U S L I M U N I V E R S I T Y 
ALIGARH U.P. INDIA 
January 20, 1970 
This is to certify that lfir»S«Shakeel 
Ahmad Bizvi, worked under my supervision on 
"The effect of some insecticides on the histopa-
thology of the midgut of different stages of 
Hleroglyphus nigrorepletua Bol» (Acrididae: 
Qrthoptera)", for the degree of Doctpr of 
Philosophy in Zoology, in the Department of 
Zoology, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh* 
The present thesis is an original contribution 
containing observations and results made inde~ 
pendently by him® 
(HUMTAZ AHUaB KBAN) 
Reader in Zoology 
Aligarh Bfiislim University 
ALIGARH. 
i'i^ilts of ^fl^/SSlZlJlBs nip;rorppletus, l o l . on crop. 
C O N T E N T S 
AGKNOVJLEDGEMENTi 
I . INTRODUCTION 1 
I I . MATERIAL AND METHODS 13 
( i ) Maintenance o f stock cu l ture 13 
(11) D i lu t i on of I n s e c t i c i d e s 14 
(111) Feeding of I n s e c t i c i d e s 14 
( I v ) H i s t o l o g i c a l p r e s t a t i ons 16 
I I I . mATOm OF THE DIGESTIVE TRACT AND HISTOLOGY 
OF THE MIDGUT AITO CAECA OF DIFFERENT STAGES 
^^ HIEROGLYPHUS N I G R O R E P L E T U S 1 7 
(1 ) Anatomy of the d i g e s t i v e t r a c t 17 
( a ) Adult 17 
(b ) Hoppers 18 
( i i ) H i s to l ogy o f the midgut and caeca 19 
( a ) Midgut of adu l t 19 
(b ) Midgut of hoppers 22 
( c ) Caeca of adul t 22 
(d ) Caeca of hoppers 24 
IV. PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AND CAECA 
OF ADULT AND HOPPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF 
HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS BY THE INGESTION OF 
A~FLUORINE COMPOUNDTSODIUM SILICOFLUORIDE) 26 
(A) Symptoms 26 
(B) Histopathology of the midgut and caeca 27 
V. PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AND CAECA OF 
ADULT AND HOPPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF 
HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS BY THE INGESTION OF 
1 ARSENICAL COMPOUNDT^OPPER ACETO-META-
A R S E N I T E ) 3 9 
(A ) Symptoms 39 
(B) Histopathology of the midgut and caeca 40 
Pa^e 
VI . PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AND CAECA 
OF ADULT AND HOPjPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF 
HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS BY THE INGESTION 
OF SOME CHLORINATED HYDROCARBONS ib% DDT, 
LINDANE, 2% ENDRIN AND ALDRIN) 48 
(A) Symptoms 48 
(B) Histopathology of the aiidgut and caeca 50 
( a ) E f f e c t of b% DDT 50 
(b ) E f f e c t of O.bfo l indane 59 
( c ) E f f e c t of 2% endrln 68 
(d ) E f f e c t o f bfo a l d r in 77 
V I I . PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AI^ D CAECA 
OF ADULT AND HOPPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF 
HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS BY THE INGESTION 
OF AN ORGANOPHOSPHORUS COMPOUND {2% PARATHION) 86 
(A ) Symptoms 86 
(B) Histopathology o f the midgut and caeca 87 
V I I I . DISCUSSION 95 
IX. SUMMARY 108 
REFERENCES 
PLATES AND FIGURES 
AGKNtl/JLEDGEMENTS 
I wish t o express my g ra t i tude t o the l a t e 
P ro f esso r M.A.Basir Khan and P ro f e sso r S.Mashhood Alam 
r e s p e c t i v e l y the past and present Head o f the Department 
of Zoo logy ,A l i garh Muslim U n i v e r s i t y , A l i g a r h , f o r prov id ing 
the best poss ib l e f e c i l i t i e s to carry out the present 
p iece of research work, I am e s p e c i a l l y g r a t e f u l t o 
P ro f esso r S.M.Alam f o r h i s constant encouragement and 
cons t ruc t i ve c r i t i c i s m during the tenure of th i s work and 
in the preparat ion of the present manuscript. 
I am g r e a t l y indebted to Dr.Mumtaz Ahmad Khan whose 
guidance and supervis ion enabled me t o present th i s t h e s i s . 
His keen i n t e r e s t and valuable suggest ions are most g r a t e f u l l y 
acknowledged. 
I am a lso thankful t o Dr. (Mrs . ) Nishat Jameel I qba l 
c » f the Department of Pharmacology, J .N. Medical Co l l e g e , 
A.M.U., Alifgarh and to the f e l l o w researchers ®f the 
Department o f Zoology,A.H*U. who extended t h e i r best 
cooperat ion and assistance i n var ious vjays.My thanks are 
due to Mr.Saeedul Hasan,Photo-art ist ,who helped me i n 
photomicrography. 
F i n a l l y , ! am thankful to the Department of Soc i a l 
We l f a r e ,M in i s t r y of Education,Government o f I n d i a , f o r t h e i r 
f i n a n c i a l ass is tance . 
I* INTRODUCTION 
In the f i r s t two decades of the present century, lime 
sulphur, petroleum o i l , arsenicals and nicotine were the only-
chemicals in use to destfpoy the insect pests. Before the 
outbreak of the Second World War f luor ine compounds, organic 
substances such as dinitrocompounds (4 ,6-dinitro- .o -cresol ; 
and their sodium, potassium and ammonium sa l t s ; 2 ,4 -d in i t ro -
6-cyclohexylphenol; i t s amine sa l t s l ike dicyclohexylamine, 
ethanolamine and triethanolamine; dinitrocarprylphenyl crotonate) , 
thiocyanates ( l au ry l thiocyanate commonly known as Lethanes 
and isobornyl thiocyanoacetate) e t c . , as well as, pyrethrum 
and rotenone as insecticides of plant or ig in were added to 
the l i s t of usefu l insect ic ides . During the Second World War 
chlorinated hydrocarbons such as dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane 
CDDT), benzene hexachlorlde (BHC) were synthesized and 
recommended fo r the e f f ec t i ve control of insect pestse Later 
on, chlorinated camphene (Toxaphene) Octachloro-dihydro-
dicyclopentadiene (Chlordane), 1 .2 .3 . -4 .10, lO-hexachloro-1 :4 , 
5:8-diendomethanoil.4.4a.5.8.8a-hexahyldronaphthalene CAldrin) 
and 6,7-epoxy derivative of a ldr in (D ie ldr in ) were added to 
the l i s t of chlorinated hydrocarbons. Simultaneously, 
organophosphorus compounds such as hexaethyl tetraphosphate 
(HETP), tetraethyl pyrophosphate (TEPP) and 0 ,0 -d ie thy l -0 -p -
nitrophenyl thiophosphate (Parathion) were also synthesized 
as most powerful insect ic ides . Since then the d i f f e r en t 
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chlorinated hydrocarbons and the organophosphorus compounds 
have been extensively used as insecticides against d i f f e r en t 
species of insects. A number of modern insecticides have 
been used in the control of IflLeroglyphus nigrorepletus Bolivar 
(Rao and Cherian, 1940; Bhatia. 1949; Pruthi, 1949; 
Ramchandran and David, 1951; Narayanan, 1953; Narayanan and 
Samuel, 1954; Feswani, 1960 and ^radhan and feswani, 1961), 
These insecticides happen to be selective in their 
action on d i f f e r ent groups of insects. Such selectiveness 
of the insectic ides has been general ly assessed by the degree 
and intensity of their action leading to the rate of mortality. 
However, in view of the enormous population of insects and 
f a s t increasing number of insect ic ides , the information on 
the pathological e f f ec t s of insecticides on d i f f e rent systems 
of insects i s rather fragmentary. Further, most of such 
observations are related to the nervous system (Hartze l l , 1934 
and 1945; Hartzell and Scudder, 1942; Hartzel l and Strong, 1944; 
Hartzell and Wexler, 1946; Witt, 1947 and Roeder and Weiant, 
1954). Similar observations on other tissues of insect body 
are comparatively less and have been reviewed by Brown (1963). 
However, P i lat (1935) pioneered the investigations on 
the histopathological e f f ec t s of insectic ides on the digestive 
tract of insects. For this purpose, he used a number of 
insecticides on ca te rp i l l a r s of Aglais urt icae Linn., (Small 
Tortoiseshell Bu t t e r f l y ) , Prothetria dispar Linn., (Gypsy 
moth) and P ie r i s bras sic ae Linn., (Cabbage but ter f ly ) as we l l 
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as on the nymphs of Loctista mlgratorla Lirm., (Migratory locust ) . 
In 6th instar caterp i l l a r s of urt lcae following the Ingestion 
of sodium f luor ide , sodium s l l l e o f l uo r l de , sodium arsenlte 
and calcium arsenlte, only the midgut epithelium was damaged. 
Whereas, I t s connective tissue and muscular coat remained 
unchanged. The most profound e f f e c t was In the anterior most 
part of the midgut which was eopipletely deprived of i t s 
epithelium. However, the remaining portions of the midgut 
were comparatively less a f fected . Such histo logica l e f f e c t s 
were general ly observed in those ca te rp i l l a r s ^ i c h showed 
violent symptoms of poisoning before dissection. 
Following the ingestion of sodium f luo r ide , sodium 
s l l l eo f l uo r l de and calcium arsenlte by the adults of 
L* mlgratorla. the h isto log ica l picture was almost Ident ica l 
and the midgut epithelium was destroyed. Whereas, i t s 
connective tissue was only denuded. The degree of ep i the l i a l 
destruction was related to the Interval of time fol lowing' the 
ingestion of each poison. Further, the epithelium of the 
anterior region of the midgut was most af fected than that of 
the following regions. The nymphal stages of L. mlgratorla 
were given weak doses of par ls green, sodium arsenlte and 
sodium s l l l e o f l uo r l de . Paris green did not cause any damage 
to the epithelium of the midgut even a f t e r fortyone hours 
following i t s ingestion. However, the ingestion of sodium 
arsenlte and that of sodium s l l l eo f l uo r l de general ly caused 
complicated changes in the epithelium which was exfo l iated 
either in small portions or in large sheets leaving connective 
tissue and the imscularis layer undamaged. P i l a t (1936) 
concluded that, in the nymphs of L. tnig.ratoria, the intake 
of small doses of the poisons required long periods to damagpe 
the intest ina l epithelium severely. 
In the 6th instar caterp i l l a r s of P» disPar, fed on 
sodium s i l i co f l uo r ide (often mixed with nicotine, bismuth or 
sodium sulphate), the midgut epithelium was unchanged even 
a f te r seven days following intake of the poison. In a l l 
treated ca te rp i l l a r s the epithelium remained intact through-
out the length of the midgut. The only noticeable change 
was in the chromatin granules of the cytoplasm, which in 
some cases became loose. According to P i l a t (1936) the 
hrassicge larvae v^iich ingested sodium arsenite and sodium 
s i l i c o f l uo r i de , l ike those of P. disPar had no s igni f icant 
h is to log ica l changes in the midgut. However, ingestion of 
sodium s i l i co f luo r ide had some e f f e c t on the ep i the l ia l nuclei . 
The midgut epithelium of P, brassicae proved to be more 
resistant to sodium arsenite. 
The e f f e c t of l e tha l or uraigually large doses of certain 
arsenicals ( lead arsenate, paris green, calcium arsenite , 
calcium arsenate and arsenic t r iox ide ) , barium f l uo s i l i c a t e , 
sodium f l uo r ide , sodium fluoaluminate, phenothiazine and 
rotenone were studied by Woke (1940) on the midgut wall of 
6th Instar larvae of an ' armyworm, Prodenia eridania Cram. 
I t was observed that there was a general breakdown and 
disintegration of the midgut epithelium by the intake of 
- 12 ~ 
high doses of arsenicals . Such damages were more prono-unced 
a f te r long intervals following the intake of these poisons. 
The sequence of pathological changes in the midgut epithelium 
involved vacuolization in the cytoplasm, fusion of c e l l u l a r 
substances of adjacent c e l l s , disappearance of the striated 
border, disorganisation in ep i the l i a l c e l l s and f i n a l l y 
disintegration of entire epithelium. However, paris green 
caused s l ight disintegration of the epithelium in comparison 
to lead arsenate. The e f f e c t of calcium arsenate was in the 
form of more or less solid mass of ep i the l i a l layer often 
with fragments of recognizable c e l l structures. On the 
contrary, calcium arsenite proved to be more e f fect ive and 
within three hours of i t s ingestion, the midgut epithelium 
was completely disintegrated. Whereas, the ingestion of 
approximately 1,0 mg. of arsenic tr ioxide did not cause 
any appreciable damage to the midgut epithelium. But a dose 
of 5.0 mg, of this poison severely damaged the midgut 
epithelium in which there was a general disorganisation of 
the ce l lu l a r structure. A dose of 0.5 mg, to 1.0 mg. of • 
barium f l uo s i l i c a t e had no adverse e f f e c t on the midgut 
epithelium of these larvae. But, ingestion of sodium 
f luor ide between 2,0 mg. to 5.0 mg. was enough to cause 
disintegration of the ep i the l ia l cytoplasm and the nuclei . 
Similarly, the intake of 1.0 mg. of sodium fluoaluminate was 
also e f f ec t i ve to cause disorganisation in the ep i the l ia l 
c e l l s and f i n a l l y ex fo i ia t ion of the entire ep i the l ia l layer 
from the basement membrane. But the same quantity of 
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phenothiazine was quite Ine f fect ive to the midgut epithelium. 
Likewise, intake of as much as 6.0 mg. of rotenone was found 
to be harmless to the midgut of southern army worm larvae. 
Richards and Cutkomp (1946) could not observe any 
change in the midgut epithelium of Periplaneta americana L , , 
which were poisoned by DDT. 
Salkeld (1960) o ra l l y administered the graded doses 
of lead arsenate, DDT and parathion to the honey bee and 
found de f in i te h is to log ica l abnormalities. These abnormalities 
were confined only to the middle region of the midgut. The 
arsenic poisoned bees indicated severe vacuolization and 
degeneration of the ep i the l ia l c e l l s . Whereas, the DDT 
poisoned bees mostly contained a large transparent gas 
bubble in the midgut. In such cases, the epithelium was 
stretched and had intensive vacuolization as well as 
secretion in the ep i the l i a l c e l l s . In bees which had no 
bubble in the midgut, the epithelium was ins ign i f i cant ly 
stretched; but the ep i the l ia l ce l l s showed vacuolization 
and secretory act iv i ty . Parathion produced neither macroscopic 
nor microscopic changes in the midgut of the bees. Further, 
Salkeld (1961) published elaborated account of his observations 
with respect to the histopathological e f f e c t s of acid lead 
arsenite, parathion, pure para-isomer of DDT and 60^ wettable 
powder of DDT as stomach poisons in the midgut of the honey 
bee. According to him the hyperactivity in DDT and parathion 
poisoned bees was due to ,the action of these insecticides as 
nerve poisons. 
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The e f f e c t of calcium arsenate, DDT and d ie ldr in was 
studied on the midgut tissue of the l a rva l forms of Heliothes 
armlgera by CHiaudbourne and Rainwater (1963). Calcium 
arsenate suspension was administered o ra l ly by hypodermic 
syringe. Whereas, DDT and die ldr in were topical ly applied to 
the f i r s t pair of abdominal prolegs» The presence of calcium 
arsenate inside the midgut of the larvae completely disorganised 
and disintegrated the midgut ep i the l i a l c e l l s . In the most 
damaged conditions almost entire epithelium was sloughed o f f 
into the gut lumen. But DDT fa i l ed to cause any s ign i f icant 
h i s to log ica l changes in the midgut epithelium. The e f f e c t of 
die ldr in was more severe than that of calcium arsenate and 
the midgut epithelium was invariably degenerated and sloughed 
o f f . 
Further, Mukerji and Hardass (1954) reported the e f f e c t 
of parathion, BHC, chlordane and d ie ldr in on the 3rd instar 
hoppers of Schl^tocerca gregaria Forsk. These insecticides 
caused great disintegration and ex fo l i a t ion of the midgut 
epithelium. The nuclei of the ep i the l i a l c e l l s were also 
damaged, Hov/ever, parathion and BHC were further e f f ec t i ve 
to disintegrate the peri trophic membrane as wel l . 
Soliman and Soliman (1958) made detai led observations 
on the e f f e c t of parathion, DDT, toxaphene and cotton dust 
on tissues of the 5th instar larvae of Prodenia l i t u r a F. 
These insecticides were dusted on the larvae. I t was observed 
that parathion treated larvae had complete detachment of their 
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midgut epithelium from the basement membrane and the membranes 
of the ep i the l ia l c e l l s were destroyed. The cytoplasm of the 
ce l l s developed vacuoles followed by degeneration; whereas, 
the nuclei were clumped. Further, the turgidity and str iat ions 
of the muscles were l os t and empty spaces appeared between the 
f i b r e s . In the DDT treated larvae the c i rcular muscle layer 
of the midgut became folded and detached from the connective 
t issue. In some eases, although the midgut epithelium was 
detached from the basement membrane, i t did not loose i t s 
normal structure except l i t t l e changes in the nuclei and 
appearance of vacuoles in the cytoplasm. The toxaphene 
treated Prodenia larvae were also a f fected . Their midgut 
epithelium showed vacuolization, ex fo l i a t ion and f i n a l l y 
disintegration. The ep i the l ia l nuclei clumped and also 
disintegrated. The sarcolemma of the muscle f i b res was also 
destroyed by the break down of muscle buni^^le-s. In the cotton 
dust treated larvae the midgut ep i the l ia l c e l l s l o s t their 
ce l l membrane and some portions of the epithelium were dropped 
in the gut lumen. The nuclei became compact and were fragmented 
into intensely coloured separate lumps of d i f f e r ent s izes. 
However, there was no change in the muscular coat. 
The larvae and adults of Leptlnotarsa decemlineata 
Say., were given DDT, methyl-parathion and about eighty 
plant a lkaloids on potato leaves (Koch, 1960). I t x^ as found 
that the intake of the arsenic compound caused complete 
dissolution of the midgut epithelium; whereas, the ingestion 
of DDT or methyl-parathion produced excessive secretion of 
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eytoplasmic material , formation of vacuoles and enlargement 
of ep i the l ia l nuclei . Of the plant a lka lo ids , only the 
colchicine and veratrine were highly toxic to the midgut 
epithelium which was completely damaged. The ingestion of 
atropine formed ep i the l ia l tumours. 
The pathological e f f ec t s of sodium arsenite, lead 
arsenate, sodium f l uo s i l i c a t e , zinc phosphide, chlordane and 
BHG were a lso observed on the midgut of Leogryllug bimaeulatus 
Sauss., Periplaneta amerlcana Linn, and Gryllodes s l g i l l a tu s 
Walk. (Sr ivastava, 1962). These insects were fed on bran 
which was mixed with each of the used insect ic ide . The 
ingestion of sodium arsenate, lead arsenate, sodium f l uo s i l i c a t e 
and zinc phosphides caused great d is integrat ion of midgut 
epithelium, often with detachment from the basement membrane 
and i t s shedding into the gut lumen. But ep i the l ia l nuclei 
showed only mild e f f e c t . However, in the zinc phosphide treated 
larvae ep i the l i a l nuclei showed the arrangement of their 
granules towards the nuclear membrane. The ingestion of 
chlordane caused lesser disintegration than the f i r s t four 
insect ic ides . Whereas, BHG was almost ine f f ec t i ve to the 
midgut epithelium although in some cases cytoplasmic globules 
appeared. 
Blazejewska (1964) observed the pathological e f f e c t s 
of 0,1^ thiometon on the midgut epithelium of the larvae of 
Nematus (Pteronldea) r i be s l i Scop., in the form of degeneration 
and detachment of the epithelium. Further, the larvae of 
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cabbage but te r f l y , P i e r i ^ brasslcae (Blazejewska, 1964) fed 
on tr i tox dust (mixture of DDT, BHC and methoxy—DDT) showed 
the destruction of midgut ep i the l ia l c e l l s . Similar h is to log ica l 
changes were recorded when these larvae were released on 
this dust and the insecticide acted as contact poison. 
McMullen (1966) studied the histopathology of various 
tissues of Oncoueltus fasc iatus Da l las . , nymphs a f te r spraying 
them with technical maneb (98.7^ manganous ethylene 
bisdithi©carbamate). The dosage of the spray was le tha l to 
100^ mortality. The most profound e f f e c t of this treatment 
was recorded on the midgut epithelium and malpighian tubules* 
The anterior midgut was f i l l e d with large gas bubble which 
was attributed to the e f f e c t of DDT present in this region. 
In other regions of the midgut the epithelium was extremely 
vacuolized and eytolysis was s igni f ieant . 
Sharma (1966) topical ly applied a l l e th r in , d ie ld r in , 
nuvan and parathion on male Poeciloeerus pictu^ F, and observed 
vacuolization and degeneration of the ep i the l i a l c e l l s of the 
midgut. But there was no ex fo l ia t ion of the epithelium* 
However, the h i s to log ica l damage was more pronounced in the 
foregut than in the midgut of this grasshopper, 
Toppozada et a l , (1968) observed the e f f e c t of carbaryl , 
parathion, DDT and endrin on the midgut epithelium of the larvae 
of Spodoptera l i t t o r a l i s Boisd. These insectic ides were given 
ora l ly as well as applied topica l ly . I t was found that in the 
midgut the ingestion of these insecticides caused rapid and 
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maximum pathological e f f e c t than by topical application. 
However, in a l l cases the histopathological changes were 
manifested by vacuolization, fading of c e l l boundries, 
clumping of cytoplasmic granules and f i n a l l y shedding of 
cytoplasm and degeneration of ep i the l i a l ce l l s » 
The above resume indicates that with respect to the 
pathological e f f e c t s of insectic ides on the digestive tract 
of insect , an insecticide may not be equally e f f ec t i ve on 
d i f f e r ent species* Further, the method ©f application of the 
insecticides and their d i lut ions are important factors in 
causing varied type of damages to the f ine structures. Thus, 
further knowledge on these l ines would great ly help in the 
assessment of re lat ive usefulness of d i f f e rent insect ic ides 
on various insect pests. Such information would form the 
basis of rational control of insects. Besides, i t would 
contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the f i e l d of 
insect pathology. To attain this objective detailed observations 
were made on the histopathol»gy of the midgut and caeca of 
3rd, 4th and 5th instar hoppers and adults of Hieroglyphus 
nig ro re,pie tug Bol « , as a result of ingestion of sodium 
s i l i co f l uo r i de , copper aceto-meta-arsenite (par is green ) , 
some chlorinated hydrocarbons (DDT, lindane, endrin and aldr in) 
and an organophosphorus compound (parathion) . The f i r s t two 
insecticides are the c l a s s i ca l stomach poisons. Whereas, the 
remaining insecticides are both stomach and contact poisons. 
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These chlorinate hydrocarbons and the organophosphorus 
compound are lasually applied as contact poisons; but in the 
present work on Meroglyphus nigrorepletus which i s a serious 
pest of Zea mays (Maize), ^orghum vulgare' (Jowar) and 
Pennisetum typhoidium (Ba j ra ) in the Nothem India (Chaturvedi, 
1946; Roonwal, 1945; Bhatia, 1949; Pruthi, 1949; Pradhan and 
Peswani, 1961 and Bhatia et a l « , 1964). Their pathological 
e f f ec t s have been studied by using them as stomach poisons. 
The reason i s that in the crop f i e l d s , there i s every chance 
f o r the d i f f e rent stages of this grasshopper to §at- the poison 
along with the leaves of host plant which become af fected by 
spraying and thus a contact poison may also act as a stomach 
poison simultaneously. The histopathological changes as a 
result of insect ic ida l actions are confined to the midgut and 
caeca because in the preliminary experiments i t was found 
that following the ingestion of the aforesaid insect ic ides , 
there was neither macroscopic nor microscopic damage to the 
fore-and hindgut. Further, in the present work, observations 
were made on the females of macropterous form of H. ni^rorepletus. 
I I . MATERIAL AND METHODS 
( i ) MalRteaance of gtoek exilturst 
All the experiments were performed on a stock of 
Hieroglyphus nlgrorepletus collected from the f i e l d and 
subsequently maintained in the laboratory at controlled 
conditions. For this purpose, on the onset of monsoon i « e . 
in the f i r s t and second week of July young hatchlings of 
if* nlgrorepletus were col lected from maize crop and the 
grasses adjoining this crop, Uiese hatchlings belonged 
to the f i r s t and second instars and were maintained in 
c i rcu lar rearing j a r s measuring 6" X 4'" with 2" thick damp 
so i l at the bottom. These rearing j a r s were kept at 
30Oc + l ° c and 70% to 80% re lat ive humidity. Fresh maize 
leaves were provided to the hoppers every day as food. 
When the second instar hoppers moulted to third instar 
hoppers, the l a t t e r were transferred to another j a r and 
their subsequent age was recorded in terms of days. Likewise, 
the newly moulted hoppers of 4th and 5th instars were separated 
and maintained age wise. Similarly, the newly emerged 
f ledg l ing were iso lated from the 5th instar hoppers and 
maintained age wise. The e f f e c t of insect ic ides was observed 
on the individuals of the same age with respect to each instar . 
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C i i ) D i lu t ion o f l n s e c t i c i d § s ? 
In the present work on H. nigroreToletus, DDT, 
l indane, 2% endr in, &% a ld r ln and 2% parathlon were 
•used. VJTiereas, sodium s l l l c o f l u o r i d e and copper aceto-meta-
arsen l t e ( pa r l s green) were not d i l u t ed . The r e spec t i v e 
concentrat ions o f d i f f e r e n t i n s e c t i c i d e s are based on t h e i r 
e f f e c t i v i n e s s to cause mor t a l i t y in d i f f e r e n t stages o f 
th i s grasshopper. I t was ascerta ined i n pre l iminary experiments. 
The preparat ion of a f o r esa id concentrat ions of dust of the 
r e spec t i v e i n s e c t i c i d e was based on the method recommended by 
Pradhan e t a l . (1959) , except that in the present d i l u t i o n s 
acetone has been used instead of benzene as so l ven t . Because, 
acetone has the advantage of d i sso l v ing a l l the above mentioned 
hydrocarbons and the organophosphorus compound. Fur ther , f o r 
a l l these d i l u t i o n s kao l in has been used as i n e r t ma te r i a l . 
The source and form of each i n s e c t i c i d e i s mentioned in 
Table 1. 
( i i i ) Feeding of i n s e c t i c i d e s ? 
Each i n s e c t i c i d e was f ed along with the natura l food 
i . e . the maize l e a f to a number o f i n d i v i d u a l s of the same age 
o f an i n s t a r . The technique of f eed ing the poison and 
determining the eaten quant i ty of each poison was based on 
the mod i f i ca t i on of the sandwich method descr ibed by E l i s o r 
and Floyd (1938) . 
To prepare a sandwich o f an i n s e c t i c i d e , a p iece o f 
maize l e a f measuring 3.76 x 1.25 cm. was appl ied with a s t i c k e r 
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substance (containing equal quant i ty o f b lood albumen and 
dex t r in ) and i t was weighed. Then the i n s e c t i c i d e was dusted 
on the surface o f t h i s l e a f p i ece by a dusting apparatus 
which was a modi f ied form of that recommended by Pradhan and 
Sr ivastava (1951). The dusted l e a f p i ece was weighed. The 
d i f f e r e n c e between the two weights gave the quant i ty of the 
i n s e c t i c i d e spreading over the above mentioned p i ece of maize 
l e a f covering 75 squares o f a graph paper, each square being 
0,25 cm. X 0,25 cm. i n dimension. Thus the quant i ty of i n -
s e c t i c i d e over a s ing le square was ca l cu l a t ed . Then the 
i n s e c t i c i d e appl ied p iece o f maize l e a f was superimposed with 
another p i ece of maize l e a f of the same s i z e . Thus a sandwich 
was ready to o f f e r f o r eat ing to each i n s e c t which was i s o l a t ed 
in separate rearing j a r and was prev ious ly starved f o r 12 hours 
so as to st imulate f e ed ing . I t was observed that many insec t s 
had an immediate response f o r ea t ing . Only such i n s e c t s were 
used f o r fu r the r observat ions which had eaten considerable 
pa r t o f the sandwich. Half an hour a f t e r the p rov i s i on o f the 
sandwich, from each rear ing j a r , the uneaten por t i on of each 
sandwich was kept on a graph paper, having smal lest square 
0,25 cm. X 0.25 cm. and t h i s po r t i on was traced out to d e t e r -
mine the area of uneaten sandwich in terms o f t o t a l square. 
The d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s area and that o f the complete 
sandwich gave the area of eaten sandwich in terms o f squares. 
Thus the quant i ty of eaten i n s e c t i c i d e was ca l cu la t ed by 
mul t ip ly ing the number o f squares eaten with p r ev i ous l y 
ca lcu la ted quant i ty o f dust on each square. S imi lar sandwiches 
containing Kaol in dust were a l so prepared and f ed to c on t ro l 
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i n s e c t s . La t e r , these i n s e c t s were g i ven f r e s h maize l e a ves 
as usual. But, g e n e r a l l y , they did not pay a t t en t i on to th i s 
f o o d . 
Civ) H i s t o l o g i c a l preparat ions « 
Folloxv'ing the inges t i on of each i n s e c t i c i d e , the 
i n s e c t s were d issected at regular i n t e r v a l s and t h e i r midgut 
and caeca were t ransected . At each I n t e r v a l a t l e a s t 3 insec t s 
wer6 d issected f o r the h i s t o l o g i c a l preparat ion and obser-
va t i on . Then, the transected reg ions of the d i g e s t i v e t r a c t 
were f i x ed in a l coho l i c Bouin's f i x a t i v e which was found 
most s a t i s f a c t o r y than Carnoy and Yao-Nan's f l u i d . Hiese t 
reg ions were embedded in p a r a f f i n wax B.D.H. (63° C m.p.) 
and th e i r transverse sec t ions were cut at 6yu by Cambridge 
Rocking Microtome. S e r i a l sect ions of both the reg ions 
were obtained in order to study the e f f e c t s of i n s e c t i c i d e s 
throughout the length of midgut and caeca. The sect ions 
were stained in Heidenhain's i ron haematoxylin and eos in . 
The sta ining procedure was f o l l owed from. Pantin (1959) . 
S im i l a r l y , h i s t o l o g i c a l preparat ions o f midgut and caeca 
o f hoppers of d i f f e r e n t stages and those o f adults were 
made from such ind i v idua l s which were f ed on Kaol in instead 
o f an i n s e c t i c i d e , or starved along with i n s e c t i c i d e f ed 
i n s e c t s . Such preparat ions were used as c on t r o l s to determine 
the e f f e c t o f d i f f e r e n t i n s e c t i c i d e s on the midgut and caeca 
of H. n i g ro r ep l e tus . 
Table 1. Ihe source and form of the i n s e c t i c i d e s used in 
the present work. 
Names o f the 
i n s e c t i c i d e s Source o f Supply 
Form or i n s e c -
t i c i d e obtained 
Sodium s i l i c o -
f l u o r i d e 
Copper ace to -
meta-arseni te 
( P a r i s green) 
DDT (Dichloro 
d i p h e n y l t r i -
ch lo ro -e thane) 
Lindane (99.9^ 









A ldr in (hexa-
ch loro hexahydro 
dimethano-
naphth a l i n e ) 
Parathion 
(D i e thy l p-
ni tro-phenol 
thiophosphate) 
E. Merck Darmastadt 
& Co. 
Germany 
John E l l i o t t & Sons 
N.Y. , (U .S . A.) 
Glegy Chemical Corpo-
r a t i on , 
Saw Mi l l R iver Road 
inds l ey , N .Y . (U .S .A . ) 
F l i n t r o ck Product 
P r i v a t e L td . 
Belveders Road 
Mazagaon 
Bombay-lO ( I n d i a ) 
Shel l Chemical 
Corporation 
Burmah Shel l L td . 
Bombay ( I n d i a ) 
Shel l Chemical 
Corporation 
Burmah Shel l L td . 
Bombay ( I n d i a ) 
Bharat Pu lve r i s ing 
M i l l s P r i v a t e Ltd . 
Sayane Road 
Bombay-28 ( I n d i a ) 
Technical 12.% 
AS2O3 








cen t ra t i on ) 
I I I . ANATOMI OF THE DIGESTIVE TRACT MP HISTOLOGY OF THE MIDGUT 
AMD CAECA OF DIFFERENT STAGES OF HIEROGLYPHOS NIGROREPLETUS» 
Ci) Anatomy of the digestive tract* 
The anatomy of the digestive tract of Acrididae (Locusts 
I 
and grasshoppers) has been studied in a number of species by 
d i f f e r en t authors. This aspect has been b r i e f l y reviewed by 
Uvarov (1966)• However, detailed observations on the anatomy 
of the digest ive tract have been published on Dlssosteira 
Carolina L. (Tiez, 1923), Locusta mlgratoria L. (Nenyukov and 
Par fent 'ev , 1929; P i l a t , 1935; Hodge, 1939; ALbrecht, 1953 and 
"Liu and Leo, 1955), on Melanoplug d i f f e r e n t l a l l s Thorns (Hodge,1936 
and 1937) , on RhadinotatuiB carinatuia var, penni sulare Rehn., 
Lentysma marginicol l is Serv, and Opshomala vitreipennis Marsch. 
(Hodge, 1940 and 1943), on Nomadacris ^eptumfasciatus (Albercht, 
1956), on Acrida nellucida Klug. (Hafez and Ibrahim, 1959), 
Chrotogonug lugubrls Blanc hard, (Ibrahim, 1963). 
In the present work a description of the anatomy of the 
digest ive tract of Hieroglyphus nigrorePletus i s given mainly 
as a pre - requis i te for observations on the normal histology of 
i t s midgut and caeca. Nevertheless, this description may add 
to the existing knowledge on acrididae. 
(a ) Adult (F ig . 1) 
The digestive tract of adult Hieroglyphus nigrorepletus 
anatomically resembles with that of Locusta migratoria (Albrecht, 
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1953), except that i t i s shorter than that of l a t t e r species. 
The entire digestive tract i s almost a straight tube except 
in the region of the proctodaeum (Prc t . ) where i t i s s l i ght ly 
convoluted. I t measures about 40 mm. in males and 60 mm. in 
females. The stomodaeum (Stom.) i s approximately 16 mm, and 
i t i s a straight tube d i f ferent iated into oesophagus (Oe . ) , 
crop (Cr . ) and proventricuius (Pvent . ) . Internally these regions 
are demarcated by the d i f f e r ent patterns of chitinized armature. 
The stomodeal valve (Sv lv . ) i s simple because the stomoda«?Tim 
( foregut ) i s not invaginated into the midgut. In this respect 
the stomodeal valve of Hjeroglyphug nigrorepletus d i f f e r s from 
that of Blattidae (Snodgrass, 1936), and resembles vdth that of 
Locusta migratoria ( l l b recht , 1966 and Khan, 1964). 
Ttie midgut (Mesen.) i s shorter than the fore-and the 
hindgut and i t approximately measures i4mm. I t i s a cy l indr ica l 
tube of untform diameter. Its anterior end i s marked by the 
or ig in of gastr ic caeca (GCa.) which are six in number. Each 
caecum i s a f inger l ike and bilobed structure. The anterior 
lobe i s about 12 mm. long, whereas the posterior lobe i s quite 
small and measures only 2 to 3 mm. in length. 
The hindgut (Prct , ) i s approximately equal .to the fore -gut 
in length and i t s origin i s marked by the openings of malpighian 
tubules (Mai. ) in the digestive tract . I t i s external ly 
d i f fe rent iated into ilium (11 . ) , colon (Cln. ) and rectum (Rect . ) . 
Cb) Hoppers 
The anatomy of the digestive tract of 3rd, 4th and 
6th instar hoppers of H. niprorepletus resembles with that
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the adult except the variation in i t s length. The complete 
digestive tract in the 3rd, 4th and 6th instar hoppers i s 
about 22, 26 & 30 mm, respectively. The average size of the 
anterior caeca in these stages i s 3, 6 & 7 mm. respectively. 
The posterior caeca are very small* 
( i i ) Histology of the midgut and caeca. 
The histology of the midgut of Acrididae has also been 
studied In a number of species by d i f f e r en t workers (Nenyukov 
and Par fent 'ev , 1929; Woodruff, 1933; P i l a t , 1936a; Newell and 
Baxter, 1936; Hodge, 1936 and 1939; Beams and Anderson, 1967; 
Hafez and Ibrahim, 1969; Ibrahim, 1963; Baecetti , 1960, 1961c 
and 1962 and Khan, 1964). The histology of the digest ive caeca 
of Acrididae has only been studied in Locusta ml^ratorla (Khan, 
1964), However, there i s no information on the h is to log ica l 
structure of midgut and caeca of Hieroglyphus niprorepletus* 
Therefore, detailed observations on the histology of midgut and 
caeca of the hoppers and adult H, nigrorePletus have been made 
to appreciate the pathological e f f e c t s of the poisons, 
(a ) Midgut of adult (Plate I , Fig. 1 ) . 
The gut wall i s invested by a thin membrane ca l led 
peritoneum (P r . ) which has c lear cytoplasm with e l l i p t i c a l 
nucle i . These nuclei are widely spaced and have a few f ine 
granules. 
The outer layer of the midgut wall i s composed of bundles 
of longitudinal muscle-' f i b r e s (Lmcl.) which are regular ly spaced. 
- 20 ~ 
Each longitudinal muscle •bnndle consists of 2 to 3 muscle 
bands which are closely applied together. In cross section 
each muscle band has a centra l ly placed nucleus (Nu.) which 
bears a few basophilie granules. Inner to the longitudinal 
muscle layer i s a compact layer of c i rcu lar muscle f i b r e s (Cmcl, ) . 
Bach muscle f i b r e i s enclosed in a structureless membrane known 
as sarcolemma and bears str iat ions or f i b r i l l a r arrangement. 
Immediately beneath the sarcolemma there are nuclei which l i e 
at i r r egu la r distances. These nuclei are either i r r egu la r or 
e l l i p t i c a l in shape and possess a few basophilic granules. 
The connective tissue (Ct . ) layer i s highly e las t ic and 
i t binds the epithelium with the muscularis layer. "Qie width 
of the connective tissue layer varies according to the conditions 
of the midgut. In pa r t i a l l y f u l l condition of the midgut the 
connective tissue i s more stretched inward than in the completely 
f u l l condition of the midgut. The outer mai^in of the connective 
tissue which i s contiguous with the c i rcu lar muscle l ayer , has 
a row of oblique muscle f i b r e s (Obmcl.). Such muscle f i b r e s 
have not been general ly reported in the midgut of other insects . 
However, in the midgut of Locust a mlg ratoria^ H l a t (1936) regards 
them as inner longitudinal muscle f i b r e s , whereas, Khan (1964) 
i s of opinion that these f i b r e s are of del icate nature. The 
inner margin of the connective tissue i s bounded by a basement 
membrane (Bmb.) ^ i c h i s thicker in consistency than the connective 
t issue. The connective tissue appears to have a uniform ret icu lar 
arrangement with nuclei , which may be formed by f ine structureless 
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membranes. The nuclei are mostly oval in shape and are smaller 
than the nuclei of the ntuscularis layer . These nuclei also 
possess a few basophilic granules* 
'When the midgut i s empty or pa r t i a l l y f u l l , i t s epithelium 
i s throvm into well marked fo lds and the entire epithelium gives 
the appearance of alternate^ly arranged lobes (Lb. ) and furrows 
( F r . ) . The inner margin of the epithelium i s bounded by a 
d is t inct str iated border (Sb. ) which has a uniform depth of about 
34 Basal ly , each str iat ion i s supported by a f ine granule 
d 
>toich i s embe^ed in the cytoplasm of the ep i the l ia l c e l l s . 
Secretion and formation of peritrophic lamellae (Pml.) are 
a lso seen in the striated border. The epithelium consists of 
digestive and regenerative c e l l s . . The digestive c e l l s (E^.) 
are general ly columnar with d ist inct c e l l membranes and their 
nuclei vary in shape. In the central part of each lobe of the 
epithelium the digestive nuclei are l a t e r a l l y compressed and 
elongated measuring between 18 ;Q x 12 ;a to ;a x fA >i. Whereas,, 
in the l a t e r a l part of each lobe these nuclei are e l l i p t i c a l 
and measure between 16 ;ii x 12 and 18 ^ x 12 >i. However, in 
the furrows the digestive nuclei are oval and their average 
size i s 16 ;a X 14 Generally, a l l of these nuclei are r ichly 
packed with scattered and f ine granules which f i l l the entire 
nuclear space. The cytoplasm of the digestive c e l l s i s f u l l of 
f ine granules viiich form f ine streaks running pa ra l l e l to the 
long axis of the ce l l s* Thus the entire cytoplasm appears to 
be f i b r i l l a r in nature. These streaks of cytoplasmic granules 
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are thicker in the inner and outer mai^ins of the digest ive 
ce l l s than in i t s central portion. 
The regenerative c e l l s are grouped to form nidi which 
are placed adjacent to the hasement membrane in the region of 
the furrows. In each cross section approximately 25 to 40 nidi 
are found. Each nidus (N i . ) has four to eight c e l l s . The 
cytoplasm of the regenerative ce l l i s l a rge ly occupied by i t s 
nucleus and i t i s c lear . These nuclei are mostly e l l i p t i c a l 
and their size varies between 12 )i x 6.2 ji to 12 ja x 9.3 
These nuclei also contain f ine basophilic granules vdiich are 
uniformly scattered in the nuclear space. 
(b ) Midgut of hoppers (Plate I , F ig . 2,3 & 4) 
The h isto log ica l deta i l s of the midgut of various stages 
of hoppers resemble with those of the adult except the dimensions 
of various layers of the midgut wall as well as the size of the 
ep i the l ia l c e l l s and their nuclei . The striated border has the 
average depth 4.6 6.5 and 6 . 6 ^ in 3rd, 4th and 5th instar 
hoppers respectively. The average size of the digestive nuclei 
i s 12 )i X 9.3 ;a,16 ^ x 9,3 and 15 ;a x 9 . 3 ^ whereas, that of 
the regenerative nuclei (Rgn.) i s 9.3 p x 7.7 >i, 9.3 x 6.2 )i 
and 9,3 x 6*2 p in 3rd, 4th and 6th instar hoppers respectively. 
(c ) Caeca of adult (Plate I I , Fig . 1) 
The caecal wall i s also wrapped by means of a peritoneum 
which i s almost similar to that of the midgut except that i t i s 
more del icate and thin in case of caeca. The nuclei of the 
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peritoneal membrane are 18 ^ x 6.2 jx in size and mostly have 
six or more basophilic granules. 
The muscularis i s composed of outer longitudinal muscle 
(Lmcl.) layer and the inner c i rcu lar muscle (Cmcl.) l ayer . The 
longitudinal muscle bundles are arranged similar to that of 
midgut. Each bundle of longitudinal muscle consists of two 
or three muscle bands which measure 21 x 12 p in cross section. 
The nuclei of these muscle bands are centra l ly placed and their 
approximate size i s 9,3 p. x 6«2 )x. The layer of the c i rcular 
muscle f i b r e s i s also thinner and weaker than that of the 
midgut and i t s thickness i s 1 8 ^ approximately. The h i s to log ica l 
deta i l s of this muscle are similar to that of the midgut. 
Unlike the midgut, the connective tissue (Ct . ) of the 
caeca i s poorly developed. However, in some portions, especia l ly 
in the region of the v i l l i , the opposing basement membranes (BMb.) 
are bound with dist inct connective t i ssue . The basement membrane 
i s well developed and supports the epithelium. 
The epithelium of caeca i s thrown into v i l l i and crypts. 
The v i l l i are d ist inct ly developed throughout the length of the 
caeca except in the basal and apical regions where these 
gradual ly become flattened to form a smooth epithelium. The 
inner margin of the epithelium has a well developed str iated 
border ( S b . ) . The digestive c e l l s ( I g . ) of the epithelium are 
t a l l and columnar in shape with d ist inct ce l l membrane. Each 
digestive ce l l has a centra l ly placed nucleus (Nu . ) . These 
nuclei are e l l i p t i c a l and measure 18 ju x 12 ;u in the region of 
the v i l l i , whereas, in the basal part of the v i l l i and in the 
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region of crypts a l l the nuclei are spherical and are about 
15 }i X 15 ^ in s ize. These nuclei are packed with f ine granules 
which are also basophil ic. 
The caecal epithelium does not form the peritrophic 
lamellae. In this respect the caecal epithelium resembles with 
those of other Acrididae* However, in .^crldium aegyptum^ Berretta 
(1935 & 1937) has reported the presence of a peritrophic membrane 
(PMb.) in the gastr ic caeca as well* 
The regenerative c e l l s (Rg«) are grouped to form nidi 
which are regular ly spaced in the basal region of the epithelium. 
Each nidus (N i . ) normally consists of 4 to 8 ce l l s which have 
scanty cytoplasm but d ist inct nuclei . These nuclei are spherical 
in shape and have the average size of 12 x 9,3 
Caeca of hoppers (Plate I I , F ig . 2, 3 & 4 ) . 
The histo log ica l deta i l s of caeca of hoppers of d i f f e r en t 
stages of H. nlgrorepletus are similar to those of adult . The 
di f ferences generally occur in the size of various constituent 
layers of caecal wal l , ep i the l i a l c e l l s and their nucle i , Hie 
number of v i l l i i s the l eas t in the 3rd instar hoppers. This 
number i s comparatively higher in the 4th and 5th instars . The 
same sequence applies to their lengths. The peritoneum i s 
quite feeble in the caeca of 3rd instar hoppers, whereas in those 
of 5th ins ta r s , i t i s quite well developed. The str iated border 
has a uniform depth of 4.5 ;a in the caeca of 3rd and 4th instar 
hoppers and 6.5 ;)i in that of 5th instar hoppers. The re lat ive 
size of the digestive nuclei i s 12 x 9.3 to 12 x 12 in 
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the Srd instar , 18 x 12 )i to 24 x 12 ;a in the 4th instar 
and 15 ^ X 12 to 24 ;a x 12 >i in the 5th instar hoppers. 
Likewise, the size of the regenerative nuclei also var ies . 
IV . PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AMD C.AEGA OF ADULTS M P 
HOPPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARSOF HIEROGLYPHUS NIGRORBPLETUS, 
BY THE INGESTION OF A FLUORINE COMPOUND 
(SODIUM SILICOFLUORIDE'). 
CA) Symptoms. 
The Ingested quantity of sodium s i l i c o f l uo r i de by the 
individuals of d i f f e r en t instars of the hoppers and the adults 
i s given in Table 2. Following the intake of this poison, i t 
was observed that the insects became sluggish and occasionally 
showed spasms. Nearly a f t e r 3 hours, almost a l l individuals 
showed uneasiness and i r r i t a b i l i t y by raising their heads and 
thorax, as well as by twisting their body from side to side» 
They occasionally regui^itated brown f l u i d and a f t e r some time 
such f l u i d i s also passed through the anus. On macroscopic 
examination midgut showed colour change as well as contraction. 
F i r s t the anterior midgut changed from l i gh t brown to blackish 
brown and then the process followed backward. 
In 3rd instar hoppers, the entire midgut became blackish 
"brown in nearly 12 hours following the intake of this poison 
and the insects died. Whereas, in 4th and 6th instar hoppers 
and in adults this condition occurred a f t e r 20 hours. In adults , 
caeca changed from yellow to blackish brown but in 3rd, 4th and 
6th instar hoppers the caeca became only dark yel low. 
Table 2. The quant i ty of sodium s i l i c o f l u o r i d e ingested by 
the ind i v idua l s of d i f f e r e n t i n s t a r s and adults 
of Hieroglyphus n i g r o r ep l e tus . 
Ins tars 
Var ia t i on in the eaten 
quant i ty (rags.) 
Minimum Maximum 
Average eaten 
quant i ty (mgs.) 
3rd Instar 
hoppers 0.811 0.957 0.8918 
4th Instar 
hop pers 1.382 1.782 1.683 
6th Instar 
hoppers 2.08 2.76 2.398 
Adults 2.771 3.577 3.278 
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After the ingestion of this poison, Srd instar hoppers 
survived only for 12 hours, vAiereas 6th instar hoppers lived 
upto 20 hours. However, the survival time of 4th instar hoppers 
and adults remained 24 hours. 
(B) Hlstopathology of the midgut and caeca. 
The major events of histopathological e f f e c t s on midgut 
and caeca of various stages of H. nigrorepletu^, following the 
ing estion of sodium s i l i co f luo r ide have heen suniDiarized in 
Tables 3 & 4 respectively. However, the detailed description 
of these e f f ec t s are given belov/. 
( i ) 3rd Instar hoppers. 
After 4 hours. 
The midgut epithelium i s stretched inward. The striated 
border of the ep i the l ia l c e l l s becomes ind is t inct owing to the 
discharge of a mass of cytoplasmic granules and g lobules . The 
cytoplasm of these c e l l s i s less granular and their nuclei are 
pushed towards the inner margin. However, the caecal epithelium 
does not show further change. 
fiftev 8 hours. 
The epithelium in the anterior region of the midgut i s 
dfetached at places, from the basement membrane and i s completely 
disintegrated (Plate lY, Fig . 1 ) . The nuclei present in the 
c e l l debri have a large and dark stained mass lying in the centre 
or near the periphery (P late I I I , Fig. E ) . However, the nuclear 
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membrane of some nuclei i s ruptured and their dark stained 
masses are lying in the c e l l dehri (Plate I I I , Fig. F ) . 
In the middle and the posterior regions of the midgut, 
epithelium i s broken at i t s inner margin and thereby the ce l l 
contents are flowing into the gut lumen ( f l a t e lY, Fig. 2 & 3) . 
The discharged nuclei have a large and dark stained mass» 
Whereas, the digestive and the regenerative nuclei present in 
the epithelium are indistinguishable and their f ine granules 
have mostly formed bigger granules (Plate I I I , Fig* C) . 
However, in some nuclei these granules have fused to form a 
c luster which l i e s either in the centre or near the periphery 
of the nuclei . The cytoplasm i s much vacuolized. Likewise, 
the caecal epithelium i s also broken at i t s inner margin and 
ce l l contents are flowing into the lumen (Plate IV, F ig . 4 ) . 
The discharged nuclei have a large dark stained mass and most 
of these masses are lying f r e e l y in the caecal lumen as dark 
specks (Plate I I I , F ig . E & F ) . The digestive and the 
regenerative nuclei of caecal epithelium are disorganized and 
their granules are fused. The cytoplasm of these c e l l s i s 
a lso vacuolized, 
jlfter 12 hours. 
The detachment of the midgut epithelium from the basement 
membrane extends to the middle region of the midgut (P late V, 
Fig. 1 ) . However, posterior region of the midgut s t i l l shows 
the attachment of the broken epithelium. The c e l l debri shows 
the stage of degeneration in the nuclei ( f ' late I I I , Fig . E)« 
- 29 ~ 
Most portions of the caecal epithelium are completely 
disintegrated (Plate V, Fig. 2 ) . Most of the nuclei are 
degenerating (Plate I I I , Fig. E & F ) . 
( i i ) 4th Instar hopper. 
After 4 hourg. 
In the anterior and middle regions of the midgut, mass 
of cytoplasmic granules are expressed out through the striated 
border -v^ich becomes ind is t inct . The cytoplasm of the 
ep i the l i a l ce l l s i s vacuolized. Both the digest ive as well as 
regenerative nuclei are normal. In the posterior region of 
the midgut, the ep i the l i a l c e l l s are stretched inward and the 
striated border only shows clumping. In the caecal epithelium 
the only appreciable change i s the discharge of the cytoplasmic 
granules. 
After 8 hours. 
The epithe l ia l c e l l s are stretched inward and their 
nuclei are pushed towards the inner margin. Intensive dischai^e 
of cytoplasmic granules and often that of digest ive nuclei takes 
place from the midgut epithelium. The striated border becomes 
ob l i terated , The discharged nuclei have the aggregation of 
their f ine granules to form a large dark stained mass which 
l i e s either in the centre or on one side of the nucleus 
(Plate I I I , Fig. E) . The nuclei present in the epithelium 
near i t s inner margin are spherical in shape and swollen 
12 ja X 1 2 ^ , showing fusion of their f ine granules to form a 
few large granules (P late I I I , Fig . B & C) ^ i c h aggregate on 
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one side of the nucleus. The rest of the nuclei of epithelium 
have the normal granules* The epithelium of the posterior 
midgut i s less af fected than that of the anterior and the middle 
regions. 
The caecal epithelium also becomes stretched inward and 
i t i s broken at i t s inner miargin* Thus the c e l l contents are 
poured into the caecal lumen. The str iated border i s obliterated, 
The cytoplasm shows vacuolization. The discharged nuclei in 
the caecal lumen have fusion of the granules in a large dark 
stained mass (Plate I I I , F ig . D & E ) . Both the digestive and the 
regenerative nuclei are swollen and measure 15 ;u x 12 ,u and 
9.3 X 9,3 ]x respectively. In these nuclei the f ine granules 
have aggregated on their periphery. 
i£ter„12Jiour^. 
In the anterior midgut, the ep i the l i a l c e l l s are stretched 
inward. Their striated border i s completely obl iterated and 
inner margin i s nipped o f f . The discharged nuclei in the gut 
lumen show various stages of fusion of their granules leading 
to the formation of a single dark stained mass. However, in 
some nuclei the membrane i s ruptured and their contents ?re-out 
(Plate I I I , Fig, C, D, E & F ) , The cytoplasm shows vacuolization. 
Both digestive as well as regenerative nuclei are pushed towards 
the inner margin of the epithelium and show peripheral arrange-
ment of their aggregated granules. The caecal epithelium also 
shows breaking of i t s inner margin. The cytoplasm i s vacuolized. 
The discharged nuclei only show a large and dark stained mass. 
The digestive and the regenerative nuclei are similar to those 
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observed in the caecal epithelltim a f t e r 8 hours. 
^ t e r 16 hours* 
Further breaking of the inner margin of the midgut 
epithelium takes place. The cytoplasm i s genera l ly vacuolized. 
The nuclei in the c e l l debri form a large dark stained mass 
which i s either present in the centre or near the periphery 
of the nucleus (Plate I I I , Fig. E)• However, such nuclear 
masses are also lying f r e e l y in the c e l l debr is . Empty and 
ruptured nuclear membranes are also seen in the gut lumen 
(Plate I I I , Fig. F ) . The digestive and regenerative nuclei 
show similar changes as observed a f t e r 12 hours. The caecal 
epithelium i s la rge ly nipped of f and the c e l l contents are 
poured into the lumen. The nuclei in the discharged cytoplasmic 
contents have the same stages of degeneration as seen a f t e r 
12 hours. 
After 20 hours. 
In the anterior midgut, the entire epithelium and the 
connective tissue d is integrate , leaving only the muscularis 
layer . The disintegrated epithelium lying in the gut lumen 
i s in a state of dissolution (Plate V, F ig . 3 ) . Most of the 
nuclei degenerate and only their dark stained masses l i e in the 
gut lumen, whereas, in certain cases these masses are s t i l l 
inside the nuclei (P late I I I , Fig . E & F)• Such dis integrat ion 
i s not seen in the middle and the poster ior regions of the 
midgut. However, in these regions, intensive breaking of the 
inner margin of epithelium takes place. The c e l l debri in 
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these regions of the midgut have nuclei as we l l , -which show 
advanced stages of degeneration ( f l a t e I I I , Fig . E & F ) . The 
digestive and the regenerative nuclei show the condensation 
and fusion of their granules which either form a c luster or 
show peripheral arrangement* The caecal epithelium 
disintegrates and most of i t i s dissolved. However, at 
places, some cellsjare attached with the muscularis l ayer . 
After 24 hours. 
The entire midgut epithelium i s completely disintegrated 
and that of the anterior midgut i s dissolved. The c e l l debri 
contains only a few nucle i . Most of the nuclei are only 
represented by their dark stained masses. Often these masses 
are enclosed into their nuclear membranes (P late I I I , F ig . E & F) 
The caecal epithelium i s completely dis integrated. The ce l l 
debri lying in the caecal lumen are in a state of d issolut ion. 
Nuclei are hardly recognizable in this debri (P late V, Fig . 4 ) . 
( i i i ) 5th Instar hopper. 
After 4 hours. 
In the entire midgut epithelium, the str iated border 
i s stretched inward and i t i s clumped at places. Cytoplasmic 
ves ic l es , often with nuclei are discharged. Most of the 
discharged nuclei have a large clumped mass which i s darkly 
stained. The digestive nuclei of the epithelium also show 
condensation of granular material (P late I I I , Fig . B & C). 
In the caeca, cytoplasmit contents mostly with granules are 
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squeezed out. However, at places digestive nuclei are also 
discharged into -the caecal lumen. 
After 8 hours i 
The striated border of the midgut epltheliuis i s 
completely obl i terated. In the anterior region of the midgut, 
cytoplasmic contents with nuclei squeeze out from the ep i the l ia l 
c e l l s and at places the epithelium i s broken. The nuclei of 
the digestive ce l l s have less granules and these are general ly 
contracted (12 ji x 9oS ) i ) . The cytoplasm of these c e l l s i s 
vacuolizedo Most of the discharged nuclei show fusion of their 
granules to form a large daric stained mass. The middle and 
poster ior regions of the midgut are comparatively less a f fected. 
In the caeca, the inner margin of the epithelium i s 
broken. Therefore, mass of cytoplasmic contents f low into 
the gut lumen and make up the ce l l debrl . The nuclei in this 
debri mostly show advanced stages of condensation and fusion 
of granules (Plate I I I , Fig, D & E), whereas, the digestive 
nuclei s t i l l present in the epithelium are swollen 
(9.3 ji X 9.3 ; i ) . 
After 12 hours. 
The anterior region of the midgut shows massive discharge 
of cytoplasmic contents including nuclei from the ep i the l i a l 
c e l l s and the striated border i s ob l i terated. The discharged 
nuclei mostly have a large dark stained mass (P late I I I , F l g .E ) . 
The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are comparatively 
l ess affected than the anterior region; and in these regions. 
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the str iated border i s s t i l l d i s t inct ly present in some 
portions. In the caeca, the epithelium becomes detached from 
the basement membrane at places, but elsewhere, the inner 
margin of the epithelium i s only broken. The ce l lu l a r contents 
of detached epithelium make ce l l debri in which the nuclei 
present advanced stage of degeneration (P late I I I , Fig, E) . 
Whereas, in the digestive nuclei , s t i l l present in the broken 
epithelium, their f ine granules are fused to form a few large 
granules which are arranged on the periphery or on one side 
of the nuclei (Plate I I I , Fig. C & D). 
A f t e r 16 hours. 
In the anterior region of the midgut, the epithelium 
i s stretched inward and i t s inner margin i s broken. Thus a 
portion of the ce l lu l a r contents i s dropped in the gut lumen, 
which have nuclei either with a large dark stained mass lying 
on the periphery of the nucleus or the nuclei are empty or 
broken. The cytoplasm of the digest ive c e l l s i s rich in 
vacuoles* The middle and posterior regions of the midgut have 
more stretched epithelium and only show profuses discharge of 
cytoplasmic contents. The inner margin of the epithelium i s 
intact. Vacuolization of the cytoplasm i s also less than in 
the anterior midgut. The caecal epithelium i s mostly 
detached from the basement membrane or i t s inner margin i s 
broken. Nuclei present in the detached epithelium have only 
a few large granules arranged on their periphery. Whereas, 
nuclei present in the caecal lumen have a, large dark stained 
mass (Plate I I I , Fig. E ) . 
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jt^fter 20 hours. 
In the anterior midgut, the ep i the l i a l c e l l s have been 
sloughed o f f from the basement membrane and these are under 
dissolution forming the ce l l debri . All the nuclei in the 
c e l l debri are degenerated (Plate I I I , F ig . E) . VJhereas, in 
the middle and posterior regions of the midgut the dissolution 
of the epithelium i s less marked (Plate VI, Fig . 1 ) . The 
caecal epithelium has completely disintegrated and only the 
muscularis layer i s l e f t (Plate VI, F ig . 2 ) . Nuclei of these 
c e l l s have completely degenerated and mostly their broken 
membranes are l e f t in the caecal lumen. 
( i v ) Adult. 
After 4 hours. 
The ep i the l ia l c e l l s of the midgut show the discharge 
of cytoplasmic granules through the str iated border which 
becomes covered with these granules. However, the ep i the l i a l 
c e l l s of the posterior midgut are s l i ght ly stretched. The 
caecal epithelium also shows only discharge of some cytoplasmic 
granules and the striated border i s d i s t inct at most of the 
places. 
il!.ter 8 hpur^. 
The epithelium i s stretched inward. Now, discharge of 
cytoplasmic globules with digestive nuclei also takes place. 
Most of the discharged nuclei show early stages of degeneration, 
(Plate I I I , Fig, B & C) , Whereas, some of these nuclei are in 
advanced stage of degeneration. The cytoplasm of the digestive 
- 3 6 -
ce l l s i s vacuolized. The digestive nuclei become spherical 
and" swollen (12 ju x 12 p ) ; and their granules arrange at the 
periphery. The granules of the regenerative nuclei a lso 
concentrate at the periphery. These changes are comparatively 
less marked in the middle and posterior regions of the midgut, 
where only discharge of cytoplasmic granules takes place. 
But in the digestive nuclei of the middle and posterior regions 
of the midgut, the granules form a c luster on one side of the 
nuclei . In the caeca, besides the discharge of cytoplasmic 
granules, at few places, the epithelium i s nipped o f f at i t s 
inner margin. Generally, the discharged nuclei are in early 
stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig, B ) , However, in few 
cases, a large and dark stained mass i s present in the nuclei . 
The cytoplasm i s less granular. The digestive and regenerative 
nuclei have scattered f ine granules, 
ATter 12 hours. 
Discharge of massive cytoplasmic globules and vesic les 
takes place from the midgut epithelium and striated border i s 
indist inct . In the digestive and the regenerative nucle i , 
granules aggregate and general ly form a c luster lying on one 
side of the nucleus. In a few nuclei, ' these granules have 
formed a large and dark stained mass. Such e f f e c t s are less 
marked in the middle and the posterior regions. The caecal 
epithelium has no further change. 
After 16 hours. 
The midgut epithelium i s very much stretched and 
nipped o f f at i t s inner margin. Thus c e l l contents are poured 
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in 
into the gut lumen. The nuclei lying/the gut lumen shqw 
advanced stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig . D & E) in 
which the granules fuse to form a large and dark stained 
mass lying either in the centre or near the periphery of the 
nucleus. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei present in 
the stretched epithelium are mixed up and sho^ i? the aggregetion 
and fusion of granules. In the middle region of the midgut, 
the nipping of the epithelium takes places only at places. 
Whereas, in the posterior region, no nipping occurs and only 
intensive discharge of cytoplasmic contents takes place. In 
the caecal epithelium, breaking of the inner margin of the 
epithelium takes place more intensely. Some of the digestive 
nuclei also have a large and dark stained mass® Whereas, the 
remaining nuclei in the epithelium, however, show the 
condensation and fusion of their granules. 
»u p. O ^  ff • 
The epithelium of the anterior midgut i s l a rge ly 
disintegrated and only i t s basal portion remains attached 
with the basement membrane. The nuclei present near the 
basement membrane, presum<-ably the regenerative nucle i , show 
the peripheral arrangement of their granules, leaving a space 
in the nuclei . Whereas, the nuclei present in the ce l l #ebri 
undergo advanced stages of-degeneration (P late VI, Fig. 3 ) . 
The disintegration of the epithelium i s comparatively less 
marked in the middle and the posterior regions of the midgut. 
The bulk of the caecal epithelium d is integrates , but i t i s 
never detached from the basement ii®mbrane. In the degenerating 
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ce i lu lar mass, the nuclei have either a cluster of granules 
or a large dark stained mass (Plate I I I , F ig . C & E ) . The 
digestive and the regenerative nuclei cannot be d i f fe rent iated 
from one another and show the fusion o ^ i n e granules 
(Plate VI, Fig. 4 ) . 
After 24 hours. 
In the anterior midgut, epithelium i s detached from the 
basement membrane and undergoes dissolut ion. At places, 
connective tissue also breaks up and only rauscularis layer i s 
l e f t (Plate VII , Fig, 1 ) , In this degenerating mass, nuclei 
are general ly obl i terated and only dark stsined specks represent 
their remainse However, only a few nuclei can be ident i f i ed 
and these have a dark stained mass lying either in the centre 
or near the periphery of the nucleus. The epithelium of the 
middle region of the midgut also indicates degeneration but 
i t s detach-ment from the basement membrane i s only pa r t i a l . 
In the poster ior region of the midgut degeneration of the 
epithelium i s l east in intensity. The caecal epithelium i s 
mostly disintegrated and detached from the basement membrane 
and only rauscularis layer i s l e f t . Generally a l l nuclei show 
advanced stages of degeneration (Plate VI I , Fig. 2 ) . 
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V. PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AND CAECA OF ADULTS AND 
HOPPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF HIEROGLYPHUS NIGROREPLETUS, 
BY THE INGESTION OF AN ARSENITE (COPPER ACETO-META-ARSENITE) 
(A) S^nptoms 
Table 5 g i v e s the maxinium and minimum quant i ty o f copper 
aceto-meta-arsen l te ( P a r i s green") eaten by tYie i nd i v i dua l s of 
d i f f e r e n t i n s t a r s and the adu l t s . A f t e r eat ing th i s i n s e c t i -
c ide , f o r a few minutes the i n s e c t s remain calm. Then they 
s-lowly rub t h e i r l e g s against the head and abdomen f o r a few 
minutes. Therea f t e r , they l o o s e the equ i l ibr ium o f t h e i r 
body and l i e l a t e r a l l y . F i n a l l y , they g e n e r a l l y become 
motionless except f o r occas iona l spasmodic twitching o f 
t he i r appendages. As i n the case of sodium s i l i c o f l u o r i d e 
t reated i n s e c t s , these hoppers and adul ts a l so r e gu rg i t a t e 
a brown l i q u i d . Presumably, t h i s i n s e c t i c i d e works as a 
purgat i ve as w e l l , because, there i s more f requent expuls ion 
of watery f a e c e s . 
In near ly a l l i nsec t s the midgut becomes contracted and 
in about f our hours i t s co lour becom.es dark brown which g radua l l y 
turns to b lack. The co lour of the caeca a l so changes to brownish 
ye l l ow from the normal y e l l ow co l our . 
Fol lowing the intake o f t h i s po ison, the hoppers o f 3rd 
and 4th i n s t a r s survive up to 12 and 24 hours r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Whereas, the 6th i n s t a r hoppers and the adul ts only l i v e f o r 
20 hours. 
Table 6. The quant i ty of Par is green- ingested by the 
ind i v i dua l s o f d i f f e r e n t I ns t a r s and adults 
o f Hieroglyphus n i g r o r ep l e tus . 
Ins tars 
Var ia t ion in the eaten 
quant i ty (mgs.) 
Minimum Maximum 
Average eaten 
quant i ty (rags.) 
3rd Instar 
hoppers 0.651 0.867 0.757 
4th Instar 
hoppers 0.931 1.366 1.215 
6th Ins tar 
hoppers 1.303 1.596 1.469 
Adults 1.96 2.52 2.246 
- 40 ~ 
(B) Histopatholopy of the mi dent and caeca. 
The sequence of important hlstopathological changes in 
the midgut and caeca ©f the d i f f e rent stages of H. nigrorepletu^, 
following the intake of paris green has been given 1n Tables 6 & 7 
respectively. However, the detailed account of these changes are 
given below. 
( i ) 3r<3 Instar hoppers* 
71f ter 4 hours. 
In the anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the 
epithelium i s stretched inward and i t i s disintegrated at i t s 
inner margin. Thus the striated border i s not present. In some 
portions the epithelium i s detached from the basement membrane 
and ce l l contents are also dropped in the gut lumen ( f l a t e VI I , 
Fig. 3 ) . The discharged nuclei as wel l as the nuclei present 
in the stretched epithelium show aggregation of their granules 
to form either a c luster of granules, lying either on one side 
of the nuclei or these granules arrange themselves near the 
periphery (Plate I I I , Fig . G), The digest ive as well as 
regenerative nuclei cannot be distinguished from one another. 
The cytoplasm I s great ly vacuollzed. In the posterior midgut 
the disintegration of the epithelium I s less marked. In the 
caeca, discharge of cytoplasmic granules and a few nuclei takes 
place. These nuclei indicate ear ly stage of degeneration 
(Plate I I I , Fig. B) . The cytoplasm i s l ess granular than the 
normal c e l l s . 
- 41 ~ 
j^fter 8 hours« 
The entire midgut epithelium i s completely detached 
from the basement membrane and i t i s being dissolved (Plate V I I , 
Fig. 4 ) . The ce l l debri has mostly dark stained masses which 
are the fused nuclear granules. Some ruptured and empty nuclear 
membranes are also present (Plate I I I , Fig . F ) . Caecal epithelium 
i s also completely detached and disintegrated. 
After 12 hour^. 
In whole of the midgut, the epithelium as well as 
connective tissue has completely disintegrated and dissolved 
(Plate V I I I , Fig. 1 ) . S imilar ly , caeca i s l e f t with only 
muscularis layer (Plate V I I I , Fig. 2 ) . 
( i i ) 4th Instar hoppers* 
After 4 hours. 
The striated border of the midgut epithelium becomes 
indist inct owing to the discharge of 'cytoplasmic granules. 
Similarly, in the caecal epithelium secretion of cytoplasmic 
granules also takes place. 
After 8 hours. 
The ep i the l ia l c e l l s of the midgut are stretched inward. 
In addition to the secretion of cytoplasmic granules, cytoplasmic 
globules and vesic les with nuclei are also oozing out. Thus 
the striated border becomes obl i terated at certain places. Ihe 
discharged nuclei show ear ly stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
Fig. C). The digestive as well as regenerative nuclei are swollen 
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(16 ju X 12 and 12 p x 9.3 respectively) and their fused 
granules general ly arrange near the nuclear periphery. 
The discharge from the caeeal epithelium i s similar 
to that of the midgut. 
After 12 hourist 
In the anterior and the middle regions of the midgut, 
the oozing of the cytoplasmic contents with nuclei becomes 
more intensive. The cytoplasm of the ep i the l i a l ce l l s are 
vacuolized» Both digest ive and regenerative nuclei of the 
epithelium are contracted (12 /i x 9.3 and^  6.2 }i x 6.2 
respectively) and their scanty granules have peripheral 
arrangement. In the posterior region of the midgut, only 
the cytoplasmic granules are secreted. 
The discharge of the nuclei from the caecal epithelium 
i s further increased. The digestive and the regenerative 
nuclei in the epithelium have peripheral arrangement of their 
fused granules (Plate I I I , Pig. C ) . 
After 16 hourg. 
In the anterior region of the midgut, the epithelium 
i s detached from the basement membrane and i t i s in state of 
disintegration (Plate V I I I , F ig . 3 ) . The epithelium of the 
middle region of the midgut i s s t i l l attached with the basement 
membrane but i t s inner margin i s broken and cytoplasm i s 
vacuolized. The digestive and the regenerative nuclei present 
in the attached epithelium are mixed and have ear ly stage of 
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degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. C). The epithelium of the 
posterior midgut i s comparatively less damaged. The caecal 
epithelium i s mostly detached from the 'basement membrane and 
i t is dis integrating, 
•After 20 hours. 
The epithelium in the anterior and middle regions of 
the midgut i s in state of disintegration and dissolut ion. The 
nuclei have mostly degenerated and their granules are only 
represented by spherical and dark stained masses (Plate I I I , F i g . F) 
'"which escape out of the nuclei . In the posterior region of 
the midgut, epithelium i s comparatively l ess damaged (Plate V I I I , 
Fig . 4 ) . The caecal epithelium i s completely disintegrated. 
The nuclei have advanced stage of degeneration (KLate I I I , 
Fig . E ) , 
After 24 hour<s. 
The epithelium of the entire midgut i s completely 
disintegrated and i t i s mostly in state of dissolut ion 
(Plate IX, Fig. 1 ) . The ce l l debrt i s amorphous with some 
spherical and dark stained masses. Simi lar ly , the caecal 
epithelium i s also completely disintegrated (P late IX, Fig. 2 ) . 
( i i i ) Sth Instar hoppers. 
After 4 hours. 
No histo log ica l change i s evident in the epithelium of 
e ither midgut or the caeca. 
- 44 ~ 
After 8 hours. 
The striated torder i s s l ight ly Indist inct due to 
secretion of cytoplasmic granules and a few globules -without 
nuclei . Similar discharge takes place from the caecal 
epithelium. 
After 12 hourg. 
In the midgut, the striated border i s ind ist inct at 
places, due to i t g clumping. There i s intensive discharge of 
cytoplasmic contents. But there i s no farther change in the 
caecal epithelium, 
/Ifter 16 hourp. 
The inner margin of the epithelium i s broken at places 
in the anterior region of the midgut. Whereas, in the rest of 
the regions there i s a large scale discharge of cytoplasmic 
globules and vesic les with nuclei . The epithelium i s general ly 
disorganized and distorted. In most of the discharged nuclei , 
the f ine granules are fused to form large granules which are 
scattered in nuclear lumen. Whereas, in some nuclei such 
granules are arranged on the periphery. However, a few discharged 
nuclei have a large and dark stained mass (P late I I I , F ig . E ) . 
Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted 
(12 X 9,3 jx and 6,2 ^ x 6.2 >i respect ive ly ) . Their granules 
are fused. The caecal epithelium i s similar to that a f t e r 
12 hours of the ingestion of this poison. 
After 20 hours. 
Almost entire midgut epithelium i s detached from the 
basement membrane and disintegrated. In some portions, connective 
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tissue i s also disintegrated (Plate IX, Fig. 3 ) . The 
degenerating nuclei mostly show advanced stage of degeneration 
(Plate I I I , Fig. E) , Many of these nuclei are empty and 
ruptured. Such changes are also seen in the middle and 
posterior regions of the midgut. In the caeca, there i s 
intensive flow of cytoplasmic granules. However, in some 
portions, cytoplasmic globules with nuclei are also discharged. 
The digestive nuclei are contracted (16 p. x 9,3 p.) and have 
only a few large and scattered granules (Plate IX, F ig . 4 ) . 
( i v ) Adults. 
After 4 hourg. 
The midgut ep i the l i a l c e l l s mostly discharge cytoplasmic 
« 
granules. But in the anterior region, c e l l u l a r contents also 
ooze out and striated border becomes obl iterated (Plate X, F i g . l ) . 
The discharged nuclei have only a few large granules. The 
digestive nuclei are contracted (16 x 9.3 . S imi lar ly , the 
regenerative nuclei are a lso squeezed ( 7 . 7 ^ x 6.2 j i ) . In the 
caeca, the inner margin of the epithelium i s nipped at some 
places; whereas, the general surface of the epithelium extrudes 
cytoplasmic globules and ves ic les . In the cytoplasm, granules 
become scanty. Both digest ive and regenerative nuclei are 
swollen (18 ;a x 12 and 12 ;a x 9.3 }i respect ive ly ) . 
After 8 hours. 
In anterior region of the midgut, the epithelium i s 
mostly detached from the basement membrane and the c e l l s are 
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in a state of dis integration. In the rest of the midgut, the 
epithelium i s only disorganised and shows break-dovm. Thus 
a mass of ce l l debri with degenerating nuclei i s present in the 
gut lumen. Some of the nuclei show advanced stages of 
degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig . E & F ) . The digestive nuclei 
are contracted (15 ^ x 12 ju) and their granules are scanty and 
large . The regenerative nuclei are also contracted (6.2 ^ x 6.2 
but they s t i l l have f ine scattered granules. In the caeca, ther 
epithelium i s mostly disorganized and dis integrates . Necrosis 
of the epi the l ia l ce l l s i s prominent. 
After 12 hours. 
In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, entire 
epithelium i s detached from the basement membrane and i t i s 
in a state of disintegration (Plate X, Fig. 2 ) . In most of 
the nuclei a large and dark stained mass i s present. However, 
some nuclei lying in proximity to the connective tissue s t i l l 
show their granular nature. The epithelium of the posterior 
region of the midgut has s t i l l some patches of ep i the l i a l ce l l s 
attached to the connective t issue. The caecal epithelium i s 
almost disintegrated and broken (Plate X, F ig . 3 ) . 
ATter 16 hours. 
The v^iole midgut epithelium i s completely disintegrated. 
The nuclei show the most advanced conditions of degeneration 
(Plate I I I , Fig. E & F ) . Similarly the epithelium of the caeca 
i s a lso completely disintegrated and dissolved. The nuclei are 
in advanced stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig . E & F ) . 
- 47 ~ 
After 20 hours. 
The midgut lumen has mostly dark specks of degenerated 
nuclear material surrounded "by the cytoplasmic debri . Some 
empty nuclei with ruptured membrane are also present. Similar 
mass of c e l l debri i s present in the caeca. 
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VI. PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS ON THE MIDGUT AND CAECA OF ADULTS MP 
HO-PPERS OF DIFFERENT INSTARS OF HIEROGLYPHUS MIGROREPLETUS 
BY THE INGESTION OF SOME CHLORINATED HYDROCARBONS 
i6i DDT^  0.6% LINDANE. 2% ENDRIN AND ALDRIN). 
(A) SymPtomp« 
The Various stages of H. nlgrorepletu^ took d i f f e r en t 
quantity of b% DDT, 0.6^ lindane, 2% endrin and &% aldrin 
(Tables 8, 9, 10 & 11 respect ive ly ) . As regards, the e f f e c t 
of these poisons, the ingestion of 6% DDT general ly showed the 
external symptoms a f t e r 10 minutes of the feeding period. 
These symptoms include shrisfei^ling and tremors of the entire 
body with appendages. Later, the insects became unusually 
active and i r r i t a t ed . Further, they indicated uncoordinated 
movements and f e l l on their back repeatedly. But, ultimately 
they were unable to orient^'ate their body properly. For some 
time, the legs continued to show twitches . During this 
hyperactivity brown f lu id was vomited from the mouth and a few 
straw coloured pe l l e t s were also expelled through the anus. 
I t was followed by the excretion of brown f l u i d and the faeces 
was never in the form of pellet».s» 
In the beginning, anterior midgut became dark bro\«i« Then, 
the remaining portions of the midgut a lso turned dark. Simultaneously, 
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contractlon in the midgut was also v i s i b l e . Likewise, the 
caeca indicated darkening of i t s wall and contraction. The 
3rd instar hoppers could not survive beyond twelve hours 
following the intake of this poison; whereas, other stages 
were able to l i v e up to twenty four hours. 
Twenty minutes following the intake of sandwich of 
0,5% lindane the hoppers as well as the adults showed hyper-
act iv i ty and uncoordinated dancing movements for some time. 
Later; their abdomen contracted lengthwise and thus the 
abdominal segments were telescoped. Often, they rubbed their 
abdomen by hind legs . Then tremors took place in the legs 
and the abdomen became distended. The mouth parts stretched 
out. F inal ly , the insects were completely paralysed and la id 
themselves l a t e r a l l y . As in case of 5% DDT ingested insects, 
these insects also vomited brown f l u i d from the mouth and had, 
loose motions. Contraction and darkening of the midgut as 
well as caeca also took place. The survival time for 3rd instar 
hoppers was only twenty hours, whereas, other stages remained 
a l ive for about twentyfour hours. 
Following the ingestion of 2% endrin, the hoppers and 
the adults of H. nigrorenletus did not behave as v io lent ly as 
DDT and lindane fed insects . However, endrin fed insects f i r s t 
started jumping. Then relaxed on their fore-and middle legs , 
whereas, the hind legs were used to rab the abdomen repeatedly. 
Sometimes, the f o re - i eg s were used against the head. I t was 
followed by discharge of faeca l pe l l e ts and l a t e r , loose motions 
Table 8. The quant i ty of 6% DDT ingested by the 
i nd i v i dua l s of d i f f e r e n t i n s t a r s and 
adults o f Hieroglyphus nigroreTDletus• 
Ins tars 
Var ia t i on in the eaten 
quant i ty (mgs.) 
Mi ni mum Maxi mum 
Average eaten 
quant i ty (mgs.) 
3rd In star 
hoppers 0.362 0.588 0.468 
4th Instar 
hoppers 0.638 0.784 0.678 
6th Instar 
hop pers 0.684 0.927 0.796 
Adults 1.303 1.675 1.450 
Table 9. The quant i ty of 0.5% l indane ingested by the 
i nd i v i dua l s of d i f f e r e n t i n s t a r s and adults 
of" Hieroglyphus n i g r o r ep l e tus . 
Instars 
Var ia t i on in the eaten 
quant i ty Crags.) 
^1inirnum Maximum 
Average eaten 
quant i ty (rags.) 
Srd Instar 
hoppers 0.598 0.758 0.676 
4th Instar 
hoppers 0.771 0.970 0.801 
5th Instar 
hoppers 1.436 1.788 1.691 
Adults 1.675 1.941 1.796 
Table 10. The quant i ty of 2% endrin ingested by the 
ind i v i dua l s o f d i f f e r e n t Ins ta rs and adults 
of Hieroglyphus n i g ro r ep l e tus . 
Instars 
Var ia t i on in the eaten 
quant i ty (mgs.) 
Minitmim I4axi mum 
Average eaten 
quant i ty (mgs.) 
3rd Instar 
hoppers 0.684 0.891 0.823 
4th Ins tar 
hoppers 1.436 1.808 1.646 
5th Instar 
hoppers 1.330 1.862 1.66 
Adults 1.78 2,20 1.99 
Table 11. The quant i ty of a ld r in ingested by the 
ind i v i dua l s o f d i f f e r e n t i n s t a r s and adults 
of Hiero^lyphus n i g ro r ep l e tus . 
Ins tars 
Var ia t ion i n the eaten 
quant i ty Cmgs.) 
Minimum Maximum 
Average eaten 
quant i ty (mgs.) 
Srd Instar 
hoppers 0.651 0,798 0.741 
4th Instar 
hoppers 1.064 1,383 1.245 
6th Instar 
hoppers 1.366 1.649 1.491 
Adults 1.28 2.00 1.76 
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of brovn colour. F ina l ly , the insects f e l l l a t e r a l l y , remained 
motionless and regurgitated f l u id from the mouth. With respect 
to this insecticide a s -we l l , the midgut and the caeca became 
contracted and turned black in colour. The survival time f o r 
a l l the stages remained approximately twentyfour hours following 
the intake of this poison. 
The e f f e c t of the intake of a ldr in was slower than 
that of other insecticides* Because the external symptoms 
appeared only a f te r two hours* In the beginning, the insects 
started moving their legs and then jumping repeatedly. Following 
this they f e l l l a t e r a l l y and orientation of the body became 
d i f f i c u l t . These insects a lso vomited bro^ -m. f l u id from the 
mouth and discharge from the anus was a lso loose* Both the 
midgut and the caeca gradual ly became dark but their contraction 
was l i t t l e in comparision to those insects which ate DDT, lindane 
and endrin. 
The survival time fo r a l l stages was only twenty hours 
following the intake of th is poison. 
(B) Hij^tODathology of the midgut and caeca, 
(a ) E f f ec t of 5f, DDT. 
The sequence of important histopathological changes in 
the midgut and caeca, following the ingestion of DDT, has been 
summarized in Tables 12 & 13 respectively. Following i s the 
deta i l s of the pathological e f f e c t s on the histology of the 
midgut and caeca. 
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( i ) 3rd Instar hoippera. 
After 4 hours. 
The midgut epithelium becomes stretched inward and 
besides the secretion of cytoplasmic granules large number 
of cytoplasmic globules are a lso discharged. Thus the 
striated border becomes pa r t i a l l y ob l i terated. The cytoplasm 
i s rather less granular and develops vacuoles, (P late X, Fig« 4 ) . 
In the caeca, epithelium only secretes cytoplasmic granules./( 
The cytoplasm develops vacuoles. The digestive nuclei are 
swollen (18 p x 9,3 )i) whereas, the regenerative nuclei are 
contracted (6.2 )x x 6.2 ;u). 
After 8, hour^« 
The anterior midgut epithelium i s detached from the base-
ment membrane and i t i s disintegrated. Only the connective 
tissue remains in contact with the muscularis layer (Plate XI, 
Fig. 1 ) . The nuclei of disintegrating c e l l s have only a large 
and dark stained mass (P late I I I , Fig, E ) . Whereas, in other 
nucle i , the fused granules form several part ic les ^daich are 
e ither scattered or remain arranged peripheral ly (P late I I I , 
Fig. C) . 
In the middle region of the midgut, the epithelium i s 
only broken at i t s inner margin. The discharged nuclei show 
same stages of degeneration as seen in the anterior region of 
the midgut (Plate XI, Fig. 2 ) . However, the digestive and 
regenerative nuclei present in the epithelium are mixed up and 
show fusion of their granules. In the posterior midgut, changes 
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are less marked (Plate XI, Fig . 3 ) . The caecal epithelium 
shows complete disintegration and dissolution of the epithelium 
(Plate XI, Fig . 4 ) . In most of the nuclei early stages of 
degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig . B & C) are seen. Some of these 
nuclei have only a large and dark stained mass (Plate I I I , 
Fig. E ) . 
After 12 hours. 
The epithelium and the connective tissue of the anterior 
midgut i s completely disintegrated and only the muscularis layer 
i s l e f t . The ce l l dehri shows dissolution of the nuclei . However, 
in the middle and posterior regions of the midgut, connective 
tissue i s s t i l l intact with the muscularis layer (Plate XII , 
Fig . 1 ) , In the degenerating epithelium of the caeca, only dark 
stained and spherical masses show the remains of the nuclei 
(P late XII , Fig. 2 ) . 
( i i ) 4th Instar hoppers. 
After 4 hours. 
Throughout the length of the midgut epithelium, only 
cytoplasmic granules are coming out through the striated border 
which i s quite d ist inct . Similar process occurs in the caecal 
epithelium. 
After 8 hours. 
Discharge of both cytoplasmic granules and globules with 
nuclei takes place. The discharged nuclei have only a few large 
granules which are scattered. The cytoplasm i s vacuolized. The 
nuclei of the digestive c e l l s are general ly contracted (12 ;u x 9.3,0) 
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and their granules aggregate and fuse to form a few granules 
vrhlch are scattered. 1!hie regenerative nuclei are swollen 
(9,3/1 X 9,3 ji) and also have scattered and large granules. 
The caecal epithelium has intensive discharge of cytoplasmic 
granules. Some epithel ia l nuclei are also expressed out. 
Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen (18 x 9.3 ;a 
and 9.3 p. x 9.3 )a respect ive ly ) . 
After 12 hours. 
In the anterior region of the midgut, the epithelium i s 
info lded. As a result of that both the digestive as well as 
regenerative nuclei are mixed up. Otherwise, the h i s to log ica l 
deta i l s are the same as observed a f te r 8 hours. The caecal 
epithelium i s also l ike before. 
After 16 hour^. 
Mass of cytoplasmic globules with nuclei are pushed out 
of the ep i the l i a l c e l l s . The discharged nuclei show advanced 
stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. D & E). However, in 
some nucle i , the f ine granules form more than one large granules 
which are scattered. !l!he cytoplasm shows vacuolization. The 
digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted (12 /x x 9 . 3 ^ 
and 6.2 p. x 6.2 ^ respectively) and their fused granules are 
general ly peripheral ly arranged or in some nuclei they are 
scattered. No further changes in the caecal epithelium could 
be observed. 
After 20 hours. 
The epithelium of anterior midgut i s greatly stretched 
inward and the ce l l contents are flowing into the gut lumen. 
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The discharge of ce l lu la r contents i s enhanced and discharged 
nuclei shov l a s t stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig . E & F ) . 
The cytoplasm i s highly vacuolized. Both the digestive and the 
regenerative nuclei are eontraeted and tlieir grantiles are fused 
to form a few granules which are arranged at the auslear periphery. 
Most of the caecal epithelium dis integrates . The nuclei are 
l ike those of previous stage (P late XII , Fig . 3 ) . 
After 24 hourg. 
The whole midgut epithelium i s general ly disintegrated 
and in some portions the connective tissue i s also disintegrated 
(Plate XII , Fig. 4 ) , The nuclei are in f i n a l stages of 
degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. E & F ) . The caecal epithelium also 
shows complete disintegration and detachment from the basement 
membrane. The disintegrating c e l l s are similar to those mentioned 
above in the midgut a f te r 20 hours. 
( i i i ) 6th Instar hoppers. 
In the midgut, o©zing of cytoplasmic granules general ly 
occurs from the epithelium. In the digestive c e l l s , cytoplasm 
becomes less granular than the normal c e l l s and vacuoles appear. 
In the caeca a lso, the epithelium secretes cytoplasmic granules. 
After 8 hourg. 
In the anterior region of the midgut, secretion of 
cytoplasmic granules, globules and ves ic les with nuclei takes 
place. The epithelium i s stretched inward. The cytoplasm i s 
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almost c l ea r . The middle and posterior regions of the midgut 
are comparatively less a f fected . The caecal epithelium remains 
as before, 
^ f t e r 12 hours* 
The entire midgut epithelium i s folded and overlapped due 
to the contraction ©f the gut wa l l . The striated border hecomes 
indist inct and intensive discharge of cytoplasmic contents take® 
place through large ves ic les . There i s no further change in 
the h is to log ica l appearance of the caeca. 
After 16 hourg. 
The midgut epithelium i s more af fected than before and 
there i s more profuse . discharge of cytoplasmic contents with 
nuclei . The discharged nuclei are in advanced stages ©f 
degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig . B & E) , ISie cytoplasm of the 
digestive c e l l s have vacuoles. Both digestiye and regenerative 
nuclei are contracted (12 >i x 9,3 p. and 9,3 p. x 4,6 respectively) 
The caecal epithelium does not deteriorate further, 
iV/ IIO^ X S • 
In some portions of the anterior midgut the epithelium 
breaks at i t s inner margin (Plate X I I I , Fig , 1 ) . ffost of the 
» 
nuclei in the gut lumen have degenerated and only their ruptured 
membranes are present, Vfhereas, the nuclei in the ep i the l i a l 
c e l l s have either a few large granules arranged on the nuclear 
periphery or only one large mass. In the caeca, some cytoplasmic 
vesic les are also discharged with nucle i . The discharged nuclei 
show most advanced stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , F ig . 1 ) , 
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After 24 hours. 
In almost entire midgut, ep i the l ia l c e l l s are vacuolized 
and the inner margin of these c e l l s i s nipped o f f . In the ce l l 
debri majority of the nuclei are represented only by ruptured 
membranes (Plate I I I , Fig. F ) . in the caeca, discharge of 
cytoplasmic contents with nuclei takes place and the discharged 
nuclei are in the early stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
Fig. D & E ) . 
( i v ) Adults. 
After 4 hours. 
Almost entire epithelium of the midgut i s stretched 
inward and striated border i s ind ist inct due to secretion of 
cytoplasmic granules. In the anterior region of the midgut 
small droplets of cytoplasm also ooze out through the striated 
border. The digestive nuclei are contracted (18 ;ia x 6.2 ;u) and 
their f ine granules fuse to form large granules which are often 
arranged at the nuclear periphery. The regenerative nuclei are 
also contracted (9.3yU x 6.2 . The caecal epithelium also 
discharges cytoplasmic granules and i t s striated border i s 
ind ist inct . The digestive and regenerative nuclei are contracted 
(12 jx X 9.3 )x and 6.2 x 6 . 2 ^ respect ive ly ) . 
After 8 hours. 
Abundant discharge of ce l lu l a r contents takes place from 
the entire midgut. Small vacuoles appear near the inner margin 
of the ep i the l ia l c e l l s . The digestive nuclei are disoi^anized 
and move towards the free margin of the c e l l s . Similar ly , there 
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i s an increase in the ce l lu la r discharge from the caecal 
epithelium. The digestive nuclei are contracted (18 p. x lb ji) 
and their f ine granules fuse to form large granules. Regenerative 
nuclei are a lso contracted (9.3 u x 6.2 }x)» 
After 12 hours. 
In anterior region of the midgut, the striated border i s 
completely obl i terated. However, in the middle and posterior 
regions of the midgut, patches of striated border are s t i l l 
present. The inner margin of the epithelium is ruptured, 
Iherefore , the ce l lu l a r contents are poured in the gut lumen. 
The broken c e l l s have scanty cytoplasm which i s c lear . Mostly 
the discharged nuclei show early stages of degeneration 
(Plate I I I , Fig. B & C). However, the digestive nuclei are 
contracted (15 p x 12 >i) and their fused granules are arranged 
on the nuclear periphery. Regenerative nuclei are also 
contracted (9.3 j^ i x 6,2 ;a) and their granules are also fused. 
In the caeca, no further change i s observed. 
After 16 hours. 
In anterior region of the midgut, portions of epithelium 
are detached from the basement membrane and elsewhere i t s inner 
mapgin i s nipped o f f (Plate XI I I , Fig. 2 ) . The cytoplasm of the 
broken c e l l s i s vacuolized. The nuclei in the ce l l debri have 
advanced stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. D & E ) . However, 
some of these nuclei are empty with broken membranes. The 
digestive nuclei of the ce l l s are contracted (15 jx x 12 }x) with 
fused granules on their periphery. Similar condition i s seen 
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in the regenerative nuclei (9.3 ji x 6.2 ; i ) . However, in the 
middle and posterior regions of the midgut the changes are less 
marked. The caeca are lifce before. 
After 20 hours. 
The epithelium of anterior and middle regions of the 
midgut i s detached from the basement membrane and breaks up; 
whereas, that of posterior midgut i s detached only at some 
places. The ce l l debri has nuclei in advanced stages of 
degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. D & E) . The caeca shows intensive 
discharge of ce l lu la r contents with nuclei and par t ia l breaking 
of inner margin of epithellume The cytoplasm of the c e l l s i s 
vaeuolized. 
After 24 hourg. 
The anterior and middle regions of the midgut epithelium 
are completely dissolved and only the connective tissue and 
muscularis layer i s l e f t (Plate XI I I , Fig. 3 ) , vdiereas, in 
posterior region of the midgut, portions of the epithelium are 
s t i l l attached with the connective t issue. Almost a l l nuclei 
show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. E & F ) . 
In the caeca, the nipping of inner margin of the epithelium 
extends to large areas and there i s profuse- f low of cytoplasmic 
contents (P late XI I I , Fig. 4 ) . The discharged nuclei are in 
advanced stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig, E & F ) , whereas, 
the digestive nuclei have only a few granules in them. 
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(b) E f f ec t of 0»6% Lindane. 
The histopathological e f fects caused by the Ingestion 
of 0,5% lindane In the midgut and the caeca of d i f f e rent stages 
of H, nlp:rorepletus have been summarized in Tables 14 & 16 
respectively. However, the detai ls have been described below. 
( i ) 3rd Instar hoppers. 
After 4 hours. 
The ep i the l ia l c e l l s of anterior midgut are stretched 
Inward and their inner margin i s laden with cytoplasmic granules. 
The striated border becomes indist inct . Both, the digestive 
and regenerative nuclei are swollen (18 yi x 9.3 )i and 9.3 )x x 9,3 >i 
respectively) and have scattered granules. In middle and 
posterior regions of the midgut, the str iated border shows 
clumping at places and cytoplasm of ep i the l i a l c e l l s have 
vacuoles. In the caeca a l so , the cytoplasmic granules are 
discharged. 
^ f ter 8 hours. 
In the entire midgut, discharge of cytoplasmic granules 
further increases and cytoplasmic globules are also expressed 
out. The digestive nuclei are contracted (12 x 9.3 
whereas, regenerative nuclei are swollen (9.3 x 9.3 >i). Caecal 
epithelium does not show further change. 
After 12 hours. 
The striated border dis integrates . Portions of 
epithelium are nipped o f f and ce l l contents are dropped into 
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the gut lumen. The nucle i .o f the gut lumen show fusion of 
their f ine granules to form large ones (Plate I I I , Fig. B) . 
Both, digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen 
(16 X 9.3 p and 9.3 u x 9.3 }x respect ive ly ) . These nuclei 
also indicate ear ly stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. C). 
No further change could "be observed in the caecal epithelium. 
j^fter 16 hours. 
The entire epithelium of anterior and middle regions 
of the midgut i s stretched inward and i t s inner margin i s 
broken (Plate XIV, Fig. 1 ) . Consequently, the ce l l contents 
are poured in the gut lumen. At places, the epithelium i s 
degenerating. The nuclei of the ce l l debri indicate advanced 
stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , F ig . E & F ) . The cytoplasm 
of the ce l l s i s vaeuolized. The digest ive and regenerative 
nuclei of the epithelium show early stages of degeneration. 
In posterior region of the midgut, nipping of the epithelium 
occasionally takes place. However, caecal epithelium i s 
general ly as before (P late XIV, Fig, 2 ) . 
After 20 hours. 
The entire midgut epithelium i s broken and only i t s 
outer hal f with regenerative ce l l s i s attached with the basement 
membrane (Plate XIV, Fig. 3 ) , The gut lumen i s f u l l of c e l l 
debr i , which have nuclei showing most advanced stage of 
degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. E) . The connective tissue i s 
stretched. These changes are comparatively less marked in the 
posterior region. In the caeca, no further change takes place 
-61-
except the appearance of vacuoles in the digestive ce l l s -
(Plate XIV, Fig. 4 ) . Both, digestive and regenerative nuclei 
are swollen (18 ^ x 9.3 and 9.3 /i x 9,3 p. respectively) 
and have fused granules which aggregate towards the periphery 
of the nuclei . 
( i i ) 4th Instar hoppers. 
After 4 hours. 
The midgut epithelium general ly secretes cytoplasmic 
granules and occasionally cytoplasmic g lobules . Similar ly , 
the caeca discharges cytoplasmic granules. 
After 8 hours. 
In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, ep i the l ia l 
c e l l s are stretched inward and their inner margins are nipped 
o f f . In the gut lumen, nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration 
(Plate I I I , Fig. E & F ) . The cytoplasm of the digestive c e l l s 
- i i vacuolized. Both digestive and regenerative nuclei are 
contracted (15 x 9.3 M and 6.2 p x 6.2 p. respectively) In 
posterior region, the changes are less marked. The caecal 
epithelium i s a lso nipped of f in portions and discharged nuclei 
show early stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. B & C). 
After 12 hours. 
In the midgut epithelium the h i s to log ica l picture i s 
same as observed before. However, caecal epithelium i s further 
nipped o f f . 
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After 16 hours. 
The epithelium of entire midgut i s stretched inward 
and i t s inner margin i s completely broken. The nuclei of 
c e l l debri are in advanced stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
Fig. D & E). The cytoplasm of the digestive c e l l s have 
vacuoles. The digestive nuclei are contracted ( 1 2 ^ x 9 , 3 ^ ) 
and their granules have peripheral arrangement (Plate XV, 
Fig. 1 ) . lAlhereas, some of these nuc le i , are in early stages 
of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. C& D). The regenerative 
nuclei are also contracted (6.2 ya x 6.2 ;u). There i s no further 
change in the caecal epithelium. 
After 20 hour^. 
The inner half of the entire midgut epithelium i s 
broken. The nuclei of the ce l l debri are in the f ina l stage 
of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. F ) . Both, digestive and 
regenerative nuclei are contracted.. The caecal epithelium 
shows the same nature of damage as mentioned above. 
After 24 hours. 
The midgut epithelium i s completely detached from the 
basement membrane and i t i s being disintegrated. .However, 
connective tissue i s s t i l l present. The nuclei in the 
degenerating mass are in most advanced stage of degeneration 
(Plate I I I , Fig. F ) . Similar ly , the caecal epithelium also 
shows detachment and degeneration of the epithelium (Plate XV, 
Fig. 2 ) . The nuclei lying near the basement membrane are in 
ear ly stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. D & E) . 
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( i i i ) Sth Instar hoppers. 
After 4 hours* 
The epithelium of both midgut and caeca remains normal. 
Mte r 8 hours. 
The entire midgut epithelium i s stretched inward. Only 
discharge of cytoplasmic granules take place. Similar e f f e c t 
i s observed in the caeca. 
After 12 hours. 
Throughout the midgut, the epithelium becomes more 
stretched than observed before* Secretion of cytoplasmic 
granules i s increased. Further, cytoplasmic globules are 
also expressed out. The cytoplasm of the digestive c e l l s 
develops vacuoles. Both, digestive as well as regenerative 
nuclei are mixed and f low in-to the gut lumen. The digestive 
nuclei are contracted (15 jjl X 6.2 p.). However, in the caeca, 
discharge of cytoplasmic granules enhances. 
After 16 hours. 
The epithelium, in anterior region of the midgut, i s 
nipped o f f at I t s inner margin, resulting In the f low of the 
ce l l contents in - to the gut lumen (Plate XV, Fig. 3 ) . The 
discharged nuclei show advanced stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
Fig. B) . In the rest of the portions, epithelium discharges 
cytoplasmic matter in the form of large globules and the 
cytoplasm of the c e l l s shows vacuolization. The digestive as 
well as the regneratlve nuclei are swollen (15 x 12 and 
9.3 ja X 9.3 ^ respect ive ly ) . 
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The eaecal epithelium mostly shows nipping of i t s 
inner margin and f low of ce l l contents in - to the gut lumen 
(Plate XV, Fig. 4 ) . The discharged nuclei show advanced 
stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. E& F ) . The cytoplasm 
of the ce l l s i s vacuolized and both the digest ive and the 
regenerative nuclei are swollen. 
After 20 hour^. 
The entire midgut epithelium i s nipped o f f and the ce l l 
contents f low into the gut lumen. The discharged nuclei are 
in advanced stages of. degeneration (P late I I I , Fig. E& F ) . 
Some of these nuclei have completely degenerated and only 
their dark stained masses are lying in the gut lumen. The 
cytoplasm of the ce l l s shows intensive vacuolization. The 
ep i the l ia l nuclei are in ear ly stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
Fig, C). The caecal epithelium shows nipping and massive 
discharge of ce l l contents. The discharged nuclei show advanced 
stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig . E & F) and cytoplasm 
have vacuoles. The digestive and regenerative nuclei of 
broken epithelium are swollen (15 p x 12 p and 9.3 }2 x 9,3 p 
respectively) and these are in early stages of degeneration. 
After 24 hours. 
In anterior region of the midgut, a portion of the 
epithelium i s detached from the basement membrane (Plate XVI, 
Fig . 1 ) , Whereas, the rest of the epithelium i s la rge ly 
nipped o f f and the c e l l contents are poured in—to the gut 
lumen. The nuclei present in the ce l l debri are degenerated, 
(Plate I I I , Fig. F ) , The cytoplasm of the broken ep i the l i a l 
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ce l l s have large vacuoles. Mast of the nuclei present in 
these ce l l s have a large and dark stained mass (Plate I I I , 
Fig. E) . The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are 
comparatively less a f fected . The caecal epithelium i s 
completely disintegrated and the ce l l contents f i l l the gut 
lumen (Plate XVI, Fig, 2 ) . The nuclei lying in the ce l l 
debri are completely degenerated. 
Civ) Adults. 
After 8 hours. 
The f i r s t v i s i b l e change in the h i s to log ica l structure 
of the midgut and the caeca i s observed only a f te r eight hours 
following the intake of lindane. The striated border becomes 
indist inct and pa r t i a l l y disorganised due to expression of 
cytoplasmic granules and a few cytoplasmic g lobules . The 
entire epithelium i s so stretched inward that i n t e r - c e l l u l a r 
membranes become ind is t inct . The cytoplasm i s vacuolized and 
» 
l ess densfity granular than that of the normal c e l l s . The 
digestive nuclei are mostly contracted (12 p. x 9.3 )i) and 
their granules are aggregated on the periphery (Plate I I I , 
Fig. C). The regenerative nuclei are swollen (9.3 x Q , 3 } i ) . 
The middle and posterior regions of the midgut are comparatively 
less a f fected. In the caeca, there i s a profused discharge 
of the cytoplasmic granules throughout the striated border. 
Other h i s to log ica l de ta i l s are normal. 
« 66 -
/^fter 12 hours. 
In nearly one l a t e r a l half of the anterior region of 
the midgut the inner margin of the epithelium i s nipped o f f . 
Some of the ep i the l ia l c e l l s are disintegrated (Plate XVI, 
Fig. 3 ) . The second l a t e ra l ha l f of anterior midgut i s 
infolded and epithelium i s stretched inward. In this region 
there i s intensive oozing of cytoplasmic globules with nuclei . 
Both, digestive and regenerative nuclei are swollen 
(12 ^ X 9,3 )Ji and 9.3 ;a x 9.3 )i respect ive ly ) . The cytoplasm 
of the digestive ce l l s have vacuoles and possess thin 
concentration of granules. The middle and posterior regions 
of the midgut are comparatively less a f fected and mostly 
indicate the discharge of large cytoplasmic ves ic les often 
with nuclei . The ep i the l i a l c e l l s of the caeca show discharge 
of cytoplasmic globules and vesic les with nucle i . The nuclei 
of the digestive c e l l s are in state of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
Fig. B & C). 
ATt^r 16 hours. 
The entire midgut epithelium i s almost uniformly 
a f fected. The inner margin of the epithelium i s broken. 
Majority of the nuclei in the c e l l debri have advanced stages 
of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. E & F ) . The nuclei of both 
digest ive and regenerative c e l l s are contracted (12 ;u x 9.3 
and 6.2 }i x 6.2 ja. respectively) and are in ear ly stages of 
degeneration. The caeca i s more af fected than before and 
has intensive discharge of cytoplasmic ves ic les and globules . 
The discharged nuclei are in early stages of degeneration 
(Plate I I I , Fig. C & D). Both, digestive and regenerative 
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nuclei are swollen (16 )i x 12 p and 9,3 p. x 9.3 p. respectively) . 
After 20 hours. 
The inner hal f of the midgut epithelium i s completely 
broken and i t i s shed into the midgut lumen. The discharged 
nuclei are mostly degenerated and have broken nuclear membrane 
(Plate XVI, Fig, 4 ) . The remaining portions of the digestive 
ce l l s have vacuoles and their scanty cytoplasm i s almost c lear . 
The digestive nuclei of the broken ce l l s are degenerating 
(Plate I I I , Fig. D). In the caeca, the epithelium i s pa r t i a l l y 
broken at i t s inner margin (Plate XVII, Fig, 1 ) , The ce l l 
debri of the caecal lumen contain degenerating nuclei . The 
nuclei of both digest ive and regenerative c e l l s are swollen 
(16 ja X 12 and 12 >i x 9,3 )x respect ive ly ) . 
After 24 hours. 
The midgut epithelium i s large ly sloughed o f f and i t 
i s in state of degeneration. Both digestive and regenerative 
nuclei are l e f t wititi only broken nuclear membranes and their 
of 
granular contents, in the form/a single large and dark stained 
mass, l i e scattered in the midgut lumen (Plate I I I , F ig . F ) , 
The caecal epithelium i s uniformly broken at i t s inner margin. 
The nuclei are mostly in advanced degenerating condition. 
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Cc) E f f ec t of 2t Endrin. 
The histological destruction caused to the midgut and 
the caeca of the various stages of H. nigrorepletus^ following 
the intake of 2% endrin has been summarised in Tables 16 & 17 
respectively. However, the damage caused by this poison i s 
given below in deta i l s . 
( i ) 3rd Instar hopper^. 
T^ter 4 hours. 
Cytoplasmic granules are secreted from the entire midgut 
epithelium and striated border becomes ind is t inct . The caecal 
epithelium also secretes cytoplasmic granules from i t s inner 
margin. But i t s striated border i s mostly d i s t inct . 
After 8 hours. 
Secretion of cytoplasmic granules further increases. 
The dii-gestive and the regenerative nuclei are swollen 
(18 )i X 9.3 and 9,3 )i x 9.S }x respectively) and their granules 
aggregate on the periphery. Enhancement of the discharge of 
cytoplasmic granules also takes place in the caeca. 
After 12 hours. 
Cytoplasmic granules as well as cytoplasmic globules 
with nuclei are expressed from entire midgut epithelium. The 
discharged nuclei show ear ly stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
F ig . B ) . The cytoplasm of ep i the l i a l c e l l s becomes less granular. 
The digestive as wel l as regenerative nuclei are in ear ly stages 
of degeneration. Posterior region-- of the midgut i s comparatively 
less a f fected . Caecal epithelium does not show any further change. 
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ATter 16 hourg. 
In anterior portion, the midgut epithelium i s infolded 
due to which the digestive and the regenerative nuclei are 
disorganized. The discharge of cytoplasmic granules i s enhanced 
and massive expression of cytoplasmic vesicles a lso takes place. 
The digestive and the regenerative nuclei are almost l i ke those 
At'12 hours. In the caeca a l so , massive secretion of cytoplasmic 
granules and vesicles with nuclei takes place. The discharged 
nuclei are in early stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. B) . 
The nuclei remaining in the digestive and the regenerative ce l l s 
are as before. 
After 20 hours. 
There i s a massive discharge of cytoplasmic granules 
and globules from the entire midgut epithelium. The cytoplasm 
of the digestive ce l l s has vacuoles. Whereas, the nuclei of 
both digestive and regenerative c e l l s are contracted 
(12 p. X 9.3 )x and 6.2 ;a x 6.2 yx respectively) and these are 
in ear ly stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig, C) . The caecal 
epithelium remains similar to that of 16 hours. 
After 24 hours. 
There i s no further deterioration in the h i s to log ica l 
organization of the midgut epithelium (Plate XVII, Fig. 2 ) . 
Whereas, the caecal epithelium i s nipped o f f at i t s inner margin 
and thus cytoplasmic contents are poured into the caecal lumen 
(Plate XVII, Fig. 3 ) . The discharged nuclei are in ear ly stages 
of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. C & D). Whereas, the digest ive 
and the regenerative nuclei show the same changes as mentioned 
e a r l i e r . 
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( i i ) 4th Instisr hopperf;. 
/ f t e r 4 hour|5. 
The midgut epithelium i s stretched inward and i t s 
str iat ion i s indist inct . The cytoplasm of these c e l l s becomes 
less granular than normal c e l l s . Both digestive and 
regenerative nuclei are pushed towards the gut lumen. The 
' ep i the l ia l ce l l s of the caeca also secrete granules and their 
cytoplasm develops vacuoles. 
After 8 hour^. 
There i s no further change in the midgut except the 
massive secretion of the granules. In the caeca str iated 
border becomes ind ist inct . 
After 12 hours. 
In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, besides 
cytoplasmic granules, cytoplasmic vesic les are also expressed 
out. The striated border i s disorganized and ind is t inct 
(Plate XVII, Fig. 4 ) . The cytoplasm of the digestive ce l l 
becomes less granular than before . The posterior region of 
the midgut i s comparatively less a f fected . The caecal epithelium 
indicates massive discharge of cytoplasmic granules and often 
the disgestive nuclei are also expressed out. These nuclei 
have a few large granules which are scattered. The digestive 
as well as the regenerative nuclei of the epithelium are swollen 
(15 p. X 12 ^ and 9,8 x 9,3 }x respect ive ly ) . 
After 16 hours. 
The anterior and middle regions of the midgut squeeze 
out cytoplasmic globules and ves ic les with nucle i . A few of 
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these nuclei indicate advanced stage of degeneration 
(Plate I I I , Fig. E) . However, the digestive nuclei of the 
epithelium are contracted (12 x 6.2 p) but the regenerative 
nuclei are swollen 9.3 x 9 . 3 ^ ) . The caecal epithelium 
also discharges cytoplasmic vesic les containing nuclei which 
have d i f f e r ent stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig . C,D & E) 
but mostly indicating the early stage of degeneration. 
After 20 hours. 
In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the 
ep i the l i a l c e l l s are nipped o f f at their inner margin and 
c e l l contents are poured into the midgut lumen (Plate XVIII, 
Fig. 1 ) . The discharged nuclei show d i f f e rent stages of 
degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. B,C,D,& E) . The posterior 
region of the midgut only secretes cytoplasmic ves ic les . 
The caecal epithelium i s nipped only at places and the ce l l 
contents are poured into the caecal lumen. The discharged 
nuclei show advanced stages of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
Fig. E & F ) . The digestive nuclei are swollen (18 m x 9 . S ; a ) . 
Their granules are fused and l i e on the periphery of the 
nuclei (Plate XVIII, Fig. 2 ) . 
After 24 hours. 
In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the 
epithelium is completely detached from the basement membrane 
and i t i s in state of dis integrat ion. However, at places, 
the epithelium i s s t i l l attached with the basement membrane. 
The nuclei present in the degenerating mass of the epithelium 
have only a large dark stained mass (P late I I I , F ig . E ) . The 
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caecal epithelium i s more damaged than before. But the 
epithelium i s never detached from the basement membrane. 
( i i i ) 5th Instar hoppers. 
After 4 hours. 
In the midgut, only small amount of cytoplasmic granules 
are secreted through the striated border. Similar e f f e c t s are 
seen in the caeca. 
After 8 hours. 
In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the 
cytoplasmic granules and globules ooze through the str iated 
border which becomes ind is t inct . The ep i the l ia l c e l l s are 
stretched inward and their cytoplasm develops vacuoles. The 
digest ive and the regenerative nuclei are swollen (18 x 6.2 >i 
and 12 ^ X 9.3 )x respectively) and both have scattered granules 
in them. Whereas, from the posterior midgut only cytoplasmic 
granules are discharged. In the caeca there i s no further 
change. 
jyrter 12 hour g. 
The midgut epithelium secretes mass of cytoplasmic 
granules as well as globules and large ves ic les . The ep i the l ia l 
c e l l s are stretched inward and these are vacuolized. The 
digestive as well as the regenerative nuclei are contracted. 
The ep i the l ia l ce l l s of caeca are also stretched inward, 
discharge mass of cytoplasmic granules and their cytoplasm 
has vacuoles. In both digest ive as well as regenerative nuclei 
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the f ine granules are fused and these are arranged on the 
periphary of the nuclei (P late I I I , Fig. C) . 
After 16 hourp. 
In anterior and middle regions of the midgut, the 
inner margin of the ep i the l i a l c e l l s i s nipped. Therefore, 
the cytoplasmic contents are dropped into the gut lumen. 
The digestive ce l l s have general ly developed vacuoles 
(Plate XVIII, Fig. 3 ) . The nuclei in the gut lumen, have 
only a large dark stained mass (Plate I I I , Fig. E ) . The 
digest ive as well as the regenerative nuclei are in ear ly 
stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , Fig. C). In the caeca, 
the inner margin of the ep i the l ia l c e l l s i s broken up and 
c e l l contents are poured into the caecal lumen. The cytoplasm 
of these c e l l s develop^s vacuoles. Most of the discharged 
nuclei have the fusion of their f ine granules into large ones 
which are scattered. However, some of these nuclei have a 
large dark stained mass (P late I I I , Fig. E) . The nuclei s t i l l 
present in the epithelium, have peripheral arrangement of 
their fused granules (Plate I I I , Fig. C) . 
After 20 hours. 
Generally, the midgut epithelium i s stretched inward 
and most of i t i s broken at i t s inner margin. The cj'-toplasm 
of the ep i the l ia l c e l l s i s vacuolized. The nuclei present in 
the gut lumen show advanced stage of degeneration (Plate I I I , 
F ig . E ) . Whereas, both digest ive and regenerative nuclei of 
the epithelium are swollen (15 x 12 p. and 9.3 ;a x 9.3 
* a i ^ 
ngotx l^ r th Ifietasniase bas©®. In Vm Far East th© s i tuat ion 
was coJBplicated; fiiy the iiicir<?JisM intraf5sis©nc0 of Comuulst 
CMmt which doteiaduecE prevQBt ax^ sor t of dstsata 
vdtfi ti:® Kost* Vietnam masins a M the figlitirsg i s . 
go lag 
In June i sa? this Md^ i e -Bas t em c r i s i s gave an o fea 
apg'M'tuolt^ jf^r Esst^Vsst ©erusfei^* Oiiit^fi sup^air-
isi'a«si soi thti Soiri^t Ofiioa gav® aid to ttie /.f 
preseflt V'ietmis, Fatt^sa, iilMJUr-Eats-t, G&r&uw ^ ^ tJie ©a jor 
CoM Wai* th^ £avi©tJ intervemtioii i » Oi^akoslovskia i n 
Eeptember iSteij had t^utiieS the m t l o m of t!ie faxon 
adaaiMstiatlofi I s tt^Xr^ i t s s^st to reaaXve these points o i 
struggle sines i t s imiigujratiou in J a m s ^ , 18S9* 
jp'roa t;!3© Mialysi© i t i s thnt CoM hss 
^ e a a vide i n w r M u n t i e s . As the CoM -^-'ar 
oaC| a new fjowoi" radiation patters cmQ infca iaoM ar©li«^f# I t s 
chief t e&tmm m m i ( 1 ) Tha d©clin© of Europe, ( 2 ) Bie r i s e o f 
tho Oriit«<a States as a leading 1:0stern povor a M as the i e M e r 
of the t:#sters group of nations, ( 3 ) ^he ©acrgefsc® of th© t:ovi©t 
Onion as a i s i l i tary pow©r ©<3iiai to the yaited State© as an 
©comaic power onisr seeoad m /aserica, ( 4 ) m© spresd of 
ii?&atwver la^^aiasi ^ Q third oi" to© whoiie vorMt tharsl^y 
pos i t ion of Soviet UtHon as the only 
Eocia i iat couacry surrounded c ap i t a l i s t «©i»siBi©s% ard ( 6 ) 
Hie emergom© of /^sias a M J^frican coyntries to mtXoi^imd ai5d 
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feljclr oisjectiv© o r kmp i t ^ aum t^ie struiigie f o r 
poimr b^tmi&n the two She siJcth point we ac^ add i n 
tfiii J^i-esefit ^^ being chalieiagsd iSf l^e 
rir-^ oi' a jal i itarit CoiStoiiBlst CMm# 
2ti« CoM vrar feas iie^n foiLiltt on me idsslo^glectii p ^ i i -
t i e a i , sti-aitQgie am tjcomiiiie f r on t s and ' o i l the f a c to r s hava 
r«S|K>ji$iiiiQ f o r mess strugg^les. o f th^ 
l>l»cs eiasbad f o r th© 4ojaimtion of the w^rM* 
eapifcalisia tba Cotriet Cocasijajlsffl are tm en t i r e l y 
d l f i s r ^ n t ideo iog les* Bass la s M Cbiim want th© cxtonsion 
of s oc i a l i ^ a so that tha /m&ticm capitalism Bh&uM be ©ijded 
p ro le ta r i an nsvolutton the u^S- ^^ants to contaiu th& 
Soviet union i n Sarop© i n Asia o t feer^sa Euesia moM 
domlmt^ «Qth tha iPacifie ml Urn 
S im-Sov i©t r i f fc a M the ideaXosS l o go s l av i a 
are tUefisseiiros ras|joasii3i« f o r th is i ^ ^ l o g i c a l s t rugg le* 
iratiomliiSia aa l i s t e r m t i a a a H s s f sna m u t r a l i s © haV0 
sm^n oth&Jt i a ^ l o j ^ i o s ishich clashi^d wit^i e i ther o f two 
laajor i aeo iag ies * f a r ce s ran i sa ra l l e i to aia forced pa r t 
o f t&e p o ^ r co i s f l l c t . 
Cisatialsya tea^^mt the C«5p yar^ /»sta Fubl ishiag Boii^e, 
Boabg^f 1962, 
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the U.S. ATTimPE TOWARDS THE COLD WAR 
Obviously, GoM Mar i s the competition between the 
united States and the Soviet Union fo r the f r iendship , good 
w i l l , diploiuatic support, a l legiance, and a l l iance of other 
countries or v/e aajr put i t as the struggle f o r the domination 
of the world. Therefore, the United States has been an inev i -
table aa^or participant i n the Cold War world strategy. Soon 
a f te r the h o s t i l i t i e s of the Second World Wai" ended, the wartime 
V 
Anglo-American partnership with the Soviets dissolved into the 
tensions now known as the Cold War. The weight of Russia 
increased i n Europe. With Germai^ and Japan defeated, damaged, 
and disarmed, and with England and France gravely weaker^d, the 
Soviet Union emerged from the war as the strongest nation i n 
Eura'sia, where no country of group of countries could match 
Muscovite mil itary might^ Only the United States could face 
i t and keep the balance of power r ight in Europe. Hence there 
was American involvement in Europe. 
Before the F i r s t World War, the Americans wedded to i s o -
lationism and hoping to remain aloof from world po l i t i e s , expec-
ted to Bscape entanglement i n the net of in-terna.tional-
af f a i r s J the balance of power, £et the U.S. fought i n two world 
1. Louis Fischer, Russia. America and the World (Bombay, 1962), p. 
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wars to avoid being the low man on the balance of power s e e s aw , 
^ M today America i s one of the two chief performers in the 
balance of power act called the Cold War?" Ard i n the la rger 
confrontation between the Coxomunist bloc and the West, i t has 
played a major part ever since the end of World War I I . 
For the United States the Big Pov/er r i va l ry i s qua l i ta -
t ively dlf:^erent from the power struggles of the past because 
i t i s not only the r iva l ry of the powerful nations but also that 
of two powerful systems. On October 23, 1962, the U.S.represen-
tat ive in the Security Council, M l a i E.Stevenson sa id : '"Cold 
War i s not a private struggle ; i t i s a world c i v i l war, 
a c o l d e s t between the p lui 'a l i st ic world and the uiorjolitliic 
world, a contest between the world of Charter and the world of 
communist conformity. Every nation that i s now independent i s 
involved in this grim, costly, d i s t a s te fu l d i v i s i on i n the world, 
2 
no matter how remote and how uninterested."' The Soviet bloc 
stands f o r a Communist world and i s convinced that capitalism 
has arrived at the l a s t phase of i t s survival . The U.S. on the 
other hand stands fo r the cap i t a l i s t system with or without 3 democratic inst i tut ions , and i s the leader of the Western bloc. 
1. Louis Fischer, Russia^America and the World (Bombay, 1962), 
p.4, 
2. p .S .B . j XIVII (1220), November 12, 1962, p.729, 
3. At home i t i s wedded to i t s own variety of democracy; i n 
Europe, i t is a l l i e d with democratic Br i ta in , s oc i a l i s t 
Scandinavia and f a s c i s t Spain and Portugal; i n Latin America, 
A f r ica and Asia i t supports systems of government f a r 
removed from democracy. 
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Bttfe i t Is ire«3r dlff icnit to s ^ as i® tH® ide&togj o£ 
th^ i^ QSts^ n m^ l e ^ n g ct^wcM.^ itt ^ e tiestei^ ti 
lieiTd stsitei iselief In I t^ t^t t t t l^m* deia^erac^t 
prealdeiit fruisao hlciaeif said in Ms • j^rumis Doe trim* 
spm&h at imeh 12^  1947, mat m^ of is foasigfi apon 
ti^ e- 1414 of the Qifi^orityt and i s aisUi^yl^eS Isr i ^ t i t u -
tioiicj represontsUTire govewsaeut, imm eJL&ctions, guarantees 
of iiaUvidaia ilaierty, fx'eedosi oi" speech audi sal 
fireodoiii froBi p o i i t i e a i oppsosston^" XdeoldgicaX canfosf is l^ can 
i » t be the Hasis of the %'mUm oioc as I t includes the differ^, 
ent t^pes States, l^ saieaver i t io a defonsiv© groi^ng agains 
Soviet mraat ratawsr than as i4«diogicaI groupixig* 
/J2arleans io^ Is: upon comunlsoi tis a oisirai a^^iinatioii 
ami tlfeat i t «rith elesi* emt ntA ixs^dUeat indigiiatioiu the^ 
dc»uat Vm superloir ©f feet l i ieneas of a t o t a l i t a r i a n mid 
i t as discjredited tsiy ItQ t&mtliO^ h\mim social coats* 
g 
Pi»0$i<i@Bt o^served« e^mmxe^et 
dictatorahipf rutbloss stroi^ ii^atiaMe.-lsdeteriaitied to 
licrli i ts sway a l l the vs^rM* fl^ i© eosis^inlst dictatorship 
is adroit in its seleetian and usd of evexy iaogiitabie weapon 
to achieve its eMs* It osed force and the threat of force.It 
1. ^pe^anta oa IntermtionaX MfMrs (B.I.I.A.,London 
2. Vol.XXXI (794>1 B&ptmtsms IS, p. 369. 
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iisfcjs brimM^^f^ su0V«jpsion, a M saiiotag©, I t uses prapagaMa.** 
1316 BUBfflGion Q£ C^mMXilm I s i j s s ^ uposi 
several eoxsvietionst t!mt Oo&tsmxAsm MsreMs Mstoilcal 
pracessfcs that lisir© coiJdiUoiss 
agai&st i i ^ c h imts j^mtmteSi^ that C^mmj^&t t ^ ^ r i e s o f 
M iepe^aiisffi aisread psmtms i^cl i has 
to mikif oi calofdalieoty aM li^et^d 
e^nieally %q %h@ grottp and nmtionai inceraats of Coamu-
131 at leadersi ©lat far fro© proaotliis aw^ iflthejMn^ away of tli« 
Stste or ai^ pjpotecUoia to tbe citiieeii agaljast of f ic ia l aybi-. 
a mtional Comuf^st it^  iateenml coi&|>iil* 
sioim is totalitariaB* to mst i^e 
pojrts-alt oi tim Soviet u^^oa as a dieinti^rosti^ an^c^lai^Bl 
pover hlahl^ • igmjcin^ a» i t did for 
the slsKSgs of Soviet Ctiina In the arid 
of Soviet ijolicy towai^s BitroiJ© in tlie as well as ia 
l a t e r yoars i 
4l|iart ffosi taa® ideological aisaj^protal^ t&ero wsr® ot!i©r 
factojr® i^cJi to teiij partici|satlon of the in tii© Cold 
bar against the Toviet Ualon* After the eisi of tis© Seeo»S/War, 
smf th& control of ^ Soviet ynioti oti Eastern 
Bmropeaji countriest yibich in turn vas tal^ ea as & direct tlireat 
1* Po|)lai and S a l ^ t t afld_JneyieS|. o ^ . c i t * , p* 
• $2 • 
to thti security ot ttis -Sfeatas. ^^i^eforo, mttoatX 
imm^iist til© r^^aii^ed tib© ©antatJsiaeBt oi' to ^ p a m t o n 
a f Soviet powjp i t rs i i i n sfid tli©a els©wh@ir© i n th© ^arld, 
jp^dwefi^  Eussian det&s^i^atioii 
iti fesm* omtsa states -was neither a t 
w&r m r a t idtfe tfee OfHoiit ^ t i a a Stali© q£ auae-
1 
' 'Eeactlog aga inst Hussion mi&^&s oif p^ver 
^ dur oim f ^ l i e y om the 
imsmption that I b o i ^ i ^ r pr^^e^cat^ Uy ot^es 
seaiss. Opto m® Eogsians v o g ^ i d eo l o g i c a l war aga inst 
us , t iMla %if€f e a « t i m « i ta tj feat l^ea as thouate ^ w&m mfc 
doiftg so." ta s i ae s are a^t ivet a M i t i s t M s f a c t vMch 
B 
deseritJ® as CoM fe^aj?*' • 0 0 s e r i ^ m Mmicm wr i te r * 
fh one ms ^pi^os^ t^an Hu l l S<9Vi@t cantro l East 
3 
Europe, h « r aei^iJotirs**' 
B.H«S# €ro&ssiaii» ni&CX@ctioQs on CoM ¥ a r % the PftM* 
Mcffi;^ . Ouai^fearxy^ Vo l . Il9«if JatMary«Harch l e& l , l^ixlon. 
Also se « Htt^h C*jtj>n • Wats^a, .fMff.iB ' 
gftg imttftfil^^fagni^K^ir IR .ggsM^ar ..ygfl^t i^&thu&nans 
Co* Ltd-1 liondoni pp. 
H*H;S. Grossman, The P o l i t i c a l Quarterly^ o p . c i t . , p.8 
3« See C o M e U Hu l l , iieisQira (liondon 1948), 11.2, 
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P&m^ was tiitim&te nt^d urg^mt noeessit^ in tae 
wdria 4ttst at^t the wsf^ the countries o f the liad 
rs'vaged SeeoM Karld Waff and t!i@ PMted ^ U ^ m s 
OifgardsatidQ ^as s^t sp 'tej save tli© syec^sd l i^ S©R«iraUoii'S 
of war^ '^  
iitmb , 'She iHseriean a l so expeetM a t l e a s t 
a ^ t k i a ^ So f t e t lioioja f o ^ streiigtlieiiliig 
psac^ a i^ f i ^ i ^ t i i ^ ^stw^air reco'eei^ ts eonfdLiiy^ on 
ffiiituai bjf ^ ca&p^mtAQn o f l^e vajr t 
pdfioi* t^^ Congress os Ms return faroM ¥sULta in 
ik^oj^evelt Hai p l e t u r M s mw p^at^var 
vorjid sased on coopeipatlon ^jmatgH tfte Halted Ratloiis, 
a ^ r M i n tihieii a i i f ^ s s i d n and of i i i f l i i s i^et exelusiirft 
aXil3i}e«s am ItaJlasiees o f poiir&f w^iiM ^ th io l s o f pas t ! 
But t^&e v%m f a l s e ^ i ^e s as t ^ eoij^se of 
f o H t l o s l a t e r I t i s trm that a few sm^isUstm in 
i a to raa t l ona l a f f a i r s h M expressed a f e a r as Foster Dul les 
tlien a |»rivat© c i t i ^ n , sa id i that be l i eve r s in a f r e 
s o e i e t ; shouM f e e l t^at t h ^ r i d e a l s vouM i>e unsafe i f the 
•worJUl beceae prepoMerentl jr t o t a l i t a r i a n end in to l e r an t and ^ a t 
p3tQpoam%s of d ictators l i ip of the p rd l e t a r i a t s ^ u l d f e e l uzisafe 
aaid m enviroment o f i i - d iv ldus l f r ^ o i a * * * Winston 
i ; See tbe statement made W Freeideat i^efore a j o i n t sess ion o 
tbe Congress on Jiarch 1 . 1 9 4 6 , Vo1«£ IX (297)tKareti 
1946, Ft iU f e x t I n i l U J . , 331* 
a * ^dim CsCamp^eU, iBie United States i n t ^ r M 4f f aira^-IMfe. . 
28i2,<ttev ]iiorkfi Ba r f e r , f o r the ^ u n d l on Fore ign Heletions 
Preface o/ O^oha ^"oster Du l l e s , p « i r l i i * Later Bu l l e s 
i^rfeed as O.S.Secretar^ of s ta te frc»& 
mm* 
ChwemiXl^B alajpffil^s vo lee a t Fuifejis, M s s o u r t , In hm^eh 1 9 ^ , 
that k m m S^vlut Eussia um i t s Cem^ualst isitei^ 
o a t i o f i ^ ofgasilsatioiis ifitondl to do i n Wi^ i a^ed ia te ^titur^f 
o r isJiat are Sh© i i i a l t s , a i ^ , to t&eiy expansive msta prose -
lyt ls l i sg ym me&lveSL stroi^g c r i t i e i s i^ 
i n t!ie United r t s t e s * 3ut« oSteww&tAB^ tho Soviet 
eaq^ni^slofi and u n r ^ i t t i n ^ pressure graSualljr tba 
f^.tQtes to rdeonsider the i r mB\mptLom tf!@ e m o f 
JTigtitiog h M ac toaU^ aeaat tha t ^ ^ad tog mi g&miim pe&ce 
o r not* I t was i n Octot^er that President Srooiais hsd 
irarised tite Cot^oBs Idiat again can we eoant on t^e 
l u a c ^ Qi ti&e with which to ^ m l& ai^ 
the l ieart o f tl^e United States ¥OuM ^ e enes^ ' s f i r s t 
target* Our g e o s r a i M c a l fieeitiri^ i a mw Itie 
Qa¥®fit q£ the roijot iKSsafe, tlie rocket» a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s ana 
jaodern air^oori^ 
^ t l i e r reaairlt^&iU ttiat tliie Qi^ted States 
m m s m d o f tslsiisig ^ e r i sk o f a war agfdLn e o f i t s d M ^ 
l&e C&mmiint mpsmloxn in Europe* l^eaee assS seeur i t r v@re ^ e 
t i o m o f i ict i - tesr ican®, tue resposse to Bas©ia» 
Iis8 mt bddii utoa I>ck5il»araisent| t»at leafah&JUl 
I n Europ^t aodt BsUdim* ^ U a n i n f b f e a Since 
m M &M i a r ge , has a JTorc^e, 
foreisi^ woxM fcs put ifcs IJQUS© i n o M « r a M ta 
attend to e v i l a s ^ e f w i s e nduM iiave imm l e f t t& fas te r . 
I t i s ©isiir tfeaf^s ^ EiJasias pressitt® fehafe w© are orgat^iAisg 
Bm^lti on a i09JrM liasisi** Qasia lo 
seen as a l^smt^ ttion ad s p a f t m r In tli^ purs idt 
o f was udd-^lSi? that a coimemisui on 
thQ m c m B i t ^ d f Soi^iet « c o m « 
M e m H & e U m agrem&atB cir aU iaaevSt 
aiflt i f m o e s s a ^ lAlitajpy f o r c e . I n QM&e to 
p o s s i M i i ^ t^e gaii!ili3S a teehmlogloaX a i v ^ ^ 
tage which i t s i g h t ^ advaace its purjposes iti tha l a t e r 
^mt^ MmsL^a oeeane acigaged i n a higHl^r compl&x, wems raoe* 
In mn^ly yeass^ the coataiissetit oX 
&i£m> yios tli& prij^^ dt»4ective at 
9t tha Oiilt@4 States* o f cofitalmeQt» tbe oiiljr 
ius t ruaost in tlie o*S« vas advocated Pr«8ideat l^uaaj 
vhen @Md i n ths Congress a a kmc^ 12» I W i that t 
Bunaioffi aoiiset I^ w Xo3?|if P» 
t^at i t miQt tm p ^ U i ^ o£ t^e 
United States to jf^ed pOQ^es 
r e s i s t i n g gt tes ipt^ su&4ttgdtlon ^ ajrseS 
dimritXes m outside ^msmxem* t 
that we aos t a s s i s t itm pQ^ploB t^ out 
t ^ l r mm doefeiuies i n tSieir ovn wfljr**! 
B r i t a i n « s g s m ^ s i tua t ion had foj^cM i t to 
di8eQfitiiii£& e c o m M c a M M i i t m r / s^^nt to Qreeee a M for&e^ 
ag&lsst eosasniMst aa i viien th i s iiif92mati0ii 
coaches WasHlQgton a f t e r tac^d a v i t a l ddCisioii 
t a T«RC® of i t s owa seeml t^ audi thm seciirtty o f i fester^ SUJPOJI© 
tito ScmsMci B^otfifi© ^xtetaiM to &M 
Z 
Tu^kmy* ^ m r a h B l l Pl&n (1947) ir« ^ i rops siM f o u ; 
fojr m m U l m a l so me^ur&s o f hu&e doom* 
M e aid t^ aeirve ^ o i 'oM purposes o f intofxial 
^j^iiaiilam oti mome^e i e v o l mM mm 
sAnaz^^os In ©mms^et teriss^ i n i^tiai^o f o r mos^ersliip o f tlie 
Wostora b loe , or to lf«©|» coiiutries f r o s f a l U f s g in to 
ths €oi&ssu&iat orliiit. ^ ^ u t y*S« a s s i a t i m o t 
Secretary o f mrntrn^ mtm Aehmson sa id on ISSOi 
teehaieax assidtanco i s iK»t pMIantturofHSTf to r tmm our 
ana s e K i&tor@st oo i f « ^de * M th^ people o i 
te^wa^i gi^  ^ n ^ j g a m ^ f i ^ l a l l tpg I W t v«0 <m9 ) 
op*e i t « t 7« 
S . me iNsofshaU Flitii was deserii jed isf Andrei a laoiaber 
o f t-oviet i ^Ht^uro f s t i t s js^eting as m attempt to as tab*, 
l i s h s "proteetorafce" o v « r Europe* 
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areas rim £rm p^ i ror^t ^ ^ ^ ^ ourn 
oeo&flty but a l so a M eiien j ^ r e laportan^ t^e r e a l 
proislse of ^iJJt expose tlis f a l s e paK>iQi6G8 o t Bolsheir.ik 
DuUes a lso h i s U n i t i n g i n a s iM Ia i r 
vlmti ^m d&cld& i n B^wmm tlist Ifc was h^b® to grant 
MXMoxis afsuialljr as foreigis Bcomw^e a i d . We sd^pt^d ttiat 
ItdUe/ i n JTdSfonse to e f f o r t a to .sabdtege t3i« 
e^Doiitloa o f £iirop»f** H^ls was a tiiat 
out tm&w M e^ ix i& l^ l U j e oouM m% ise euredf 
aia irae inteiaded mt oa l^ to tbna smmh^WQ of Uim 
Western l^loe ^ i M l a a M o tbe r neutraJUlst comatries coi>» 
that iisc^ o r eeosssJsie i i i ax^is^ 
mil strestglte&ii tlie haiils of looai eotturdst m^rnmb&m 
woXtm S.goisei'tsoUi ^ s i s t a u t Sacjretaty f o r Sss te ru 
^ I ' a i r S f ConsBtislst mv&mnt us a " ^ j a M m t i o i i oJt 
p ros i i rU i s tng f a i ^ l c l se i a M c o m i ^ r a t o r l a l agparatttst'* 
" "Tress"'"' """" 
t» pmPXtm^^M r -^^lt/H^l^^w lim^ tmo. 
op«olt*t p. 107* 
Qm European Secoiier? Frogrss®© nas passed W tho tesricaa 
Coisgross on Barim 31, 19i8» tisasoiigfe i M c l j , $ ITfOOOf000,0)0 
to cfeatmligd into ths mcQ^foxf of Western Barop® 
over tl30 mxt iavat y&BJ^s* 
aotlJt (766) , »»e«iftb8r 14, t m a ^ p . 
i 
mi j o l H t f t ^ BiMwmm* ih^m &XlXnmm •ms^ t^^ ii^tjraisaijts 
f o r &t m& psiiX^ o f iicri^taiis&eiit emmv^ 
sigKii'lG^tife ^ ^ eo imn^s t mi^M liOuMf 
Im a aai^^j ' to tho l i M M States , iioesiidd int^maMoiial . 
eosinsiilsisi WtitJkB In ^tlsat^ mim ^^ povest 
t4i»ii sga ius t the Stat^s'^f d ^ ^ s ^ a l Bm^t^rf oi S t a t * , 
F^stdir In vim &£' tim £r»S» 
tlisiagh^ ^ a t tlieir **i3afc40J3aa s^ciirltir cajsaafc on s t r e * 
o r Hinted StatMgs ^a^^o i r©^ H ^ f fil^tOd hmm 
to stimr^tli a M aJ^o preterit taie 
df aUUiiS fiTdia f s i l ^ i ^ Soviet ^^aMs* Biiil^es 
feared that I f tt^ Soviets n^eat l a M iitasses o f 
^ the sca les o f norlil povor w u M t^ e 
heav i l r a^aiosfc u s f " His p£»iief was ish&% o f ' en taag l -
l i ^ agaltist i s upaa l l^ad a i l l * 
anc^s tlmt t^e j^oliciits o f the Itsdia liad ciasHed 
ta t top ly . pf-incipfiX a l i i a i ^ e s are os f o l l o w s s 
<1) S ie tsmti^ o f Bocipxocai 
a 
(Bio l ^ c t ) t s i ^ m d on tlid a t fiioSe Janeixo 
i * SsSsS-s Vol.X3JXI (786) , BepU 2 7 , 1 $ ^ * 
rax (734) , Jtiljr 20, p . 88. 
• • 
D e ^ w n a l l ttie Xatin ^e i r i ean States* 
( a ) mmmu M g m d « « ^ ^ 17, I®!® 
UQlte^l lia^amsu 
2 
a © E^rtli /»tXsatJ.c ^ e s ^ - , sl^nad o s 4p££l l e t© a t 
WashlfKgtdR pow&ra B e i g l w , C a i ^ & t 
D^fiaark, ^QD&Ot I c ^ l a M t I t a l ^ t lioxesi^itrg, lha i e t ^ r X a a l S t 
I b ^ ^ t i^^tiigal^ WtKm s M Ur&eeQ aad torkis^ 4oiim 
i s t e r on teinrusirjr SOf X ^ t s separate pmtdoa l o f 
Fe^Ttiarjr t^t tWB eeia^JUsg t^om to ^olii* Each s lgua^ssr pledget 
ItBmH dair&lop Hie eapacitr ^ r e a i s t ^ a e d 
attaekf to sc^asuXt ^ g e t ^ r I n the e^eat of ttarsats, anS to 
regard sn asa i^ aga inst a m la^re as an aga ixat 
aJJU © l i s « a s taie f i r s t Emmprnm sU-lmme t© wMclj teie 
te^Oiiifii a par^** fti@ Biisslan e^pl^fiiofi Wm ^tom BokI^ in 1949 
^ Mw^ ioe tlsls lae^ause I M s eacplj^sidn alarmed 
the fiiia poMcjr of ^ i s i i i ^ tog^^^j? i n a 
im® smmt t^ door agaiaist 
fuiture mgot ia t ioBs i Instead i t tsk«ii i a l ^pe tHst sltUf 
sMom of ^skmBB M g h t bQ j^e it io ias o f streagtSi 
so that ^QQ ^ r«eogals@d and out o f tiam can gxoir 
1* m J g i ^ m ^ 
pp. th® was mt m pai?tjr ta t M © f r o s t y 
i t forisod th^ f o r l£{e N^l^* . 
l ^ f r flffi i n^ i r i i fU f tna l m i ^ y g i t l S t M f 
pp* w - s ^ * 
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ag^^aient*** S©cr«tai'>' oi StateSf l>Qan i^Uemn^ s a id on Haircii 
imQt 
*^ 0iur i s i i s f l ^^ i ^ i e t ^ ^ oplisions 
are I'^ss&n im a tesrs to 
iSiscussi t^ napiMmt®^ to sgs'ti^i we arcs 
um^rntamBbl^ UBm to mm mim o f 
W0 i s m t ^ ® 1110 IM - -
in JTntuf© as Mum In past 
i s seeklt^ ^ m t m n t ^ e t m m ^^tm I s 
i M i c a t i o s Hiat ftii0 i ^MM ^ a f t u i t * 
f i l l 
m"^ wag o m o£ thci itxtimtpsX aUiaacfss i M e h VQSe 
tb& priisas^ purpose th@ t l irest f i ^ a 
CdB^ufilat Xo a radtlo s ^ ^ s e ^ i r ^ i m f ^ ^ 
^©^a stiidi "251© V^^Btom t&e dei'eas© system oi tn© 
JtiPee i a ix$ the I^Z'tli Canffitmll^ aiaS 
4 
( 4 ) i<iei:a:lty,/frQatjf iiQtvmn tlie o f 
^u^tf-aiiay BeM Zsaiaod a » l t!ie i ^ s m Pact it e l g m d a t 
Bm fimiaeisc^y on Septetsl^f I f l ® ^ ! . 
1* i»etiteon t M t e a aad Ute' Soviet 
speech a t th^ antirarsitjr o£ CaHfort j i f t iB&ski^le^h pepayt* 
PwtoUi^ f v *2s 27» ia&o) » p* 47?. 
S* Sm Bspax't o f KiXiiats ^•Draper (ilr«>y 
3* 
• icjil • 
(l>> ISie Bouth^Emt eolXmUve mieme freat^I (mnllii 
Pact i , slgiiea im^iM dA ij^ 
m m l ^ i ittist^raJLiat Franco^ m t leaXandy Faklstaii» mi ipp l joesy 
£hailaalt Uisited Klf3@dosi and I n order to iRilld 
v a i l agalimt esmunlst a j ^amidn tu Mla.^ 
eatt^ht to lisit® as iaa^ coantries as passi&le i s isllitaJT 
tsom these i s^ l^ - i a t i s ra l and a U l a ^ e s the 
llnited States had aat^raS pacts and 
arf'angesiQiitg oa tri lateral tesls the s M son® 
qPw^ wMch Mdad ss^m eaiisitries to taje t/©st©ra bloc. 
tti® has i^ttial agred&ents v i th the 
ShllXj^j^mBf th® Bsfu&llo ol* gouth 
& 7 
msmsAf mkltstm 
y ^ t Iff ^ y i c i ^ ikiUGsr* mpafftrn^ot oJT 
6tat# Publication Seaeral F^r^lgn Policy ser ies 
117, I , 912.016. 
2, sext ID m^mtu^ /Mf l^af i g w i K B B^iaUggg 
S3* 
4 . fext o f 3?r«at^ in i t ia ted W President Be© aiaJ Seemt&xr 
mUj69 on 7 and ei^niod on Detober I t 1 9 ^ i n 
£mtSi&r o lTf lelal QmB* eommntSf lUiaaS* t^anuarj^ 
^ f e * t oS 2r«aty aad ^irfteaeot® i o xjpd (807^t 
I)©ceei3«r 13, pp. 896-99. 
6 . text- df M t u a l D^ranc^ A&X'&m&nt, sigmS on 
Hay .19, 19S4, i n . f i m . Il^lggffg 
Hajr 19| 1964. 
7* fea^t ol^ DeJfexiee snd Eeoiaoislc ^reemeisits in 
XXIX C74&), oetote&r fe, 1 9 ^ , PP* 43§-442. 
- 102 -
AiJaut th889 aULiajseeSf the Ass istant Seerets^y f o r 
Suroi^afi M ' f s i r s sMdii 
"Our aU iQS are tfeass to i^hoa ore b o u ^ , aiaS 
wha i^i iM to UBf W speei^te treaty d&i iga* 
t loaa* F l r&t speakli^ chromloglea2.1^t ^ 
of Ma de Jamijro vMm MaS® as in 
aXXtmim Mith Sa JMi^icaii BepuisJles 
i n th » mst^sn -m hmn 
Atlant ic Ttmst^f i s a 
tSte 14 m.%lam a^e mim^sm 
Trmo t^^  v l t ^ JUistraila so l mw 
W have Seeur i l^ Faets with the HiijU.* 
ppifias an^ v l th 4upm» Fu t t l i ^ a l l 
bg t r ea t i e s audi a l l ia f iaes v i i ^ 
mU.Qm in Westarii hejaisphda^y 
l a Siiuyops, a i^ In th© Fae i r i c . ^1 
Ih i s s^tM vss d^vm^a Imtom th& slgr^m mnila 
raet* In mstrnrn oldo i n the o f 
2 
Kxm&mt 
"Jhe l a r g e s t ^ m u j ^ m o f natloiis ana i^e m s t 
f^rMda&a^ that Mstdxy hm ener Umwa mmtg 
i l iat I t cansMers i a eo^is^Q danger* mt l on^ 
mm eapal^Io qZ mlMing &n ^mms^m emme^^f 
poi i t tcaX and psfeteilogleaX pr^saiira oa timrn 
nhd aay choose to ^tasd apart f r o a ^m* isol&tiQSikm 
em hBSdly j^ractised ^ mti&n towsrd stjt^ a 
mlUt&ry Facts add9d to s t r e t ^ ^ o f the Oolted 
Stats t agaiisst tho Soviet threat . In i t s mfe loa ' s 
s d o u r l ^ ani isdliag e a » he l a s t i ng l y achieved i n i s o l a t i o n 
"Oar mopopBun Mi les** , ,PtS*B» jotsd (TSa) , Septeasier 
a* M i a R jf'attiiihn FgUgy op*c i t * t p.m. 
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'mt oajyr i a cdoperat loa with foXlay ijatious*', sat4 
Ps0stdemt E i s e^vo j? ! " m® ^as tha t i n a i ^ r M thi-eatetsed 
mismm^&t mptxmioiA&m^ ana shyaf^ejnnsiy tecfem^ftgyt ^ ^ 
g 
a m t ^ Stafcsfi •'csjamt, ^ar© mt^ stsija atoue^" 3Ji© ifae 
inlieresfceat i a doing whatevef i t isay to prei^^ot th&m (ui^oJSBsit-
t e a } couBtjfles t m n iaiJAng pwey to communist imper l a i i s a whlcli 
i t s i m & l v m ^ u t i a Motm^ Sun^^ry} Buesi asadl Vietinis^* 
i'Q^ fcMs pt.a'ijos®, a Oeited © r f o r t was needed s M the 
ched f o r a l l i e s * I t s po l icy was on the tifiSeVBtaaaiKig 
^at ast seeuflt/ for the fiem irntlom I^msA oitiLy 
i l l {|tiit@d ^ i m t r n Xhe 0f}|t@(i f^ati^ns, owe vaslous regiosssO. 
ag fe is^ f i t s l a Euroj^t l^^tin /.sug^rica a i^ I n the rac iX ic i 
stttual i ^ & e m m «> a l l a f Wi^b^ thiisgs t e s t i e r ^ tlie 
iis®0yfeasc# aJT anit^ was the triew o f Jltevens^ 
^Sssistaat ^ tise D i r e e ^ r or ttt© Oirfic© o f Eastern 
3 European J^ fa i r s * 
, - • ^ 
Xntei 'mtloiml comtmlsffii frois the 1}*S# i i l m poii it , used 
as a jslogsn Jtor gdifiiisg eontro l &{3d 
i t s ovn b ruta l fcim of i@|K»rialisfi wMols i s the lasgatio^ o f 
- m . 
1 
fsat ioimli^ }** BuJlJles I ' ^ark^d* fhtgi Soviet ^Qf^tods and taetitts 
sea mMmiSm^, W tSie JUsarieans. Om of asst 
s t r ik ing c^iaractexlstic oiT Soviet Strategy atnl t ac t i c s " i s thei i 
o f and ( ^ r c i o i t perstzasion a i^ 
pressure ar® Qi ensure© v^v&tB&l^^ iseai]® gettiJOg otiier 
poopi© act i n des i red v s f s * l^ ^^at i s p ecnUa r afej^t the 
S^viist i s mmisms' i a i^ ie l i thesis isetlidtdia 
use ccifii&i^y sij&nXtEuaomsJt^i Bom^timm i n suceessiont 
iysd o f ten with a i^rasdnoess ^ c l i y Impressiisg m m people 
tends t0 ©©i f -du feat i sa with otSsera", sai<| George ^ r g a n , 
D l reetor of tii© Senriee l a s t i ^ t s a t Washijsgtoi^ " 
Secretary BmU v i ^ w ^ the Cola war as the l i i roct axprasslox 
of t f^ datesiaiimtioi2 o f tim Sim-So 'v iet d l^e to 
t l ie i r ^ M s t o r i e a l i ^ ioe^itablo** ^ r M r#i7oXiition ever^r 
'a 
airaila&le ist^ass* im r e i t e ra ted tliat mmt aalmtain 
our to d@t@r Cosffitti^st aggression In a } . ! i t s forais*** 
Sat how tbe torieaus couid do i t * He spoks, *'with our a i i ioSf 
itfe hssQ tliat a t i i i t ? a M m the i d H to use i t f " 
Ihe /ioericans do m t see m acd to Urn CoM War u n t i l 
th& SoviatSf started i t •'decide to abai3do» i t f ^ 
1":"' ''' XXKI i79kU2Q Septsaoa* 
2m i M 6 » f M I ^ it21&)g October 2&f 1962, p.Gfel* 
iMd4*t (121®>» We i aba r fc, 1968, 683. 
Septamser p» 607* 
• lOti 
16 i s aodut l ^soe oi^ tlia CdM Vm^ t ^ t the U M f ^ 
Statfsfi ana hwt^ qiKlfc© d i f f e r e n t vimn and see f r o a 
Viideiy 4 i f f© r i f i s I n e f f e c t m i s divei-geuce has l « d 
t h ^ ta d lss^^ee sharsJMr o^er sevara i i s sues - s p ^ i s J l ^ igi© 
matt@x- mllXt&sjf pacts ani las^ojr i ss i iss o f v s r M 
t i c s Morm^f F&wmBa^ Vl&tmm^ j^sia^'^ete* Infl ia 
vsa mmr& tliat MmwlG&n aiadl Sec ia ion wbb s i^iire 
td ga in aa o^er die Comiimnist li lac, regac^Isss oJt 
t^d g^tmlm in&ex&sts 0i I n i i a ani tha /(si&is pmplm* 
at® &m iQWm^nt tJtiog i s that as Tar as th& 
War i s ^ n m r m d ^ mSXh^ OiiitM States I s d i s v an tM 
ta jTrae b e r s ^ f t m the c o i l s q£ Big jpov^i* dip^idmacy s i i ^ e 
tm dts^ Bhm Xisdi&si l e M e t s mm HQmlmed 
tliat t^ i n t^B liifolair stsu&gle w u M 
tantiigdoimt %Q los ing sveryttiing that I i ^ i a h M ^ainad i n liet^ 
M u g s t rugdie iost imtiQCal iM^pem^nee* d ^ l a r e d 
i » t&bBi ^ o r e i s a i ^ M fedS^, cer ta in ly we 
raX» I t m t i&stCer ^ i s ^ g U t axsl i s 
v l i x m t ^oin i n th is e x h i b i U o n oX liiutuai m i s 
att itu&e m t OBI^ basad upoR isi^ral cfsnviction but a lso 
1* tipm&i i n thi© 9ou6© of the People, ^um 12, 1.96a, 
v o i a i , l a a , 
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td a g v m t ©xfeene upon the cancjpefce JTsets o f I M l a ' s |>0slUo» 
i n li3Lt#rmtloml liadta m s js l l i f iar ia^ i?©^. I i ^ i a o 
l e M e r s Imew s t f a t ^ l c impl icat ions of hei- geographic 
^ojdU&it^ to t m mott p^ imHul CQim&anlst s t a tes tbe 
Soviet swKl China anS that'|>afffciaiit^ tavs fds ths West 
i^ t tH ta vmQmmXlksale t&mtom on i^ la i i 
Hhm^tom^ I M i a l o g i c a l i / m t to entmmle he r se l f i n the 
CoM 
B^ura tlid CM of sii 'cMtect f o r e i g n p d l i ^ 
IsaUeved the s t rogg i e East a M l^'est 
i^sB r e s ^ t of d i f f e r e n t e^smisic p & i i t i c a l systems* 
stilted to d i f f e t e n t s ec l eUe&t On ^ ^ 19^0 lie ooservedt 
^life mmt smiXm thmt thQre nm d i f f e r e t i t types o f 
eooasMe poUe^ In the tdda^ In different countries nzaS 
t£3ey toiie'ETM i n t l jetr iieopXe, WeXlf tue only t h l » g to 
d^ i s to leave %hm to out their destli:^* I t ms^ be that 
o m o f theis ^ u a t i f i e s t M s p-olie^t ^imttser j u s t i f i e s amthejr* 
I t mi^ 'm that & ^ I s d f o U o ^ s tlie course^***** i^ e mmt 
91^  tlie ^aaia o f lesiviJsg m^sy couisliifjr to s ! i i f t i t s e l f 
i o regard to i t s l a t e rna i a f f a i r s * Ai^ e f f o r t to chauge ttie 
eooQo&ie poMc^i o r aq^ other i n t e r m l p o U ^ i f o r e l b l ^ o r to 
limayendeEee and, J f ter> pp. 
i M i a %ta8 f o l l o w i ] ^ t^at course, , f y p f i ggfilgi 
( Ind ian I » f o m s t i o n Serv ice , Urn © e l h i ) , p . S^ m 
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bUfSg to fteajr upan i t , X^Mb eount^- jpresaure and 
to c^utlfiiJ&tts ^ MoS. & type at 
«!iicli a lit?©»aiia»l0t«>lAw© phil&s&piif 0f i i f © * n m e m 
aes i z^ to e&mmtt o ^ a r . p i ^Me to ai^r v i m o r tlioag^ti 
I i ^ i a has bieeG agalttst tStm €oM War sijsc© tier 
i i i i o p e M Q ^ e a M wsa m t r#Mjr to aee iio^M i n terms o f 
ulam sod She t^lime^^ d^aocrat le 
o f i lXe mM i s tiio XmgGBt tloffiootac^ o f Mim* In h i s Bpeeah 
o f Oetoiser a , at t t e iMcfemii Coiif&i?enee o f tSm M ^ t l c m 
I f i s t i tute of Pac i f i c Ee lat ioos C f ^ i&xkh Hehru ss td i 
Big oft©3s askeeS i l.'hat i® ^isaiMstsm doifig l a 
^ f i Bme does i t a f f e e t m f 
to m r i . alxmt deeper tia^o to 
deeper p m o l m s o f ©v^iry t^onti?^ 
d i f i i o o x t Qii&stioiiK than q m s t l a m o f 
eoBcaioisis o r m i f thet vero 
tine Qtt0stioii i » f t i s the 
In sp i t e o f d i f i ro f s i^os i-^garS toJE ttioir oz'«6d3» 
&6 l l0 f s i d eo i o i i e s i l ^e oo ly was^  to o s i s t pcsacefuUy 
tog®t!ior va@ to givo up policjr of hatred and i^iolei^eoy 
fkihm Qdiroeat^ and forth©!* s&phosisea that coimtrios eannot 
cocfirort ©ach other by f o r c e o r throats o f fo roe* f o r Sttcli 
3 
attocspt m u l d lm& to catastrophe f o r aiX* 
a. i^D&ia and itmmt&h 
Winter, p.S* 
a * i^bria, p* 
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Oa mssith^x ocaas ioa M sai€t tliat tf^ I s l a the 
pamf o£ imm'lGQ oiii IMsaia lb erlsls a M 
baffiasitar fr©^ tbe aitteat© iSisaster iMch taces tm 
sp^&ch ffehrii t r l ^ ta j?«if©al ^ Jepartaaca o f those 
countr ies d i d m t to c a p i t a l i s t s o? ^^iswii^ 
a M ealds 
" ^LU io i i s o r Imll^^e I D iMat l a ea iXM Mdstefn 
Q s i p l t ^ m i ^ l l e ^ e 1b But 
there a i^ aanf a l lX lo i i s ^ ^ are m% eo^mlttedl t^ 
ell^eir ot l^e&e idedl^g ieSf a i^ yet seeltf f t i 
^It f i n better l i f e a M mm h&p&t^ 
moording to t3se Sol tea States aafl the Western 
esi iotr ies* thesis t?je ^ i e i jsslo of y & s t e ^ Dioc ms that 
Sov iet Hu&sla CoiazsiiEil^ t . China cstleng \giWtk otlier soiaiXer 
Qomm^&t liad h o s t i l e aggreeslire I n t e a t l e m 
te i faMs wet-M* ^ t X M l s l e j ec ted t M s tbes ie 
on tli«! oriels that Indict 414 m t see a i^ dla^eet tlureat o r 
danger to he r se l f from the Qomnml&ti m^lA* I M l a d i d m t 
|}elleire ^ a t Soviet aRlea «ii>t2id attach t m i B ra ther siie hvA 
fr leindl^ re lat let is vlt£i Bussla* I t tieeense o f 
t loG o f th is ^ e a t that i M l a has m t et2p|x»rted the defence 
U E»hra» fggi^f iB IMiru was g lv lKg 
h i e QTgmmts In favour o f dlsftrmament to ssve hucianitr 
from ext laet lon* 
3 . Bovles , Ranort (Itew Stork, I S M ) , 
• 109 • 
arrssgezsen^s &m aetioJas 01: the Western t^loe asa avoided 
exterimi pressures* 
l isaia 's pol icy thm C^ld Uzs fess tsees om o f 
Iseepiisg 0iit qX X U In her v l ev i t enm tieoause the ¥€St an^ 
the tQVl&t Us^Qu Xdui^ ^ms^m i n & grim mmpeti* 
tioii f o r tifsi^id ^omr ana ^ s t t l o n and l^at ^s ia sat M s l m 
are mt i a jpictur^ as j i l i ^ tMcgs o f Big f^wars* 
M Its&lm to the tl«S«4* ifinotet 
"Hia iMitkreau Onited States a M tlie 
C^viat ^ a a i a %fhich has tlioa be^oae l»aaic i s 
partljr ideo log ica l ar^ p a r t l f a r e f l ee t io i i o f 
Itotrer p o l i t i e s , in asgr ease diatnisty a M f e a r 
o f tha Soviet Oaion Cdoii^  accofituated Soviet 
teehi^eal acMeteiseiits) are at ISse root o f 
/«ericafi Strategjr sti& tact ics * I t i s theae 
f e e l i n g s wliieh make nm Goversfi^iit g ive the f i r s t 
f r i o r i t ? to iJoiMiog up an aJLlia&ce a g a i m t 
Soviet aod eamunlst aiwers i n i^th l a i l i ta r^ aad 
eooJQomie I t i@ tlie cleavage vMeh m ^ m 
thes th i i ^ In teres o f ^^iiipolarisatioif o f Wm 
norid* And from this top p r i o r i t y ^ ivea to 
ffiiMn^ the %iorld as fe f ro& the e o m m i a t ii^mce 
ar iae m&m ^ ^ di f f ic ixXt iea o f M&vimm. 
f o r e i g e | jo l ie^« " l 
l a d i a lias i » t prepared to support ttoe Western hloc on 
the i deo log i ca l i^asis heeauae i t i m l M e d a l l so r t s of countries 
anal i t i^as a M l i t a r y a l U a n e e rather ^ a n an i deo log i ca l 
alUittice. H.B.iiayo v r o t e j asy that t ^ CoM War i s a 
1 . G . U J ^ t s , '^^s se^ Us" An Xudlaa view, £ s i a l 6B 
j S H a t o , Vol .37, m^ l f October, 18S8, ^ 3fork, p . 109. 
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«0isfJLict Of two ideologldSt on® of v M c h esi&rsces a l l 
i s stepJ^r tjne**^ miixu &©lleved that I t was the 
2 
a i i i i ta ry point vieif that was Somimnt lu Mth&r esmpt Evma 
Br i t i s l i b l s t o f i a a s , l^of^sscraasrat^e aafi Buttor i r ieM, 
supi^ftBd vim that wee tern al l iaticd ^as mt M o o l o g l e a l 
mi% i^&S&smj^ toynim&f s m l a ^ tlie s t rugg le 
i n terns oi potw&s po l i t i c© ; saids States aaS Soviet 
Osiloa «• the t^o powers « ^ ^ m u M l>& antagonists i n a f i n a l 
naked power p o l i t i c s * mejr aro safe«>gaaxdi]as l ^ea* 
* « * « l a the o M fosMoiiiisd I f i a game o f ^ m r pol l* . 
t ios » wMoii, i f pers is ted 1% nm Qnl^ lead a tnLrd no r id 3 
war aiiS s 'knook-out Fiartnemorof %smt& tBat " ce i the * 
m& C a p i t a l i s t vorJUl i s the EuJfWt^ iliat i t 
olslsds to Do • • • « « Miot the v o x M mods mi^m a l l mv i s to get 
t!i« l ^Bm o f tm& ontarpiris^ ves-eue socia l ism o f f I t® i d o o l o g l * 
o a l pedesta l a M ta trmt i t not as & oat tor o f aofiti-^religious 
f a i t h and f soa t i c i say tmt a comi^ti seiose, p r se t i c& l <|i]0@tioii 
o f tibial and orro^i o£ m m or o f ci^cite^taiicos a i^ M o p * 
t io i i * ' 
1 , s ^IU&DCO • Xdoologieal o r 
0ef@aasltro«, iJattyfial <3Jromto>, spr ing 
2 . 9 ISi© f u m c a t i o « s m v i s l o n , 
^ M e t r y of Ir^ojKsatloB a M Broadcastiigg, Gover i »eat o f 
M i a , Kew De lh l i p.70« 
a* l a t o r m t i o m l 9titloolr*| J f i & m a S i s i M 
i t o d u m * % ioctob« r m ? > , 
See I b ^ . f pp. 474.76* 
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ZGdla ti0M fi^ psoQl&m &S the CoM earnxot 
i B t&riiis QosmmAm aud one mix anl 
tua otHer vix^uoas, Xatlia va® m t i a favour o f 
oitheif s M e t f j r ing to i s ^ s e I t s oitrii M o o l o ^ the irest o f 
the i t mm c m m a t M r d ^ r M var* I n tite 
wurds 0f Tmhm. i t « a » Ife ©Kplaltied as smclsi 
€l0ul)t i f ^ aCtsr ^ terx ' l^ le <lisaste]p of a 
tie nations ma^ v l i i the var^Mafi yoOf X hatre 
I t t t i ^ d0mt ^ a t mm t i f eitUs 
o f a w i s M a e n ^ e r s ^ ean sixri^iire 
a t a U . " ! 
£i i i ia*s Jisi^assaaef to ttie t r i ed to 
eacpJLaiii ^hs ^ ^^^^ /sserieajss Sisiisik o f 
l i fe** t ^ imst p^&slW,^ In th@ Beeause of th#ir ou t * 
statndicg ii^ iniiMifi^ itp & a ^ i^anl^jr f ro& a till^der* 
ms^t ^^^ir M ^ stasdlard® of l i i r i i ^ a M t ^ i r preweffiisomo 
i£t sphere^ -Mmslemm laxat t^e i r 
coisstitutioiit ts^eir eeomiaio s^et^n and ^ ^ t o a U the i r 
o f H f e ^ ar& best pomthh^ I n Ute i ^ r M * iioir f inft 
i t d i f f i o u ] . t to reoonciXe ^eas t t l ves to othsr va^s and iseans 
o f Xiitiag bM mtlsXm* For ijostanca ^ a y ean mt uDderstaaS 
B r i t a i o witai har t radit io f is o f i i i s aes^ f f a i r a and Her 
iisparlal. raSftotisiMXititis sliouM itrafar aq^ thii:^ approx isat iz^ 
U Spaachaa af. ..fehrii lQiQ*6S> 
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"saelaiiajs** niaor l is l ia resor ts t9 s t a ^ p i a i i j i i ^ l imtesd 
mX to pPiM&tm onte^pri is^ ^ i t ^a s sa ad 
a s ^ c k ta esat pt^oplt^ i n Puited States t^a t Cans^s^st 
s^fitsa i n Eussla m a i d mQQl th# i r onm tsehsoa^glGaX 
s^ i^vem^nts , as idLtfe the spitiJ^k 
b&lXX&tXc Iheijr l)eiriMe£Bi©iit a M d i s ^ p o i n t ^ i ^ t a t 
titis ifas j^mi^ortionate t^ tli©!^ unboutiiM coiiCi^. 
in ^ Capitaii&t aider's mp&eltj t& yi&M soleatifie 
m l e s s thfiB f i t m c c i a l dliridenisl*^ 
m m 6911 aad soiid vli^tm i n eaeh bloe -^i^thex 
i t i s c^emnuilit d f c a p i t a l i s t * fhe Vlcto I M l a 
Br»S.Baaiiakrisliijais p & l n t ^ 0wt 1 r a bt^adcast im$m 
pelisi OS Oeto&er 24, 1963, that e i ght its goo« i E 
eois&tiiild&s lOoi^ v i t ^ tlio isai a M tui^t, Im ^veut, ^^jmmisffi 
Buid liraiiglit mt« » j r ia l inprovem^nts to fojriafirly liopeless a l H i o a s 
aiad t!t8r«fore fo iml iavour v i t h amta^ jpopial^tioss iti aaxisr 
Wd med mt ^at t^ ^mplm itr^tfess 
otHsr id^im diJtre^&sit trm or mitQ viekea timn 
o i i r ee l ve s^ 
iSia stj^tfesffian. Ootolser Jasd i s t e S B l m s 
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ZaSia mt does m t i o i s e i ther t to 
nod ndntraJU m t Bm mr^ tf^^aat 
o r the fS9mMt!l&t attaclt h m t^nr l to f^ ^ s o a a S , i f 
a t ^ k e S thd %ouM come to hot aid l a ai^ or eirent* In a 
B «S*€ . I n t s f v l e ^ on atiz^ 19i3| l^hirit sa l^s " I sue umolm^ 
teljr m « eattermX danger « to X M i a imm QommtAsm. o r 
a i r otbair I M i a tJelleved tlaafe l^a eliafice© o f a 
l^estism attaofe oa tuyioee dli# liocos^s! aiModl ^ I t b the 
Co« « t i i l s t ^Joof wera iroi^ l^e&aso l i ^ i a had bo^n laaio* 
ta l i :^ !^ eloso poXatioiis with i / e s ^ n powc^rs 
that I t was £Dt i n t t ^ o£ ^ S.S.i^* to cmnh i M i a * 
l i ^ t o M i t ^ m M Xrsdla to a » | Jdlii* 
tax-ll^ . stxosger* Xndia Ohos@ to zmaim nsutra l It a 
^jo^ birol&aoiitf uiQiier tli^ p rova l i i pg ani po l i t l eaX sltua^ 
tiofif so tliat Siasic a i a o f f o r a i g n p o l i ^ 
113 a niorM war, slight ^ sorvod anai s e e u r i ^ 
Indeed i t vas m t i n tho nat ionai I n t ^ f e s t o f I M i a 
to Bi&m lilth olttier of Urn tvo former Soeretary 
Q&mvBl of I nd i a ' s ExtdnmiL M f a i r a Mis l s t r^ , th& l a t e 
Ba^iial wrote cor reot l^ i 
1 . ••me aecwlt i r o i l a i l a 1947-64**, S a a W i a J m ^ t ^ 
&lso se® '^Ittiia I n w H a S t r a t e ^ ? 
Actuali^ this happenad to t>& r lg l i t cent pereant ^ ^ n 
Coiixiiitxlst Chltm. attacked Xnflla i n Octoi>er I9&S9 the UmSm&m 
Qm& to tha reacua slM gave and al l i tax^r aid 
avan v i ^ u t a v r i t t a n aULlacce v l t l i India* 
X M i a 20, 1963. 
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**2t e m arguea t h a t o ^ ii&sediiatd i m t m 
intQ^mts will he TrQsrsed W this Qmntief ii&pU* 
caUHg hersa l f D/ ^a i - t inc i fX t i e s * I n oMieaigr 
combinations o r coal i t ioms- 'o l '^ ^menSs l i ips o r 
eisdltles ot tti0 tuo coisps i n tS:m isa^or 
par t o f tlie i i s rM i s u u f o r ^ m t e l y d i v i » 
Sliis tuiidliing eau ^ aaSe c j ^ I i c i t imm Hia imt&n^ 
c® of the O.S^ MUtaiy i»act with f^feistsa la 18M. India 
oppQ&isd U^B P&et b&emsm in ber iriew this l>rougl$t tli@ cold war 
to %hi& door or Iiidlaa siii>e»iitlmfit aM dlJPect threat to 
XMla*8 i^&me seemrlt^t streiigth^neS ^ ^ i s t a n on l^er tsor. 
and csSo solution of EasitMr prolil^ K^re ooaplioated* 
M M l d o f thQ road pa i i c ^ vas l i ^ o m i f l e d Isy tlie 
Cli imso f i l l e t t ^ sdlltsj^ aHiatidi 
o f ifltli mm m s U 
^coMi iM j to IiehnSf tli^ ^ s j r ^ s i s -of f e a r p r « * s i l l i i s 
tl4$> tws of aaUoicts wiKj o f ^ n f e a r i ng 
2 
saiofi imm me'k o ^ r lalght l ead to war* tn&t ineroases 
l:i@r o a ^ ^ l l t a r ; a l l i a m o i ^ e b igast moassar l l i r i as&ftr the 
clrcti^dtaiicosi a g a i f ^ t o m or ^ o t l i ^ gi^mp ao l til ls 
v lo ious c i r c l e e v e n t m l l ^ Xoaidls to war* ¥ o r M peace l a thro* 
atffjoad afid ari&ed coafifllct t^coaea l o a i a ' s pos i t i on 
1 . G.S*S«Jp*i f a M the Salafico o f pQWQt^f Indian gear 
j ^ak o l Intarnat lanal Aff aira> Vol* IX (1962}, p*4» H« 
I M l a sbouM mi lM her ovn s t r « i i g ^ 6o thmt 
n s l t ^ r s ide iiouM l i k e to lo^se l iol la*^ m i i t r a l i ^ * 
2* oi- l^ ^ear® i n gaSflffUfffi , 
2i8* l3liris*8 I n the i M i a n P^J^Ximmnt on F«l)*l&t 
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hm ijeen Ui&t war i© mt Im^lt&hXe* InOia has 
b ^ f i VQieg act ive I n ^sd luct log that r o l e o f peacesaafeer* 
hm tr/iSij to save ^ lijsirM JTisiwa m ^pm&emm ^Ismt&r 
qM h^loemist^ 
Peace is tii@ ultifisate aim of M i a ' a polleir. 
mbru was amas^ fe tliGt even tlie lisa^iers o f U.S. 
uad igj® Soviet Siiioii always talked peam on 
!I3M 3B| w&te Im^emim ^ ^ tensions tir p s l i c i e® 
otl^ eir liafia. Be mX^ In Safi^ a oa 17 Ueceejiasr t m f i ' 
emmt oai^rstaM lian people tails, m^ iout peace tlte 
esity for the of but at the eaae tiffie issSiilge 
lA the VJar, imeli man^ &oo\kt a sitaatioA vhieh ie 
l^&mlm d&ngeroi^ acd smy Imrst at mw 
isaa&iiti*' 
InUa to ereate a *t6i8per df peaee* aiad ^eimlisr 
to lead vorM mis^ from a seiise of paralysing fesr of tlie 
ii3&vitaM.llt|r of XMia tiiought t!2at In l>&tmmn the tiio 
lilo^Sf Vtmm sm% l>e t^ aet as sort of *m 
or ffigaiator** l ^ s role uss ^ FJi^ ieliixm 
priiieipftl s^e.'^^In&ia has mt tried ®o m^U to 9t«er 
the laiddle eourse as to &e a factor ve hopey Mght aet 
1. ^hrut mwi^ imim op^cit.. p. 204. 
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m & M M of c a t a l y t i c agent*** f ^ ^ u is^Me a dii&iXeir strntetsent 
In v l l l lam israatage oi g^reat It^hmmm is^ 
lierseif iritii one mtiom* Wn&t infliisssee 
i s i^m^m sisi i t I s i n tu© £s?>&m %©rM poacef** B^pm 
r eJee tM a isid4l0 0$ liSm m M p d l l ^ mA aad® i t e l e a r : ""it i s 
smt & po l i^^* I t i s a p98it ive» eoast i^et ive 
pQl le^ a e i i ^ r a t e l r a i s^t^ a t s^jsetl^ng a M dftili^erateljr trariag 
avoid ^ a t i J l t j r to ot^ieir e^^nt r i s s } ^ a i f ' i ^ imt j ^ as f a r 
a as 
2 M i s Mvocataa l ^a t p^acaToi e o w ^ s t o f i o a h&^imn 
l ^ e na t iom o f l^o ^ r M i a onl^ i s paaiia* 
n ^ m fo l l ows i n f&m Lok S a ^ a 011 Bf IS iSt 
" I f th© peoplo are dasivous of putting m acd to 
tlia €oM WaiT) i t s e m s ^ us ^ t tlia u p p m s ^ 
shmiA m% ^ ^ostiXa* Conntiriaa S i f f a r f j ^ 
am In malls' poiieiaSf in tba atsnetara 
o f thair govaarmeBta ani iit IHeir aeoaojsie appfo* 
aehes* esmot put an to isimsm 4X£€emmB6 
tg) wa^t irar w iU . axte^iffliiiata ^ httsian 
raoai a M cot put an eod to ^ a s a 4 i f f a i ^ f i e a s 
isar to our pritneiplaa ana to our 
i daa o f aaeuritsri i^ut i « t us m^gtdm tlia f a o t 
that va iiave to J lve i n th i s no rM t o g a l ^ r i n 
peaca* W hava to f i n d a va^ o f co«>«3ciit6»c«* 
SSia oniy vasT i s l^ T poacafo l laetho&s a s l m t 
t i t i i ^ m acting In. tairas o f ta^ CoM Mar 
D ^ i ^ aaans eoRstant appaaXs to iiatradtViolAiiea 
ana f «ar . **4 
J a ^ B a l a f tSa PurliaBiaiitg o f tlta V o X . m , 
a (19^9)t iC^ffii^Bntaltli pariiaisastarsr Jiasociation), 
aa l ^ l ^ g t P. ^^ ^^^ 
4 . Sahnii i m i a ' 8 f g m g I S gflMffy^ o p « o i t » , pp«209*S10« 
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If idla d id mt l i k e Bi iUes * po l io/ la tSia CoM o t 
•^Spealtlng jfjpom strength,* ' B^caase I t addsfi ta ith^ gi^o^UEig 
t emlons i n tb^ w r l d tlie Uta pawer 
om Mm &Bom a l i t t l e th^ tlidn otiiei* 
B^ysi Mon^&s slsoy so ^ c i t M f srei^mme td 
imtiees part^ to ist^M i t s stms^Wa r s f l d l j r 
as 
W m i brnesm n^sar M t t e r i n eajtment^iig mpon ^ QoM 
War e 0* I* ( ^ e i ^ a l on !>^«mber 
I S ^ t s i i M t t£> a^ ott laist tl i is Mm& me € o U U&e i s 
anl foniaisi^iitallir vmng* ^ t i s i e ^ r a l * I t i s 
t o a l l M ^ a l s d f s&mm Stierefore, 
l@t lis tm in duir lalisdts ms ts i ^ a t the slgtit is*** 
t l s f'eelissg wait "aaTartiiimtel^ lia^s l iM i s aaUdS 
fh.@ C^M War t© ^ t t ^ tlia® a liot war o r a 
sho0t i » g M * * ^ t o f t ^ C^M y^ sip i s a irer^ itegatioii 
d f ^ s t ^ e&nstltsstiati o f UI^SCO s ^ s i i ^ a t wars liegi& 1 » 
^ ^ l a lMs ol* mn» CoM %smis . sieaii t & u t i i ^ } ^ o f vay 
1& til© islialis o f Oas l i i i i i was tevoted to sof^niolozieo 
&ts& tbi& a l l t t e a g h tlio l i f ^ y aod be 
s a i d i y o « ha t « s siKjrd l a your M a i f i t I s tetter to m& 
i t to «iitjrs« a M miir ls l i i t I n iromr isll tbm tkm* 
1. Mis-ot iailft'fi .l^tiffllfill.amiBff 
Itoid#t !»• 
• l i s • 
f ake il» use i t a m t^o i r i t mis&f l a a t e M o f ^ i o g f i rus-
t r a t ^ i e ^^wemiv&a and a l w ^ s l l i i i iMi^ t^Q o r tli« 
u m of th© sts^rd a M y e t s a p e r f i c i a l l y t ry ing ^ avoia i t j " 
^ aiiave makes i t tt»lJllke 
i ^ c a i s a ^ f i ips t l tv r i n t l ^ CeM Mss -wgfM r^irutt Z i ^ i a 
hms Hoes itgmii^t i t * oiO^ i i ^ tn i s^ i i t i s m e hands o t i m i a 
to ai^oid Com War untangiemeiita igm and i s t&e o f 
with o i t ^ r oC the t ^ bijoes and swi^t ia^s t ^ i s 
has isgr e i the r o f d loes lodlia 
hojHie to create an » a r « a of peaco* i n Asia sad a l so to bring 
the asT&l pressure o f that ' area* o f l i k o id,Med natiocs agaitw 
might 
St actions of tht) tvo ^locs taiat/feurt that area« Nehra's 
2 
address to 69th sess ion o f tha XnSiac ^ t i o m i Cbi^rasa 
OB aamarsr I S M , i s oatoiler^liy hare* He saidt 
" I v o pover fu l hlocs of nations confront each other , 
oach trying ti» play a SoMnant ro l o * !£hos# ^^o 
refosB to ^oixt e i ther of those groups are c r i t i c i s e d 
as s i t t i n g on tho fencoi as i f me re couM bo oisly 
two oxtrei&o poeit ioos to take up* Our pol icy has 
been o m o f laotvaligiSQts&t and one of f r i@r4Jy rela-> 
tions v i th a l l the count r i e s • . . • .Ve are coiwincod 
that ^ e p m b l m B of today can be solvod ^ poaco* 
f u l ofithods and « i a t «ach countxy can l i v e i t s mm 
l i f e as i t chooses without imposing i t s e l f on the 
other* « * « « f t tace i s not jssareiy an a b s e i l o f w a r . I t 
i s a lso a s ta te o f mind* fhe state o f a i sd i s 
coispletely absent f r o e th i s world o f Cold War today* 
ve hatre endeavoured not to saccuAib to th is c l i a a t e 
o f war and f e a r an! consider our problems as w e l l 
as probleas of the world as d ispass ionate ly as 
K&hru, M i a ^ a , f o r e i g n o p . c i t . , pp. i t s ^ O T . 
JMSSuBaffii 30, 1 9 W . 
pQfiBiitlQm m hBV0 that ^vm It mm 
ahouM t^^ vo rMt i t i s vo r l ^ 
ta a f e a Qi the v ^ r M tram i t ta tti* 
^ t e a t Sidsefore* M t ^ UtA deolosed that 
Mia will M m psrtieipasi In a i!«af> mtA m hmm 
lioped ^ a t 9 m m countries i a i«ouM l ikewise 
k m p mrar ^ ^ ^ i t tlms lyoiMing ap m area o f 
She Is^gex* ^ a t air^a i s m r e ^ dsxiger o f 
irax I f ^ ilioXe w d f M i s d i v i d e in to t m 
loajoir a M ItostHe thsa l^eira i s m h&p& f o? 
t^e m^eM a M war l i e ^ ^ s imv i t ab l e * * ' 
mm hm tlis mm ot ^iw&e ms^M*^ fej ©aataia ^ 
sproad dt mjsme^m mM loS ia !!0p@d f o r m s rea of so 
m to 4otei? tS5@ f l a w o f CoM War isHel^er i t e s m imm i^e 
tfcst or East* 
ia&ia fktA Qos^sitadalm I 
I 
I f idis m& Q M t ^ S t a t ^ i&teraat io imi onsaa* 
M m fJTo^ s a t i r e i ^ aiffei^eiit p&rspectit^esf i M e l i a f f e c t s i n 
turn tlieir a t t i tudes Awards tli« War* 
IisiSie*s mktioimX in te re s t hid n3taking do to g i v « 
spoc i i i o C0nt«nt fes me H«stejr» p icture o f t2ie Soviet 
s b i p msd i t s i i it«ri i i itioiml Coacmtstol&t e m e m n t m 
eggross iv « & y^rsat to itjaop^oSem^ &£ Bat io»s s M 
to hwmn freedom* Indians* tHeir long 
M@lox:rf &aa l i t t l e A l m c t contacts w i ^ the 
In pmmml osporieoeo a l so added a great d ea l 
to d i f f e r enee i » I M l a s aoa ^aerican outlook* Atsaricans a re 
re lated deBceot ai!d coffii£oo t r ad i t i on to the i?lctiias o f 
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eommdst oppi-easi^n In Easeern mmpe nM Soviet 
vhile Xmtam have m smth link vlth Msr^rtuB®® &t t^ies® 
Bmim esjfir mf years Xmia did mt sm Sttw 
&£ t^moa^Bt attsck 0b fees- t ^ m t ^ ^ * touiii India 
has f i g h t i n i coi&eittBissi a t home ^ Hehry vei^t bq f a r as 
tQ mvemntB I B the ^ X e o f Soia^ii-East 
as aiad •^antt-natS.omlistlc**, i ^ i i g •'eittrea® 
sisS aj^tfesds* bat fels afcti^isa© to i a t ^ y -
^MQyiiii^st mvmmKtiB ym tli^at t& s^jr wore on itmsr #oom» 
sAC l U f f t c u i t i e s a M iifar# mt Ui^ wm^t o f a 
© a g i m e r ^ I n th« m^B o f mwmw t ^ t 
Minn s ta tesses have shonn 
o f the commiBt S a ^ a r within tM& oM ^tte^r 
Bsmm to comuniat p o i i t l e a l p ract ices i a s i S e Euseia 
a M But l ^ e i r o f tha natura o f 
m m m & m does m t coMBttmurat^ll- B i i m t thatr ar«Iatioz^ 
idth Cotsisiislst emntxieB or tha in t e rp ra ta t i oo o f cosiBm* 
o iats* i c t a r m t l o s a X 
Alsottt intanaal^coxsmBEiissi i a India f o^aa r /jabassfidoir 
Ch&Bt&p B>vI&b vrotat can b& m 4oul»t about tha 
Govaraoeiit's 4et&areiliiatioa to taka a i ^ stapa to d a f a a t cmaiti» 
Bim i s 
tm Jmn^^lal iehxu i m s s .^Rf^g^ l^^S , IWQ* 
Foratsii f ^ I I ^ ' ^ t f h a HiMu> JOB® % 
a . BmUB s . ^ a a a a i a f 
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' ^08 I n d i a ' s api^roach toirai^s i^mmAm hgs socio.. 
It^gi^cd^ M 0 m mi^ m e that &xpressl0n hm&f a jratiomXlfiatioQ 
Isoirn out 0 i ttie mpetXeaems o t a society tdth a p p a l U f ^ i ^ low 
stQs^mdB o£ l i v i n g tliat brei^ mass dlseontent. In i^itx^ ^Ax^tq 
lodta ^ m » a i o l ¥ tli© dai3g#r <S8^ f r ^ a int ierml 
coniitiojis^ ana ivmi tfi^ comamABt appeal m a l i b e r a t e 
ing m'immnt ii^Mtli&s' £mu eoioalaiisfi) ishmwe & e^wotiry htm mt 
iiem i *®* Isdo-CIHim, QX tm& l n ^ r i i s l a M 
2 
^ t t & t ^ i a l aiid a/steiaa* 'D^mtmtom^ l i s i ia etdsd 
agsiosti t^e 0«S* o f entaiaglis^ oliiatie&St ana suggested 
tiiat th& li^st ta I'igl^t &»mamim vm mt military cdntaiis* 
i&ent, bat thmu^h I s ^ M i i ^ ^ e o m ^ e a ta^ lU t i " and C u i C i U l a s 
la^tlmte m t t o n a l i s U c as^ l ra t loos* t M s was siala reason 
g iv^n fi!^ f a r M s ©{ j j iasit ido t^ l-M© P a c i f i c Fact i a 
i g h m tifo I f i m luteirvisv v i t h f nml i a l 
i n Kascli, ISSlf ss fsjr as v ^ s to eixmmmlm In Mia 
cam&rsie&t ( 1 ) exscdisrase&Qijt o f mtioBalismf qsSl ( 2 ) 
tssy helping ecoixiale progr«0s* H© polatied otttt « f h a t i s say, 
til* sbduM mt ise o M e W c i r c u a s t a ^ e a to o f 
^mmm^m as a Hb&ra t l a g f o r c e , vtilch thejr ^ i s t e t i ^ s do**^ 
i « i tnaiaa iM^lm.^am'i I W r f f t p * ^ * 
2 . m f f i e f aod P e r n OS I J i ^^ t f l f i l l oM l 
M t f f U a Co*, 
4 . I f Um sm $ MmmlMmif 
/.pirU 1$61, ^bllsJssti isff ^ e C s ^ a n Bepartseot of External 
MXQlm^ p* 123* 
^ 122 ^ 
I^S^Boslsger hm rightly XfmwtkoA €<»iifi«Siijag th is vim that^ 
"^m Ib a&i>le sh&vt ^ a t imst Asla&a t^e fitaln 
i ssue mt k^scom "eersus ^^ Cap i t a l i s a f a t s o s 
Gomm^mf M ir&tlieF mt i ^c^Masy m r e a l iroiee ^or tii« 
i n josogif^say eo lo i ia l i s% de&po* 
t i c gmmi^mmmt ocom&lc l^ackwi^SaBss* 
In t M s i M l a i i oplziiofi h&e been iisp^es^ed t^e 
Soviet tdfis p fopagaMa su^pdrt £qs astic{ i la»ia3l8fii 
ar^ in ps^wtleulm its i t r e l i ^ i i a b l i a i ^ s ^ j p s r t to i^e^om 
mvmt^^ntB i n im&msl&f ^9»Chlm a M Malaga* I M i a t on tlis 
^QHtraaryt h m irr itafeed W tsii© ccifiaBlfeaeat of fifiani-. 
e i a l a i^ fidlitar^ eappoft %& mXXl&B who i n siieijr mXe m 
MiO. t j^isi^ t^ em^ i^ssistan^^i Fojr 
imtrnm&f the CI*S« 4iil mt o ^ ^ s e p o X i ^ o f QpuSfth&t^ i n 
Sough SfiS Portugal. claims tn Oody & p&itt o f 
But l&c^drs o r me Western s>JldCt ^ t i c i i i a r j ^ 
UmBmA* tm In iateriJatioeal cosissiiiisia a jwv fom of iiaperialistt 
t^fasuqr toaii i ig towards t ^ ^ M 4o£(iftatioB» t s^ icg to euiUvert 
1 . flm to op^c i t . t IP.14S, that was f o r 
t!i« S«vejbopiioist ^ a t f o r e i g n ai<l» 
Colomb©.?iao a i f « d and d e s i r e iaternsA 
ataiJiMty i a Bmm^ . and Ifepal^ . MaJUmr aaft Perkins* 
mevarnat m* v/asbingtoo 1948}, pp^ 
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deisocratlc: andi mxweomtiiilst r eg i ae s i ^B f&v&t poss ib le Kdth 
the holp ol* l o c s i coi£iiaiii»i&t8 litiyaX to themf Sliey e l t ^ 
i n the i r pl^enota^ml poist ^sx ©xpamion oi" 
Soviet injtiue&ce i n Eumgrnf a M tlie Cofi^mmlst attaek 
on Eouth iojrisa i n 1S&&* M&itie^B took imsasaiism as m 
smvm&nt i^ icH imB operat ing t^^mipi i t s ^ s e o v s M 
BrnUlm G^mtsm* l^raov&r, i a thsiif iri@v eossmtilst povers 
ifere sii^Jt@«'isinded uitltedt a ^ ^ Mitii s o^ f i e i en t aisfi 
iMuQe tliem td acbleva th&ir aims throu^i lasx ami 
aggroBsloni the sluouid tie streiagt^t^'s^ ^ l i t a r i l ^ . 
2 
JohB Foster Dttlles obse^eds 
Bide CoiKiiEist €ai3ti?0XlM 
a t ^ f o m o f i ^ s r l a i i s t oa ldn i^a i l i ^y r ep r e s&a^ 
a vast mntmX land ©ass witu a fKjpuMtioii o f 
HK>tOO&fOOO* ^ u t lOrnOOQ^Om m&n are r egu la r ly 
tHider aeos v i th mam" mam trained fidLUioiis i f i 
reserves , this l a M f o r ce occupies a Central p o s i -
t ion i ^ c l i por^dt® of s t r ik i i ig &t msiy&m o f s^ut 
a ^ B g i^erimet^r o f mm milos* 
I t i s W i m r e a s i j : ^ a i r e^iiipped 
^it i i atoiQio to s t r ike t i t r o ^ D^rtliern 
^ c t i o routes v ^ c h tiring our i M i i s t r i a l aross i s 
range of quicls. mUack* Bte throat i s i ^ t mlUtsu^^ 
m& Soviet ^ulasts dispose nm^xk^vkt "world fiUm 
uppajratias of i a t e r m t i o n ^ CQsmx^msu I t operates 
with t r a i m d ag i ta tors mad a ^ ¥ s r f t t l propagoMft 
o r s ao i s a t i oQ » * * * » I t seefes to l iarass tlie ex i s t ing 
order and p&ve ^m ws^ f o r p o l i t i c a l fatms i^icbi 
v i l l iJsst^iMcom&anist cof i t roUeS r o g i ^ T ^ 
I ^ a ^ t r a t e q y f a c t i e s a f m i A 
Corjgressf House i^eaaent ^"asMJsatoa 
»»Poller o f ^'ocuril^ and f ^ r ^ g i ^ i l f f a i r s , ^ p r i l 
Against this the Indian viev hes been thpt the Soviet 
prograraroe for Asia rests on politlael, cultural end econosle 
penetration rather than on military conquest. I t follows 
that Gonjsnunlsts' best gaiabit Is to infiltrate the ranks of 
Asim political parties for th^ir own purposes. In Asia th© 
communist appeal has not o@©n in terms of the overawing force 
of soviet armea slight - ite etorale weapons enti huge armies 
m<X airpover -> but in terms of ^ding colonialism and of 
proiaoting economic p3 enty. through drastic land refoiRn, 
collectivigea agriculturel and nationeli^ed industry, t o it 
is not because of strategic fears but at the aspirations of 
govemm^ts as well as their people that they gave ear to th© 
ivoviet appeal. Many inUlcns thought that Americans had misread 
the significance of Asian conr.unlst taovemente because they hev© 
thoufjht of communists as conspiratorial gamblers for power 
rather then as leaders who offer answers, which may be honest 
or niisleedlng, to some of th© press^jig questions facing 
Asian peoples.^ 
Therefor©;In Indl© it has been a widely accepted view 
of the conflict bb basically a clash of power rather than of 
ideals. In fact, India has been subjected to intensive pro-
paganda efforts from both sides in the conflict, /uid these 
i . Poplal and Talbot, Ind^a an^ Amcrloa, p. 65. 
« t2t 
tactom enc^iiragod imia t9 figHt sh^ iHvalVfwteist in 
the COM m^} 
imu Am mB potict o^ EKSAmLzm m*im:ES ^ 
f 
India roia^ow^ Urn poUe^ or miwaUgiisent with eilhei? o£ lai® tvi 
pom^ b20cs Xdr aaifitai»lng peaee aM Bmmslty in th^ 
ifdrM* imm tbm vax^ r deglimlDg of he^ Iislla 
ottidir* In tmi^ vim tlies^t alUaneds lutonsined tlie Co34 War 
tttt^ioos aM rivaJjfi&g X'at^ er than puttiiSf^  an. to Uirnm 
lier pt^lic/ Q£ ^ e s u s e . iirstl^^&ho 
m^M with c e t l E i s ^ i n c i j i l ^ « vss w i l U a g 
esS susl la. a i l i t s 
tatioi:^* Seeaiaiisr^ Indian t^&ntad to jLii?« in peace s M f r i & M * 
sMj? with «cii4JQti:i©s» aisl idth ai l countries § 
had m ^ i i ^ to fear froa ^i^oody nlm haS m designs 
oigMmt axw 9Be* wouM trir ta avoid ax^ f a r * 
eiitai:igle»i}t8 sspeoi&ii^ vhen thee® not in her mtio* 
nai interests* i^ ouJ-Chl^ f India ini and ims prai^ared 
to Sttj^ portf vhsils hesirtedly a Byst&m of interna t i o i ^ o rd^ 
ana eoll«ctiir@ securitar* Fi f^ l^t e fr«G Xodia vouM te^ to 
popiai G^ faiboti p* 
* tm ^ 
reduce toasiaRj sootti® iioi'M eojifiicsts a M w&sk irigo^otisly 
f o r l a t e r m t l o i i a i psafie^ 
U ^ i ISie f irsts Seesetarif-Oefss^ral ©r tb© UsHt^ 
mtiQm tBltf ^ j x M mt mhm in Par i s aft J amar r IS , 
thckt laSiaw les^aJf hsS imm M s mm approach % 
^ r M sfiraii*®. ®»lsia fiirst**, Li© impresst©ii 
to tSk< t^itw© o f 14.© wanted 
t& &imimm mhm tfaat g io&ai lifetwe^ji 
CoMaeisffi soft ihe Islm mmti^lm aus t m^e t h e i r 
Mt Wt^m was mt mv^ W ^ th® 
g|,<iliaJl al&s Qf OoKUfilsm, ciir of mX 
cant imnts th& O t i i t ^ c^mertt f o r a l l * His 
mla^ t^ s M SftgrisouM W ^ Q&m^pt ©f M i a as a 
clsl eBfeit^^ yhmn I jfallouM mjtmw tr^iH tisssigitt aai 
m® Bmtm% Puion on tfeir Asian ^atii^B^, ©tilJL iia^a&ali^ 
that fm wm mt aJa^at mm Qi M© m& eoimtqri 
hm wuB i n i » loram M s^t-tiing 
^.iit^mmm b&tm&m. ^  Hait^d States a i ^ tk& Comti i iet piir^rsy 
&M iasMiati© o & i e c l i w %rss ta ts^ i r i tMraw 
fmm^ u © , i l l mum* ein^pai^ 
J^M ^r fet I S M , f p . 
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tmm i^rea* Foj^mss shouM lie giiian to ^cfciisaay 
thQ ffelira-Lle partlcij o£ s^ms pjpoviaed key to m apprecia* 
t ion ©r t M iiLpiis^s as ii^UL as the coatimislon Asian m n -
a l i g t m o t a M ^ e i x i s b i l i l f or ^ e t^ accept it & 
posiclva force lit faisrour of iatermtiaml peace* 
M i a j & l l i t a ^ a l i l a acea {^etwsen i iat iom on 
t ^ j^pottndl ^ ematlon $ 
Increaali^ a race of araasaests lef^lisg to 
2 
fcM f e a r of totaX war^ was tiiat thou^j ho w t t M 
m% dei^ the f i g h t of m M o n : ^ tm& Xeg l t l aa t^ precauUoiss 
f o r B e H Imt a i l l aneos opes j^ aiialt^ 
against BQsm omer countj^ or countries d e f e a t tho l r owe 3 purpose oi' tr^latg to *i!ialiit@i» pa^ce tttroii^ * Xn 
l& l s r e g ^ f^hm g am expression to thougl^ts at a press 
4 
coi j foram© l u 1860 o® July 
orgaialmtlons lisiro growja up for is 
calloi smtftal dof«iiiSi# «•«<•• It 10 oi^n for ni^ 
co^Rtr^ to hm0 orgaiilsatloiBS* But I f I eisy^  
W eoi ail re&pect to tSxem ^ o^s approach to 
this questlom Is witoout croatlog otw feostllo 
I 4o m t d^ny tho m c o s s i t j of aay couif^igr 
or grottp of couiitrl0« protcctljo^ thmselves or tafcl&g 
st«ps protect themelvss against possible Sanger* 
Shey aujf do so &XI m&m* ^t the si^etl&e again 
aoa agalft iih&t a cottntry s!i©uM decide Is, vhether 
1» op *c i t » t p* 
S^nrey of l a te rnat lona i Affairs CBo/al Institute 
of IfitomatiftonBl. £ffoirSt loMoii)» 
grass Copfagene^s_ lQ^ . 
4* Il»ld«t p» 60* 
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its policy gen&jpaUyr l^ads towaMs prois^tlcg a peaco 
tmllt ol* i t is 4&f@m6 or oom t^himg 
oisd ••••• Om country calls i t der^^e and the otiisi? 
mmitvy says that tMa d^feiuse is aiistied against it* 
oth j^? eountiry also talks atjoiat defence asd takes 
mm otlieir aeasus^es* Bo th^ go ofi fiomatixig ama-
is^ats**' 
India QM th© differed ffoa each other a® far 
as fcheiJ? attitudes towards ths ailltary alliaisces were coticerijs 
because of the fact that they did mt have siailso' oa 
th& i&5u@ of th3 mtufe the comianist threat* So the 
Cold War is a conflict hotweea two ideologies, hetwe^a the 
Coacaiiilst world ©M the "fre©** vorM beUtm^i s '^Godless creed" 
QQd ^ Ch&rishod iraliiu s^ of lioerty aisd freedom. But the 
Indian islnd rsfus&s to accept this drnilJtLit&nm It sees the 
Coid War as a struggle for power hetwseis two ^sloes* the 
coiiBtries find the countries of the Vest coiaim together mt 
th^ miXmm kn & C^art^r of positi'fe programes for 
the vclfare of msi^iod out because of th^ir f^ar of the 0»S«$*H 
fo IMioi^ CoM l^ ar is a m m v ^ hu.ttl& for w r M donimtion 
by tyo pow@rs« each %rith its ovis group of lesser povsrs d«» 
j^T&e^mt upon it for safety arJ. sttstenama, 
taSia;. opposed the policy of foraliss military alliaiices 
hecimse shs wanted to isinlMzs the possibility of a Vorid War 
which adght ij© caused hy the iiicreasing iaternatiofial tensions* 
Gh©{' did not heU^iro in the fiew that peace couM h© fisin-
taiissd oaliT through such allianeeSf so that the CommttlBt hloe 
iiottld mt dmr© to risk a war i f the Hest v^s strong. 
• m • 
^hra C3uM uiiaerstam, although dia not approve, mill-
tsar^  alliances iststw^r. gi eafc power® vhtch vauXd have Bom& aieaiv 
ingtt But he saMt ^^ ^ ^ iiMfirstaM Mlitsry pscts aj»l 
al l ia itces l^tweo^ & huge g iant a aag a l i t t le pige^ 
o£ a It hm ra ^eaiaiiig i n a j a t i l t a r/ sense to mo» 
In tM0 a^^ oiH^' e^uotfiea that eovtut, fieoa 
p&int 04" view of m c i e a r var i ax© thase s^eat ca «Rt r ies i ^ c h 
la a p^sltloB to aso to 
attach BmH countries to Umm^i^mB Xn al i i am really i&eans 
• ••••Ihat they ^esM-ng very mmh ^epernlant on thdse 
coontriesl* ' 
Ifs&Xa i5$li©vea t^ese paet® a M a i i i a i&0s hod dis» 
sfsaaent in laie ^ r M isar© aiJd isor© difri«ult# Uehni 
a4«lressii3g the Oislted rsMoc© Oemital ^sseishl/ at "B&u tark on 
© 
B0€emimr BO^  that these po&ts aad alliaticss 
do mt sdS to the stJ?©Qgt3j a^ ajsm^ mtiom* aiOy 
hostill'^t og tc» a pklXxig up oi armmmat^ £Bkii3g dis« 
aad difficult* iC i t 1& our oiyectiva that 
m mist hm& paacre^  th#iii i t i^oxiom mc&ss^sstiy mM it 
foUoirs necesasxily that m mst mt imttifess ©ur idea s»f peace 
h/ past isilitai*/ estahli&hiseiits a M pacts s m a l l i a n c e s * " 
U l^hra , Speech i js I^k Sal3ha, 
p* 177• 
• lao • 
oOf He&m visrr^d, istHi© addresslog Bajya Sa l^a 
OR Decembisi? 18, 1967 tfiats « f M s comtaa t wrestMiig , tM j r c^ia 
nBWf til ls piMiig or efaameots, th is f r a o t i e s m v f ^ f o r 3 
mi ' e powerful v&npcuk^ the mltixuate weapon inhere does I t a U 
lead t^? d^dstrmctloiu'^ 
I M l a n t ia t ioml urns cmamJtx^ Mlth tlid I s i an 
cottnti^es les'geJ^ end mt ^Itu thut q£ Entojie* Tk^t ms Wm 
reasaa ^ ^ Indians d id mt psxtlmlBrl^ tg KAta as a 
EuJro^e&n dtifence was f^lmi deferisi^is m&snr^ 
m£ tto Kisstara ^ioc* Sairiet ym.011 ha4 lJ©«ii reacting to i t 
unTa^oi^aoi^* I » l ia opiosed colonlnilsa atroi^l^ Isi 
ai:^ forsiy so interested alil^ tn m-ose 
pr^^isions ai tha l^rl^ iltlmntic paat vJ^ch coixM bB In^rpre-m 
tM to iii@3ti that tMs hug^ t?JU>c of the Westsm natioiss Oilsltt 
isteritefieon of tli^s© of its ©esiiers, ^hlch wro coioniai 
pow r^sy to pr€>tect their estetiilslmeiJts* M in fact* 
w© see tiaat and Portugal had small <^ loJtsiaJl poss®ssiom 
ciQ Ijsilaii iaalisland Itself* mer©for© if Xiilla objeeted ta tli«t 
part of MTQf i t vas In imw Interest* It vos In 19M 9n 
^prll 14, tl!iat In a stateiaent Br.SalaEsr, Port^uese Frime 
£<iioi&ter 1&M0 a r&ference ta MtQ ^at l^rtogal ii^oiiM Imokn in 
2 
Qoa the tc&ai^ a M th^ Byrtii ^ t i a t ^ i e Pactf 
That gm0 Gh^me to the IndLm objectiom* 
iQMSlU QS , V d i . ^ I V t 
(Com9i»iir@&lth Parliaiuentary Assoc iat ion ) , 
kimt f^hru i^ought oi fUtO was expressed i n 
w i ^ s Ilia El Jtmsf 
i f m i a a f r es ted sal' as 
m t ^ r j t i e d aliout the ^tJLazitic ?act*X 
t^as q£ ce r t a in genera l trends ^tlaixtle 
pact leased iras^ r l g h t i ^ an m t u a i defotiee 
aga inst aggyessioiM they ©^©jc^ r i gh t 
t3 d0 But g e o g f a i ^ e a l l i ^ I t sprsadta. X have m 
©b jee t l o s to that# mcfee^ Q r m m m m i n which ar© 
l iaMi^ Jitlafitic «oueitri#8* But i ^ a t I s m t B laportatst 
i s the te t^emf f o r tlie p^tct to Include i n I t s sc^pe lilie 
pr^teet ion ot c o i o a i a i te i f r i f e j f i es^ a f /^tlautic Powers* 
fhe Fact ao@s m t contain t M s l^ut subseQuent eonversa* 
t ions b&tm^ti Foreign Ktnis ters aiii o th^m gradual ly 
Dr i f ^ that iHf tims cfoaiigiiig i t s el iaracter. t^iith ragard 
to that, I th^uisht that thara was soDset^iiig easGnt ia l ly 
opffQS^ ta tfoa i^asic Charter o f tim Onited 
ear l^ sta^ea q£ ii^fOf ^ I M i a o raspanaa i^aa 
fa^oaratoi® ta tha G.S. Kehru -eas contaRt that war© feept 
iofo^iaad, feut tSMm was lia aii#stio« caiMJiUtatioB iiacauss 
are m t in i t at ail '^ai^ l h& axplsiiiad that Ind ia ttfus giveti to 
mi^arataod t^at i t waa a ragiofial arrai^effient vitHIn 
of tisa Charter* i?ttrtajariBor@ he toM the IMiats ParliM«©iit 
that tha Coisii^i^alth l i i^ did mt In af^ ws^  comsact IMia 
vith tfea Kartli Atlantic Fact. Ferhapa, IMia thou^t mat tl^ 
1. f f f g g ^ n r t r w e f ^ l g ^ g f 
a* la facty article of tl3»B Harl^ 4tla«tic treaty cavars the 
^Algarian Departoenta of the area to be 
defended* 
3. Sariier also, Iiehni hsd gi'van the a^va exelamtioB in 
referanca to MIkO vhile ^dressin^ the Xndian Parliameitt 
%m miam waa speaking ia tha Ifidian Coosti^tent 
ILegialstiir©) on April 1949 om day after the signUig of 
ISartSi istlantic Factj pp.iiSB-a33* 
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p&ct was necessary and b&ing Jtorged ion th© W&at o^n d^ f eace 
nxsd had m aggr©sg iw purposes. ^ In facfc^ i n Jieir t>jr 
sofise of the ^'estora <i©i:ei5«Q tt»asares I n i i a never Jaiplied that 
tlio v;0st€>a?fi powers were m:3tivated other considerat ion 
tlian o£ llt^ Cmbmmlst itl&Cf alt^ougii in hcijr 
th.a& v&r^ jteaTi oiTtoii taa^ag^erat^i created a war 
/.t^ wB^ I n l i a ' s a p p o s i ^ o n vas mt mf strong b&esmse vm 
mt eom&X'ma. vith MtOf a European d e f e ^ i v e aiXime&m 
Bit i m i a opefO^r opposed the formation M ^ B Paet, a 
Pacific Paet on the i^ roaial ttmt th© stat© of Soutla-BMt 4sia 
vas asset tied aad tbtts thss tlm© vas B>t rip« I'af such a st^p* 
Xzsdia did mt ^inm a desiral»X# uxdess the ditiiation 
i n iBdomsla mm lodlo-Ciiim fead ^ e u r«60iir®d, 
Z 
vltH XMia*s view point at that imttallQ aad 
Ore-at Sritaia desired thiB pa«t isaiisiy mm wanted InSia tji join 
i t . M t India did mt like i t stixit at the O0laiat»£> fiieetirsg 
Cowomrealth in d^ci^ed that slia ifiteiitior} to 3 
4oitt sueii a pact* fh^ oiai/ fear so&mod to tliat i t udgl^ t 
bolster th© ^Inki^sg streij^th oS the e»a®iiitl power ic Sowt%-
East-^ia Jtor Ifidia ^ss m% r@My iit all* Before the 
tt^ea tlte Fakistaa ^ i i t&r/ Pact was si^Bid ia 1864, 
though India opposed i t v&ry stroi^l^t «>t doat»t 
thd q£ 0«S«A*» he staid l a ttie Parliament 1 
" I t Is mt a QUfcStioa of motives tnit rolher of certain re-
sults ti!ii«!i iasvita&ly follow.** iSliiUtoSs Ms^ fch 
a. Stat©iaeot of Pean /icfeesan oc a Pacific Pact t^^ 18, 
Tezt in .lafSr^t 
l l r i ^ l S v i « l ^ m M l a . i f f l .Mto (Oaivers ity o i Mncesota 
press, Mimaapolie 1953), p* 67* 
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signify o£ this pact, IMia tried td <li£CO)i£-age i t in r irst 
itistsmc©* /•I'tsff t&e defeat ot f^atiQceOists in f^hru toM 
"So far as Pacific Fact is caceermd ve 
mt ©ficouraged i t . In fact, thatight tliat ai^ y such 
mVQ was nat a rigijt aofVe*"! 
But, later, li^efi tli^ i j?act was aiiiiea, IfiSla did m% s&ow 
at^Sf sctivd liofitility to i t and rsgsjrd^ i t some^^at disifitersst* 
eai^f \thlch was c i^ar f r o s th@ statei^ent miym &t 3 
pm3& cofiferem© on Jiiiid 21« with m^wcd %s> Pacific 
Factt 
" I sfii as t pa r t i cu l a r l y interestedur Sser© sr© so&e coun-
tri&s associating thmmelyas for etc. It 
aoes mt in the ssESie war ss ysu other 
If the i^acific Fact also has the sacio treMSf that 
in regaas to coiorAailsa, in regard to omm matters 
^ea it is m% 
I M i a the jproiiosed i l iddle-East a r g a M s a -
tioij? for thfc dificussioas bsid astweon tho aaJ 
Britain in f a l l of aM in Pakistaii vas to bs 
Included* In niew of Ch^st&r Boirles, the t^ i&n 
in Iz^Sia, tho project y/as dropped on account of Indian 
tion» although i t seom A^ that the M-ddle Bast-f^tatos* own lacic 
of agroesent am tlie min cause of its failure* India's 
a* me i ^D idea did not aateri&lisd* 
Chester Bowles* f^filaaasaaor 's aosor^ itimf lotk 
- m -
vas b&cmim ox tha l a c t that lha 
k^m thireateoed to <3&tm ta Ind i a ' s rfehru 
ps^tft&tiiiis a ^ a i m t feMs, th@ S^deratoi sesMoit of the IisSiiis 
Matlosiai Caa^iircsss, saSiS, ' that tfie, Auglo-U^S. mov© to mak® 
Pakistan a i&^ iiNs? piroposed MSIl^O if&s oi CQ&cteien to 
l i ^ i s a M i t T^ouiii af l 'eet a i i klaSs of oalaHass sad 
toiua i n I M l a s M Pakisiiar* aiid South AslaJ Pofelstau*© ine lua i^n 
\tQuM. hmm mt acOy made Pakistan stranger in coirf'Iiet vltSi 
Miaf a l so f imstrated a l e a f ssuildlug ^a ajp©® o f |>6ace 
2 
siia llesplug the 0OM as Tar as fraia her feariSeJra. 
might have i>eajs th& im% that tli® movm erne trm th& 
bloc whleh seeded to tryltsg to tak© »t«p0 opposed a 
to I nd i a ' s i o t s res t s * !ls2irtt»s was that InsSia ths 
i%Q»t of fesir that Pakistan tHreooe 
on ac€oufit oi cqM var coming maa^er* He cMe i t 
«i.#ar on Jamai jr **aiw4ousl|'j i f aqf smeft dewei^psient takes 
piac© in t&at region tile coM war coi^ ss right to our t^rder it 
PaMstsa ^oiras* It is uot tlie possifoiiitjr of war aetweea ludia and 
F^istao, ^ t i t is the possibility of world '^or 00mlBg ri#it up 
to our do>rs i ^ch is of coacarn to usf** 
furthericor«(| lfsdlist*s nm^mnt opposition ^as o^or 
ESm^ and Baghdad Pact. mxB tim U.E. and Ir&ln foUoved quit© 
divorgont policies as far as the regional Pacts w r e concerned* 
i * i m l a Jeygf ^amsry i? » 191^. ^ , _ 
2. Kuadra, J^c. t p.0S. 
mv Ddlhi 1.9M, 
i i m s .m^f Jaraiarr p. m . 
6 . I t Has t>eeii dea l t w i t^ i n d e t a i l l o the f o l l o i i i a g chapter 
separately as a coM m r Issue* 
- -
;; H A P I iu li 3 
IHjj, 
Si^JLMMiMJMLlk' 
Kom& beeme e eoM wbt Issue after tli® tenaiaetlm 
of the world wur I I • « s th© defeet of Jepeo In 
the vitr k'hlQb brought the acceptance of the surren<Jer 
of the Japanese forces north of the 3StL perpllel by 
tb@ Eus£im forces end soutt of the 3Sth perellel bjr 
the Aserlcm forees, Vhos Korec divided Into tw -
Sorth Eoree ®iid l-oath Earm md ihlt para31el l>ec©S€ m 
•iron curtj^la* sepprsiting north -'nd ootith Eoreiss.^ 
It was the f? 11 lire of tHe and the to 
cs 
r:fcree on steps to Isspl^ent the vsrtime prosilse of 
inaependence for Korea* uhleh led the United States to 
s«bnlt the Korean yestita to the Gener{?l Asseasbly. Despl^ e^ 
the protests of the U.; t e Gener-1 /.gseiihly vot€4 
& resolution'^ to estat^llgh J- United Hstions leaporsry 
Soamlssicaa on Eores wlti fiutbority to observe elections for 
B aetlonel wtleh in tum would estel>Ils^. f. nctl(»5al 
£0¥emment for Hores. The Coaslss'i^ aoul^ not function 
1. For detcils see, gr^ yy^ y„, pX, XQ^fj^Pflti l fMiFS 
m^m^f m r ^ r ux.i.uu, ism, 
pp. Also see IkM- • 43i»473, 
2. The United fctates, United Kmedom end Chin® declared 
in the Gslro Declsretlon of i Oecembt-r 1943 thst *ln 
due course Koreo shall become free and Independen't. ^ 
see DepBrtmnt of fctste, Qccffipst to Invm 
pp. 61-62 (nppmdix i>. Ihe Decl err. tlcai reef firmed 
by the P.otsdca Declaration of 26 July. 1945, See IkMv 
pp« 53-54 (Ap endlx 3)• 
3. Text in jjp.cuy^t^ . m IntemeUanfll, i f f f Irs 1^47^ 
1952) pp. 699-701. 
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effectively beceoi-e they vere refwgea facilities to 
eater So^tli Eorea."^ 
Botb Horth Hore© mid goutfe Kor-e^ t^ anted t<s remite 
the country under their resfwetive leadership. On 
3 me i950 ©esse the cet«stroj^.y whm Sorth Korem 
forcjes crossed the 3Sth p«ra23ed prxd figjjtSsg started 
Btat the GoaKiaalsts elle^ed th^t the South Koreens first 
crossed the frontier. The Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the O.L.I .ft., /s.A. CrotuyKo stfit^ds »fhe pres@at 
events la Korea begm on ^me in consequence of 0 
provocative sttacfe Ir^ unched by forces of the fcoutii Koreon 
©uthorltles on frontier ereas of the Koreai People's 
De®ocretlc Bepabllc. This etteek was the result of & pi^-
jaedltcted plea."^ fhls lesue of the incursion fro^^ Iforth 
Koree into South Korea was brought to the Onlted Nations by 
tiae Onlted ttetes. Ccaase^uently, the Security Coimcll met 
4 
deaentied the imedlete vfithdra^al of the North Eore^s 
to the 38th parallel. The Council a3so described the 
incursion, to the absence of the U.t.L.B., es an act of 
egression. A unified coi^nd tmcier the iJ.f^ . flag was set up 
by the Gotmcll on 7 July iSSO end Cenernl H6c/,rthur ws 
1. Details in 
pp. 
2. Full details in Ib^d, pp. 
3. 4 July 1960 and suppleaient to gssJUIffifiSs 
i i July; 1950, p. 12. 
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appointed Supreme CoaamSer of the t3,S. Koriem forces-^ 
On 7 October i.950, tfee euthorl2ed Hsc^JPtliur^ the 
©f the O.H* I^resn forces, to esctmd 
the mt into Horth Korea, If neeesscrj'- fhe crisis reschea 
its cltoex tdien the O.K. forces opproncl^d the falii filver 
Cvbieh divides K©r«-s Croffl fefidiiiria) md the 
Volonteers la lerge aussbers mteredl Kore®« on 11 October, 
1950 s spokessm of the Siilnese Foreign P.^aistry declared 
that the Ghiaese people could ml •staad idilsf t^Lile Korea 
Mt'.s iaveded by the Colted ^.tetes ea^ its eccomplices**^ 
The interventioa of the Sliinese *Volmteer* forces, as e 
reBCtim to the crossSag of the p^rElJel liae by the U.K. 
Coaaaad, mede the a.s. coB^ ie'i® China ss «ac^^ressor* l*he 
heevily oiit-aaaibereci troops aaaer the commmd of Mee/irthur 
fe l l bccK riid mm tsisble to restore the line imtil tfe© 
Chlaese Mere some seveaty miles ^side foath Koi^a« 
After serioas reverses, the O.K. forces began to 
ad^i^ee egsla eerly la i96i. But there ceme lasother heevy 
North Koreea-Ghiaese cocaiter etteck in /.pril i9Si, i^ilch 
developed lato s v i r tue ! steleacte et the 3ath pcrellel.^ 
I t vfis early In July IBSL that the negotietloas 
i . &/i588j B.b.a.^ 17 July 19S0, p. 83. 
quoted, Siri. , P- 302* 
3. P.674, 
4. For detoils, see latfiJ^fit 
pp. 435-.4S3. 
betveen the tvo sides feegaa bat could mot prove to be 
s success m they mre twice feroKen The exehi?aEe 
of prlBomTB vaR a serious pmttt^ m h&f^ tm the psrti^s 
2 
cmcemt^d* tbey reac i^ed so agreseieiit m tli© 
repetrietSoa of prisoners on ^me 8, 19S3 aaa, Ifter m, 
signed m amistice ec^fiesieat^ on U7th ^sly, i,853. Tm 
e£reeia©nt, with otbet- ttiiags, proviaed »lso for the 
voluntary reptrlotlcgj of the prisoners of war laiaer the 
supervision of the S^utrel letioas li^patrigtioii GoiEiEisslon* 
£lace thea neither the nor tbe t^ovl«t Omic® could agree 
m tfm terma for reimltiag Korea aad it sti l l remains 
div ided . 
Koree Is aitueted so strategically tbut it coaM 
be s centre for CSitaese aad Soviet iaflaeace into the tea 
of Ispsa or s brldgeheea tor ^Gpm&se pmeW^tim of the 
^slm ffieial®Qd« I'lms for the it hes b strategic 
laportmce md has been a c«ntre of ssBlor Fef tlnBtem 
Conflicts.'^ Siace the Korean crisis in i960, the centre 
of gravity of Sate mat Ion el politic® shifted to the Far £.ast 
I . lext of the O.fi. Meiaoran<iim on the Bre&k Dom of talks 
vlth the GomEnmists, 12 July 1961, in SilufLS.., 
^ July l&Si, pp. ^ ^ 
i M i ' i June 1963, pp. S66-8. 
3 . Text ia msmm^xs. .m mp^SJLM^t PP •386-40?. 
I 
4 . Fo r instance, fhe t Ino-Jepenese war of il|94-9S end 
the Itusso-Japanese war of 1904-X905. 
frosa Europe end this wes the beglaulng of the cold wer 
ia the area concerned ©aci s tiireet to the world of a 
tfeljrdi vforld war- Beeease ©f the feflff of th€ expansion 
of Gotsjsaaisa in EoJ?e®t determSae4 to csteblisb 
© Govemisettt in Eor«e-jrrlea<lly to the Hostem eouiitri®s 
end a enallenee to the Co^jeanlets ssd tsscc Korea in 
the game of power politics and n field ^here the conflicting 
ideologies vf^s of l i f e rsised their heeds.^ Bat India 
thought otherwise. It wes in even prior to trie real 
crisis of i960, th«t Indten public opinion ms wflected 
b^ tfce Hin^u In the following editorisl on the Moscow 
Declarstioni 
"Big poKor diplofflfiey st i l l dgjBinateg the 
©ettle®eat of post-war orobrfeas- tfee interests 
isnd ^ust rielits of smeller peoples have to be 
subordinated to the prestige i3nd power of the 
gii»Jor nRtions* rale b^ i Big Po^rs does 
not condtice to n % id l ing of freedom tbroagh 
tbe world, . . . rivalry between the mighty po%®rs 
postfKKies the dem of Incepea<j€fice to smell 
peoples . . . ^ha end of tbe Fer Ee^tem mv and 
the occupation by Allied forces tbat fo3lowed 
fcave given rise to ausso-Afflericim rivftliy in 
Korea, fhe proper solution for such a tangle 
would be coaiplete withdrawal of the forces by 
both aussie end AiJerice, which would be consistent 
not only with tte proMse seade daring the war, 
but also 5ust under the circofflstances. . . . Korea 
suffers because two aejor powers imagine thet ^ 
their streteiiic Interests clesh in her territojy."^ 
i . see L.H., «Ihc probl^a of Korea»», lai im. I f f ^ 
vol. IXX, p. 190. 
I b f i J l M u , 30 i^cember 1945. 
- 1«40 -
This VB8 e cold war elecient* 
fh® reeson for the indo-O.S. differences m Korea 
wes the fact tfoet tlis thfo coon tries viewed the crisis from 
eat Ire ly aifferent eagles, m Ismim writer obseiweti 
tbat tfce Sorth Koreaa ia^eslon ©f Eoytfe Korea, Ironieally 
esoQgh, provided « s©re spot ir* American re3gtions.^ 
H:e seme view yiB» estpressed hy sa Am^riean elso. indie 
was aot interested ia KA70 end Etiitipean Issues^ hovemr^ 
theS' «ere remote from HkH®, but while "Eorea is /*siea 
couctry," wrote Chester Bowles, "Indie in eossjon vith 
jBOst Asien sad Middle Bsstem peoples^ iies wetched enxioasJy 
the cotirEe of tbis oonfliet, end It is here th«t soiae of 
the slharpest dis^greemenits heve srism between ourselves 
saast of nm-Gomamist jlsie*"^ 
Indls was willing to see o negotletedi settlement of 
the Soreeii pJKsble® end believed that th^ division of Kores 
youM be aissstroiis for the fotore of Koree md would also 
5eopcrdi2e peece md stafeility in th© Far iiast, es 
Menon, tb® Indian Cheimien of tb© first U.S. CoCTlsElon 
bsKS stated c© 19 Febriioi^ 1948, even prior to the time, 
the crisis reacbecl its olirasj&s 
« I f the Koreans are tenacious of independence, 
they ere eqoeJly teneci^jQs of their unity, 
Nothing is taore remarkeble tli^ the homogeneity 
1. Eonclre, J^C-, Indian Foreim Poliey p, IkS 
Z, Bovsles, Cbaster, ikitoSa^iaHsJIaooii (Rev York, 1054), 
p . a s s . 
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of tbe Korem net ion • they belong to the 
sam race, speak the isaae Ificgtiage aod ore 
fouBd of the Slime traditicRs* fhe North 
cmxnot without the Souths ncsr cea the 
hovtth without the Borth. The South is 
agricultural mtS the Horth Is inaustrlalj 
%im £©uth it the of isle, the 
Korth is a reservoir of power . . . Korea 
is thus ia^iviisitole, whether yoa look et 
problems faro® m eccaomic, politlcel or 
fcistnrical point of Deep dovn in 
the heert of eirerj? Sore®a, whether ia the 
Worth or ia the £outh| Is th.is longtog for 
u»ity« . . . Distr^ctea md diaillusiotied, 
KoreEHS of ell shades of optoion hs '^e tern 
cpproaohiag as rucJ telling m that *the 
Baited Hattons is our lest hope* • i f this 
last hope, too, is shattered Koree may 
b3o¥ upj sad i i BJ^ he the begiQEiag of a 
vaster eateclyga In ^sia »ad the world."* 
fc'hen in ceptecaher iS47, the O.t.ii. referred the 
prohleta of the independence of Korea to the s^econd Less ion 
of the a . l . General /^ssemhlj, Indis supported the inclusitm 
of the is&t^ in the egend©.^ th'B same was opposed by the 
Soviet Balon. At the time Indio advocated the holding 
of electims with s vie^ to the calling of b Constituent 
Assembly ftt a ¥eiy esrly dete to Koree md for the establish-
Bsent of s national Government. Moreover, she did not 
agree thet elections should be conducted by the occupying 
powers. After the elections <m May 10, 1948 in the 
7on6, the itepublic of Korea was foraially procalimed on 
The Statesman. 20 February 19^8. 
1. Eis fcer proved to be true vhen on 26th June 1960, 
the mr started between Sorth Korea and South Kore©^ 
2. Kith the U.B.-A., the U.IC., Chine, end Syria. 
- -
iS J'al^,^ but India refused to reeognljs® the Bepoblic 
of lores beosuse she felt tfest such recognition wo«3di 
perpetuate the partition «ad preSadiee chauees of 
llfiificetioia of the country Hove^er, if sfter th© 
crisis took place, indl® decided to assist the Bepublic 
of tooath lCor©e ia its figlit sgalast inv^sion^ it did not 
mesu sM iavoXve my modifieation of her for«igQ policy^ 
B®ttier the policy wss based on the promotion of vorld 
peace fad tbe development of friendly relations vith the 
coontriefi conceme4» Sertsialy it remained 121 Independ^it 
policy determined solely by India's ideals end objectives• 
It vios India* s earaest houQ thrcoghoat the crisis to put 
an «id to the fighting to settle the dispute by 
isedlatioa^^ 
India* s approach^ to the problem of Eores w&s based 
OG the following considerations; 
Kortfe Eore® was the aggressori 
2, tbe ver smst be localiaedi 
i . fbe People^ g Desocrgtie Kepab3ic of Eor«a was procloissed 
in Hortli Korea 00 Ceptember without sny reference to 
the lUR. CosHBission. 
a. B# fchitr« Kao and c. Kondpi, *'ladla fnd the Korean Crisis", 
India cu^rfey^y. ^ol. ¥11(4), October-i^ceQiber 19S1, 
pp. 298-99. 
3. lietira, PP. 
4* K©liru*s steteaiiaat on Korea on August, Psrliassenti 
Bebgtes^ vol. pt. I I , 3rd August, 1950, ColTaSl; 
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3» Weys end ®e®aji aust b© found to m& the ver 
et the esarllest mosscatl because th© Koreen ver 
fcfid the explos ive -sf beooaiug s 
1.0rge scale msptfl mr* 
4. The msst get ind«p<en{ie2ic6 • 
%he fa tare of Korea must be toy the 
people of jioree t^ ith t^tt seny aatsMe laterferenc©-
At fi Pr^sE Confereaea on jtjly Sahru clerified 
Ia<iie*s stm^ regsrdiag the Korecsa l^ er^^ Em denouaoed the 
sctlcm of the Eorth Eoressns efxd declared tust the invasion 
lis^ teeen road© <m s large sciile tbet it b«en well 
plumed. In edditiofi to it fee said that ladl® hga agd© 
ao offer of mediatloii md hgd no Intrntion of doing so 
iml®8S so requested- In his vle%r "the best ssssistsnce that 
Ittdie eaa r^der In this grave crisis is to help In lisalting 
th€ eree of confliet md enaiag 
The the sltustlos otherwise* Unlike 
Ijaciis the ^mericeas thought tfec^ t internetlonel Comunlsm 
was trying to ccbieve l)y force what it could not otber\ i^s© 
eobieve, and so there vsb to be no appesaement* "It is 
that appeasement of dictators. ••• the sure i^ad to world 
war", said president 'Imman in bis Bfsdio Address^ on 
^^^ July i t s o , p .6, a l s o see 
SPflif^mffi^S VP* i04.xXi snd £jEM5Ul9B£imiSS£,185Sf 
p. 26. 
2* on the "Airas and Objectives" of resisting aggression 
in Korea", vol. XXIII (S84), Septeoiber 11. 1950, 
pp. 407.410: 
September I , IUBO md *nr aggressim mre alloved to 
5»Jec«ea la Korcfe, It voiiI4 to© m opm Jjai?lt#«tioa to new 
setr- or agg^ssioB ffterefore, United 
Hetloos ffifide its historic decision to meet military 
aggression with ermed force, The f i ra ectioa tskim 
the United «stions is oar Isest feope of ae^ievini world 
peece", he sdded. In the Seme address the Fresldent made 
the following poiatst 
"It is yoar liberty md mime vhich is involved, 
v-.t- cpnaot hope to meintain our own frcedoa if 
fret-doffi elsewhere is v.i|>€d out- Th©t is 
/•asericsai people ere tmitcd in support of bur 
pert in this tpsk. • 
"Oosaiaunist itsperialism preeehes peine toot 
pr^etices Bg4ircssion.' 
"iiight now, the bettle in Eorec is the front 
line in the strugg3€ between freedo® md 
tyrenny. But the fighting there is part of 
& larger straggle to buil<i b world in 1ill^ ic^  
& ^ uet md lasting peace can be maintained. 
'^ Tb^ t^ is vhy we in the Waited Stetc-s must Increase 
our own defensive strength ov®r md above the 
forces ¥fe ne«i in Korea, fhnt is why ve must 
continue to worK with other free nGtl^ Tna to 
increase oar combined strength 
Accordingly the aims end objectives in regard 
to the Korem crisis aiglit be mentioned as fo33o¥ei^ 
i ) preservaticm of penee end security through the 
United Nations isi Eorea* 
-ee Ibid, pp. 409*410. 
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11) fhe Ko?e8ns a right to be free, Independent, 
end United • rs they vmud to he • imder the 
direetlcm find guidance of the O.K. to help theat 
en^oy thet right. 
i l l ) To prevent the fighting started by Gomiaanist 
iKperlellsts in Eorea an it aiigbt e^ spend into 
B general war. 
Iv) Belief in freedo® for all the netions of the 
I'er ^ast inclwdtog Eore®. Beee«se tl^ freed 
of Korea m& fit stake, th© U.i.. ms fighting 
taider the United Batims for It in defenc© 
egaJast e6gre££.l<]®L« 
V) to tesett the nations acted as tools for the 
Commmist dictetorship thet there woald fee no 
profit for eny people vho follow the Coaisainlst 
dictatorship do«a its der& end bloody p&th end 
to ©sK theis to follow the American m^ of freedom, 
the ¥ey of mutuel cooperation end Internal peace, 
the /^ mericens believed thet the reeeon of the open 
fflilitery ©ssfiolt on the Kepablic of Korea was the fact 
thet the BepubHe wfcs too gooc a Society to be tolersted on 
the otherwise Oosimmist aoslneted laeinleUd of Korth /isis, 
end because it ubs so th?,t it coold not be overthrom 
froat within b^ indirect aggressicm. Direct sggresslon wae 
the only way to blot out this aorel sell®Eit on the Commonist 
siaSnlend.^ Bulles, the consultmt to the Secretary, said 
on July ?t ths^^fhe etrufcle in Korea represents the 
IhM'f vol. U n i July 1?, 1980 p. 90 
P-
timeless isi-m of whether lovers of liberty will he 
v'igilmt ©fjougfe, bravo enojigli saa united eactigh to 
sarvive despotissj, ye lisve a«ver nsacheti isjbea a greot 
priaclple was involved. ••• our o ^ liberty ceanot long 
be safe ia a i^i^ rid libera despots cm strike do^ libert;^, 
piecemeBl» witfc fire svorde" 
Ttos the S£i%- the crisiii froa b perfect Gold 
Korld strategic vie« poiat cjid the fEct of Coffismaist 
gggressioa (vhich was iaspirei by Bussi® Chins - frooj 
the view) Justified the in tsklag unilsterol 
ectioR la FO:REOS8 la the interests of seearity md post-
poaiag the recogaitioa of Comsiunist Ghias t i l l after the 
settl@@@st of the Korem isgue. 
la the begiaalag the Gov«iaiaeat sad public 
welcofaed the ee^^ptsstce by Ia<iie of the two Security Celine 11 
resoluticas^ which respectively called oa the Korth Koreaas 
to %rith4ra¥ back to the 3ath parallel ead oeeee hostilities, 
gad a£k«cl members of th© U.K. "to furnish such essist^oe 
to the Republic of Korea as ©^y be aecessary to repel the 
©rmed attack ®ad to restore iatematioaal p«sc© md security 
X. (fe/ifiOl, Jtme 1960) j ^ i t r i i X - g o ^ s M ^ u J l f t l s l s l 
imSf i s , pp. 7^ , < f >/ i sx i , 27th 
aua « , i9SQ) Ibi<i . » Uo. p . 4 . 
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In the eree". l»iiic© the aggtesBlofe^ bed coao trcm 
Co®i3imlst Sorth Koras, l ud i o vas csrefol aot to give 
room tot thct ea a resist of tt-r position 
on north Eoreaa ©g^  iresj^ it)®, reedy to eoadesai 
the i^iole Coaasanist Korl^ as "sfgres^^ors" Fiidi thi-t she 
f i n a l l y fiJi-gaea v i th tfee VesteiH teloc, observed mi 
2 
isaian writer. fberefore, ladia did not send any troops 
to the aid of Baath Korem Republic altttouKh she liad 
In t^r comamieatim of 29th 3'ttfie, 19S0 th«t "the 
bfilttog of aggression find the qviok mstoretim of pesceful 
eonditioRs esseatlnl pieltides to a setisfactory settle-
ment. fhlg policy is bsSed on the ptosaotion of vrorld peace 
m4 th« ©f friendly relations vltb ®21 countries."^ 
Qa Febmr-ij 17, 1063, spesking Sn parliament, Sehry feisiself 
saidi "¥e did not tsJtee pert In the fighting becawce, 
thout;^  we ere isrepared to give medical succour, we 
nothing to do with th® war such*'*^ 
The Delhi aors'espm4mt of tlrie, York IMate^  
voiced his r.ppreeiatioof ® "Prime Minister Je^aharlril Kehru's 
1. India ws£ one of the members of tfie 0.0. Commission 
oa Eoree reported that nggresslon h&X tmm 
p3ec€- yoc. L/i496, Sm& 19S0. 
2. Kundre, J .C . lad laR F ^ r g g n 
Tlie rinaustan fime.s, 30 J me J.9S0. U.S. iJoe. l,/iS20, 
Jme 1950. 
4 . Kehru, E P l A ^ t . 
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i?ctloat io scceptSag the U.is, Security Cornell resolatioa 
ccfidesBning the aggression of Hofth in tmposlag 
ootmter musnrBs «tas a l i l^ip eoaregeous dse ls i^ to tlie 
cmt^t of the <Selteste state of Indlm public opSalcai, 
In the of aiploisats gad other 6bservejrs bete in this 
Instance Fend It li«?hriu . . . hn& risked offend lag a large 
section of the Indies public tbat Is altresensltive on 
the S©st-Mest questloa-** The ssae Issue also poSotea cmt 
trist "President fm^i^*^ ennotaaceaent end the lamediate 
employsi^t of United States eiffls were ccKidesmed as mother 
tostsnee of K©steifn intervention in parely Asian Affsirs.'* 
^^ustla, the y.c. representstiire said; "The cause 
of ^nstice md peece is strengthened by this positive relp 
froffi 6 great net ion sach es ladle 
Sehro el so voiced his syiapsthy for Urn fUi. . whai m 
December iu60 he eaici: ''In the fighting In Eore©, the 
ffiein btird®a of the United Ifetions has fallen on the forces 
of tte Ualtea .states. They have suffered gre&tly, and I 
t'{=lnk our syspathy s?.o«lci go oat to them."^ 
But India aid not go ell the vey vith the United 
iftetes end other pov^ -erg who s^it their ®r®ed forces to 
k f i g w r l ^ y , ^ o t h Jun© i9S0, p.iO. 
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Korea i^ich mtcigociissed a lerge secticsa of the Asierleim 
people • P r l® « mis ister Hehrti aade M s viev <sle®r 
that India's support i^Iet«<S gpecifleelly to Korea did 
aot extend to the otber steps mentiaaed Sa ppesldeat 
TriiaiMi»6 steteaeBt^ of k? June regarding Forasosa and lado-
Indlft ^listaJaed fro® vhes the aeeuf»ity 
CouBcil pBSB^a its third resoltitim^ an Jaly 7, 19S0, settlag 
op & Waited Setioag eomaad becense ladia m& not shading 
eay troops^ Oa tbft same B^hru^ ta his press ccafereace, 
ejiplsSaed vfey ladia deelia«ei to Bmd asrsed forces to Korea* 
Be seidJ lallitaiy ©sslstaaee is bej'oad ladie's eapecity 
sad woald sake l itt le aiffereaces. lad is* & defence forces 
heire been oriaaiEed essaatifilly for defence sn-i siot for 
service in distent theatres of vsr."^ At the same time 
fefcJ'u ei^mestly trisd "to •'lad e besis for tertiaating the 
ccaaflict, md it wes on A3 July 1950 thp.t Sn his identical 
messages^ to Marshal ijtslJo RSd D&m Aoheson, tseeretsry 
^ vol, mil (674), Ju ly 3| p . S . 
2* See the Cf^sniaicatloa ofCaovemrsent of Xadie) dated 
29tfe June, 1950. 
3, i./iS88, Jaly 7, xySQi M s ^ ' t July -i-SSO, p. 83, 
The Hindu- 8 Jaly 1950. Bat ladie caaoaaced m 
m w T o W to despatoh ® field Ambalsace tJalt sad 
a saell sureical Cnit to Koree. la edditioa to i t , 
she supplied 400,000 jute begs end e eoasidertble 
weatlty of mediciaes. 
fear PX qn j t e^ ^HXmB mOf P* 
Text i£i jaaqmmXra px^ 
pp. ^ i^lso see P.M. Nefcru* s message of 
July 19^  1950, I I M M P - 706-708. 
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of £tst6, fee explaiaed tlist labia's purpose vbs to loca^lx© 
the conflict to facilitate peaceful settleaaent by 
Ijreeicicig ttot «ie£<ilo«k in tfee s-o thet 
represent fit Ive of the People* s Oovsmiseat of CMae can 
tBice & seat In tlie Council, the cea return to It , 
or fclirougfe lafor®«l outside 
th© Coyoi^iil, tht th^ aasl China, vlth %im 
foelp coopereiiaa of otfoer pmm lov^jig B^tlons, can 
flod ® fe©El5 f©r tsrffiiaatlag the cdifliet emd for a penseaent 
solution of the Koreaa problem." But H«hra reeeive^ no 
encouraging respcmse frou my of the pcrties,^ 
ffeus, India's policy md getioas were datersiaed by 
her desire thet the Rorem war should r^ein loceji^ea^ 
8a<i thst in ces« of extessi'^n sbe should not be obllpe^ to 
fe€» Involved in it . Thig position India m©liit«in©di gl l e loag-
¥hile condeming thte Sorth Korean figgressim, ¥ns 
thinking th«t th€ Korean ver might essuae larger proportions 
thereupon, Sn b special Se&sion of Parliament on 31 July iSSO, 
President of India Dr» Kejenara rrased ssue It deer 
th^t the suggestion mmde by F*H. Ketiru in these 
"VBB not intended to condone eggres.-.lon or to w a k ^ the 
{authority of th<s %it#a Sationsj it was tseent to edd to 
tb© strength m^ saorel force of tb« organl^stion md to 
facilitate the early tf^risineticai of e daagerout situetion*" 
Psrligiaentary Debate^ vol. V, pt.II , 31 August 1950, col.lO. 
jsgsinst this see Broadcast by president Trusen explaining 
the need to proc&lia a stete of Emergency, Dec* 15, 1950. 
26, 19S0, pp. 9Cf9-lO€0. 
x&x « 
hcasee sfc« did not w€dat to get iavolved la it snfS vas 
cf i re fu l . 
ftll tiles € stfitemmts^ sugfej^tioas activities 
on t h e part of It^din aot have bej^i F i g g r e e s b l e far 
the %ited £tat«s. ffeey thougfet thet g©bru was tiylng 
to esa^SIiste tii® Coiteuaist '0400, yhlah wss sssoclated 
vith eggression. Oa iSth a^ly, X9BQ la h.%B reply^io 
Sehru'fj eppesl JDean Ach&sm politely rejected ladle's 
saggestlon for ssetlug Goraauaaist CbMr, at the n.S» and 
said: 
"there toss ROt at m^ tl®? m j obstacle 
to the f u l l part ic lpst lon by the* l o^let 0nion 
in the «orif. @f the %it€!d, Jlstloni- the 
deeisl- 'B thr tQtrlftt Unioti I t s e l f . « • « 
la ©lir oplfii'^a, the decision bcti^ eea 
co®pi?tiaig c1 eiasRt (TOvemrBents for Shlnri* s 
s©®t la the OGitai letioas le one wisich aaist 
be reached by th« Ofjlted Hntloas on Its merits. 
I t Is » auestlaa on vhieh there Is at preset 
fi wide diversity of views eiaong the membership 
of the Untied, iRticas. I kaov you will egree 
thet the decision aot be dictated by m 
iml&Trtal eggression or soy other ooaduct 
vhich should subject the 0nited HetioaE to 
coercion or duress." 
Thi© reply It clesr thet the regarded . 
1. Ibid.^ vol. m i l (S78). Joly 3i, iygO, pp. i70»71. 
Ag@la&t this Marshall Italia velcoaed the appeal md 
ia his reply of J«2y iS. x9S0, stated"! fally sfcer© yoar 
poJUat of view »s regards the expedieac^ of the pe^goeful 
settletneat of the Koreaa qu^etioa through the .©curity 
Gauacil with the otoligetory perticlpstlea® af the People*s 
iSiistSSt P* ^^ ^^ ^ reprt£®Rtstives, (heviag 
resumed sest) la the iiecarity Council on i Aufust lifBO^ 
said thet Kehru* s approech of geetSag the Comimialst Chinese 
ia the O.H.O. fad locisliEetiaa of the Horcoa war ves Uic 
right one. ,of. ihe.llnlt^d ff rtloas. 
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IndloQ suggestions as imply^g concessions to the 
GorosBttaist powers OS B pri<;e to be pcl^ L for the Korth 
Kore^a »gg^«sBico cod leaving the Kor&m i>ue«ti-Qa op«a 
without esKing my cocaaitaents on tti« pert of the c<i!B»u-
aists. In Washington "Sehru* s messftge caused mderstandsble 
ennoyaace. The tJnited States wee uay being asliLed to bti^  
off a Uocs®wnl8t ©ggressicai slreeOy tmder way,'*^ Indi© 
tbowglit otliePwis®. To ber these cmotss loas seemed t6 'be 
necessex^ parts of the of eeslng tengictis for ^ 
geraer&i settlement in the Far Kest. £o th«3?© were vi^e 
diffemices between th® tvo countries. In the O.fc. ey© 
th« tmt of Goamaalst sggression wss of uppermost importGnc€ 
vhile Indis sm the Korean ^iiestioa together viti^ other FsSfc 
Eastern issues, tirns, sto« blurred tb© fact of CociEiiinlst 
Bggressim. Washington was eoavlncedi thet It was better to 
figbt the sggrrssim tbm to secure peace by roefeini; conees^i ons, 
iR-felch it refused in tbe eerlter pert of the yesr and w® 
tiie more unwilling to great Mhen the only new factor in the 
sitwetion wss m ect of aggression against tfe® United Nations.^ 
Hehru voiced his ennoyence vfeile speaking in the 
Indian perlicaent on August i960. Without octueliy 
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meattoatng ttie O.&.a, tie midi^ 
«I f V® ere eatrgetic in cmdemSsg the tggrassion 
by Sorth icore®, it is ij©cesse«y to that ve 
ere bj? m memn s a t i s f i e d fey cmdiitioos 
In either Horth or i>o«th Korea. Tbe policy of 
ues t^m paverc i s do^iast©^. aors by Buropem 
problems then by those of x&i&t md they i^ ontinu® 
to tske decisioas vhich effect nmm^ of /.fla 
ifitfeoat of iderstsidiag th« e f f e c t i v e a^edi^ and the 
spirit of pmple* la the West tfeer® i s 
l i t t le imd^rstsa^iog of the Setters ootlook. . . . 
m aader^teiia the oetlooH of tlm /.slstic Coisatries 
very nsuafe better thm. the %st» the future of 
4sia is s t i l l 4€t©nnin@ii by Use o? tbe 
V.'esteta Wo rid.« 
eaphesized that say attesspt to tackle ksim proble® 
withoat tskiag Mb Into cccount booad to prove fruitless. 
md eerteialy tisis wes s clear tedicatloa of Xndip* s differences 
«itli the ¥est, led by the on th© best w^* tn s'^lve the 
Far Sestera probleas.^ 
Fartlisr, the lad^-U.??. diffsreae^s m on 
the is^a© of erossiag of the 3Sth psrallol by the O.S, l-orces 
in Octciber 19S0 md Cblmme i^tarveatim in Korea, on 
30 jL^ epteaiber 19S0 st s Prefix Ctmfer j^as© ia liew Belhl, Ketiru 
publicly steted his fir® gjad vigort">ias oppositicaa to the crossing 
X. Extrect M , 
pp* 7C8-70S?. ror foi l text of the ©tetesaent see 
BMUnSSalm-fieksMSt S, part I I , 31 Jyly - August, 
iSSO, co l s . 
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Of tfee SStli ppffsllel by the jl!»H* foreos m<2 esl'SJ^ 
"It wouiJi be i-^ iwng to cstry oa ©liltsiy operations, 
wlien fkeaceful methods ^m bring the necesBfiiy results* 
f he r s f o r e , thinlt thrt. th© » f ^ ^ ^ s shotJltl net 
go beycaa vi.e 38th psralliS t i l l ©11 other ae^s of 
settlemeat h^m been explored. I t is wrong 
to thiok ihj^t yoia em geln sa ob^^ettv© b j pursuing 
military siethodg to th© atsost eiad to the lest." 
j^cbni lieat efiets t^ tc thf Sauih Korean President 
byngsLSB hhee ®rs4 
« l r Pr«!si4.mt mm-t tfeet v l l l take all 
kiads of silltery steps farthermce of hi& 
eiffis, I dif fer frsjE hlai. I ec no grest 
ateirtr of Pre aidant lihefi, ejn^ fciow 
Perhaps, tlie G.i , .^. and others regarded tfce test in Korea 
to t!^ e light of n penal ectlon, whose prlncipel ob^c-ct 
the paaishjneat of m sggressor* to Indlpu opinion hoveirer 
t!"e Xoi-eiJn was lac-r© liite e civil ssticasi, viiose principal 
ob^cct vfiE tbe rightlUf of a wrong, To In<Si©, there!ore, the 
retreat of tte ^orth Eoresna behind th© 38th parallel ae&at 
that the tlnite4 Nations hr>d ftccoaplisbed their tesk of defeadtoi; 
Korm*^ Th® itrong bed been rigMed &na there was no need of 
crossing the 38th p»ra31el» this orossirig eertsinlj eliensted 
Delhi f r ^ Wrs^ hingtoaf becfiOi^ e India regretted thst the ai . 
forces did cros& the 38th parallel sgsinst h«r strong opposition. 
J- Coaferosces, l.^ SQ., .j?^ * 
aur?ey of ,j[ntfemationt?l affeirg 1950^  p. Si3, 
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B'rom th is time onuorcis vI&ms on the Fa r -Uastem 
situet ion almost never coincided iin<2 were matkm fey sharp 
a i f fe renceE end e g r m t o f isratiiisi Toerii2S.E;?siioQ by 
prpes rnd publ ic of -he 
lB«li0 expressed har opposition to th© brciidSjig o f chta® 
as aggr-eises' bjr ttw t!»H» oti init i©ti\ 'e cai J ^ o a r y 20, 1951, 
©s sh© tho'a^ht thnt socJ^ a step vculai batipcr pccieeful aeg©-
tif^tioRB m^ iecresss the of war. Iia spit© of the 
f a c t ih®t ©er] l e r on &€pt€>iKt;€3? 30, I960 G .^ou E a - l e l hgd warned 
thet Ibtls WOQIQ not Idly s t ^ d by " v h l l s the tearritoiy 
of fi aelgfebour vas l>eiag vmtcmly toveded",^ m^ Westers 
powBTB eoi3ld not s^eept Cfci^ness oout rnt lm crossed 
the 3Sth p?5rsllel. Eescs fe r th , ^Jhioes® ' ntervened^ in 
the eerly l a 19S0 lafiit^, rethc r t h m fcleaing ih© 
ahtn®ee f®r I t , looked issksiBte© at the Hslt^d fo r having 
prec ip i tated « c r i s i s? hsvSng igoored I n d i a ' s warning md thus 
Greatisg the risfc of ii gmers,! var* I na i e ' a r t t i t a ae se^^ea 
one of rat ioa®l izet ioR o f the Chinese conduct rather thsn one 
of bleia©, %ihleb ran against the U^b. whish was oatroged by the 
i . Kundra, J . C . , i W r ^ ^ t P* 
E'^ y^ShjSfig.jey^, jigeagz^ October 19S0. 
3. The luH* Comasfinci in Kores in its report of iovember 5^1950 
reported contact vitfo Chinese IK>G» I^/lS84, 
Hov. 1060$ eai the represeatr»tive in the i>ee«rity 
Council alleged oa November i950 thet Chines® Comrajaiist 
forces iotelling a^ore tfoitji i^ oo^ OQtji were engaged in f'ggre-
ssioa in fforth Koree. Xear Book of the Onited Sstions IQSQ 
p* 242. 
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CMnese interveuii-ja. The press* slid Congress* demised 
fer tfoc us© of fetoj^ic w^ sponss tr, stop tfe® Incrsesing 
Goisaiaiiist Siiiiier® drive ^ ^ t-s r«set]« the forceiB 
incrcBBed.-^  Tfeifc cePtelH'j? al&rmea ladiig. fortetnately the 
ato® homh eotila not lie used, on Fetoi^ wfJt'y JL9&1, the 
United ; tet«f in frett^ ing passed the resolutlotii^ 
ctsiideraiiing Chls® @s agfeires&or So reseti<m to the T?...;.ft,<e 
md Cfeinr* s op-position to th« rtrolutlcaa of eessefir#*^ B#tl. 
iisa ear3i€r opposed tr® 4r©ft re&olMiioa oa tlie groaM 
thet fi ' usefal parpos© voul^ Ise iierve^ by th# P^klag 
Osvemment m Ftgf;fesfor, fecBidet the aecej-ser^' PRychologiesl 
i r 
Rtmoaphe-re for tusccssf^il a^gotletions woul^  dlssppear'^'eectn-
tuf-tiiif existing tsntioij, ihurefore, he observea tb®t 
Inaie ws tc £0 disastrous p ooarse*^ 
i^ &th Morch t^Si^ referriac to ihe j i tust io i i In the 
V^T iiett Is'ehinj soids^ 
lie Onites listlons wss seeiit to be an iastitutlcai 
lor tfce preservetion ol* md ws? ©rgfsaij?:^ 
as sacfe. I'srailoxicelly emough^ it is aow 
In meet lag mBt^ mstlm v/ith ursied force* fjooth&v 
'feorld AfV^lTh president Tmmm*n 
st4-.teiEeot Ft © prett confaroace on Hovcsbcr 3o, 1950^ 
g.l3e York i-'ece^ aber i , 1950. 
-^ ^^ Qt P-
First Cosralttue, 4^th Mtf,., 
iiO JfinaerS, i.96i, p* for tictcil® see B.S. 
fitpteeient th© G©Ber©l /is^ jembly on I Feb. 1951, 
©th i^ztlm 327tli Htg., 1 Feb., 1961, pp. 694-^6. 
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curious feature of the situfitian In ILoir^ a is 
becomifig Increasingly evident* ft jj^ ew development 
is tskiat; place, P. r^tber remerkeble mc 
disccsicerting one*" 
Furtheraiore, there vere minor irritations between the 
t¥0 coimtries on tvo is&ues daring tbe course of praistice 
negotiations in li'SsdaSS: { i) the scope end ©pke up of the 
proposed political confer^fice on the Korecn settlet^at,"^ mu 
( i i ) th€ conditl<M2s of the repatriation of prisoner: of vcr* 
She United ttstes wanted conference to be sttended only by 
the njstions that hrd bome the fight3ja£» But In^is ergued, 
BS Eores was caily one emong ufiny isetjes in the Far thet 
chsnees of settlement in thst ^res voulo be enh^ -nced if other 
interested though noS'-bAiiigereat /.sig® coimtries also took 
pert» The United ^-t»tes was opposed to India* s piirtlcipetion 
in s Eoresn pe&ce Conference beceajte India wse not e belligerent, 
on the otfoer hand India regj^rded herself to be more than 
merely r con-be3 liferent netion so f^r as the Korean vsr was 
concemed* Festicps, the ceut'e of the • opposition wasthe 
hostile "^ ^ttitu-ie of Bhee* s Govemraent tovsrd io the 
delegiite Henry Cabot lodge Jr. explained* "in vi«\(f of 
the Isnoiai ettitude of the i^gpublic of Koree the pfertlcipaticai 
of India vould ^eoparaipie the success of the Conference."^ 
i . the question was discusted 'n the /^ .ssombly In i^ ugust 
United States opposed India*s Jnc34iion in the Conference. 
He ©ISO believed tfeet tbe C€»irereo<j« w6s most likely to 
sQeceed if it was limited to the belligermts oa both sides, 
ti^a this matter the Yndlm delegate said tbut ladie had no 
desire to seek ® pl^ c^e ia the Gonfefence mlese it was clear 
that it could perform some usefal fuactioa in the interest 
of peeoe and tlsi^ t the asjor pertiei. concerned desired its 
fissistance in the setter^ m ladiiea view on this qaestion 
was as followsJ 
«The presence of neatrtls vould bave loosened 
tension and introduced soise cordiality into the bleak 
etmosphere of a conferent^ of erst-while enemies 
or belligei^ntE, none of whom could be considered 
as victor or f^ s vmqui&hed. In this respect the 
I.ore«3n politieel Confciv2h<ce is unlike the Verseilles 
type of peace conference. Tbe presence sf neutrels^ 
the round table iaea mil the provision for ynenisitj 
betfe-een the two belligerffiit sicles for eny decision 
to be adopted, es proposed by the Chinese ©ad Korth 
B.ore«msy seem to be reasonable enough md useful 
for the suceesfcful termination of pe£>ce parleys*"^ 
Though the Conference was never held "Washington* s 
opposition to the Inclusion of Indis in the Eorem Stonfereace'% 
©t lesit , "brought Indo-Ataericen reletions to a low point, 
if not the lowest in recent yeers,*'^ 
on the Question of repstrlstion of the prisoners of 
A. i m . 
"Political tettleraent Sn the Fpr Sfist"s m Indian view.-
Foreim .^fj-elrs.K^por^, Uey Dclhi^ March 1984, vol. I l l 
Ho. 3, p. 3S. 
3. F.obert Xruabull remr rked in e despsteh, York. fimeH. 
tepteaiber ii7, 1953. 
war. In NoireKtoer i.9S2, the d^lega^te msde the best 
€;cpot;itioii of the viev of the l-iestenj Powers f-ad said thet 
the OQsmmd vouXd feew #gree<J to hsve sll prisoners 
returned^ provi<t€<l no hinuaoiteripn ssoasMerstlons preireated 
suesti ret«ms* AecoMiag to bim atimber of tfce prisoners 
of war inKSer their co^aad fesre^ thst. If t!i€|r mre ret^^rned, 
they be executed, iaprlsoneii or treated brutel^i if m 
ettesapt was made to return theia they vouM ret 1st it by force* 
Therefore it would not <mly b© highly iiamorcl to force tteir 
return bat it wotiJa el so reculre a milltsJ^ opcr»tlon OF TVO 
toconsiclerebl© proportions. Be edcieci, ©Ithough the Genera 
Convention gsve the priFoaer the right enti the opportunity to 
go bosee, there wee nothing 3n i t to Isply thst he saist be 
forced 0t the m.^  of the bayonet to go beck when he dia not 
vmt to 40 so«^ The ciid not isueh ep?.»reciat€ the Indian 
resolution^ of -17 Sovetaber i9Sii end ms not heppy about it • 
They thought that the Indian resolution did not unr-«bi|!U0U£ly 
guarantee fair trestisent to thote prisoners who did not wish 
to be repc trie ted. Moreover, they tbc|ight the resolution vbb 
2* V'hlch V8& adopted by the General /ifeseabXy on 3r<3 isecenber, 
i96a. 'iext in iMd ' i PP* iiOi-aOE. India presented-th^ 
resolution J when the de&cil ocK over repatriation delsyea 
the ceasefire. Krishae Mcaon contended in the Assembly 
that the Indian resolution was in feet e ceasefire re^olu* 
tion, s& the only outstanding obstacle to en flmistiaB 
ekireemeat In Korea wes the prisoners of vcr issue, end if 
this isrue were settled there laould be e ceasefire within 
twelve hours. 
u. A.Cy.ri.^  7th wcssion, Fir&t Coramlttee, 635th Mtg., 
iDecemtr, i9S2, p. i.76. 
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vsg« « ibout vhrt vould hf^p en tf» thos?* priotm^Tu who opted 
Bgainut r^-patrirticBi. Ilie '•s,. C-ovemjaeat was also fifr«idi 
ttiet the proposed Politicel Goafereaee would not worfe ssoothjy, 
Heace, they lasistM that to mti^ e the Inaian resolotion 
acceptable to them the refereno© of the iseue of tlie prtsmefs 
of mr to the political Coaferenc# asust be nile4 ©yt.^ 
Indie* B role es the Ghulris^ of the lieutrel srations 
iiepetPiation Oocraissloa^ was aeae diff ieult becaap® of the 
ffict thct neil^her of the t%fo blocs folly coopsrated with 
ladig in the discharge cf her dtial duties as Chnlmm executive 
^geat of the HKF.C and custodian of the prisoners of war« 
i.tEt€iseiitfi by leading /^sinistrsticm snd Bepablicen Forty 
C.A.O«ii.« 7th tesfcioa. First CoiSKlttee, §a9th l-l^g., 
24 Soveaber 1962, p. 141. l-eter with s fev esen-^aents which 
pertly met Aseericaa oblections the O.fc. accepted the 
resolatioa* The lU. . i t . rnd aosffiuaaist China <ild sot 
eceept this* yyshlUislcy, the £ oviet representative described 
the resolution in the follovine word&i "The drsft resolution 
of the Xndim dalegstion irfhich is designed not to put 
en. end but to prolong snd extend the wsr, cannot serve 
the cause of the peaceful settlement of the Korean ^ueEtlon. 
p.A.o.,K>,7th Lesi^ion, 399th Plensiy 3 December iSSii 
p. later on, on June 8, 19S3 the belligerents emolucJed 
m agreement on the repetrietion of prisoners of var t>>hich 
was wry similar to the one India bad proposed in her 
resolution land the U.M« @cceptea. fext in Jime 1953 
2. The CoJiiiaiseion esteblisfeed on 9 lepteaber 1963, 
took charge of custody of the pritc^ieri. of Ksr from both 
sides on the be l l ig^ts by ;.^ 4th .^ septesiber* For b det^ed 
studjf of the voUiln^of SUr.C, Lee ihlvs iiayal, lQGi£* £ role 
in the Koreea Question* Delhi, t.Chand laid Co«, 
Cliepter V» Untier the IrJsistice Agreement, India was made a 
member-ahainam and Executive Agency of the S mesaaber HhhQ* 
'iext of the Agreement in gti Yeer Bo,fiat P' • 
* 1 Cli • 
spokesaea raising doubts etout the iapcrti^llty of the 
Scotrsl IS^tiotts Efepstrietion Coaaalsslon,^ of vhlda In^ie 
ves til® Chaira^, deeply raaEIed th® Govsisasseat end the 
pi^SB of tfcat eomitJt .^ la October 1953^ Dallee* reference 
to the the **m celled aetatrel body'*, weg ijot 
appreciated l a ^ ilagafit i54, ase<i th€ 
strongest leaguage egfiSiifet Ijiilia, s^ lag tlist io«tb Korea did 
ml itfsat "e saheaiag betrsyiag Indi® on our 
accused Indie of "trafficking >.ith the Goiamunicts".^ The 
tiiit in m effort to stay •aeulral', 
Iniia 1.8^  (slmvlf Qo^ gndt oae of the ot)ligetiens it hus 
©ssuaed^ Ihe saiae peper, ia 0 ea^sequent e^itori^l, es; erted 
thet by refasiag to carx:^  oat pi^visiona is tte engistice 
agreesseat in, respect of of the prisoners •ladl® 
vialetes the ofeligBtJ^as it assamea vten it agreei to act 8s 
desltiag umpire and ®s ougtodien power. I t is scarcely in ® 
position to object, muQh less to cherge a violstion of tte 
emlstice egreeaeat, if the comiB®ad mekes good the ladlan 
Im For the reports of the MUhQ see J[M-EeH££iil-l£JUsafi 
iiocassaotA 1954, Printed by the imager, Covemaeot of India 
press, lev Belnij Jllso see for KaLC Reports, " ® 
Sovea^er i , 1963. 
TbMf mgm% 30, 1953. 
I-bidy i s Jeou&iy, 19S4. 
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default by releasing prismers In confioralty with the 
fimiistiee agre€3®nt."-^ f^ee ¥ashln£tcm Pos|; (es quoted SJI 
^^SL^iSMi ^ Jsnttaiy i9S4) 1)1}®©^ in^iR ^or m impose Ible legel 
tsfigle iii the release of prisoners of var. "The Indllms 
chose an oMuse way out of the dlleaaa© of the SKhG after the 
fellure of the tvo sides to Bgr«« to a pollticsl Conference . . . 
In seeKisg to Bpj?emm Cfeina, has sought to fiad a mtMy 
middle path vhen in fsct no aiddle path exists.'* All thl«; 
crlticieaa^ wes basei on a greve alsreading and sjtslnterpretstion 
of the terms of the ormlstice nihioh aid not vest in the Indian 
Cfeaimaii of the N?JKG and iixecative Aj^ ent the powers or the 
obligations vhieh the criticism invested Indie with, observed 
en Indian writer-® iinother observer said thet "a neutrcl 
CoffitHission governed rigidly by armictice teras was not the 
right body to pull sfcestnuts out of the political fire for 
the blocs of the sold uar.^ 
,lbid« ^  19 Jeaueisr 19S4. Bat it was noteworthy tbfst caa 
21 £t Jsnuiiy^ 1954, the ^^w York flmes balanced the obove 
criticisa with favourable (to India) comment on India's 
roles «But the final show down under the influence of its 
greater soldier. General i'hiaiayye* India not only resisted 
Gomiminlet pressure to use force on the prieonen but also 
turned thei-e men over tij the I t may be doubted i^ether 
say other pover could heve done this without precipitating 
violence, and for fulfi l l ing the substance If not the i 
letter o* the aswlstice agreeaent India deserve s the thmks 
of free men. 
2« In both the Com^ Qunlsit and ncn*Gommunist press of the %;forld. 
It m&t be aentioned here that even the O.i. foecretary 
General supported the tJ.H. Somand on this issue stating 
thet the release of the prisoner!! under the O.fJ. Coaamd 
vith the civil Im etatos did not contravene the Armistice 
agreea^nt. fhe Elnau. i;9th January 1954. 
4. tee • Kxplcnations to Korean ?0Wt - l.eesons of the experiment*, 
by f? iPrefcU^ably Indian) corresponaent firasa the dCTjilitBri^ed 
sonc^ ninnn. Jami rv. iClftA^ 
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f?©hru rcficted QUite dispassionately aad seW, "irhatewr . 
opy hr.ppen today or in the near ftiture in regard to Roree, 
¥© sisy feel is all feutalltty that ve used our endeavours in 
helping to brSiJg hottilities to an Thr^ t was &om terviee 
to tile «aase of peaee« \:e hr^ vfe no easy or smooth tesk^ md 
lisve bem ©ttscked fro® K11 sides «nd have hsd to function 
in the context of hostility, suspicion and biti^eraess th&t 
exist bet¥e€® the two sides* 0«r impartiality ma objectivity 
hf:ve been assailed m4 tbe President of tbe Louth Korean 
Government had hurled tLrests rnd insults «t us. In ^pite of 
sll this, we he^e continued to shoulder these responsibilitias 
without giving isey to pres&ure or departing fross the purpo-e 
that have always cuidled ue ™ the prc.^otion of pysceful €»nd 
5ust solutions."^ 
But the reectiaa of the Indira press was ssuch more 
ottt&pofeen and bitter thgn tfojiit of the Government. Celjinc 
t-eastor 2:nowlmd» s assertion that ladi® was "3c;bota£j!n£ the 
peece as she did the ¥®r" m extrcordinr,iy oonajent. The findu*' 
Ke W8£ speaMng before the K©lyeai session of the Congress 
Party. ;fhe Ftndu^ M January, 1954. Beceu&e of the fact 
tfeet the Eouth Eore^ Govemraeat had alwee^ s opposed a 
peeceful settlement of the Koreen wsr md stood for the 
unification of Korea by sny meens even by force, lehmj once 
publicly referred to the • Irrespondsible* aseaner of the 
iuouth Korean Governmoit snd its threats of violence which 
he said y&s agains t ell cenons of intemctionel law era 
conduct. il>M., 7 January 1964. /.ttecKing the Xndiaa 
proposal for reconvening the O.H. fieneral Assesably, the 
t,outh Eorean Government accused Indie of having •definitely 
aligned herself with the CosiminiKt Camp ®nd no longeris 
her ova mj'ster. .ihe jumps vhen ^©scow ihhistlCE end runs 
errsndt^ for e chubby m i^ vith blooay hrndt vho sitL In a 
high &eiX in the ivre^alSn." IMd. , 16 Jfanu«.ry 1954. 
I L M M October l a , 1953. 
- im 
wsiBe^ tbat "thase lofjsiers hy their stjiteraents are 
enacmrtigiug the Khee Coveimaat In I t s pol icy of i nc i t e s^ t . * ^ 
HoToovmT^  indlfflQ editors began to sprinkle terms mch ®s 
"sabotage*' end "treaehery" c»v«r th^ i^r «ditorieX psges. The 
yp^n Press . ossertede if the I?rjitsd States stmde for 
"then it is higfo t3j»e thet the mt±m of its spokesmen 
essiimed s aore reasoaabl©, respoasible gnd pers«ftsive hoe'% 
or ®ls© cirop all pretenees.'*' MOtber editor aotedi "The 
ispressioa is strosg thst tfee co^sad is mr^ sach 
ictflaeijoed mm if It does not sbare, the coytii Korean 
oppoeitioa to the armistice fhe Goismand, teking its 
mm from Washiiigtoii, aot beea ss coopcrstife kith the 
nuhc ®s it should 
It is iR this eoatext that the Gmeva Ceaference m 
th€ fe r is® St C-whlch m^t from ^pril to 16 J me 1954) fiiled 
to ©rritf© at a ©oltition* tJijliiee the Western Q®ap KhSch t^ok 
c tragic view of the sitantioa, it vas felt in In^ia tligt it 
had Jit luast, demoastrstsd the deslr© of both sides to raett 
©ad jti©goti6t€. Sehru his view in the Parli^ent th®t 
the proposal® inatt© t^ t th© Coftfereace by bottt sides eou3di be 
"a kiad of bridgehead froin which a hopeful landing to Uie 
chores of a Eoreao settlement and indeed, should be 
L£SIL fMSKlQMm^, Qetober 6, 1963, 
Ootober Ih, 1053. 
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plaaned OP eavlsegcd*"^ 
Indie dM not isccept the spofssored resolution^ 
on tfee ^Qesrttea* of sKilflcatisa of l^orcsj. ladisn 
representatl¥©, in the eoarse of hso urged th»t 
to echleve the ofejcctlir^c of pciGcsfuJ ttfiificetlon, tbB 
o»«rfe€s ms direct negct let lens the two parts 
of Korea, witboat ootside 
f i le above aas lys i s isaJees i t cl©®r tbr-t feoth 
Ia«si®os irimted poaae biit they differed ov^r the best 
viS' s«eare it , Mhlle In^ta eoatSm e^d to sesare pcsec 
md to rediijse tfe© threat of 0 tsiggcr var ia East /t&ia, the 
United States 'iesirltsg to avert s new worl^ wer, strove for 
e tfegt dlsscsrsgu Cos^imist sggressicai •avwwtiei'Q* 
la Xn^tss cpfeicsi ths only m j c!it vss vithdre-wel of fill 
troops frojn th^ t%'0 Koren^^ tfee opeB.teg ef tslks bstwe^n th® 
r«p re seat of tbe tvo tsovestiifsisits, vith a view ultSmately 
to hcMias elections in botfe the 
hit'ives*^ 
<J25 AUgost pt. I I , vol* VI, So.3, 
col. 
'd* *?!!€. r«solatloa vm ecoept^d by the aeaeral ilsseaably on 
'Mn, JfrMj^QOKMMf p. 90. 
p. as 
4. KrishEu Menon* s speeehes - C* A«0.B., 9tli session (1964) 
Pl€R. Mtgs. pp. S25 ff smt i k i ^ b t t iOth Sesflon (19SS>, 
Flea. Mtg®., p. B42* 
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Ae f^ reisalt of the lado-fl.s* th« letters 
attitude tO¥?»Pd£ > Conasraalst Ching pei^aps the 
creatim <»f jblfjifO mas a reaetioji to th© Korean eplsoc^e* 
Unfoftwaetely all tlie efforts failed md tlie parties 
dM not rmch mf sgreejaent md Eorce remained divided* 
GerteSnly. tii© ^h^is q-aestioia of ©adlng the Koyeea confl3[cfe 
bristled with a variety of dif f iealties pud jproMess, becaose 
it iavolv^a, directly or indis^ctly ell the Great Powers 
engaged in the Cold vr^r, observed © notei Icdiaa writer-^ 
/®y %'oy, siestera actions ^ poetares Sa the whole episode 
'^ere largely motiveted by the less edify lag eoasiaerstioas of 
the 'Cold strategy by vhieli tiiey sought to eaeo^irepe 
deserters froni {losisanist forces in future wars, end ase these 
deserters for their o ^ eii4s of figlitiag Constunism.^  
4B) mm? 
!thifi was the most isporti k pect whicfe the B.b. ooaoluded 
^itb the A&im ooisntries it arousetl vehement eriticis® end 
1:. i ' .ajea, M . i . , ^ ' o m . j y e C a j t g S J k a ^ i a ^ f o p . c i t . , p . i i 4 
3 * P r e v i o u s l y t he M l i t s r y P a c t % i t h P a k i s t e a was s i gn ied 
i a ^f8y 1 9 6 4 t o i n d i e ' s o p p o s i t i c m was o v e r w h e l s i l n g » 
I h i s i s s u e i s d i e c a s s e d in e s e p a r a t e o M p t e r ( K o . S") i n 
t be sanie t k e i i i s . 
• km -
protests in Indi^ both fro® the Isidisn GovemaJeat mi 
tfip. public in geaerel. Indl© tod alwsys. been sciyoocting © 
negotiated setilfesuent for all o\itstftadia|> Frr £©£.tejm 
QU< stions. It ms oa Februrry 1964 thet Ke^i^ en 
appeal for R ceasefire M Indo-Chine. He seid; "It seeras 
e treaieadoUE pitjr thst this should eaotintie without eny 
serious cttempt feeing to fine ® t^ ay out."-'- In his view 
the Geneva settleasent on indo-ahina crested a suitable otsjos-
nhere for pesaeftil neeotletioa.^ And psracioxically the proposal 
for a collective defence system in coath a^&t /.si® to assure 
•pesc® security md freedos* to the net ions of i.outhfisst Asie 
md the Western Pacific end which wes aiaed st counting p^tentiel 
Chinese' eg? res Ion ia t^omi.trest was sponsor^^d on t^ e^ ©ve 
of Geneve conference on F®r urtt t.t i-shich f^  setil of the 
conflict was due to be di&aus..ed, «ith C\ in«j as a 
perticipeat, 
la his statement to r1 iaent on 24 April 1954, 
voiced the Govcmaient of in^i©'t regret ^d concern thpt^ 
"e conference of sueh ®oaitatas cheractcr, obviously celled 
together beceus:© ntgotifitlcMii was c ufeldered both feesible snd 
t . UiOiS-IfiMS, Febrirusiy a?, X964. 
2. In B stst€;LeQt on July U., i9S4, on the Geneve settlement 
H^ ghru spoke sucht "ffcis is one of the outstanding 
@Gliieveotents of the post-war ere, rn<i for the fir^t tiae 
ti-cre will be no wer in the «orla. ?^4s is s greet step 
torvardj but it is onJy a steis, f:n<i it to be followed 
by per;.lstent efforts ®t further settjem^t to fts&ure 
pesce for the f u t u r e J u l y 24, iSS4. 
3. E. gjL.. D^b. April 1964), pt. IX, vol. IV, 
cols. 6680.1. Also i'ee, C*> . j^eb. (27 Aur.ust 1964), voJ.yiX, 
So.6, col. 597. 
necesta iy , shoula ba preceded fey a procl&aBstioii of tsfcet 
to isck of f a i th in i t , aad o f e l t e m a t i v e s lavolvSag 
tfarests ©f sanetioas- Hegotist ions are fiRndicspoed, th€> 
s ta r t i n pad they saske chequered progress, i f sny ni. s31, 
witr. daresfc", threats^ s l i g b t s und prodesaetions of leek of 
f r i t h preceding thest.' Furthermore, these fievelopewmte \ere 
o f grave concern mcl of grievous s igni f icance t o India beeaUi© 
" t L e i r impiicetlons iapingc on the ncxvly won md cherished 
independence of Asian cotaitr ief . Th# iHRintenence of independenoe 
snd sovereignty of Asiea countries as well es the end of 
colonifel and foreign ru le ic es en t i s l to the prosperity o f 
^sisn peoples se well ©s f o r the pt ece of the vor ld» ,e do not 
seek laiy tpes i s l r ••Im in /isi©, nor ve do chempion any narrow 
ond sectionsl Asian region^l lt is . v;e only seek to keep fo r 
oarse lves r-nd th« adherence of others , pert icular3y our 
neic^boars , to a peace sree md to e policy of aon-al Ignsnent 
End non-coajcjitment to world tensions fnd ©ers. Tb i s , ve 
be l i e ve , i s e s i ent ie l to UE Tor our o^ n^ SF^ ke 8nd aan alone 
easfeJe us to oau© our contribution to lox^ering w r l d tensions, 
to furthering disarmament md to world peece*" He added thnt 
"the present develop®-, n t s , Jovevcr, cast a deep shadow on our 
.hopes, they imprlnge on our bfisic po l i c i es and thej seek t-^ 
contain ns in e l ignaTnts. " In th- sum statement Bi^ ^hru 
eapheaizcd the orainous: f ee t tl;?t the ennounceramt of the 
proposal to set up tbe llaOC iii^ d b^en preceded by ststfesients 
« -fctli' -
"vhich ceffie near to rsstaming protectioa, or declaring a 
kind of Konroe iioctrine, onilnteraJly, over the ccustrles 
of L>outh@@£t iSsle." 
The United i tetes thought otherwise i t beceme interested 
In hpvifif soch a pect bc-opwse of the outbreak of Korean 
yipv .'hieh provoked tt-e prob3em of meeting the Gotnflianist 
challenge in ooutheest M i ® . Joto Foster I3ulles, spaeklisg 
8t an oversees Press Glssb of /.merica at fo rk on March 29, 
1964, c l a r i f i ed the position thats^ 
"Onder the cmditinns of todsy, tV»e imposition or* 
Loutheast Asie of the politica3 system of 
Cojusiaftist i'.iJE6i8 and Its Chinese Comsanist s l l y , 
by wiiatever means teoula be a grave thref-:t to 
the whole free ccj^monity. fhe United fctetes 
fee l s tLat thjit pos f i b l l i t y £houl:i not b© 
pefifcively accepted, but shoyd be met by united 
a c t im . 'Ibis asight involve seriv-jus r i sks . But 
these risks are f s r less thm those th#}t v.i3l 
face UB 0 few yters from now, i f k® dere not be 
resolute- today.« 
I t wes a l l because of the fact that the erea had grest 
strategic velue. fcouthes^t IhlB ms astride the aiost direct 
md best developed ses m^ s i r routes between the Pac i f i c and 
^outh Asia. I t had gsa^or navel ^ d a i r bsses. Therefore, 
•'Cocsmualst control of ioutheast h&la esrry a grave 
threat to the phi l lpaines , Austral ia , md Sew xealMid, with 
MtA^ Mkz., i-i: April 1964, p. 
- • 
wljom te© h^vG treaties of mutuel sssistance. ffac eotire 
j^'esteaa Fes i f i c ares, the so-calle<l ''offshore 
Isleaci chsln", woiila be strateg ica l ly endangi-red", 
the Cecretary to tfc.e s&ise addir^ss."*-
Obviously, coatainsaeat ©f ComisaiiiiBm was the m i n 
ois^eative before tt% Oniteu states wiiile fomolat ing the 
SBArlO. a l l i e s , ia his speech bafore the opening session 
on 6 Leptember %n. Manile, &aid£ 
"The Onitea tt»t6E hes i t s e l f no direct 
t e r r i to r i a l interests in ;:ioati.ei4st ^s ie . 
Stverthele&tj, we f ee l e of comniQis 
destiny with tho&e vbo have in this erea 
the i r l i f e md being. 
"^e are miite^ by a Gommm danger, tba 
Meager thet stesis from intemeticxial 
CosBsaxaig^ i^  asd i t s la^^atiaMe eisMtioa. 
We knov; thot wherever It aokes ga is , ss 
in Indo-Chine, tbese gaSns sre looked 
on- not as f ine l solutions, but es 
bridgeheads fo r future 
CcKiseqUffeRtly, my s igni f icant exp^sion of the GomauQist 
voTl^ would, iUideed, bo © dsng-r to the United States, bfecay£« 
" IntemBtioael coii^nisra thSaks in terms of ultimate3y using 
i t s power position against the United States, f be re fo re , 
we could honestly s^?, using the words that President Konroe 
$s6d te p rod aiming b i s Doctrine, that Comeamist armed 
I k i i M (7^5), £0 c.eptemb«r 1964, p. 391. 
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figcression in southeast Asia kouICI, inffict, endmger oar 
pesce and security jt^ id ©all for counteraction on our psrt'S^ 
decl^jred iJisll«e to Ms to the fJstlm over rudio 
end teltvirion on Leptemfear iS, 1954* It aeent thst tbfc 
tfnitt4 btBt0B was Interested in the defence of Mam^ Burina, 
Mslevfi end tfe© reffiaiJEsiag, pgrts of th© forssr Fr&nets s^aplrc-
in Isao-Ghina I.e. metoex, Leos and Cambodie froa both 
intersftl subv©rfei>n cn4 extem&l sggression. Moreover the 
luaericenf; were alarfied at the Coaajanist success in ln<io-€hine 
mil to create an immediate deterrent against Cofassmiat 
©xpsnsioDi to prevent the felling of the MsIbu "rice bowl" into 
the bends of the Gomatmists.^ 
Contrary ta this Aasricsa thinking India's rescticss to 
the for3i3ti<m of such a pact like i^^ ATD^  almost i^tsie^istely 
sfter the O^eve settlea^nt, was extremely anfavaursble* 
Inula vas not readiy to see any tslfe about an aati-CoaauaiEt 
collective defence system fit a time the contempleted 
"Peace Area"* spyeared as ftc^rlng become m accomplished fact. 
Ju&t before the settleaiffliit, the tino-lnaifg* /.preesent 
on 'libet hsd been s^  igned m April 2B, 1964 wfoicfa pevecl the 
¥8y for very coraial relsiicms between the two coimtries* A 
4;ener®l statement ccaataining the ' f ive principles* of peeceful 
coe^ist^ce was also attached to this agreem^t. These 
1, Ibid., M l ^796), September 1954, pp. 431-432. 
2, For r background to see Dt232es4 "A survey of 
Foreign ?oliey Fr".ble©s", lb la . . /J^mi Febraery 9-
iy&i, p. '^13. Also see IkM-t ^^ O.Vlll (714), H^rcb ii, 1953, 
pp. 33i-33J. 
prlaoiples were reitrested on Jtjae 2Bf to e Jotet stetessent^ 
by Freasiers fie^ru end Choa-Ln-lal during the l e t te r *? v i s i f ^ 
to Kev? Delhi end Bsogoon, vrhich had treaendous iapect m 
the forces gqvexnlng tlae preseat Internet ion si rG l s t imships 
of the oomtr ies of Asia. i Snce tbe CoaMunist Chinf; bsd 
accepted md pledged to mfeiatain "FiVfe P r inc ip l e s " , the 
leeders of non-e l I j^ed Govenameats of i»oiith end touthea^t 
/isia v€re rel ieved fo r i t laesnt thet Communist Chins would not 
ass is t the Oomamnist movem^ts in tb^ I r coiantries* 
Setru refused even t o part ic ipate in the Manila Conference g 
&na siids 
"Oyr pertlcip&tion in theOisnilo Conference would 
&eve saeant bur giving up our basic policy of 
aon-filignaeat teeondly o « r going there 
woold obvi-^usly have 8 f f ec t «d oar position in 
Indo-Chins, as Cfeaimsffl of tfao three ccsamissions 
there. He had gone tlaem sad we fead been 
chosen e l l perti^is for those responsible posts 
b^ceuH© we were thought to foiaov e certain 
pol icy. Moy, i f v© change ths?t policy and 
go behind thet, our iidJole posit i m in indt^Cnins 
would fcf^ve chisnied. fhuz vou}d hev€ been a 
vety itBproper thing t© do I t seems to me, 
tfcig pBrticuler Treaty is looking dengeroosly 
in this direction of spheres of inflneuc© to 
be ejiercised by powerful coantrios beceuee. 
i . f u l l TeJEt in I n i i i UaeM* Jyly 1954. 
In June 1854. 
3. Ind ia , vo l . 7 , p t . XX, Ho. 30 
(29 bepteiEber 1954), co l s . 3677-Si. For fiJl3 
deta i l s see Ib id .^ co ls . 3675-97 
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ultimately, i t is ttee big ead powerful 
cotmtrioB UiBt wiZl a © d i e an<l not the 
tvo o r thr&e wealt sas l l A&iea comtr i e s 
thet aey he rJlieti to them. . . . There i s 
reference to D faet or s i t aa t i ca created 
vlthlQ tfais area yhiah might en t i t l e theai 
to Intervene ••• Does this not e f f e c t th« 
vhol© ameeption of in tegr i ty , s o v e r a l ^ t y 
end Sndepcndeace of the comt r l e s of tisis 
areag. ••• f be wltol© ®ppro«eh of th is 
treaty i s not only e vrong aperoeah but a 
ueugeroas one from the point of view of 
isny ^sisn country . . . hsv® ir€nt\ired to 
tslSi eboQt an area of p€ace end m h^ire 
thought thet perhaps, of the mgjor 
of peao€ might £oi2thoast /isia* 
Kow, the Menile Treaty ri'ther co®es in 
the way of that area of peace. I t tak^s 
yp that ifory erea vhich fee m area of 
peace and almost cmverts i t into an area 
of p o t ^ t i a l war." 
Tbe object ion, vhicb S^hru aacte seriously was to the 
provision ( a r t i c l e 5s) of the- treaty"^ f o r regaraing s i tuct icas 
'^other t h ^ by armetS atta i^" Jor constituting dmger t o the 
feignstory powers. India regarded the iiic:wsicm of the t e r r i t o -
r ies of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in tiie t reaty area,"^ as 
going agfcinst the s p i r i t of the Geneva sett :eoent .^ Because 
of the f sc t that the Indo-Shine settlement «bs based on ti^e 
fimdaisental assissBption th f t t^e aev bom states would resiB in 
X. For 7ext see Kkll (79S), September 20, 1954 
pp. 393.396. 
Ibid., p. 335. 
3« India L'epteobGr IS, 1954. 
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neutrs l , tfe© inc lu s im of th©ee states in thfj lJp«ety area 
ef feeted that toesic assumption mdi the i^hDle eoQceptlon of 
the Goafermce deeisioae i s ahakes m l y 
psycfaclogicall^ but preet ica l ly .^ Erlshna Kenon aade e 
detei led stetemmt m Ind i a ' s polat o^ view nn th© pact In 
the Ouited |?ati<ms Gmerel 
"¥e thSBk that i s omtTuPf to th« sovereignty and 
self -respect of the peopla who are there. I t 
i£s cmtrKry to the s p i r i t , i f not the tersss, 
of tti« lOaitad Setioiss) charter aad, «hat is 
more, i t i s goasetfiioi: calculated to prevent the 
^sian countries froifl ircsaiag out the i r u i f f e renees , 
and i t is a lso something caJculataii to prepetuate 
the vai-y things i t is seekieg to prevast . " 
I t i^ as not a l l i umce equals sn^ was based 
upon diplomacy by threats . 
Apart frons a l l thasa Indie was direct :y 
a f fected by tho S^AIO because India oana aadar the • treaty cree* 
of the pact, m well as the fact that a none-too-fr iendly 
3 
Pakistan vas a mt^ mber of i t observed an Ifidiaw v r i te r * P r k i i t m 
^aa the only *aoloabo rower* which part ic ipated to t U MssUa 
Cc^iferenca and fchich a lso joined the Cmfarenca. India beliavedi 
that the only reason f o r her jo ining the pact vjas her hos t i l i t y 
/ 
p.«-w«J[;eb. (26 august i9S4 ) , v o l . V I I , co le . 447-8. 
2. iUAdu^ - i 3tb iiass. (1964), ?len. Mtgs., pp. 2B9-30. 
tovards In<ite. might be proved fro® tfee obvious 
fsctsi ( 1 ) Kbi le sigjsiup the Msalla m the 
th® Pakl®tE!al Foreign Mlal^t^r eajjhfjsiget the point that 
i t was atraed et frcsi whichever qasrtcr, i . e . , 
not merely from th® ComamlBt Quarter — - I t may pjt^eeed in n 
region 'aggressicm has oBhsppUy besa a coisfflon 
e^perionce dorlaf the psst may cn his insistence 
tJ © Art ic le 4 of tteir treaty r«drfifte<? to o®it, the 
qwall fteatioa 'Cosisualet' against * aggression*. Except the 
United i»tate£5 \ihich isa^e e reservatlcm m the issue, the b 
other siembers of ccmsttat^d to Pakistan*» atand.^ 
( i l > ^t the Mfsteac© of Pakistan, a r « fareace was made to tfiC 
need fo r early setilement of the Knshsir dispute, Sr» the 
Ktrachi meeting of the Covinsil of the sS<ftfQ $i\ March 1966 in 
i ts ©onsmnnlf,Be.® In Indian view, this reference was wholly 
oBtside the purview of the organisation. The Indian Governaieit 
reacted rather strcaagly egainat this r e f ^ r ^ c e * To Hehru 
i t came cs e great »surprise* und the reference to Kashmir bad 
conflraiea his »worst apprehensions about the orgrjiisotion* 
i - I b sJUMi i , 9 September iy64. 
I 
l a f ac t , the Paiclsteni Foreign Minister was reported t o 
have said that the treaty coverfcd aggression by India 
agaSnet Pakistan. Goral B e l l , ^ S S m S ^ j O L ^ ^ m s S i S M l 
op . c l t . , p.Su 
3. SaS-EiMilf 9 mvQh 
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which i t rapreseated, objection was tfest since 
the subject of Kashmir had aothing to \tflth the declared 
object of the ( t o lacrmsse strength of 
aes^er ngticns egsiast external e g g r e s s l ^ and intem®! 
subverr:lcii>t tbe r « fereace eo^id oaly m&m thet "e militac? 
a231i3iee i s fescklag mmt^i*^ acneij?, rfiislstsQ, in i t s 
dispiite with l ad l e . For my orgmlsat lon to ftiactiua la this 
way to the detrlraeat of s country, fe'hich i s f r i m d l y to the 
5nalirld«&l aouatri&s comprised in the o rgmizat loo , x-^omM at 
eay time be cmsider^d as impropriety." Therefore, India 
hed protested to s l l tii© eouatrles emc&med at the unusual 
prceedur© edoptsd by tlse council.^ 
lEdift the estabj is'rimast of the as the 
very aagetlois of the recognition of the G^eva settlement 
m Ifido«Cfeiiis that there was the need end pract lceb i l i ty of 
ccj-existence of states of d i f f e r i ng Ideologies, especial ly 
China l e i s - g - f i s the IMo-Chtee Ststas . Ko^ * could the U.K. 
and F r ^ c ® , whs took tb « in i t ia t ive to nsgotiat® the Indo-China 
6€ttleB5©nt, ha^-e a j so participated in th« Miinils Coaaferen'^e 
and agreed to set up the LhhIO was a i l th« mom odd, i f not 
worse. Sehra suggested that i f their real ofejecttwe was t 
to ensure seciirity f o r the Eoutfeeast Asian region, then the 
hepobllc of Chine must be recognised end allowed to come 
m 
.peb. (20 Kerch I W ) , pt . t l , vo l . i l , Ko.27, 
co l . 3042 
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lato tbe United ^atioaa.-^ It Had hem India* s fo ra l^ 
polloy to develop friendly reletlong with Chin^ mcl she 
W6S net goiag to Join my corabinstioa. 
Dace Setoo voiced his ocaieem also sl>out the after 
effects of ttiB treaty* He said th^t "ooimtries gfct inter-
Iccicei with ©ficb othea-- feaeli pallSag la 4tfferfcat directions 
sad te e crisis you &m pulled ewey in e direction you 
aevei- thowgtot of goSiife,"^ Ee feared that this v?oa3a md 
$ja turiBOil cad cr^ a^te listred, feer end spyrehension assong 
countries, 
^notbfcr emsidiiratioa vas tlie ©pprehension of ladis 
thBt tbe LEATO would mem b return of tfee West, to A&is^ 
md ® <io«iiiati€is of th« Asieti coustrfe s Js a new form beceuse 
the Kestem powers vould provide the loilitaf^ assistance under 
the pact, and netwrslly the ^sian comtries would be dominated 
M 
by those powers and wcsuld <»ily be junior powers to the pect. 
Ag&inst the outspoken opposition from Xndia^ the Pact 
was sliced on 8 ieptouber 1954 mder tbe leadersliip of the 
rjnited £.tates. This ves oaee ageln m evident proof that 
the United states v&b not prepared to belt i^s own defence 
X. India, bepteaber 1954) vol. 7 pt.ll 
Ho. 30, cols. 36ii7-90. For a detailed Indian critique 
of tfoe iBAtO. see K.K. Karenjie, feeg^.r^tl.. 
(Booibey, 1966). 
2. India, t^tMlft lifftofi^ es., vol. 3, pt. I I , March-April,1956 
cols. 373&>6* 
-See-Poplsi and Ta lbot , jft..P^g.. MarlOiW> -PP' ' 
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plms in ae fereoee to tndim oppositim.^ IbSJaSSSSffi 
ft right ving ma pro-Viest peper CsitB^ scated tbat 
decision of this isognitod® sboula have be^a mm^ sgilmt 
tne studied opposition of IndiCf Isdoaesia md buf®o 
op ositicm of Ceylon is itself m indic.';tioa 
ttet v.'®£t€m povere ere not preesred to aeeept Asisa fscllag 
Bs a bar to rapid ssiXtts f^y action."^ Kestem bloc ms 
thus frustrating India's policy of *p©ae«fol ao-.existenc©» 
end lessmSag of t^sions. 
In the United ttstes itself , tt,cre wens fev perseaas 
vho were egeinst the bEATQ* Kr. Chester Bovles was one of 
theo. At least he expressed tis doabts as to the useftalaes^; 
of e i,outb-&®st Asia Defence Orgaaisetlon wltliout the psrtlci® 
peti«»i of Indie mat other * neutralist* countries en<l Bsids'^ 
'"io rely m m rHisnce of these nfetions (Louth-Kores, 
Foraoss, Tnsiland, Philippines, Australia, 
Nevzeslsnd with less then B population of of 
free Asia) WOUIJ h& like trying to hold Europe 
vith a MA'K/ consisting of tpsin^ Portugal Greece 
with rest of iiurope sit ting cai side lines* 
It ymlu be welcOT© aseistanee, but it could 
Lerclly be decisive." 
According to welter tipimpi^ the Manila ^Treaty "is the 
f irst formpl instrument Iji souem times which is desi^ped 
i . fis the In tlio cesfe of militriEy aid to Pakistan 
prior to the li^aTo* 
"Inciia after i.aATC", ^u t^f^ m, ^^ cpi^ pii^ lgtt i.ept.i?, 39 54, 
p. 457. In opposing the iij^ i^x), India sble to teke 
EURB© m<i In<I nesie with L.er end exercised enough influence 
to keep 8 wavering Ceylon liwey from the pect. 
Chester Bovles, jiabfissadar* s Keport. op. e i t . , p. 386. 
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to 3ice£i£e intematlcmal Interv^mtion in Internal a f f e l r s . * 
In part ieu lar , the yj j l ted ^tetes lied scquii^di in the treaty 
* m ondefiaed r ight m ^ ea Isaplled ©bl lget loa to iaterveae 
ander eerts ia ccadlttoiis**^ 
CcmseciUeatls^, thoticb X&diis not Join the Coas&nml&t 
bloc^ the EigBiag of ssEAfv a id help Sn la<lle*s eoaiiiag to 
I? better undarstanding vith tfest b loc , especia l ly with 
Com^mist rad added to the sttapleloii of the i'^st in 
the ajlads of the l ad i sns .^ 
•1. The filado. Xb tepteiaber 1954, For example, 0.;,. 
2. Kuadre, Indim. Foreiicn PoUgJt tl947,S4) ^ op.cit. 
p.98. Also see V.F. isutt, "Indien Policy and Attitude 
tovfcrds a fcouth-£.est /.eie treaty Orgsnlest ion", 
CNev De l^ l ) , September 9 , 1954. 
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(G) gOE^ CRISISI 
One of the laost important cold war Issues was the 
Suez canal conflict on which the views of India and the 
United States did not coincide to a certain extent. It 
was the announcement^  of the nationalisatioh of the U^GZ 
canal company, on 26 July 1956, by President Nasaer of Egypt 
2 
which marked the beginning of the tragedy. By this cmnounce-
ment the Government of Egypt proposed to use the income 
from tl^ company to build the As\fan Baaa and the Company's 
shareholders were to be paid eoispensation in accordance vdth 
the last closing prices. According to the Bgyptian Government 
the CDmpany had always been an I^ igyptiRn company, therefore, 
subject to Egyptian law and nationalisation in no way did affect 
1. Sba-Ilim* 12 aepteml^r 1956. 
2, Perhatss, President Haeser did i t in reaction to the 
Anglo-American decision to suddenly withdraw a wseK earlier 
the offer of aid to build the Aswan High Dam. 
Previously the Canal was owned and operated by the Universal 
Suoz Canal Compapy which was an Egyptian joint-stock compaijy 
registered in "Sgypt, although the majority of its share-
holders were foreigners. It enjoyed a 99-year concession 
from the Egyptian Government, i-^ich was due to expire in 
1968 after which the control was to revert to Egypt (Bg r^pt 
had already and repeatedly announced its Intention not to 
renew the concession)• The Constantinople Convention of 
1888, an international treaty, regulated the canal and 
a8sur<»d freedom of navigation in the canal and non-discrlmina-
tlon to all its users. For a short but lucid account see, 
A.P.S. Bindra, Suez Thrombosis (Delhi, 1969)• 
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Egypt's international coimitinents in regard to the use 
of the canal under the 1888 Convention and the recent 
Anglo-B^otian agreement of October 195 *^ Moreover, 
p^ssurances were held out that freedoia of navigation in the 
canal wouM not be affected in any manner or to ar^ degree. 
Ihe stand taken toy President Hasser in regard to the 
nation^ilisation of the Suez canal va® thus perfectly justified, 
Tliis move aroused quick and bitter criticism and 
opposition in the Western coiuitries - in Britain, French and 
the United States particularly. These countries took certain 
financial and economic laeasures against Bgypt and held 
urgent consultations in U>ndon where - in order to consider 
the establishment of an international agency for the c^a l 
to ensure freedom and security of transit with due regard 
to the in;;erests of Egypt - they announced on 2nd August a 
plan to hold a Power Conferencej including India, at London, 
In their view the Egyptian act of nationalization was an 
*arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an 
international agency*• It was also said that the act 
threatened freedctta and security of the canal guaranteed by 
the convention of 18B8.^  
The London Conference was held during 16-^3 AugustT 
/igain, 18 nations met in London in the third week of 
1. the Suez Canal Problem July 26 > September t966i A 
Itocuraejitary Publication. Washington, The Department of 
iitate, 1956, pp. f . 
2, In Which 22 States narticipated instead of the 2k invitSed, 
India attended i t . 
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S^eptember 1956 and dlscyssed the proposal to constitute a 
Canal 0SGr*s iissoiilation. Xlals AssoGlation was formally 
inaugurated at Loudian on 1 October.^ Perhaps i t was India*3 
opposition to this association and indication of th© 
inhererit risk of war that i^nglo-Freneh decision to 
take th© issue to the 'Jnit®«i ffetinns. The crisis reached its 
peak when Israel launched sudden aggression against Egypt 
on 29 October by Anglo-Fi-onCh invasi m of the Suea Canal ar'^ a 
two days later. 
IMDIAH AMD AlCPICAH BSACTIQIfSt 
fhoui^, both India and the iflraited States opposed and 
their views coincided on the aggression by Israel, Britain and 
France against 2gypt, it was an the issues - of nationalisation, 
of tho canal by ^gypt, the two London Conferences, the 
proposed Canal iJsers' Association - that they h^ ti quite 
divergent views, 
1?he national interests of the two countries were not 
alike. The American loaders viewed the Middle Kast noti 
like the British and French governments^ in tenas of 
national interest, but as on® sector in a global policy in 
which the adversary was not Arab nationalism but Soviet ' 
2 •imperialism*. On January 1957t J*resident Eisenhower made 
1. India apposed i t , 
Ciurvev pf Intprnati A f f a i r s 1956-1958, p. 8, " 
- -
a dietailed statement In the congress, tte aaidS 
"The reason for interest in the Micidle 
East is solely that of Tjower politics. Considering 
her announced purpose of cominunising the world, 
i t is easy to understand her hope of dominating 
the Middle East If the nations of that area-
should lose their ind@p@i3dene@s if they were 
dominated by alien forces hostil<» to freedom, 
that would toe Iboth a tragedy for tlie area and 
for many other free nations whose economic l i fe 
would be subject to near strangulation." 
The United States was not ready to comrait itself to 
the Anglo-French causo rather i t played a conciliatory role 
so as to keep away the area- Middle East-from tl:® clutches 
of power polities and to keep itself on good terms with the 
countries of the Middle Kast. Therefore, on September 1956, 
p 
the Secretary of State Dulles declareds "The purpose of the 
'Jnited States in relation to taie Suez situation is precisely 
that which is set forth in the First Article of the Charter 
of ti:^ Ohited Nations, namely, to seek a settlement by peaceful 
means, and in confoniiity with tl^ principles of 'justice and 
international law," In no way, Washington was likely to 
undermine American influence by l in ing up with the 
colonialist powers against Sgypt. 
1. PPUCY in th^ ft^^t - 19S§ * 
^une jJocamenta^ PePRrtm^nli of Publication Mo^f 
August 1957I pp. 16-17. 
2. IM4., p. 87. 
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tn the Unltedi States view, ths Suez canal's tioportance 
lay in the faot that i t enable<l tte nations of ^sia and 
^urope to carry on the commerce that was essential if thee© 
countries were to maintain veil-rounded and prosperous 
economics, the Middle Bast provides a gateway between 
Kurosia and Africa, Furthersore, i t contains about two 
thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world and 
i t normally supplies the patroleum needs of raanor nations 
of Surope» Asia and Africa. The nations of Europe were 
peculiarly dependent utjon this supply, nnd this detjendency 
related to tran^ortation as well as to production. This 
was vi^dly demonstrated by *®the closing of th© Sypa canal and 
some of the pipe lines. Alternate ways of transportntion and, 
Indeed, alternate sources of power can, i f necessary, 
developed, But these cannot be considered as early prospocts 
These things stress the immense importance of the Middle 
East," rf^ raarked President Eisenhower,^ 
Though, the United States was not dependent on West-
Asian oil and her resources were sufficient to raeet her awn 
requirements even in the eimnt of war, the American experts 
were of the opinion that th® United States and her allies 
could not carry on a p^olonge l^ war without Middle East 
1. M^t pp. 16-17. 
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oil*^ In addition th© tJhitea States has a significant 
econOTie interest both In th^ extraction of tliie West Asian 
oil and in Its supply and distribution to Europe;. 
Certainly, the overyi<ling foreign policy objective of 
the Unlt©€l States in ^est Asia was to prevent the expansion 
of Oovlet influence in the region the American policy makers 
while realising thnt the Arab nationalism would serve as tho 
best deterrent against Soviet expansion, were greatly 
disturbed by what they regarded as the dangerotts and misguided 
policies of President %S3er of £gypt particularly his 
policy of non-alignment, 
Secretaiy of State CUII^B in "J 956 took a new 
course of action towards Bgypt when he driaastically announced 
that the United States had decided to withdraw its offer of 
financial aid for the construction of the High iJaa at Aswan,, 
fhe withdrawal of the aid offer, and more so its manner 
1. • Information supplied by the U.S. l^ epartment of State 
in reply to the questions put by Senator ^illlom J. 
Fulbri^t (i>eraocrat) Arkansas), U.S. Senate, tlie Pp 
proposal on the Middle Et^^f,^ X, 31, 
2. Venkataramani, M.S., »Olld and Foreign Policy 
the Suejjs Crisis « 1956-7% International Studies, 
vol, g, Ko, 2, October I960, X.S.I,a., Asia Publishing 
House, New Delhi i960, p, 11lf. 
engered the figyptien people ina their r resident, end 
lea to scpeoulatioaas ebout the posfcibi3ity that L^-pt mSf^ it 
reteliste by denying the . ac? qbsibI to v'ettem thipE mo 
thereby JeopsrdlRlni che f3ov) of oil to Europe. 
India sftd .igypt were two very good friends foil oiling 
the policy of nQn-.r-31griment. The two aoirntries hfid the 
deepest sympatLy for, end cupnort to each other's aspiration®, 
internal pnd extemel, ana inoeed, they hea al»noLt identical 
rttitudes on fflo^t of the i.crld isfcue.s - of adhering to 
th© Penchsheel end the bending principles. India vfs;^  
Interested in the continued evailability of the cenel 
for the trm&it of shipping or ^ o^ds of e]l user-nations 
without (i is crimination ©n the u&me terns enii conoiiime 
e£ before, end th«t the :..gypti?Mi Govemratnt hod rpsclly end 
fuJly pupri^ ntee-d to slJ users of the csnel. Therefore^ the 
reections of the Govexnramt of Inuis and people to the 
•^^ptien 0ct of netif^ieliE'fction -^ ere contrsry to those 
of the ' eetem governments ©n<2 press.. Ihe bitter reactions, 
the fflilitsnt po^^ tures anu the hostile ©ctions of the vcest 
ageini t t-.gypt were not comprehensible snd justifiable to 
X the Goveitiment and people of In«tle. 
i . For 8 cloi-fcly pnd cogently argued dt-fence of i^gyptian 
not ion filiation, see 'Lucr. ma sovereignty', 
4 Augu&t 1966, 
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In the view of Prime Minister Nehru, the 
nationalisation of the Sues; emal ms • symptosiatlc* of th© 
weakening of the dominotlon of European Powers over Vfeet 
Asle which hfiji lasted for over a hundred years. 'Asia 
is on th@ njareh, And is emerging to t®ke its rightful 
place in world effairs. '^ Furth6r_jnor6^in a statemeit 
g 
in the LoK Sabh®, on August B, 19S6, Kehru saidJ 
"The Suez canal company, which Is nati-^nQllscd 
i'gypt controls the operation and the 
equipment, and holds the concession of the 
Suez canal- The canal itself is in ii»gypt and 
an integral part of ulgypt. The severeliji.ty 
of ueypt is thus beyona question . . . The 
&mz canal company is an Lgyptlen oompmy and. 
In view, subject to the lews of the 
country . . . No cuestion of expropriation has 
arisen since the share^holders are to be 
eofflpensated at market value. Even if there 
reiaein any outstanding differences in matter, 
they do not call for developments «hich lead 
to an international crisis." 
' India vas not a aisinterested party. She vras a 
prlncl]^' user of this waterway, her econoalc l i f e 
and developmmt were also effected by the dispute* Even more, 
India vaa passionately interested in averting a conflict. 
She was in friendly relations with hgypt ?snd had also good 
^he Hindu. 2 /lugust 1956. 
Hehru, fprslm, ,mi.gy, p. 628-29. 
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end close reletion& with the I r lnc lpe l Kestem countries 
Involvedi ena thet'e reJations were beM In gre^it ejite^sn 
by us. ihe c 'nsldereiions anc the c r i t e r i a on which the 
Oovemment hsd to besfc the i r ' iecislon vere therefor© not 
eesy to uetermine. They were to be &UGH BS cioula serve 
the Ci-u: @ of ©verting the con f l i c t ma obtelning b peaceful 
sett lemmt before i t was too l e t e . Certainly , in the words 
of Nehru't fcetfeaent of this problea, on the besis 
of the sovereignty end dignity of l^gypt, had by agifeement 
rrficfigst e l l concerned, and the sbantSonment of postures; of 
threats and violence and of un i l a te re l oation by e i ther 
perty" , were of the utmost eons@m to Indle . 
Wdtionelization of the Genel tools, the Unitec 
£.teteE, Br i t ieh ©n<3 French govemraents by etirijrlse. -hey 
held cnsQltpXi •m& at Jondm eno i t viafc oecldea thf;t 
could not be el loved ' t o scsi?'© oontro3 of the canal* 
In defiance of intemst ionol sf res cents Mici that i:rite3n*s 
*efci€ntl8l intereists in thii. erefc must be ssfeguerdea, 
i f necessary by .tiilitciy sctlon* But the united estates 
ifSE not valuing to use forde* The statement isiued by 
2 . Ux./iaU^Qriy, , London, 1960, p.424. 
JLMsIm P* 426-7. 
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tho United i^tates noted thnt ' the sei7,ure of the 
lnst©31atlons of the Sue?. Senal Compeny' bsd • fsr -reaehl i ig 
ImplleetirinE', ^^ ut took the view thst the setter was 
pr lnc ioe l ly of concern to thosG'nations vhose economics 
depend upon tfee proaucts» through thf canal.^ 
? 
llhui the United i^tetes ett i tuUe, during the t r spa r t i t e 
consultft lons ves to widen the b&sls of aiscus&ion, to 
keep the parties toeing, ana to evaid precipitate action• 
Ihe kestem case was, !n<See{i, bu i l t on the assunsption 
tJset the three pothers were defending not national intereLts 
£t ^^ fsfe, on the contrary, the 'oone of their eccusetion 
against Nasser that he was »taking s e l f i sh scticm for 
purely national ends' ~ but e ' g reet Intemetionel waterway' 
in which many 'other countries , pa r t i cu la r ly , Austra l ia , 
Ind ie , Ceylon, md e la rge part of .:.outheafet Asia, had 
3 
•fi close i n t e r e s t ' . hs f o r the United i t a t e s , Du l l f s had 
frora the beginning Icifi 'dov® the principle that i t was 
essent ia l to 'jiiobillze world opinion in favour of in te r -
national operation of the. canal ' and to ' g e t our t r i p a r t i t e 
i f e ld . , p. 159. 
3. Ib id .^ pp. 126, 161. 
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2 
vieys accepted by at least a two-thirds majority of the 
conference that ves to be celled'^- Indeed, this was the 
Ipjpllcit presupposition upon which American wi31iiigniess 
to ect with BrlteJiJ end France was b©5ed. 
There aro^e further differenc©& between India snd 
the Ilnited states on the character of the london crniference. 
3 
I^dle ¥o«ld attend the conference, announced Plehru on 
August 8, i9St3, because, his govejmtaent had satisfied Itself 
that Its participation tvould not 'in.lure th® interests or 
severely rights end dignity of B^ptM it had also *obtBtned 
the necessary f3si:urafiees fro® the United Kingdom. And the 
decision was taken with the ful l cognizance of Egypt. 
India ts-as not bound by the principles of internatlonel 
control set out In the three-pov.er stateiient, and its 
decision to attend was determined less by Its interests as 
s major user of the canal then by tho hope thet Indian 
participation would conti'ibute to a peaceful settlement. 
Ve further said that "the Govemraent are well aware that 
this conference can reach no final decisionsj for that 
requires the agteemsnt of iigyi^t" «nd Egypt could not and 
i* iiden, p. 437. 
2. Which met on 16 August. ligypt did not attend i t . 
3, Kehru, PP. 530-532. 
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would not teke part in e conference to which, a3though 
a prlnolpfll, It hed merely been Invited without prior 
consultetion. 
States 
The United/thought othervis©. Herman Finer while 
giving ecoount of iKJlles* Policy on f>aez crisis wrote that 
in the alnd of l>iil3es the IJ.S.b.E. vas resolved to be the 
champion of li^'pti so was India of Pendit Nehru and 
V.fv Krishna Menon. i^ecretary of 5tat© Dulles was not 
fond of Pendit Nehru or Krislma Menon. He imew how deep 
and contemptuous was ttie hatred Men on bore towards the 
United states, a sour, corrosive hatred. My way the 
Indian itobassadors in Cairo CK.A.Y.J. Bahdur) and Washington 
(O.L. Mehta) were busy with Nasser end Dulles respectively. 
The Indian embassador to Ko^lngton called on Dulles and 
told him thfit the Indian Government did not like Du3les* 
plm for international msnagement of the canal.^ During 
discussions with Krishna Menon, before the beginning of the 
First r.ondon Conference, Dulles fudged the Indian plan of 
merely instituting eupervision over a canal authority, 
which would be altogether and exclusively Egyptian, as inadequc o as his present approach. 
133.136. 
a. mUs,^ P* 144. 
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on the following two ISEues the t^o countries had 
quite dlvergait plans: (1 ) the QUe t^icxi of iigsrpt's 
sovereigifi rights, (11) the n&ture of the proposed *lnter-
netlonel system* and the chorscter m^ functions of the 
proposed operatiag fcody. The pl©n introduced by Dullss 
was more in accord vlth the vlev/s of the British end French 
Govemmmts then thos® of the iigyptlan Govemment. h^© 
United ijtate® end the Indlen p3on&^  were bpsed on •diametrically 
opposite approaches to the question*, as Prof. I^ a^ an 
observed. The Indian ^Isn was to start negotiations with 
a basis of i^gyptlan sovorelgnty and then aeclde the quality 
©nd quantity of iatemationsl association necessary to 
msore the proper writing of th© canel and the legitimate 
interests of the user-nations. The toerlcan-Britlsh-French 
approach postulated as a basis intematlonel c«mtrol of 
the Canal« ®tid then decide the quality and quantity of 
sovereignty which could safely be le f t over to Kgypt 
cemslstently vlth the doralnaat interests of the user-nations-
v.alter Llppoiem observed that the end-result of the t\^ o 
approaches ml^t have had l i tt le real difference, but the 
X. For a verbatim record of the proceedings of the conference 
If l l^^ Washington, the Department of 
2 . iie^an, K.S. , India In, f^iSj^ lc^ , Affs j lrs P« 
Plnauy teptmber 1966. 
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tvo plans represented both In origin end content too 
widely divergent outlooks and attitudes. The feet 
reaslned that the Western Powers deliberately sought 
to side-treok the only tvso real Issues in the £uez question, 
I .e . , the legality of oeti'mallzation end the tenns ena 
procedure of compensation to the shar^olders of the 
natlonellsedi company end tried to bsmboosle li^fpt ond the 
rest of the world to believe the one end only issue for 
settleaaent was lntematlona3 control of the canal - m 
Issue vihlch herdly arose out of Ugyptlen netlonel l7.atlon 
of the oenel.^ 
In an edltorlel, The faew- York C^imes^  tsought to 
confuse end discredit the Indlm position by, on the one 
hsnd, steting that the reel issue in the dispute was 
whether the canal should be en Egyptian waterway or en 
Intetnetlonal vaterwey, and by pretending, on the other head, 
that the questions of Egyptian eoverel^ity, hrah netlonelism 
or coloialalism were not et issue. 
Criticising the Ifnited Stetas sponsored pi en, which 
sought to intemetionell^.e the operating agency, Kriehna 
4. Be5en, H.&., Pt)*clt. 
2 . aSii-lQSKJSte^t 21 A-Ugust 1956. 
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Mencn, the chief <ieleg8te of India to the conference, 
remerked:^ "It l& InconeelvablG that the Kgjfptlan 
Oovemmmt will aupr^der by treaty whot it has already 
set up", tod also that the Ifidlon end U.u, propor-ale' 
Represented two fundamentally different approaches. One 
sees intemationelisation e& the only remedy « the repeal 
of natlonelisetion. My plan does not Involve the abdictition 
of the position the Viestem Powers have taken upon later-
naticjsaellzation. Jhey csn keep th^t position. But we 
must find e position between ttie Western position and 
de faato position of Bgypt. The purpose of negotiatiohe 
is to alter the position of both siciesl indifii was'not on 
either side of the dispute, 'we are trying to get a 
workable arrangement*, further he said. 
2 India disagreed with the alternative b-Power proposed, 
The Hindu^ 23 August, i9S6. For Text of Krishna Menon's 
speeches see, I^ ew Delhi, 
Information service of India (1986). 
orlglnelly sponsored by the ynlted a^ sttQs end Blightly 
amended by four other powers vfoich received the support 
of is partlcipaiits of tb® conference and had for its 
object the international control end operation of the 
buez cenel. i t proposed negotietlng vlth Kgypt a 
cmventiotj vhich would provide for the creation of a 
i.ue2 Cenel Board for operating, raelntslnlng, md developing 
the canal to which Egypt (which would be member of the 
Board) would grant »sl l rights and facilities appropriate 
to its functianing*. The Board would fBake periodic 
reports to the United Nations. The plen el so provided 
for m as^iti'al commission to settle disputes arising 
frora the ooeration of the cenel. 
- x@s -
though urged the £gyntXm Oovemment to relieve the 
Menpiies Goanlttee (to pres^ ^nt the pli^ to President Hasser 
of fcigypt), because inUle did not want to <lo »enyth!ng which 
^Guld thmM a hurdle In the way of negotletions' aeld 
Menon. India rejected the Jritish and rjaanCu Gov^nimeiit* s 
propoatel (propos^cd to £«gypt vith the ooncurr^c© of the 
2 
imiieci LtatGfe, ignoring the r^gyptlm proposal ) for setting 
up B o@nel users* asc-ooi;tlon, i^ hleh woula seek to operate 
the Gsna), collect tranelt dues and p®y fagypt appropriate!;^,^ 
Criticising the propos©! Prime Minister ?lehru said that 
"the action proposed ie not the result of agreement, co-opergfrlon 
or consent, but is to b© taken unilaterally and thus in the 
neture of en linposeci decision", ma regretted thet "this 
?he Hindu. 28 August I9S6. i^erlier he had calM the 
t.UG?. controversy a 'crisis of confidence* partly from 
the way in i^lch natlonRllzation was aft'ectpd and pertly 
by troop movements. Kis view vas that cfreement to 
negotiate would toe a step in restoring confidence. Ibid., 
August 1956. 
2, Egyptian Covemm^t declined to accept ihe plan presented 
by the Meneles Goainltiee on the ground thet it was not 
in confoimiiy with the sovereignty md dimity of ligypt. 
The iigyptien Govemtseht Itself proposed thet ell uaer-
nations meet and discus:, the creation of a negotiated 
boay to eonslder questions of freedo® of navigation, cenol 
oevelopmfcnt;toll chorees etc., end to review the xfclBfci 
convention. 
^i^pt denonnced the proposal a& an act of provocation 
and s violation of the I8m convention* India .sided with 
ilgypt. 
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development which very unusue?, end will render 
peaceful settJements raore dlffleult of realisation. It is 
not oalculfited to secure to the users peaceful and yecwre 
use of cenel, whiob should be, and Is, whet Is requlreti by 
the users end the international community." Mehru, Gt the 
same time, welcomed President Nesser*s proposal of creating 
e •negotietS^e bociy*,^ fhe Times of India, in lis issuer of 
teptefsber 14, 19S6, called th© decision to spl up the 
Users* Associetion •polltlcel benkruptcy for which it vould 
be difficult to discover m edequate parellel*. 
Despite the feet thot both Inoie end the United Etetes 
hed divergent views to b certain extent, for vjaohlngton, 
the basic conslderetion was probably thet 'war over cues 
vould mean the bankruptcy of Americen policy In the Middle 
i;8st*, end, indeed throughout A&la.^ Ihe Manchester Guardian 
in its irsue of i^ .eptember iS, 1966 reported thet the course 
of events in August hed nede clear the key role of Indie, 
and that the &t«le tJopart:aent in Vashlngton, In forimilsting 
Its policy, vae 'thinking of Kew Delhi even more than of 
Colro', or possibly even then of London. 
A* Leptember 1966). pt. I l , vol.viii , 
Ho. 45, col. 6965. 
ac^. 
^Chester Guardian, 6 August 1966. 
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It v&B the triple aggres. Ion against h&pt by Briteli, 
FZ'snca an4 Israel, on 31 October 1966 thet brought the 
ooincideno© of views of botb the countries, The two 
aotmtrles aondfimed th© aggression. Nehru publioly . 
branded I&raeli ectlon as e case of 'olesr, naked aggression', 
/^glo-^'ronch action wes eonderrmed by hian. bs followss "nfter 
fairly conaiderable experlmoe in foreign effsira, I senriot 
tliink of 8 grosser case of n^eci eggression then what 
iinglend and France are attemptjUig to do . . . " He expressod 
1 
his regret et the Veto of the U.f • draft resolution, by 
if-nt lend end France in the Security Council end said "in 
the roidole of the iiOth century, we are going beck to the 
predatory method of th© Ibth md i9th centuries. But there 
is a difference now, There ere seJf-respecting, indepmdent 
nations in Asie end Africa, v.%lch are not going to tolerate 
this Kind of Incursion by the colonial powers.'^ in 5febru*s 
view the i«ng3o-Freneh aggression vbb the end-reeult of the 
Baghdad Pact which divided ^reb nations^  and invited coviet 
apprehensions of a threat to their southern frontieif by 3 its opix>nent3 in the • cold war*, 
1, Condeaning Israeli aggression, calling for imaiediat© 
ceese-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces behind 
erfBistice lines. 
ii November 1966, 
3, Hehro at Ih© A.l.C.C, Meeting. The Hindu^ l^ i Tlovember 1966 
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in the General Assembly^ yhile 9Up:>orting the • 
dreft resolution^, the inaian delegate seids 
"There has been released over Egypt and 
its people a raenlfestation of the 3sw of the 
jungle, Instead of the lew of peace and the 
law of nations es fsishriJi^ in the Charter. 
Thue on the territory of ii.©rpt 11 e raockeiy 
being mede of the charter of the United 
E3etlon£, ®id there the organs of the tinlted 
Netions are being affronted by aggree&ion 
and inV8£ion#"«^  
In the Halted states enger was Intense; veteran reporters 
said they oould not remember ever seeing American opinion, 
3 * 
bot^ official and public so incenced. Du'Jles expressed 
his 'extrsise displeasure' to the L^ritish charge d»affairs,^ 
and no doubt was le ft that Britlan, France ana Israel were 
believed to have executed a preconcerted operation about 
which the United Ctetes had been deliberately le f t in the 
dark. The llaited Ltates pi eyed en important role in the 
i . Ihls resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 
2 Roveiaber 1956 which urged immediete cease-fire by 
all the parties and halting of movement of military 
forces and withdrawal of forces behind armistice line. 
U.N. I^c; V3256. Indie welcoraed the creation of the 
U.S. Lsjergency Force In Lgypt md was one of the 
24 meaibere of ^ e U.H. which offered their forces. 
^ 1st Kmergency session (1956), fi62nd Mtg., 
p. 31. 
1 Jtovember 1 8 5 6 . 
I b s J U S S S t ^ November 1 9 5 6 . 
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Ceaerel Assetribly by putting forth its proposel for 
liumedlat© cease-fire end withdrawal of troops. But It 
rejevcted the ovist propo&al^ of 3olnt i-ovlet-Aroerlcon 
®ilitfry Intervention within the frrase-voi^c of the 
United Hstions. This Joviet initiative wes described 
®s 'unthinkable', 'en obvious attempt to divert world 
attention from the Hungarian tragedy.'^ The fact v/as 
tbet the United btates vented to employ Asian influence 
in the United Hetlons for reaching © settlement of this 
problem. The Hindustan reported that "V.eBh3ngton 
plens to u£e thi& Influence in indls to marohall Afro-
Asian pressures on President Sesser both with the short-
term objective of clearing the canel and for the working 
out of snltfible gusranteefc that freedom of nevigi=ition 
will not be obstructed." 
As a result of the Indian, Aiaerlcen ana soviet efforts 
the Anglo-rrench forces completed their withdrev/el of Its 
forces on jjeaemher. 
1. Put forward by prersler Bulgenln in his letter to 
President Eisenhower. Text in l^ ocuments, on Iptemali^Qfll 
MMf:^ m^ f PP» 292-4. 
2. m ^ ' f pp. 2^94-95, 
3. rinmtBn, x i m s , 3,12, 56. 
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fhe influen%lal Indlen newspeper fat^ctesman^, prRlsod 
the American Government for a isense of responslfelltty and 
the epirit of mocioretion thnt it had difcpleyed. ActueXly 
teeretery of fc^-ete Jotm Foster Dulles decl^ ^rea that the 
Qovemmeat took one of itt- most difficult ®nd 
sioTOntous decisions in recent times vben I t resolvecl to 
be loyel to its cofntnitnjents to the United l^ations rather 
then to fcsr historic ties with Britain and France. This 
decision was n^ made exclusive3y on the haeis of devotion 
to the ideals of the iis^ rld organisation hut al^o of hard*, 
heeded calculations concern3ng the short end long tern 
Interests of the united f.^etes. Oil was one of the mott 
important factors. The Luea crisis brought out clearly 
the vulnerability of waterways end pipelines located in 
unfriendly territory end there toy g,ave added Impetus to 
the huge prograiame of tenkor construction which many 
companieb had already underwj^. Mother lesson for the 
end its o21ics was thst the doveJoprafnt of nuclear 
power most be given even greater priority than previously 
i * 3 lloveiaber 1956. 
2, "£.ecretary Dulles, llews Conference of February 5", 
jlj.l.B.. 36 (25 February 1967), p. 306. 
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in order to lesson the eiKtent of dependeaoe on K'est 
Asian otl.^ 
Me r loan |)oXlcy makers were con vino ed that British 
influence In the region hsd suffered m irrevofeable set 
beck end thpt if the U.S. did not move into the position 
that Britain hea occupied in the inter-war jear&, a "pover 
veouum" would be created px'ovidlng ejioellent opportunities 
2 
for Loviet penetration. The Eisenhower Doctrine (19S7) 
syabolized the determinetion oi' the U.ti. to go to war, 
if neoessai'y, to prevent the soviet Onion from gaining 
control of K'est Asia's riches. 
3 
Nehru comniented that "when a foreign power tries to 
step into another country, i t disturbs the peeoe of that 
country end creates conflicts. It gives rise to tension 
end 8 race among foreign powers." Evidently he did not 4 
approve of the I^ootrlne. D.F. Fleming's remark seems to 
be noteworthy here th«t "the only thing thet vbs claor was 
that the doctrine constituted e me^or intensification of 
the cold war." In e leading article to the Hindu. Vielter 
i . Venkatareroeni, M.c., "Oil and U.j:-. Forei^i Policy During 
the fcuez CrislB - 19S6-7", „„%:WiM,, vol.2. 
No.2, October 1960, Asia Pufeliehing House, Hew Delhi, 
pp. 148.149. 
feee hditoriel. Sew York TimeiRt 66. 
3. The pew York Tlwes, January 7, 1967. 
4 . Fleming, i i .F. , QrggMg 
vol.ii, i9&0-i960, Gcsorge Allen nnd Unwin Ltd., London, 
1961, p. 844. 
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ilppiQsnn warned that Dulles hed no chance to succd6<3! In 
th© Middle Sast if h© refused to eccept the feet that 
"the Soviet Union is 0 principal power - e power which 
c^finot be expend excluded« which must be balanced end 
negotieted with. We should, i t seems to hfevc i t 
in ntind thet we are on the threshhold of a n^ w situation 
In regard to the oil In the Middle Best. Jhis is often 
tokm to Biean thet the s oviet Union m®y sttempt to ruin 
western Burop© by deprivini it of access to th© 
l.hatover might h6ve been the differences and coincidences 
auring the Luez crisis the fact regained that both the 
countries - indi® and the U.t.A. pleyed a conciliatory 
and constructive role In furtherance of a mutually satis-
fectory settlement by negotiation, because of their own 
vital, interest in keeping th© buez catial free and op£Si« 
2 
Walter lippiaann had rightly observed thet both the United 
states end India were playing a siailarly concilietoJry role « 
the United §|ates on the side of the Keat and India on the 
side of Bgypt« 
A. S M J i k l M i 12,10,57. For Chester Bowies' criticism eee 
srif, v.tfilfiatssat 7,7,67. 
The Hindu, 16 September i956.So added Beston, Washington's 
unfi l ing procedure was "to play the it>le of iaedi©tor'», 
eoing Qigong with "no long range plans anywhere" end 
"being constantly euiprised by events", y^e Hew York 
Zlmssi l^ ovember 'dO, 195<j. 
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nothing mom hgs, perhaps, ©dded to the strained 
Iudo-^iB€ricaa relatione thm their diffen^aces oi?er policies 
toik-erds Pelcistsa, whicfi have raised misunderstandings ana 
irritatims betwe^ the tvo. fheir differences on tssjor Issaes 
the problem of K®sh®ir, the . fallitsry fel3eincevith 
PaKlsten are the obvious examples ns far as tiielr reletIcais 
with Fekistea ere concerned. India has been t i l l recently 
looking on Pakistan BS the MEIN threet to its security, so the 
n^i—on. the s oviet leadership zs the main threst to Its seeurity." 
It is true also that American responses to 
friction hfj^e, at times, been reminiscent of Indian rospoBses 
to £ovi#t ^ American frlati£»i."-^' The U.... wants friendly 
relations vlth both th« countries, Inciia rad Paklit'n. 
this Is beeeuse of th© Btrstecic iaportance of PsV^istm for 
the 
The memories of the partition of the Indian subcoatinent 
into two independent, Soverei^ Ltetes i . e . , India end ??k Isten, 
1. Poplni end lolbot, i 
relet ions T Indian Council of v.'orld /affairs, p. 68. 
- iJ04 . 
sre fresli la the minds of Indians. Tbe totise of eosnaons ^f 
Brltein the ActJ pa Jtjly iB, 
I t wes implemented oa 15 ^uguat 1947. Tbougli tbe 
ides of e sepsrete state for the ^msllais of the Korth-K'est 
Korth^Bsst comijjg into the pletsire sad tlie Gripps 
Offer of 194^ fsaa the Csbinet KlssioR of 1946 fond ffailed . 
to brSag ttei® laea es e replity, it wes the Kouatbatten Plea 
feroaght the partition of India Into being, la spite of 
Indifj*s great oppositloa to the saae. Even Hehra we^  aot 
res^ to Bccept It, h© sei<3 onee sfter tfee terrible trsgeoy 
of Celcuttej 
freedc® we mvls&ge^ and for vtileh 
md suffering, was for~«H the people or 
India, m<l not for one group or class or the 
followere of ose religion, fe'e aimed et s 
cooperetive coa^Boawealth in «hicte all would be 
equal sharers ia opportunity aad la ell things 
thet fjiv© meaniac aad value to l i f e . v;hy 
then this strife, this fesr md suspicioa of 
each 
Hehru in bis Dlscovcry of In4iB hB<i It 
1. Full-text in ^^ ^uly 
2. i>ince the meetiag of ?^u£liia I.esgue la Icliore on 
Kerch ii3, 1940, tlbe goal of e aEtioasl Muslim ^tete ves 
fihspiag its oae or the other form. Sorassa Brovn, 
Fiijl^fi^ tgtefe:, fA^ XnMe,. Harvard llnitrersity 
press Gs®bri€ige, Msssachusetts, 1963, p. 146. 
3. Ne^ r^u, ^ Fore if a op.elt., p. 1 
4. For details oa the subject see, Ketru, fh^ of 
ladifc, ;sie FublisiJlag Kouee, Bombey, 1961, pp.ii57, 279-84. 
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cl6»r ttiRt the H&tlve IHaawsi® gBci the Intrusive I sis® 
hed only one OFlglt i i . e . a Gosmoa Qlvlllmthn, blr fe3 
Babaaur B^pm (1S75-19S0) also the same vlev, €n 
the other hm^ Kohd. All Jlansh (1876-19^)» Kasilaa leader, 
wss of the view tfest Hindaisia m^ I s l a ® were asore then t«fo 
aifferent civil isstioas. The iBdim Sptioaal Congress had 
always been sgainst the dmmd of the Moslto Lesguc for a 
separate Islamie Stgte of pskistaa. Xaste0<i It had stressed 
® United Lecalar India. This was the most fandfinieatal of 
the RiQcia-Jlusllm divergences, which lea to the partition fi 
syad is ©2 so evident Sn the present day K? sbsir dispute bet^en 
fhas PakistsB was not is pQliticsl tera 
orginelJyi it wes to aescrme s spirj.«,usj. 
ideal. T,8ter, the Intease rel igio-political straggle gave 
birth to Pekistsn. 
^ e supporters of the Sat ions Theory* believed 
that the creati<m of Pn'&XBtm would solve the Hinou-Kaslim 
problem, iifter pertition this prov^ to be vroag rether the 
idea fipreed Coaisamal fighting and ai^ ss sigrctians heifhteaed 
t e tiocial nnd Politicel tensicais, fiiisunderstrmdings, i l l will 
i . tee Brovin, v;. Horaca^ SM. 
PcElstfifi. pp. 130-131. ^Iso see Chakravarti, B.K., 
t orient hmg meas, Calcutta, 
1966, p. m . ^ 
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feuspicions which had been geuerf^ted during the Independence 
movement. Even after partition the Govemnent of India 
was willing to iteep eeonosia, ealturel md sociel cmtscts 
md to be on friendly terras vitii Pekist^ because if was 
natural b& botfe the c^mtries iiave more in common than my 
other eoontries In the ^orld the entire continent of Indie 
end Pskisten. Bat the friendly rel@ti<ai& anticipated by 
Indie on mtitual understmding between the tvo countries end 
the end of the fiinda-Muslim problem did not come about 
because there were certain unavoidable problems which hindered 
the pnving of the way to solve the disputes. These probleuss 
Future of Kashmir, evacuee property, division of 
assets, treatment of isinorities. Canal Water 
dispute and other disputes. 
I 
PKuPxJgri.; 
fhe dispute arose about properties aband<»ied by evacuees. 
The rural or urban imovable property of evacuees was liable 
to forfeiture, while there were several restrictions CCKIOB mlng 
1. For background, see Kerunrfcaren, Indi^ In V.'orld Affairs 
A9SQ«.a3, pp. 166 f f . ffor a detailed end comprehensive 
analysis of the subject, also see India, hehabllitatIon 
JKetrogpegt (Sew BeJhi, Ministry of fcehebilitation, 1957). 
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the export o f other va luable a, beak aepos l t s , 
did securt t ies * For the solution of th i s prsble® then© 
•wer® discajss-ioss, Coafefeacee, dlsegreesamts, figreeaents, 
the t%o Oovemsents. lad s f t©? tii© f a i l u r e In 
tBspleaentSnf these Bgrnemnts^ there ifsre th® ehsrges o f 
noa-tsple!£«Rtttioa, bed f a i t h c^aiplplnta against each 
other thet m r e reprassive lews ccmceHiiag evactJses property 
were assde. I t vas in i9SS that the problea o f moVBbl^ 
property satl aocomts seemed to hsve been so lved.^ But 
the problem of isaoovsbl® property vss steted by Palcistmiti 
not to be sol^ea m t i l the protoleai o f G f a » l Keter dispute 
ves s e t t l e d . I t a f t e r en sgreesjent'^ signed between tee 
t¥o Govexnoients on Lepte^ber 19, I96Q, that th i s obstacle 
•a * 
idmMiM.Mkmji 
Ihe second problem wes concerned v i th the PsKis tm 
assets , At the time of part i t lca i , the succesEor Govemiaflbt 
of In<ii® had been l e f t !n physical poseesston of the cesh 
b e l m c e s of mdiv ioed I nd i a . By agreement She to p^y 
55 crores of rupees to PeKlsten. But a f t e r the probleffl of 
^ee I M - U M B i November 1955 f o r the text of the d e ^ s i c n s . 
Ind ia External A f f c i r s (Min is t ry of • ) !f'lie, Indus Utttep 
J PP- 1 -22 . 
3 , i 'rovn, >• Korsen, Qp .c l t . ^ pp« loS*66« 
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Ksshffllr erose ©nd the ludloiift in e great jaasfecr , 
incliidiag soa<s high o f f l e i ® l s oppase<i peylag this s^ia to 
Pskistan ©rguiag thst PaTs-tstm might use tbe money i s war 
papepsretioas ogaiast Indi®. Fo l l ov lng p e r t l t l o a , (jandihi*s 
f®st at Celeatte feroaglit nbout some jsort o f r e s t to these 
prohlms.* Indisas ver© inf luenced. 
foiace then thig questIsin was in diseussions sn4 Sn i960 
I t fefes so lved.^ 
I t b'as a sastter of l c m g « t e » nEtional econosSc l-sportsnce 
to b:;th India and Pefeisten, fhe pa r t i t i on of Indie resu l ted 
in dividing the Indus r i ve r i^yste®. Tfee se^ ic^ l ture in v;est 
p®kisten l e r g eJ j depends upon i r r i g e t i on f r oa the Indue r i ve r 
{iftd i t s t r i b u t a r i e s , th« .JThelaa, dieneb, Havi, Bens, snd 
s u t l e j because there the r s i n f e l l i s scgaaty. The two r iverss 
Jhelum, end Chenefe fJoy in sucti a d l r t o t i on tbet the i r waters 
ere mainly u t i l i z ed in Pakistan. Only minor use of th©ia i s 
mede in Keshrair. I'he tvo r i v e r s li«.vl AND £,utlej PBSE thrrjugh 
both the countries and the Bees i s so s i tuated that i t s ful3 
use i s made in Indie 
i . I k M s P' 
a . .See KarmB Keren, 
"" ' J 1962, p . " " Oxford Cnivers ity Press , Celeutte 185. 
Jjglair, Fpgtfg md fimms, ( B e i h i , 
Publ icet ions Divisiion, 1964). ^Iso see F . J . Fowler, 
»1he indo-Pe^isten hater i>ispute, srear Book o f ».'orld 
A f f a i r s 1955. vo l . 9 pp. 10i«ii5» J . B . Gupta, 
Indo^Pakistan i\«^letiong l..'47«19SSf Aaeterdtis, D. 
J&mbfjttn, 1968i pp. 173-74. 
tlie diepate erose tram the f e e t th^t while l a d i e 
siaitrols tifee Qppsr eosirses o f r i ve r s si ipplf lag, aych o f 
thut vater^ PsKletaa i s in tfee po i l t i o a o f sisklar greBtcr 
use of the v-ater. Tfc^ h^vi^ 3eas and E a t l e j r lwsrs How 
ti^i^'Jgfe terii-itory be fo re reaching Psi^istea sad most 
of tbe lend la v.'est Paisistaa i s to be i r r lg f - ted hf these 
r ivers * In case India csulci aiirert the i r wgter fro® Paicisteii* s 
Ceaels , I a d i « eoisld irsry tei^re i t s n m n o ^ * 
She ssae s ight h&v^ h8ppene<i « i t h regard to Indos, ^riielt^c md 
Chenab I f Ind ia could re t s i a Kashmir end then India wotJM be 
Sn a posit ion to h®ve a morfcal g r i p oa Vest P e k i s t ^ sg r i ca l t i i r e . 
After greet e f f o r t s and fai3tires snd success an agree®/it wes 
signed on SepteailJer 19, 1960.^ 
I M ^ M I - Q L - M i a O i i i m ^ * 
A f te r pa r t i t i on the profeleat firose about the treetfaent 
of iiiaclu a i a o r l t i e s ^ P a k i s t m and o f ?»!asaiia a i n o r i t i e s 
In I n d i a X a a i e cti<i r.©vtr f a v c « r the pa r t i t i on on the 
bas i s of r e l i g i ous separation, this, vea mede c l e s r by 
ISchra Sn Psrlifiment oa March 17, i9S0i d id not accejt 
1 . F u l l tox i in Indiin, g x t e m e l A f f a i r s IMSnistry o f ) -
f b e Xnaas Water Treaty 1960^ pp. 
i s l l l i m Hindus in p e k i s t m end 40 mi l l ion 
Muslim ia I nd i a . 
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i t st tmy time on the h&siis of ivo nation theoxy but m 
tbe b « s i s o f some kiad of t e r r i t o r i a l s^elf-deteruinaticsa. 
Ciesr ly i t was iapos&ibls to div ide M i a oa the fees i s of 
sepsrfite r e l i g i ons groups cm one s ide or the other , b@cai;i& © 
thej- were bound to over lap* " /4iu f a r the r he leaded, 
discouraged in every pess ib le wey the a i g r a t i oa of l s r g « 
numbers fro® one B^g jR l to tbe other Un^^^J'tiiaate^y 
in spit€ o f our diseoux>@g3?nentf people oasie ovor in h i e a ^ 
reds of thousands", md «8n exchange o f populaticm is soiaethlne 
we heve opposed ®11 elong***-^ 
there w®s constant movemnt o f population fro® Pakistan 
to Intiie end v ice -versr fcsa inter-^Comsuaal v io lence, even 
s f t e r pert i t ion, was f l&siag up.^ Biar© %?s£ cheos, v io lence , 
discord six around caused by th i s movement of population* 
t¥o Bsngels (Kast -PsKis ian, ^iest-Bengel ) , Kasbsjir, (the 
then) Hydei^bed, the P m j a b , the S t t g r Pradesh ( f ome r l y 
United Provinces) were the c r i t i c a l areas vbere the erisfe 
v&B at the top. In January 19S0, anti-Muslim r i o t s broke 
out In Celcutta end in Februery 1960 snti-flSndu r i o t s f oB oved 
i . Uehru, I M U I & J L S M U & ^ I A S I L ^ o p . c i t . pp. 456-S9. 
For d e t a i l s see J .B . flas Gupta, 
op, c i t . . Chapter V I I . 
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in Dfieee CGapiteX of East Briigel) m4 in other perts © Isa 
th is em lias tiis Etaia of eoffimumal r i o t s 
md ffiismdersteadlag b e t w ^ s tfic two eotaitries upto the 
present dey in the tvo Bengals spee ie l l y - in sp i te of tte 
fact that siinority eoantssioas irer® aet yp In the two Bengrl s 
ead other aiessures a l so have teeea ased time snci again on the 
o f f i c i e l ]t«V€l* nmy vep i f i ab l® eeses the siistreetisent 
have occurrad e . g . la In4ia Cat JabeJpar) in February 1961. 
the attaeks vere mad© upcu the Mosll® cosiaiaaity tSuriag mors 
then oae In P a k l s t ^ also tbere was re ta l i a tory v ioMce 
vihich vas against th€ Pindus, Keceatlly in ^uae Indore 
su f fe rea froai these r i o t s at present /ihsedab^d ( in 
s tate ) i s ssafferSae froaat i t * 
B,. 
Oa« o f th® other probleas was the pro'dleia cmeemLng 
th€ rehnbi l l ta t ios of reftig^es o r the problsa of cgrJng f o r 
incoising refugees- Itie refaee^s who flowed to Pakistoa fraaa 
India suf fered miaiy d i f f i c u l t i e s es there were RO s u f f i c i m t 
f a c i l i t i e s provi^Sed by pskistnn beeause i t was nevly bom 
counti^ vithoot gay experienee of organisea adainistrat ian to 
preserve lew and order end protect the refugees fro® hunger 
end maltreetiyeiit* There were fewer sve i leb le resources to 
overcome the emergency md help the arr iv ing re fugees , ^e i ther 
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Else eoul^ provide tfa© p ^ p e r fe^lp to protect f jvacmes 
l€8vlag i t s t e r r i t o i ^ -
In Ist i is Sii co®psri£i®a there were several 
f o r alsai lsr refugeesf more f ac5 i j i t l « s o f ssn i tet lon 
ps^ Though thti.© ajpygngemeiits were ja©t act©cuete 
fcut they at l e a s t eoala provide t^apors?!^ she l te r f o r re fuses* 
Befoge^s Gmslsted o f peesaats , l€sa pi^sptrotas vt l legeBs 
end urbeya woi^erss s r t i s s n s , <5oolies ^ otl3«rs of low 
©cQnoaic l e v e l s , fhese refugees had to fece poverty, hunger 
m t i l th is problem hed been part ly re l ieved hf 196H In India 
md pefeistan a f t e r the cmstr i ict ioa of resideaces and Golcaiies, 
i a ILsraohi aaa L 'e lhl . Ihoii^* the r«jhj-.tillit&tioa hed 
s t U l 
been done, this probleas reaeine^ es ngay refugees were/l iving 
to suli»fitas«a®rd ^ © r t e r s in Karachi and Celeutta vh i l e stoking 
to perffisnent poverty-"^ 
The other dispute Has & p o l i t i c a l one concerning the 
accession of certain prSncel^c stiitoa e i ther to Xncile or to 
Psk is t f i i . fhe Indian indepen^nce ^ct , il»'47 d i r e c t l y epplied 
to the B r i t i s h India md not to the Ia4isn t ta tes which were 
todepeniSent Sn theory. Ihey vere l e f t f r e e to accede to one 
o r the other country o r to remain todependent. The dispute 
arose matoly to the case of Kashmir,^ Hydershad, end junegadh. 
i . tes: Broiiifa, S . Ic-jr^fsn, Oia.cit . , pp. 
ii. This prolJl«ia r«jiaaia& ^ s o l v e d to the present day md is 
discusfeed seperetely to the fo l lowtog pages o f the 
QBtstB chapter. 
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^Efeege three smtmmrslQl qpsstlon^ b^ stwefctst Ind ia md p a k i s t m 
^ero csejrriefi to th « iSait^a Hs t i o s s . 
iM&MUM^ 
India iitd not socept the decisioss o f the Hswab of 
JORi&gadh that i t shoulo eeaede to Fsitistan, sgsirist the 
vishes of b i s subjeets end the edvie® of the f e l l ow princes 
o f Kstiilawer* Juaagadii was aot gsogrephicall jr eovifciguous 
to Fs&lstaa md Lord Ho\Katbsttea, as a Gram, r©presente t iw 
fcsd i t c l e a r et a spec ia l m&t iag of the Chsoiber of 
PriRcc'g m 25 Ju ly tfeat although tb « s tetes were theoret i -
cells ' f r e e to secede to e i ther -f the DoiaisatioRs or to remein 
Snd^pmd^t^ the pr inc ip le o f geographical eoaat igoity eowld 
aot fc© l e f t out l a makiiis decis ion Ja regard to the future 
of my s t a te , m Februsrjr i@4S, a p l e b i s c i t e tras held , yhich 
favGursd i t s accefsion to Ind is^ md now J«Megaclii i s e part 
of C'Ujrat s t s t a . 
The people wfeo were In power Sn Ryderabeci t r i ed to sieKe 
i t en in temst iona l i ssue , even a delegate o f the Kizsm's 
GovewwEeat p&rticipeted In the Haited Hot ions Security Cour&O 
meeting end raised the question of the re la t ionsh ip betveen 
A. Lee l^anaiE Ksran, 
pp. 
Hyderabad ttsd lafiie. Piskistiai sis© supported the e^thoritfe s 
Sa Mhen the j t r i e ^ t o assort the lud^poidenee o f 
th® Hizsm* Ia<iie <iM not F.gr©©. i i f ter some f iegotiet ioas^ 
the Rl£©m concluded a stiasd s t i l l agreeseat witfa th« Indian 
Goverameut m 29th loireeflaer 1947 Bat th i s agreement 4 iaa>t 
M crest ing good w i l l toetween th« two as the aathorltJfiB 
in Ky^erabsd took s <iiffes^ent thst th®y ha i^ only »suspendied' 
soae o f sovereign powers o f the Si^®®- the Government o f 
Ind i s eould not rescb s f r i snd l y settlesaiait with tbe Hyderabect 
Governmente llydferabad liz-am wss defeated toy Inciic to & 
"iOO-hour by "Po i i ce - ae t i on " to restore law ®ad o rder . 
On teptembar IB , 1948, l i ^u® l e f t s ru l e r and Hyderabed ves 
Efepi as e Iftat^.^ La te r , et the ti®® of ti^etes* r e o r g m i s ^ o a 
in Indies Hyderabad wes kept no Icsigor es ® p o l i t i c e l entity 
i s sov divided aacsQp the s t s tes of ^ndfera, J^ysore end 
Kahursshtra t e r r i t o r i a l l y . 
Because of c l l tfcocc! problems the r e l e t i a i £ between 
India and PaKistm did not rm&in f r i end ly snd insteed beceme 
deter iorated . consequently d i s t r u s t , i l l - w i l l , staspieion 
1 . Government of I n d i s , mit^.. P&mr on Eyderabed^ I^elbi, 
Goveiaffient of Ind ie P ress , 1948• 
ij. For de ta i l s sm Lpruna K a r m , ,e.it., pp. i24-130» 
Ih© B r i t i sh end the Araericen Pyesfc i j r t i c i sed Indian 
condaet toward Hyderabad, but ind ie resentea St on 
the ground tlsst the c&ae was misunderstood* 
took hSnd^ring the v^y for i^accefitl ml&tlomm M^hm 
tjtiec? tc s lgs s \«r'ltii rffikls'taia but ifc 
refiaire?^ to it* Ketjrti s^ddi % vmtm^ yes to crest© 
i-a alm^ifn^i'^z .liich ^szuli hsl.p Is tin- soXj^ilea •sf thoa€f 
E® fcfid tfe^t Iri<iia sad r«klst«sa 
witfe otfeer sfceriag comoB history 
m i ©ttitttre fipart f ron tbe fr^et tfeet i t ^as oio' acEt dcor 
neigfcfeoisr,^ B^ elk-ays Rsled out mr m js neapoQ f o r tbe 
€Es4«ig of r^iletltms. But Pakistsn isld 
Kot fsgree, he per fect ly ready for i t . He always stood & r 
latei'scsaiaiinsl tmity seated © peacefal so lBtIca o f 
hop^d ¥« ec'iilcl l ivi i together la that 
fr«ed?j23. The supporters ©f Paklstt® lJa4 a 
d i f f e r m t gospel , tti&y mx® ao't f o r anity 
but d isunity , not f o r coast rust loa tout f o r 
<i€stractioa^ m t f o r bat f o r d i scord , 
I f not wer«« 
KaJar® mmTstoo^ ^m l l that I s d i e aad Pakistea siiotild 
oa f r l ^ d X y terns rather then feeing hos t i l e to ©ech 
other beoaasa i t Mas dsngerous frOT ecmomic., s t r a t e g i c , ©a? 
soc i a l poiiat of v l «w . l a /isia the t ioas b e t w e n these «f 
t¥o cnmt r l ^ s ^^onM a f f e c t the whole p o l i t i c s o f the 
c o m t r i s s . I t woslst a f f e o t fevea the uecEirlty of i nd i e . !here-
f o r e , he enphaslced the n ^ d of cord ia l ead very c lose 
re l a t ions « i t i i PuKistan* 
ikIsiAt P* 
8 
Mtbaug^t tbe pa r t i t i on o f Xn^l® gaire r i s® to fiFjay 
prf)bl«®s. It. ws the dlsp'ata owi" ttoii^  of licr-haiir 
thet bad hism the mst c r i t i c a l po^^nt ht-tvem Ind ia and 
Pakistan tiri#ir frlem^l^f m l o t i a a s . Uot ofily 
betfesesi Ittdin I'^d f f k l s t a a the risMtoRfc h$rc-. Issfeis, s t ra ined, 
th@ iitatfes i « s-Jfo I e to^^ ' Ic i t , toee^as® of i t s 
strategic -teterests in gfiiJ Mzbsiir* ^^sair times, 
a iae « the r i m of prc?bl®33, Iji^Jls m k^ TJaited 
tiBVe mlsmdeifiitooa other m.c tlms Iriritatedl the f l ow 
of f r t o d l y reietiof is tka two ao-antrSsE. 
B@caus<s of U s g^egfaptiieel l&cetioc ^Ith i t s 
thfl i.ovt^t ^fjii'-a, Ghim mtd j^fgbaaistaQ, 
c lose ly iiiirolves i j jdis* e Satem^t ioae l sii^BrJty md contacts 
with other ooujatri^s, Keshmir la to Za^Jia ©wisg to 
i t e ecoRoffiic lapot-tisas© CsT^vm tr&A^ roiato® f ro® 
Gfrntri?! Asia to l a s t s rsjso pass t lswigh tfciu utnt^,^ Kaijhis-lr 
i s s Kualia ®s3-r i ty st^t^s, Ina ie did aeir#5fr wmt p e r t l t l o a 
on the b66l5 of tb© two nstloii tbeor^f 1.®. Kiaslis s ta te 
Kiisllffl s tete - i s ®lr»o Iriportant for'PekSs tsa 
beeaiieo of its ecoaoaiic, p o l i t i c e l sti-eteric slcnificsaee» 
At p r e s « i t tb€ f ee t reaains that K.-shmir i^rdbleia wes 
i . Hfifom, Qi^.cit. p. 44S 
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th© i'it ttoe afitlnh pcllcj? ilxlch Soffc the indim 
f?itl3<pr to m^ of tvc 
coitfisirlts ladla or p^kiytss, or to reisete ladependent 
soTei'slcR In occefi^ sjsee wltb Imlifea ladspeadenee Act of 1947 . 
Provis ion t&T isrss smae in th® G^^^emaierat o f Ind ia 
/ict of 1936 as oniJei' the Inaepeadeacs ^et of 
19471 
iR^iaa fatetc be dt^eaed h&m 
to th€ iSomSaioa i f tl i« dommoi^ 
bes 3 iga i f i©d tsls aoceptsace o f en l a s t j m m t 
oJT Acms&ion cxcaioted tfc© Kiilei:' there 
I t ffl&tls I t evident that t- wss tko smfe,geBtion thst my 
othei? action -wft£ iseoess6?y to siis^ the aeaes; toa f i n r l . 
ihere no requirtatnt f o r ^scartslati ig popular on 
S'ither l oao c I the pro v is lens required a oonditionel 
or t€iTipor,sr}' g-.cc^issioi. l a f e e t , ca sceasjiioa oace maue 
v&B eoaplet^ aaiS tlEis3 • 
in cess of J^ afi^ SsS pj&d. KiibiiaJirV The Maharr.Js 
o f taaeoUioa responsib le f o r tli® tiepirmiag of 
th i r eontiniMcl mhapp:^ dlBlogo^ oa Ee ves iatorestcd 
to vaewac to lijtdla ao r to Pak is tsa . l a Bpite o f the 
of S s r l MauatbRtta3:;u ths tfcea viiil© 
\rlsittas V riaegay hi j a l j ; 1347 f o r four ds^'s, tlset MehBra^a 
Bi i r l i/ingh s!i:r,ilci ©itiier Xadia or P-aKistea tey August 14, 
the MEharaJs a M aot doaids aay th ing , the f « e t vsk thet tm 
v;8ated to remain inaapeadeat- The reasoa mlglit have beea 
th^it Ji-© di&liiied the statas ' B^^isscim to Ind ia because laS ia 
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be lag; aeaoeretlzed or to Pa&istsa hBQmne i t was e 
Hosliss S t a t e H E V i n g rdl tb i s la aiiad evidently 
DTOidiRg my f i a e l ueelsioit, foe requested toth l/offiinims 
to s i i ^ tfoffiporarj^ staad s t i l l hgrei&mmt^ providiag f o r tlse 
cc&tSaiii&iaee of econoBilc ea<J sdaialstretivit re lat ious batviacsi 
ths £rtet« f'fidi the i/o!®iaions on the ease bs&is as b^ore the 
ereatioa of &>2iinioas. Piii:istfia I t (yeqtiest of 
iki AUfcUSt i94?) on Aogust IS , 1947, while Indie injected tte 
LBim and liiromed K#?stiJnir* s Hehr.rajE that farther dlscusrim 
of the m&tte^ woaM oe required. 
I f th^ pr iac ip les of rel igioar. predominance n^ 
gei^ferapbicel contigtait^, vhleh was applied to the pr vlnees 
of Briti^ffe India , a lso hed been spplleti to the Indian . .tates, 
ths stctc a f Jaawia and Keshair vould, proaab^y, heve gone t> 
Pakistai* sisa the Eefctera psrts of J province, prcjaoiiSiifHty 
Hindu, o r pasisibly tb® whole s tate , given to Ind ia . 3at 
since the eliciee lay vltli the i.i3ler, Mehsrsje B s r i faingh, laitng 
i.. i t v£!S isiplicit in his l e t t e r f?««?os3aenyljig tn« instruffleit 
of fiCC€££ion iOotober 1 M 7 ) , but tiie circumstances 
made this l-ndependence iapossifcle. d&t&ilti se© V.P. 
o r ient L o n f e l ^ ^ L t d ^ t ^ ^ c i l ^ t t S ^ ^ 
Z* For th€ of the tal^grems «ixclisns6d festvsen the 
OoveiniacBt of JeMB end Kasbmir and the Goveraiaent of 
Pfekistnit regarding jstsmd stilt s<?e pftcuritv 
j i a m s j j - i u ^ s a a l j t a s s s ^ , -^th LuppXe. Ko«7, 
'Igxt of Vm telegr&ajs e-&<ttiaa«;ed between the covemsient cf 
J ammo end KaaLnir end the Govemffl^nt of India regard ing 
ciiso a btmd st iJ l A^reeiaBnt lakhrjiprJ, P . I . , sent lei. 
h'e¥ aelhi i Intemstional ?ub3io»ti<SnD, p. 45 
- -
en autocratic Jnile-r, fosd the rifeht sad duty of saking e fine 2 
aee is ioa* In the Val ley thei^ vere MU£:ii3s, but la Tudakh 
grid Jeiaijia tb© ncia->tusll®s were in ma jo r i ty . even the 
v-c-re divided betv#cn two orgcaalEJ?tioaa ~ (1) 
i^stionsD Conference, lee<aiEi£ the tscia popular ant 1-govemsieat 
ee i tet ions end opposioe the tvo nntinn theory, U l ) the Kmslim 
ConfereQce - sdvoeetiiig i t s inaependmce - i t w^s not aa easy 
r f f e l r to escertain: the vlshes of the people. /J.l e t i e sp t s 
qS tbe MsharsJ^'s aurini this perioa of Snaeclsion %fere ealciSBted 
*to i so l a te feis s tstc from whet ves hrppenlfig 0II sromti.*-^ 
As V#P. Meaon hgs observetii 
'"ihere W8& ea obvl'^iss l i n e of aci;ion which 
the Kghfraje a i tht have takea. Ee oaald, hs^© 
cellei i R Conference of representat ives of 
the people of Jaraau pnd rvashaiir md ciiscsos.^ed 
the ruestion vitB them. But the Mahera^e wes 
in 8 MicewbcTish f rese of mind, hopini: f o r 
the best wiiil© toySnt with the notion of an 
independmt JfjBKQU eftd 
iher© was no prest-ure on K stmir to jjoin l a d i e . On 
lb /iugust iy47 K.a5ihaiir beeeae an inaepeadent stete but i^er 
re lst iooE « i t h the rest o f Ind ia - aiviciecl into two iJosiintons -
Ina i s snd Pakistan - were yet to b€ aecioied. 
^ f t e r this hed occurreoi, the su:;picion, a i s t ru s t snd 
misunderstendSng pliiyed gn isjportent r o l e . In ?«kistcn 
A. Gupta, . . i s i r , kKshmir h ^.tuoy in inciie-Pflk^Lstan,,,, 
Asia Publifchitti houst, IS€>vf P* d^* 
'dm ¥«?• Henoa, SiUSlSs.*, p* 395* 
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\lthUk « %sfeek6 after part4tioa» tfec sospiclon begem to 
be voiced th.Bt the Hoherejs of Keshsir m evmtml 
aceesiictfi t^ India iasteadi of reaislning^ aeatral with regard 
to India end Pakistan* i.ven before part i t i^ this 
ba^ tekett piece irffem Indie aid not accept Kasbaiip's proposal 
f o r 0 s t a n ^ t i l X sgreei^at v i t b I n ^ i a . Pokistea el ready 
sp^.i-uhcasive of ©sneuverg md rommir^ d seticais in^oX^Sng I c a a , 
euispecied that tbe MabaraSa wes secretly plaaaiai to aeeest© 
to In^ia eveatually rather tbea to accede to Pakistan. Ihis 
swspicicai wes beifig airea x^ hi®, at tb© end of ieptembor, the 
Meherc^© of |';6sbjair aa«xpecteaiy released tteikh Abdullah, 
though be coitliiued to holu Sa oigtention tl.e leader of the 
K«Kli®lr Moslim Gcoiforenee, v.ho bed been op^ly fevoiiring 
kBtfmlr* G acccsiicai to Pakistan. Fyrtbersiore, India stsrtcS 
to bu i ld tfce roed froa P^^Ibmkot to Jrbskq* ?ol3oi lag e l l tbeee 
circumstanees, to. v^eptember, 1947, o. f'usli® revolt rgsinst 
the Ltete Govemaent of KesbJsir bixsKe out in the alrsfxdy 
ai£«ffected erea of Thus frcst this time, onwards, the 
reletioas betveen the tv;o coimtrles could not remsla cordial* 
T^he drassi tic cetestropb« too^ p2e-ce m October X947 
vhen oli'v Inv&sitm o f Esstisir by a r a e d - l i t n tribesoan to<^ 
piece. On October ao, 1947, tribesaisii begt^ n to croes the 
i.. ?x€ss Note issued by the Govemtaeat of ^©mu md 
Kashmir refeerdirii' alsturbj^aees in the s ta te , Ik: ^epteabar 1947 
i,uotea by Lsfrulls^'. Kf-an, 6tb y r . , 
4o4th y Feb., i9S0, p. 11. 
fetate* s » bosrderi on the fourth Say u provisional /t^aa 
(Free) Kmtmtr was prsselisisBed with I t s owa C o w m a m t . 
Gn<i6r socfe pressures^ the Mcharaja f l e d across the sountate 
to Jessa on October in ©®ir defence, ^ e t r ib®l toveders 
vere not f a r from fcrlfisgar aa4 were loot iag mt^et ing 
Kaslims Bs m l j as Findag aad & few itiropfeens a l so , and the 
£ t tete forces w^re not enoogfe to fee® the aggression. 
I t vas Q«i October 1&47, yader th« growing tbrest to 
t r l a sga r fro® t r i b a l lav©d®rs, thet the Kfefe&re^® ©f Kashmir 
executad m Instrament of occessioii witt the lr«4iaa t^omlnlm*^ 
He vas advised in doJtog so by Menon, jiecretary, ttatec 
Ministry of l a^ ie * snci supported by sheikh Afedullafc, On 
October Sir, next d «y . Lord Momtlftatten eccepted the accejssicai 
provisionel ly^ sad decided to defend Ksshssir, isssediotely, 
Indir. despatched troops by &lr to ©rrlve at t r i a age r . Actael ly 
these troops pushed the tribesmen beck end gradually cleared 
the ?©lley. How a f t e r secession Kashmir vas m Integersl 
pprt of Ind ie . One thing i s aote^ort l^ , that vhi le acceptInr, 
accession, Indian Govemraent made i t per fect ly d e e r to the 
Sf^ hite Pei>fcr, o ,^ J ^ am^ and ^fes^isii-, Hew Bel h i , Government 
of Ind ia , n . d . , pp. 46-7. 
'dm PP* For the ^ext of the Inst russet of 
AceesEion of Jasamu snci Kisshair, October 1947, elso j^ee 
i b i d . , pp. 17-19. 
Mshcra^s"' ^ Esshislr tbe Goveraimmt should toe ran in 
fatar© th® popuXtsr vllJ nm tlmt as ooa i-s law asd oMe-r ' 
had been restored la the t t s t e ena iavaders hed been driven 
out of the i.tat®* ^ s o i l u refer©ace to the people would s e t t l e 
the question of ©ccessicaa of rissii-sir to I nd l e . ^ the saaie 
speech iehru 
mad© I t Qlms^ to them thet feblle 
MelccKied the secestion of I^esfeslr d id 
cot Visat any hurr ied ead forced acoesLioR 
end « « i^tfould rether wait f o r th% people 
to cecid®.*'^ 
pj -Mstaa refused to recognise t h i s ion^ end held 
i t we£ a v io l s t ion o f the stend s t i l l agreemat md « f raud , 
perpetrated m the people of Kssiitjir by i t s cow^raly ru ler 
v ith the Bggresi-im help of the l a a i s a Qovammmt,^ I h i s 
was @ vrong e l l e g e t l o a . 
Ketira t r i ed fcis best tfest the Qov&mmunt of PsicSsten 
might restrEla the r a i a e r s . in b i s l e t t e r® to the P.M, of 
X. Sehru, Indus' o p . c i t . , p . 445 
2. I b i d , p. 444. 
3 . l e l e g r ea of the P r l ae Minister o f Pakistan addressed to 
the pr iae K ia i s t e r of I nd i a , 30 October 1947, uhtte P^aep 
p . 49. 
4 . ^roeucast by the P.M. of FaKisian, Mr. Liaquet A l i KhKi. 
Jioveab€r, I ^ i d . ^ pp. S6«60. 
5 . istfeitR I teM-* PP- 74.75. 
Ffiklstm^ m Becembej? 22, 1,947, the Govemia^t 
of Pakistan to to 
" ( 6 ) s l l aeeess rn& as^^bXTak l s taa i te$l?itori©s 
f o r operatioa against lissfaairi 
(to) 812 ffillttary aad other supplies? end 
( c ) e l i other Klads of that might tend to 
prolong tfee 
ife€ reply^ of Decesber 1947 o f the P.M. of Pakistan 
i s aoteiKjrthy here; 
"^s recerds the charges o f s la ead ©sristaace 
to the in^adere, the psklstsn Covemmeast, 
we enptestically repudiate thesi* on the 
QontTar^f tb© Pakistan Goverament heve 
ccmtlnued to ao e l l ia the i r power to 
discourage th€ t r i b a l movemfiats by c31 iseaia, 
short of war-" 
^ f t e r the feiXure o f d iscuss ioas betwem the two countries 
in s o l f j n g the problem, the inereesiag los6 of s i l i tars f 
operations were proving iadecisiv© and cos t l y , on 31, 
1947, l ehru re fe r red the matter to th€ fmcurity Gotmcil by 
despetching « cherce-sheet^ against Pakistan charging F e k i s t m 
under A r t i c l e 36 of the United nat ions charter with "an ect of 
sggression egainst Ind ie " and l i s t i n g a n f r i m d l y £Cts, both of 
oEaasissicai end comiaission by the Covemaient of Pakistan* He 
2. 3rd Year, iuppl©. for November 1948, 
fmiBX^ pp. 
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arged the e©»«icll to persuade the of Pskistaa 
to mnA i t s ways piosaptly. Ih l s was put before 
the becurity Co«neiI m 1st January 1948.^ Pek l s tm facse^ 
the «lXeg«ticais with vigour sad seat S i r XcfruUBh Shan to 
l u m i/uccess to ecmfiact the case.^ 
In bin reply^d®t«d ISth Jmuery 1948, ZBfrui :sh Khea 
saids 
*«The Fak ls tm Ooveismeiit «iBphatica21y deiiy that they 
ere glvSnf eid etid asKistence to the so»ca21e<i invaders or 
heve ©osiffiitted any &ct/ ot sggres^rioQ ©gelast Ind ia . " Acttaally 
this cmSlmed wiiet the P.H. of Psklsten hed. elresdy statca 
OE i/ceember 3o, 104? sad was a totsa end strs ight dea i s l of 
oor e l l eget ioas toy Paliisten. I t Is aot€«orthy that to th is 
time Pakis tm aevez- t r ied to Jes t i fy i t s presence in Eashmir 
or to cl&l® say right to be thero. lastea^ i t deaied i t s 
preseaoe la Enstistir eaci made g number o f couater eoaplcSats 
ifficoaoeeted with th® eoapljsiat of Itjaia re la t iag to K&shaiir. 
Ihe only releveat cooater coatpluiat t.o the laciiatt cose on 
Efashasir w®E thst^ " l a ^ i a obtoSaed the accesslca of the htBte 
2. The Chief of the ladiaa Delegation was S i r n . Copeleswami 
/lyy eager, 
suppl«. f o r Hovesber i.948, Aanex ii, 
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of Juraffiu end Kethadr by frpud and v io lence , " 
But FeKlctan could not produce eny evidence in support of 
this al3egBtlon. Indle aid never put eny pressure on the ru le r o f 
Keshmir to accede to Indie, liven, lord Mountlctten, the tho j 
Oovemor General of Ind ia , had told the ru ler on behalf of th© 
Govemajent thet h® nsight eecede to Pakletf^n i f he so desired gnd 
thet we wou3d not teke I t as en unfriendly act . In f a c t , there 
w8£ no talk of India intervening in Kashmir, m i l l t e r i l y . only two 
deys before i t s edcession, the poss i b i l i t y that the ru ler of Kashmir 
might esk for Indian help mbs considered f o r th© f i r s t time. India 
did never try f o r Kashmir's ©cceshion to Indio against the w in of 
Keshmir. on M ^ 31, 1 9 ^ , CandhS said thj t " i t was not the 
Mahsre^a with his so l id iery thet would count but the Muslims who 
were the vefct majority t h e r e . N o t only this much, Kehru was 
confident, while writing e l e t t e r to Bcgum Abdullah oa June 10,1947 
that " I have firm convictlDn thet the w i l l of the people w i l l prevail 
in Keshmir."'^ From the above eceount i t is d e e r thet there 
3 m e 1, ;; 
HIndustqfi_S'imes, i i t h June 1947. I f Kashiuir ecceded to Ind ie , 
i t was no \<onder. Lome of the leaders; of the Kationel Conference 
had the b e l i e f thfit the state would lo in the Indian tinlon, i f 
f ree w i l l was allowed to be expressed. Gandhi wrote to Schru 
in August 1947 that Bekshl Ghulea MohomraBd was most sanguine 
that the f ree vote of the people go In favour of Kashmir joining 
the Indian nrjion, provided the Govemaimt of Jammu md Kashmir 
would release fcheikh Abdullah ana other leaders . Pyare l e l , 
Mehatme c.andh 1 i The test Phase, vol .11, Ahmedsbad, 1968,p.3S7. 
'ihe people of Ksshasir were shocked by the news of the part i t ion 
of the Indian subcontinent which is c l ea r from Mrs. Abdu31ah»s 
l e t t e r which may be called an expre&iion of the wishes of the 
National Conference, that no one has been pained more at the 
recent proposal ( o f pert i t ion) than the people of Kashmir, Hlr^dust^ 
an Times, j.Sth June 1947. Before thii: Abdullah was reported by 
B jndustan Simeg on 7th June 1947 as writing to one of his f r iends 
favouring Kashrair eciesfcion to India . iAt present he is the most 
important f igure end supports the p leb isc i te in Kashmir.) 
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ms iJo question of eny or o f violeacie or ei?ea of a 
threat of violence m the psrt of ind ie as f a r as Kasl^eiip's 
eocesalm to her ms coacemed. On th® ca i t re ry , i t wes 
Pefeistaa which croated viol®iee ea4 in turn aader the presavir© 
of circaastsaaes Eashair raaer acceded to India* 
Indiii came to Keslimir thPo«gfa l€g®i process easi Pakistan 
hgs no lege l sietiis in I t got Into Ksshiair only 
tbrowgh cn set of sggre&sion \«hich em never be j u s t i f i e d as 
l e ge l - Pakii5tsn came i t s e l f , i t vss neither invited hy the 
ru ler b r toy the people of Kashmir. Mr- .Tinnah, tbe fousuer o f 
P e k i s t ^ did not tfeink, before par t i t ion , that the ^tat© should 
4oin paklsten i f the M«s31iB£ m m in majority instead ho fend 
saidJ " f h e poXioy of the ©13 India Musliai league has hem c3eer 
frojG the very toeginnln^. We do not wiah to inter fere with the 
inteasne) a f f a i r t of ©ny state . That is a matter primarily to be 
resolved between the rulers end peoples of the Ltste."-*- According 
t© hi®, unt i l i t s eccession to Indi®, Kashsslr wes an independent 
Knd coverei^a i tete . ^hus invasion of Kashaair by Pej^tistan vas 
contrary to Intemetionel lew. fhere could be no Ju&tificftt ion 
whatsoever f o r Pakistan WBt& to intervene in Eeshmir. 
Furtherasore, vhen the United Sf»tions coassis&ion f o r India 
md Pgkistan v i s i ted Eisraohi in Ju ly , 1948, the seme foreign 
Minister b i r Mohsssmsd Zs f ra l l ah Khfin informed the comffiis£l<Ma that 
l l m ^ June i.8, 1947. 
t t o i r regttlgr ^alslstsEi bed feeea f i ght ing in 
Kmhmit t©mto l ! y stoce Ms^i 1 9 4 8 C o m M i E s i o a la i t s 
f i rsts md obj^^ctsd th®t mttor^Mg to th% Secar lty 
Co»a©il Hesoliitioa*' of^the th© Go^srameat of 
m s t^SQ^estea to Safot® lamadiataly the Lecarity 
Soma i l of my a s t e r i ® ! chmg& Sa tfee s i t i iat ioa . I s e l e t t e r 
eadr^asM to th© Lecurlty th^ Paki&tea 
to eomply U'ith this The Government of 
Pakigta i l iafe, Iwwe^er, not toformM tbe teeawpity council 
about ih© prmmm o f PalEistaa t j^ops in the etat© of JesratJ 
m^ Eashaiir." 
fhen the Foreign m n i s U v to ld tfoe WiQlP tfmt i f P ck i f t en i 
troops hB^ aot gou® ttisre, Ind i s w^jtild hgve taton over tlie 
wbole imUer the accapatlon of the rni^e^^s md thgt siii«® 
tb€ ooisstlseloa hsci "bem cbatgedi to fieal wltli thB probleag 
related to th® lado^Palcistan qtaegtioi:!, his Sotrernsaeat thought 
that the Snfoftafltioa sbowM l i s t e sd glmn to i t . But 
h« beim un©ble to do th is previously because of the aeJsy in 
the comaissioja* s la the subcoatin<mt. /;riy wey Paklstso 
1 . Pakiataa f i r s t deul^ci aa^ l a t e r s ^ l t t c i i thet she hes 
&mt ber troops to E&shair - ^ i r Qmn iSijion, the U.t;. 
Madiatop, ss id ia e f f e c t , thst Pak is tan ' s action ves a 
breech of iateraatiaia®! law. 
k, b/ll^Q, fBTBgmph lk7 
3. ipMl 
ftfevelpmdi; &ov«mEent of Fskist f ja . Huiistry of Kashisir 
/ f f E i r s , n . a « , p . i , mother resolut ion was adcpted on 
iJQ J entire i94S by t.hich r. thre© meaiber Co-Baission 
¥8s to be Rppointed to Investig©te and meai&te but thgt 
hes never implemated. For *:eJ£t see 3rd y r . , 
l upp l . f o r Sovember maejt. po, 64-.S. 
€ r * 
Jisd no Just l f i e s t ion ta go into a terrltosiy wbere i t had 
ao l ega l f^ci eoast l tat ioaa l r ights . The Coamlss-ion aaacie 
i te views e l t a r in I to the cRclosare of th« 
UMCiP iteporti"^ presence of paKistsn troops in Jaasau 
em KeshsiiiP, bovfever, eonstitates a sjateriel change in the 
sitiifitlon i ^ ^ a e h as the Security Oouzicil did not coatemplete 
the presfitacB of troops Sa that b t s t c . " 
thcsfl v ic l e t ioas by Piskistaa, India was 
exercising teer rigtet md <iutl«Bs to protect t^e 6tfite a f t e r 
i t had acceded to her* The presence of the ti-oops of Xndis 
In Kashmir wes l € ge l . Indie m s l ega l l y authorised to do so . 
i t is this unlawful presence of Pe'Kisteni troops in. 
Kashmir, ^ e r e they hasl no locias stend^. thet the Coiisiselon 
h&l tc takfi into ec^s iderat im in forffiuletiiig i t s resolution^ 
^atea ^ligast 13, x948. The f i r s t p r e l f e i a s r r step thi>t the 
resolution st ipa lsted was thet l^rnUlstm should agree to 
withdraw i ts troops frota thct t tste becsose the presence of 
Fpkistani tr- ops in the ter r i tory of the i-t&te of Jeasiau 
s 
cad Kashmir coastitatcd/aaterii i l chmge Sn the aituetlon -
i . t/xiOO, Paragraph 4 . 
-kaiftaksik? tapple . f o r Uovosber pp. 3^-4, 
iHoIeliCeepted this re solution but Pakistan aid not work 
ii; accordaac® with the resolution. 
• S29 « 
e olJenge wliiaii had b©^^ e f f ec ted by Papist on vithout sny 
tooifledge of fchti Bemrit^ ' Council* Therefore the f i r s t 
foremost coudition of the trace w s the wlthdrai^al o f 
P e k i s t a i l t roops . A thcro^igh resdirig o f th is s^soltstion 
©ekes i t obvious that UBCiP had k e ^ i a ^iew the lawful 
presenc® o f l ad iaa troops, ia Kafih^ir in eoatrest to tli® 
mlBvivtl'pTBseuQ.^ of Pakistani ®31itsry foraas In the ; t&te 
m ^ s i so tliat I t pr^eeaded m e d e e r rscognit ioa o f the 
f a s t that tiae sower®.Ignty of the Stat© m s vaster in I n a i s . 
Actua l ly , OGce Pafeistm was forced to a<imit to the 
Qommts^im tbs t regu lar psklst imi troops wei^ f i g b t inc iJ^  
KssSsffiir, iQdisa «K?iBplaSnt aeedsd no fur ther p roo f s . Tkis 
l>rov€d thc't PEkisi^niE aetiois ¥es -smtTBTf to iBtenjot ioaa l 
sad i t wa^ obviously ga i l ty of eat s f eggresKion. 
Tbsro fore , Ij^dla iasve t&m pe r f ec t l y j u s t i f i e d in. 
pressing the otcur i ty ConncSI to esk Paklstfaa to withdraw 
from Keshoiirj Indiaas vers persuaded, tc accept the tJfiCIP 
reso lat ioas of August 13^ 1948, find of •Tanasry 5, 1949-^ so 
ss to s«cnr© peaceful end barmonlows r e l s t i o a s v l th e close 
neigiiboor, Pskist®n. I j idis accepted the reso lut ions contsSning 
.G.c.it, 4th Year , s a p p i e . f o r Janof.ry 1949, 
pp. 
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p l eb i s c i t e pi^posels^ provided Pert I end 11 of the 
Cossaissioos reso lat ion of lat^i August nhieh r e f e r to c ea se f i r e 
mo the truce agreesaeafit haa beea Tully iapleraant^d. Certainly 
Pekistan wise awarfs tliet i f i t a id not act up t^ these 
resc lut ioas by f i r s t w i t h t o ^ i a g i t s troopa end tribesmen 
from Kas te i r , Ina ia voulci aot fce boa&i^ in any wsy by i t s 
eccepteaee of those re^o ly t i aos . AK the perts I ana 11 af the 
resolution of ilugast 194S, have not hem iiB^Ieaented 
beceuce of PeEistsn ' s refassJ to withdraw* I ts troops i'roa 
iuslisiir m& tbus the eon«liticsBs hove not been s a t i s f i e d i na l s 
Qbtk no Itaager b© held to be botmd by these reso lut ions . 
Ibe time went on, Pekieton dragged on the n^.gotiptions hoping 
that v i th the e f f l u x of tiaie thfc people woC'd fo rget Psk i t tani 
in Eesbsjir . Ana indeed, oat s idert forgot the Indian 
complaint against PE^istanis , r-ioreovfcr, they ev<:n t r i ed to equate 
the i r presence in Kashmir vdth thct of l n d i « . On the other 
bedn Indie was not prepared to be treated, in the same wsy as th« 
egi,rcsS'.or beceuse she. ¥«i: the aggrieved party . Pekisten ciid not 
Afisolotlon of 21 Ap r i l iii4S, adopted b^ ' the security council 
e l so ce l led f o r the withdrawal of e l l the Indien troops md 
the tribesmen fro® Kashmir so that a f ree and impfirtiel 
p l eb i sc i t e may be held and an Jnteria?. GoverntBej.it representing 
both "the fflajor p o l i t i c a l e^roups", ( the Sst ions l Conference 
end the ^zad Eeshs i r eleeimts) should be ©stsb i i shed. fit the 
time of p l e b i s c i t e , conauct of the voting was to be entrusted 
to a P l eo i se i t e Ad^inistret ion headed by e iTnited Netions 
appointee. Furthenaore, © five-men United Set ions Go t - iss icn 
on Indifi and Pakistan ( lOKClP) wee to proceed to Keshmir to 
€xerci£© i ts ^ood o f f i c t j s t-t the disposal o f the two aisputr.nt 
countries 3n restor ing pesce md firrsngSng a f a i r p l e b i s c i t e . 
pp. 396-4ou} , 
UC .6 .^ . T 3ra Year , tup;.le. foK Apr i l x94«S, p p . a - i y . Ihe 
is.'ue ayring the aiscusjilcins in the security council frotn th is 
time onwerds has been hov. to frjsaie the conditions fo r h 
p l eb i sc i t e Kcceptalilc to s U the interested pe r t i e^ - '^hQ' 
one or Lht- other reegon vere involved in the fpte of Kashmir\' 
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gcoept RiQ? of o f f e r s taede bj? Indifi tS^ti f.ad again. 
&me wes the CBsts vh^ ioriaf, smm-e of diaeaiioioiis 
Ind ia asny coacessiona pro-s-isioiially in rsgsiM to 
d©«ail it jsrs»tios proposa l s , io^? afee is not gaSmg to make 
:Bor© ooaciissJ.oas or to bssiGsXly a o i i ^ t^sess reso lut loas 
as the modlf iestioag propose*! so f s r havs be^ i only to favour 
of Peklaten. That i s ^ Ind l r ^oes not care f o r th© c r l t l c l s a 
thst XEdi» a l4 aot accept my of the proposals made since th© 
resolntScns ©f /,ug«8t 13, 194S and Jeau^ry S, 1943. 
essurmse that the question of s e ce s s lm 
sh..iUX4 be fiettlea by e reference to the people c f t e r the 
law end order had bem restored in Kashmir. given volmterily 
gad l a i i l e t e r i e l l y , hut tt did not make accession couditionfi'l 
to a reference to th® people? i t was not to Pakistan 
which feed no l>ocas Et-.sndi m the Ina i a be l ieved thet 
Vilsstever p o l i t i c a l interest Fakisteu hed In the future 
gccessicai of ths iutate, i t f o r f e i t e d by i t s aggmsBlm on 
Keshmir. ii reference to th© people v©a t o be implesiented 
only a f t e r the invaders hnd hem expe l led . pl«8<ie<i thfit 
f.t this l a s t c cnd l t lm ha<i not been f ^ i l f i l l e d m the resu l t 
of Pakistan* s continuing occupation of s part of the t e r r i t o ry 
of the state , PsKistan had no r ight to demand a p l eb i s c i t e on 
the strength of ths August 1948 reso lut ion , vhen it hfid not 
carr ied oat i t s o m p©rt of the kitJc resolut ion which should 
precede th© w i t M r a v a l oT the M l k of I s ^ i s s f o r c e s , 
pr^llminsn? to taking ©ir-aQg^Bsat® f o r & p l e b i s c i t e . 
Xjadie»s snsitfer tc the c r l t i e s ©f feer stanci was that e v m 
i f sseeessioa wss conditioBel on & p l e b i s c i t e , the plelbleeite 
i t s e l f c m d H l m B l on tb® l i q a i da t i o s of pgj i istai i i 
eggi'sssioE to £®shffiir estftblisliffiest o f lew end ord^r -
ne i ther ©f wbtclJ sjmAitioB lass been f y l f l l l ^ i so f ^ r . i be 
rmsQi bem the iatraosigtnee of ?&M.lst&n» 
B'Mr Bince Jsa^e i^ 1948, there hav® been I m g 
discuss loss on th€ KsBhmir problem in the i>eQurity Gomc i l 
oistsid,©, in<jluaiiag discuss Sons l)€t\#€on tb& Prime Ministers 
3f tb© tm c&imtrlGS. tUN* Qmrnlssims caae, issdiators 
ceise tQ €xassine the prc^le®. Oa 31, 1948, a cease 
f i r ® was brought afcout aad has hem k^pt though i t has been 
broism ocQBBlmBllym 
O ) MjmihMj^mX' 
f o Indie « i t b i t s s t rp tcg i c , p o l i t i c a l sad economic 
s i fn i f i c enoe Et'shtiiir hp.s become s symbol of nct loai i l prest ige 
sad ifiterantional ^ust iee . thoagh Keshmir i s b Mttslia-
aifsjority s tat€ , Ia<ii«a de feats tJiis eti j*racteristic» 
In indim view Kashmir i s the pert o f l a d i a h i s t o r i c a l l y , 
geogrcpbical ly end l e g a l l y as Bshru once remftrkeil "Kpste i r 
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has at no time been recognised as a sovere ign s ta t e under 
i n t e rna t i ona l law. I t has always been considered an i n t e g r a l 
part of I n d i a . I n d i a ' s defence i s invdved as Kashmir i s 
a s ta te bordering wi th her two neighbours Pakistan and China. 
As f a r as the accession of Kashmir to India i s concerned 
in h is speech, during debate on Fore ign A f f a i r s in Par l iament 
2 
on March 28, 1961, Nehru dec lared : "The accession o f 
Kashmir to India i s e n t i r e l y in conformity wi th the Indian 
Independence -Act and the n e g o t i a t i o n s that preceded i t ; i t i s 
a lso fu1]y in accord with a l l that has happened in case o f 
the other pr ince ly s ta t es v/hich acceded t o I n d i a . " Thus 
the o r i g i n a l accession of the Kashmir Government to India was 
l e g a l l y complete and f i n a l by the execution by the Kaharsja 
of Kashmir o f the Instrument of Accession on 26th October 1947 3 
which was formal ly accepted by the Governor General o f I n d i a . 
Consequently, India has had some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the de fence 
and maintenance of l-aw and order and some r i gh t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y hand 
in regard to both the p l e b i s c i t e and d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n . On the other/ 
1 . Nehru, I n d i a ' s Fore i gn P o l i c y , o p . c i t . , pp. 467-468 
2 . I b i d . , p . 467. 
3 . Lord Mountbittto was the Governor Genera l . 
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pfjkiKtan, had coas i tted r.fgrfeseion in Kashmir, hsd 
no s i m i l f r r ight aad i ^ spons l b l l i t y la Kssliaiir. By ttie 
pccesiion of the iitate, Jsrasm Kashmir becasje pert of 
the t e r r i to ry iB^iie, Ju r i a i c e l l y fnd p o l i t i c a l l y . At 
no time heve the United Setions Ootmlntim pna £,ecurity 
Council chsJ l ^gea th i s fact.**^ Furtmrjaore , Hehro s a id , 
"ne i ther the Gosisiission nor the i ^ ca r i t y Council has 
suggested that the eecession wes open to autst ion*"^ 
As B resu l t of the ficcessioa oJf the ^tat© of Jaissu 
end Ksshajir to Ind i a , the Government o£ Ind ie became 
responsible f o r the d e f a c e of the i-tste egcinst tanlawful 
agrresfctcn hy P?.ki6tsa helping the tribssiaen ( invaders ) sndi 
in<iisn forces ©it^red the t-taie in October i947. staring 
the f o i l owing months o f November m i Decembep 1947, the 
Covernment of I n^ i s t r i ed to persusd© Pekistaa to w i tWrew 
the re i ce r s fr:^ a5 Kashmir but could not sacceed es Pfikistan 
t»as pers istent ly denying i t s involmmmt in tim inveslon 
of Kashmir. Then in&lB re fe r red th i s issue to th® Security 
Council of the United Hetions on i s t January i94S, "as m 
ect of f f i i th , heceu.:e ve be l i eve in the progressive r e a l i -
sation of 8 world order and a world government. 
i.. Hehru, I n t o * o p . c i t . , 467. 
fc- i m ^ P- 468. 
3 . m ^ P ' 
- aas . 
The reference fey l a a i a to th« t^attrity Council wes 
mpde m iega l b a s i s , ffee lad iaa oleiajs asd e l l e f f a t lms 
cesinst Pafelstea \eere purely lega l • iiocopdiiig to the 
esse the SnvgKlers were allowed trans i t ecross Pakistan, 
they were allowed to use PeKistan ter r i tory as a base of 
©peretionsj they included Paklstea a a t i o a s l s j they drew awch 
of their military equipment, t rmsportst Ion , md sapplies 
fros! Pakistsa, end Pski&teni o f f i c e r s vere t ra in ing , feaiding 
mcl otherwise actively h^pinfe them. India charged ^ a t 
such sssistsnce was m "Act of sgiresbion against i n d i e . " i 
Further more, in the end of the l e t t e r it claiiaed thet the 
reservation of peace in the er<.a wee not only in the 
interest of both states but a lso in the " Interest of the 
world." 
Toachlng the l ega l interest , the Indian l e t t e r aif?de 
e reference elso to the accession of Kashmir to Ind i a . I t 
steted that es the threat to the Valley of Kashmir became 
grs^re the ru ler of the atete had appealed to the Govern® nt 
of In<3i6 for military help. A s iai i lsr appeal was sisde b>' 
the state* s popul? r leader ijfeeiKh Mohammad Abdullah. The 
state had acceded to i n d i ^ TTnlon vhich thereupon prcssptly 
1. Paragraph I , x January 1948, .. .C.Q.H* . 
3rd year , i.upple. l o r ^oveiaber 1948, p. 139. For 
the fu l l Te^tt of the l e t t e r see I b i d , pp. 139-44. 
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sent K l l i t a i y help» Moreover, i t a^dedj^ "But Sn order 
/ 
to avoid any poss ib le s u g f e s t i m thrX Ind is ha<i u t i l i s e d the 
s Iiiffleiiif.te p e r i l f o r her p o l i t i c a l advantuge, 
th^ Oovcraseiit o f Ina i s made i t d e e r th&t oaee the s o i l 
o f the J^t6t€ hed hmn cleared of the Inveder m d nonael 
conditions restorer!, I ta people "wotil^ b « fre© to decide 
the i r fu ture by the recognized deaocretic aac t^hod of © 
p l e b i s c i t e or refrcaaduKs y^iich ia order to ensure complete 
impar t ie l i ty , ai|,bt be held tinaer internetional auspices . 
) 
India did not f e e l eny necessity of end could not meise 
the fcecority council tinderstaad, vby the Indian Government 
hpd not ffiisde s s t r a i ght cberge o f sggressicm egs inst Pskists® 
under chapter 7 of the Cherter Indie did not m^ke i t s posit ion 
c l e a r tbet the main Indlen Interest ^as to secure the 
w i t M r a v a l o f invaders f ro® Kaebmir ss soon as poss ib le r « ther 
then to bbU the Tiaited lletions to condeasn Fakisten as »n 
ag£ressor .^ v;hat Ind ia demanded vass 
X. Paregraph p* 141, For d e t a i l s see f ^ r u India 's 
Foreign PQliey^ pp. 443.449. 
2* Later on p l eb i s c i t e becsme the central issue as f e r as 
the ©fcttleja^t of Kashmir problem i s concerned. 
3 . Pop le i and l a l b o t , li^dia. end Afflerlca. p . 72. Frsnfe Morses* 
view i£ that i t was a a i « t eke on the part o f the Govem^i&nt 
of Ind ia to teke the Kashmir is£ue to the Sftcarity Gotmcil 
under a r t i c l e s 34 and 36 of Chapter ti of the B.U. charter 
which i s m t i t l e d " P a c i f i c iuettlem^t of Disputes" Instead 
of under Chapter 7 which i s spec ia l ly concerned with "^cts 
of A&gteskion*** Frank Morses, " V i s i t to Kashmir: /3I -
/ddinfe up the Balftnce che«rt«% Ilmefc of Ind i^ , Bombay, it>th 
/•prii Ai^S?, pp. 6 ,11 . But A. iippedorai does not at;ree with 
hi®, l a h is view the c l ep r proof of the Pakistani aggression 
was avai lab le only somt four ja(aiths a f t e r Ind ia r e f e r red 
i^ecurity Council md a f t e r r a k i s t ^ cooiai-
t tea tr.e act of ag^ ressicai. Appadorai^ .t<sgays in P o l i t i e s 
d e l a t i o n s , Asia Publ ishing House, Bombay 
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«(JL) f o prnveat Pais is ten Goveiiamejat p e n o n a e l , 
ss i l i te i^ BSkH C i v i l , from par t ic ipet ing o r 
s ss i s t lng Ha the iavaslCQ of the Jammu 
^ 2 ) to ORU upm otli€r Pfiklstiiiii o s t i o a s l s to 
des i s t f r o s tailing pert In f igt it ing in 
tlie Jamjm md Ksahsiir s tate* 
( 3 ) So aeny to tlie SnvB^erBt ( s ) eecess to and 
ws® of i t g i e r r i t o i T f o r o f j e re t lms against 
Kesfeair, ( b ) © i l i t e i y and Qth&r supp l ies , 
( c ) ©21 other kind o f » i d thet might tend to 
praloag th® present struggle 
Ina ia <3esir©a " m l y to see peeee restored In S e s t e i r 
isn^ to ensare th « t the people o f Keshisir ere l e f t f ree to 
decide l a m OJ^erly end peaoefal meuner the future of 
the i r s ta te " seid the represent s t i ve o f I nd i o , G. /.yjangar^ 
in hig st©t05jent Sn the Seoarity Council on iS th January 
iSvex^fthlng that In«iia haa iScai€ had been in discherge of i t s 
l e g a l , constitution e l , end mor»l r e spons i b i l i t i e s end 
ob l i g s t i ons -
Ind ia refuted the PaisiEtsni e l l eget ion thpt i t at>talned 
the eccession of the t ta te of Jemmo and Kashair by " f raud and 
v io lence . " Nevertheless l n d i « did not put th® s l i gh t e s t 
presfaure on the &tste to eocede to the Indian Boaiinim, 
"beoeuse", ia the words of Hehru, "Ke rea l i zed that Kssliajir 
i . £/62fe, psrsgraph 13, p . 143, 
3rd Y r . , Ho! 
i ^ i I or t u l l text 
s. 1 -15 , 227th Mjjig. , 15 Jaauery 1948, 
 - ^ . . ^ ggg IMJIm PP* 13-29. 
VQB ta e very d i f f i c u l t pos i t i on . " Re hliaEelf wes In 
f®900r of sscertsSaiag the wi l l of th© people of Kasftsiir 
as was elea^r from ^liiftt sa ia : 
"We ^id Rot mat a sere scoesslon from 
top but pQ. associet ion In cocordance 
with the w i l l o f the people, ir^le^d, 
did not eneourege any rapid d e o l s l m . 
t»ven in regard to a iuten^ L t i U agraexent 
no speedy steps vere tekea by a s , ulthoegh 
tBSlmlr fes^i entered into e t t s a d - s t i l l 
agrcemcsnt v i th Psfelstsn eom a f t e r August 15."-^ 
£:o f a r ss tJie p l e b i s c i t e issue was concerned, i t was 
not the ftiQdeasent&l f eo to r before Indis rether , ©oeordiag 
to fftghra, fundameatel f a e to r i s the. aggression of 
Pakistan on l|tdl«n t e r r i t o r y , ssecondly the denia l of the 
f a c t of that ag f i ress imi tti lrdly tbe present udmissim of 
the f a 0 t . « As Pakistan In fomed the UMCIP in July 1948 when 
i t v i s i t e d Pakisien thet three regular Pakistani br igades lied 
bisen figJating in Kasbmir t e r r i t o r y since Kay 1948, vhich 
conetituted a mete r i a l chaiige in the s i taat i ( » i * In f a c t . 
In I n d i a ' s view «1list iins been the fundamental d i f f i c u l t y 
la t h i s Kashmir busSnecs?. the fundmental issue h^s been 
s lurred over and passed over . How the bas ic f a c t o r is 
revealed by the very admission of the Pakistan Covemra^it."^ 
i - Nehru, M l n * g, t m X m . M U S X i P- 443. 
3 . i m -
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fctuplly s time Uien the f i g h t w a s ir-ing on itid 
the situation was deteriorating, C-opfJr Lh-a-nl /.y^-mcar pointed 
cut thr.c the nsfctiiou by v?hich the .-.ecority CJouneil vlthccl to 
tackle the problem was £.f0siev.hr.t like "putting the cara 
bei'oro the hori^ e'-' becau. e ihe.x verb leisurolj ' cisctisolons 
on plfebii-elte rnth( r tiif^ n on itoppinp the f i fh t in 
In^ia accepted "che rc-5o3titions of 'ilvJlT on certain 
ccruit lons, Jnoip. etnphr-Kir.ed that i f she v .^t to eccept 
t he c oni.T» i£ & ion' £ p2 c-1) Incite p ro po.-; 1 £ ( i n s 2co r uixnce v, i t) i 
the resolution^ of b J^ mur.ry iu4i) ) , no rctiom coula be 
trken in referd to the.'n unti l Fart J md I I of the Cowmisi ion'si 
re&ol i i i . ionof l3th .".ucwct, i.y4b h; d been f u l ' y Imylv-T.cnteti. 
^hesfe pr-rti re fe r to c€-a;.c:*ire .'rid the truce figreent?nt .-nu 
rJiiO th f t " in the event of "a^-iatan not impienenting thcfc; 
proposals, or lif-vint ceepte^s then, not 1-rsp]< xc-nt int pjiiHE I 
fna 11 or the refrolutioa of i3th :.u£:uit, the L-ovcmT.ent of 
InUir'i: ncceptsfice of tz-ess should not bv- ref-jiX-aed az ^n Miy 
wRy b^Jiuing Ui.an thets.'"^ 
Ihc reeolutiofi ret/uired that i'fu-.istan thcul- v.ith<lra-w 
iti. araed forces fr'.a the area of the ..tote occupi<;ci by i t . 
India ves e;iked lo v.-ithdraw t,ho bulk of it.-: foreos Ic-tGr, on 
rekistRjCi 'rtithciravinj, frDm thfit frcfc* inciia zight retein her 
i . i./. ..36, January 1948, pp. 6i-5. 
4th y r . , £uppl6. f o r Jaauftxy i949, pp* is3-5. 
iuXLcLtii't ^-upnle. rfovember 1948, pp. 32-4. 
3. ' • . - -
ft, .c.c.it^, 4th Yeer, apple, forjiaauaiy 1949, /<niie}!:*4, 
/.ide-Kemoire 1. 
arm to the i>tate in order to glire I t protect ioa* fhus 
the r ight of i f ldlsn ATtssf to be there ves r e e o ^ l s e a btit 
i t was s tsted th€t s iace FaKistea was withdrawing completely 
from the Jcasau eod Kashmir fetat©^ I s d i e ©Iso coala reduce her 
fo rces thet ^oald %md ta b r ing abotit a be t t e r atmosphere. 
Therefore , ^ehra 4 e c l a r e ^ Xa Lok Sebfea on March 29, X9S6 
dorlng h i s reply to the debate m Foreign / i f f s i r ^ , th « t 
" a l l this t e lk of p l eb i s c i t e md other things Is coaspletely 
beside the point , those qo^sticais wooltl a r i se only irfhen 
Pakistan had ta^^m b certaii^ s tep , that i s , withdrew! of i t s 
f o r ce s , md Pskisten i s oot of court t i l l i t p e r f oms 
i t s prSasiy dutjr by ge t t i ag out of th© pert of the t t e t e 
oa vhich i t cosimitted a^gressicai. f h i s i s a ais^or f e e t 
to be re®effliber@a.« 
In the Goiremmeiat of I n d i a ' s view, the s t t i tude of 
the aovemmtat of Pelcistan towards the l a r ge - s ca l e disbendSng 
aad dlssriBiBg of the AvM Kashmir forces wes a t o ta l obstac le 
to the bringif lg about of the peecefa l conditions required 
f o r a p l e b i s c i t e . ^ "ISatil PsKistse goes out nothing e l s e 
i s going to be done, about li p l e b i s c i t e " , said Kehru, " instead 
1 . Kehru, ^ndia* ^ F-oreigji igjf , o p . c i t . p . 483. 
2 . f h i s was aede c l ea r in the l e t t e r of Gccretary Generel 
Ministry of External A f f a i r s , I nd i a , addressed to the 
Ghaimen of the UKGIP, Qth Bepteaiber 1949 ( t /AC .WH^ks ) . 
For the fe3£t see, 4th Y r . , Special Lupple. 
Ro.7, Doc. S/l430//;dd.i, Annex 36, pp. 143-7. 
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Of goSxig o » t , ?8kl®t«» hfiS now eatsfoacteed i t s e l f . " ^ 
jkccordlng to Indians the a l l l t s r y aid peot , of pakisten 
v l th tb€ ia i©54 created not only £ aew mll iter jr 
sittiatloG bat e new p o l i t i c a l sitiietSoa which teceme 
proeressl^/ely beesiiFe o f the Hew cf thle si i i itsi :^ feia 
to Paklfitsaa aisca tfee caocluslcn of cxiAltr md the Baghdad Pgct . 
m d sfjttce then "apart fro® the snd const i tut ional i ssues , 
we ham th i s pruct lea l espact to pease^er in d i scuss iag the 
question o f JCashisir v i th Ps^^lsteal representat ives eri<i 
o thers . "^ India was aot re«dy to take any step vhich wottid 
b® dierapt ive or ups®t thiags thet feave sett led dowi 
beeaiis® i t wsat-es to promote th© hap'oJne&s and freedom of 
the people of Eeshmir. 
I t the coiEsnmsl psychological war that cofitlimed 
to SEE^ i t impoesrible uoder tfee c i reusstaacss to obtain e 
f e i r p l e b i s c i t e . KriB.toa HeRon, the repr©£catative of 
3 
Ind ia , in b i s s t a tem^t in the Security Gouacil on ^une JSS, 
19"e>2 d-eclar^ed are e i^eculer State^ s32 of €«ir orgsoissstion 
is p o l i t i c s ! em has nothing to do with the r e l i g i ons aspects 
of E people. Wc ere not pr^epered to face a pos i t ion whore 
1. Sefera^ X o i i ^ l j l X S i l i l m ^ S l l g ^ • p- 487, 
2 . I M i - i P- ^ t ^or d e t a i l s s «e Ifold,^ pp. 484-486. 
LaSsMm Y r . , i0i6tiri mg-, 22 June 1962, pp.42«5. 
- « 
re l i g ious f g a i e t i c i ^ i s to be or i s protected." l ieai ly , 
ludifi did not ficcept part i t ion on the Hindu i^tste rnd 
Muslim vtate tteeory, rather i t vas e p c l i t i c l l settlement, 
tilie situation vss aede much sore defer vhen In Fe^rutiry 1964 
I nd i a ' s representative, Chogl©, in the- ieciirits^ Comci l 
stated^ thet "Our position on Jeiaaia md Kesfcaiir i s olesr 
end «ne3:biguo«s. tvo resolutions of tfc® i^ecarlty Coaneil 
deeling ultb the p leb i sc i te mbtb conditionaJ end cQntiaE«nt 
on Fekiatan vscstlng it& «igt;resbion rnd t i a t conaiticn has 
not bem complied t l th . . . by the pessege of time end Vfiriows 
fpc iors intervening . . . they have be.cme obsolete, k© cannot 
posi-ibly ccfiateinplote vith e; ai-aifflitj? the threat to tbe 
intefersticfi of our comtry th€ d an, e r to our cherished 
pr incip le of seculeriso by the holulng of p leb i sc i te in 
Eeshmir. I visb to siake i t d e e r cm behalf of ^ Government 
thp»t tander no circumstences can we agree to the holding of 
c p leb i sc i te in Kashasir." 
/.pert from tbe issue of secession end p leb i sc i te there 
have been other caQtlderations vihich arose from Ksshmir 
probleia from I n d i m vie¥ point which shotild be broui^ht out 
here. 
India ruled out wer as a meeeore f o r the eesSng of 
i9th 3fr., iOdbth Ktg . , 5th February 1064 
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r®I&tloQ8 ead there fore tjroe and sgeia t r i ed 
to have a ao-wsr % c l a r a t l o n vlth Psk lstaa wiiicii was eci 
by the l a t t e r couatiy* But s luee t b « other party " b r togs i t 
Ja te lks e^d sfeouti so nsacte ebowt Kehru had to b « 
per fect ly reety for I t , foeceut® i t eaauot b® ru led oat 
ixkdepm^mtly or a n l l a t e r i g l l y . ^ 
Wfeen I i ia la was to go to the l^orld Court f o r m 
cdyieory opinion, she opposed the ides beoause la tier view 
th i s was ao t & o^etter f o r tfe© viorld Court o r fo r m ^ i r l s o ry 
oplnloa* Mather "tfci£ i s s p o l i t i c ® ! I s s oe " , eaa, %-hat 
¥86 tnor©, "We ei^ both members o f B l r Petrtoli* s much Iove<i 
ffio2!2o©¥©£ltfi the termg o f oar adbereaa© to the 
yor ld Court we heve as^e soaa exoepticms l a record to the 
metiers eaa be r e f e r red t o I t " ^ , sa ia Kr i s tes M«aon 
in tbe Sectar l^ Council, to tiie question of reference to 
the isorld Court doe© aot s r i s© . 
t^e GovemiKeot of India ttcoHaed to ccaisiaer 
proposals f o r the iater f i&tionsl isat lQa or d iv i s ion of 
Ve l loy , o r 3otot coatrol o^ * Kesbadr ead tfee l i k e * P r i s e 
A. o p . e i t . , 4t® 
2. SnA i i m » M i.968 when Pakistan sttaeked Ii3<5i8 m^ 
Inal© f©c©<l i t success fu l l y . 
3 . iujAakjufiM iOietli pp. 42-S. 
Minister Hefaru, in l3is ststemeat-^ la the Lok Sebha on the 
Indo-Psklstea M i a i s t e r i s l f e l k s OR Kashroir, reitePnteS 
m 13 Attest 1©63 thst " I f asd vhen e settlement is a r r i v d 
st^ i t jsust obvioQsiy be a peaceftil cme, not a f i e c t l n g 
the s t a b i l i t y and progress elreeay eohieved, end must 
str^igthen the f r iendship betv-een tho peoples of Inctia a M 
PakSsten, v;itIioui this no settlement hes eny loe^l&g.*^ 
m a l e MiiS not prepared to be treated m the seme l eve l 
es tb€ 8ggr©s^or bfseatsse stie wee the eg^rltved pgrty .^ In 
I.er view vith the eff lux* of t tee the outsiaers snd even 
Pekistpja forgot Pakistani egfreE. ion in Kashmir end the 
Indiun cmplnSnt egainst i t md evm they t r ied to equate 
the i r presenee ia Keshsiir with thst o f I n d i a . 
InGie has not been ready to abandon her aov^relgnty 
over the s ta te of Jsoiffiu end Keehair md has never agreed to 
my resolut ion which even by implicnticai ciuestioned th i s 
sovereignty, ihet was made c l ea r by the Priffl© r i n i s t e r , 
Le i Behsdur fchastrl, in h is l e t t e r ^ to the tecretary General 
o f the United B&t ims on i>eptemb< r 14, 1965 <3urinp the 
Pakistan wor, vhcn h© said tb^t "no pressures or sttacks v i l l 
Ih i rd b e r i e s , vol . H I , 
August X y w , co l s . i68.1t>5. 
a . Rchru, Infti f i 's i PlfeiKfl o p . c i t . , p, 490 
3 . In coap l imce with this v iev Ind ia re jected the Crrhnm 
propose ls , ^ A3th lfr#, £>opple. fo r Janm.ry-Mar<h . 
l e s a , pp. 
65/21501, pp. 3 - 7 . 
de f l e c t as f rc® our f i rm resolve to aieiiitein tbe sovereignty 
i stKi t e r r i t o r i a l integr i ty of our country, of vhioh the 
j 
^tfete of Jeafflu and K®eh®ir is im integra l p e r t . " 
*ihe tJniteci estates hf«s £Ot involved in the Keehair 
aisputc- ever since Ina ie r e f e r red i t to the United Hations 
in 194B* yarisaf these^ about kii yee r s , the representetives 
of the • hsve bad to express t^ieir views end cast votes 
on rsfitters relfsted to i t - Thus the Oovemment of the United 
ttsti^s played m important r o l e . 
For tbe tJ.L. att i tude toi^ard the problea of Keshssir 
imlike Ind ie pnd Pakistan, Sashsiir may be seen froai the 
point of view of Cold v^r world s t r a tegy , l i fter world wer I I 
(1946) , tw5 super povers - the and tfje U,^ » 
emerged in place of Greet Brjteln^, Ceraeny e tc . These two 
po%»ers beg®n the asrcli of worla domination by txySng tJ 
subside e€ch other ®nd thus s f i ' eet iag the vorld balunce o f 
pover. 'ihe fletional Interests of one power struck against the 
o t h e r ' s , ihus «old k^r started between the c ap i t a l i s t block 
headed by the United s te tes end the Coaimimist B loc , heeaed 
by the U.baL 
•h. Ihe pol icy of containifeent of Coamunism 
e f f ec ted the lndo-tl.i,» and Paicisten re la t ions as Fi?kisten 
i s a pert of the " r tog of deterrence" nnd thus Involves 
/ 
' iiiserlo^ &emf l ty f ©Jthough the UnltetS States Is neither 
f^fraid of PaJ^istan nor regards PuKistsis m ItJcely to sosuait 
/ 
Aggressico."^ tfce tl.S. Govt ji^jiseot ^'ijamestly hopes 
t 
'to see^' the dispute toetx-i^.-en Iftais psci f ak i s taa regarding 
Kafhali:' to he "sett led Sa accordance vith the Onltecl liaticais 
j^^lQcipIes In eeaordaiee with tigmeamis' 4slrmdy re^Qh^d 
bQtweeti thf' pe r t l e s " , rev^atrlced iicstossss^ior i^mest, ft. Gross, 
representative to the In ^his \tfas the f eo t 
tiifit in 1947 mci 19^48, /sSJerioa* s aein isEifediate coocem vas 
centered cxi I t s f e s r or as uatptlofi tli^ Mt the dispute stlght 
l€8<J to ft generel between Indie end Pdsisten. lu esse 
there mTB no eenerei wsr, the tension wou3di contlatie andifie 
e^isustiaf, flillltt-i^ bucTiiGtfc we^ ^ken t^o comtcPias. 
liius Sa tufli tfeie dam aie^jt e f f e c t the Afflerican stJ^etegy 
in /.sl0 by pashiHi dom either ia or Psidstan or both tb 
Snl>o Comsimist hm^s* f h l s can be made c lear from s 
statement jiisd® by iieym<»3d A. Esre , Assistant L<?cretary^ 
f o r jfjeer Eastern md 6outh Asian A f f a i r s , before the Kouse 
Co^aittiee on Foreign ^ f f e i r s on Merch 22, 
A. poplai end f a l b o t , India and America^ op. e i t . , pp. 70-71. 
T XXVII (696 ) , October 27, ISSi^. p. u5i>. 
3 . ^his AiB#ricaa f e « r came to be true In Auguit ly6S when 
8 f u H - f l e d g e d war broke out between Indie and Psklsten. 
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"fcotath ABis Is tbfc heert lmd of acm-coaajunlst main-
Imci A i i s . Ihe w i l l erid det€ri8infitlon of the 
peoples of this region to wltbstansS the pressufes 
Tx'om Goamunist Chine, vri l l , in the long run, 
beer l iecislvely cm th^ question whether Comuelst 
ChSiie eea be « « i t e i a e d mnd prouf|it to resieet the 
d ^ t s t ^ s of lotemGtional low ma society, ^e 
sf^oula ao i l e t this view ol' the k&pojcimo^ of 
the regism be obscured 
'^en the Kashmir probteo arose, the Gosmywist expansion 
w©s Tepid mti the Aaericcn f e e r was, in f e e t , bcsedi on 
the (ielieecy of the situatioia was observed b^ r one vriter'=^ 
¥ha thet pattltic th« intcmatioiiGl espect In the jsaost 
extreaie teras , K^slisJir could be "the grf»ve yafti of tlxs 
rcssfiJiilBi^ A n r J o - A a i e r f n o s i t i * ® on the siabeontificnt of 
or st the very l e a s t , i t coulu icjpedie Viashingtoa In 
vhBt was eppisreiit3y i t s current tenciency to look tOT^crd 
lsi4is a p s r t i s l policy substitute f o r Ohlna**' 
Kowever, the United states with a l l the members of tte 
Onited Bat lane waniefi to e&c a feis disputes settle<l pc©ce« 
f u l l y * I t had the most "eginest des i re to see the t w 
i.- JisjkMLLf vo l . LIV ix4t>0), AprU ii©, 1966, p. 
Z, itoslager. Lawrence ttUkfM* . 
'ihe Kec^ i l lm Coajpeny, Kew YorK, X95u, p« i.05. when l a 
a965, P«Kist8a attacked Indie the United C tetes wes 
elsrmed «bee«usc Iiidle and Pekisten are tvio very importnat 
notions vihose fr ienaehip end progress ye highly v d u e 
snti becsuse over th® Eiuialeysi? i^ed China w«s slttfee 
eagerly waiting f o r a chence to pick op the pieces" , 
sEld Arthur J . Coldberg, 0..::. hepreseatatlve to the 
0 »N . , in his address before the Setionol rresc C3ub 
et ..aehiagtGn cxi i^p'ril 19, 1966. IhM , vol .11V (1402) 
Kay 11, iOub. 
« a4a . 
great states of tlie sul^coEntlnetii ^o^to together to assure 
tteelr auttiel peace ea^i security sg we l l « s tfeeir smtoei 
p r o s p e r i t y T f e e O.fc* Nat ional interest l l ies in having 
f r iend ly r e l a t i oa s with botii lad Is end Pekistan which put 
tlic y. i . . Uk t ccssplex poslt iou so f c ? es the Kgshstr problesa 
m^s coQcefxiecl. 
from tfee tliae Brit®ija tri^isferi'ed poi^er to the Government© 
o f indie and P a k t s t ^ la 1947, the . acloaowleagod tfe® 
laiportmce of tfiese tvo nations s t r g t e g l c e l l y B i t u s ^ d 
on tihe riffi o f 4sla vhere the Assericans cooldi foresee r#a l 
pi^speets of orderly proeessea of rood©Hilsation in Asio» 
v^itboiit progress ena s t a b i l i t y of tfees© two, on t te c(mtr®ry 
i f e i ther of thcffi o r botli shouaa f o r any ceuse stumble bed ly , 
then the prospect f o r I s rge parts of the l e r g s s t ec3f&neat 
in the O .v . eyes, «otild not be b r i g h t . Th® Kashmir issoe 
which hes been ® central symbol of the e r « c disputes between 
Indie snd Paitlsten *'h8S b^en a c m c e m " , from the beginning 
" to th© U.t,, becease of i t s iapsct on the po l i c i e s of sad 
progress of In^ ie md Pakistan inc l « a l ag the i r po l i c ies 
toward the United S t s t e s . " In f a c t , "Eeshmir i s only one 
Bemericed i^jnest C ross , r ep re sen t s Ive to the 
General ^seembly in the Security Council on Dec* 6 , 
i^AUfix, XXVII C70S), Dec. 29, 19S2, p . X032. 
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Qspect, of eoursc, o f our l a r go r Interests la the sub-
continent of south As ia " , admitted P h i l l i p s Te lbot .^ 
IQ the view the o r l g l a of tm d ispute vat conplloeted 
ma act'plji ouried in tiie history of the great sub-cf^itinent • 
Tfce dispute fega long h i a t o r i a a l m a s€utiisent«i i.nd poi it lc«r l 
roots m m g the peoples of both countries. '^ Fros the 
CJ.t,. viev point the bas ic issmc before the O .K . v&b the 
••disposttim of The saoin question, however, " i s 
iiitenk<07gfn with u complex of r e l i g i oos f e e l i n g s , netionol 
p res t i ge , l e ga l sub t l e t i e s , and ec<Kii>3iic pressures , 
The rn i t ca ctutor eaciorted the eceeptgnce by India sad 
Pekistsn of the JIKCIP reso lut ic^s of Augu&t i94b und 
Jcnu«ry a p o l i l i c o l oospromise of the d i f f i c i i l t l e s 
which fol lowed frots the p s r t U i o f i o f the fubcosatineat into 
two countries rnd the ea^iuring dispute over the states of 
Kethsiir. This comproaise provided th©t the p l eb i s c i t e in 
Jsaimu end Easiiair bs supjlesjentsry to the cease f i r e and 
truce arrengea^nts cceitained in tlm a^ lCXr- reboliitloan of 
13th August 1948 without coercion or Intimidation fj-oa the 
mil itary forces of e i ther ooimtry. The l l . b . support of the 
resolut ions was based m this p r inc ip l e of self-deteormine-
t i on . 
i is£i£tmt 5/eeretary fo r Hear Esstero md couth Asinn 
A f f e i r s , in his address to the /issocistion of v.i<3iit© 
ot b i ch i to on October 23, 1964, v o l . U , (1325) , 
Boveciber 16, 1964, p . 70id. 
2, I t ve;. the view, e^pr^ssed by £'<?cr«t;»rj' o f t to tc Rusk 
before Ganferencc of Lecesibor it) , i96c;, D.; . 
vo l . AtVll Uecesber 31, 196^, p . 998. 
3 . I M B M vol.XXI i & m ^ October 3 i , 1949, p. 664. /icidres 
ssfide by i^puty Under Secret r ry . KusU. be fo re the Cosnaon^alth 
niub o f Ca l i f o rn ia on Oct. 1949^ 
- -
As ^BT bb the l e p f j sspect of the dispute iai'lsteci ly 
Indift ana the e l a l a s of PeJsistea, ia acidltiofi to op-^oslfif^ the 
claim of Intiief-^ ground of certain ^mirvpLla 
f e c t o i s , econoffitc t i c i ad coimiiuif:! p f fment ions vere 
coacemeci, the C-ovcmmcnt nf the Halted i -tatet f'-nphr-bired th©t 
the agreement feetveen the t w o^'ticns f o r an c-nduring 
settlcfflcnt of the dispute ssust be reached m bro,id polit&Dl 
grounds. The d m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , tbe c e s s e f i r e , end the 
p l eb i s c i t e vere the isj^ars, to whlefi i t l ent it& saprort . 
Gross, the rep resent Rtlve to the said " In our 
i t is eminently f ^ i r sound, hnd In ful f l l^G-nt of ourdj i ty 
as xs-jsber. of CoUiCil cc4icated to peaceful setzi&mtnt&^ 
to raeoBasend to tlie part ies tlist they accept a pr incip le vhich 
strengthens the concept end value of the cef isef i re l i ne 
md avoids the r i sk of an extention of mi l i ta ry cctivity.«<^ 
recording to the Americans i t hes bacn tlse l l . ^ . ' a e s i r e , ' 
throughout the h is to id o f the issue of Kfjshair, to Co Tchp.t i t 
c o u l o to bridge the gcp ( d l f f « r © a c e s > between the tvo f r iends -
Indif? c-nd ^smericis. The p r inc ip les on which iiiaericans t r i ad 
to proceed to nss i t the pa r t i e s to carryout the i r charter 
ob l ieet ions vere one© s u i a o i E s r l s e d by f imest /». Gross, U - t . 
i . Thft the stete of end KRshnslr scceded to Indie* 
(5th y e a r ) , Ho« 9 , p . lid 
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r«pr€S€iit®tive to the GeaersI Assemblyj^ 
" l a the f i r s t a l o s t lug po l i t lce l . 
settleio^nt must b e ' e a agreed cettlemeat. 
'^bccoadly, the fc«carity Coancil n i l l slweys 
welcome cgre«ffient ©f the p s r t l e s wliich 
thisy them§elv@B a m reach on my theory 
thet w i l l s e t t l e the d i fpute wliioh i s 
eonsistent with the p r ine ip ies of th© 
Charter, 
'^Thirdly, I t I s the rol© of t t ^ Security 
Council to assist the pa r t i e s In seeking 
to reach agreement, i n th is case the 
Security Council hes isede a ve i l s b l e the 
©excises of ^ r . Frank Graham m U.K. 
representat ive . 
'Fourth ly , egreeaent most frequently is 
reached step by step through negot i s t ion , 
and negotiat ion involves m element of 
i soaprc^se , 
^Final ly^ the Secarity Coimcil should 
eongider with <jere the views and the 
reeofamendetions of i t s r ep resents ive 
indicate to hi® end the pa r t i e s i t s 
views on the posit ions he has taken*" 
In doing so, to c<^pose th® d i f f e r ence s hetveen the 
two f r i e n d s , the United etates aterted from the point of 
agreement between thca because in i t e Tiev i t wes sn 
equitable coaproiaiEe besed upon the nmrnd pr inc ip le that 
the people whose p o l i t i c a l a f f i l l a t i m end netionel stettE 
was subject to dispute have the r ight to express their vfll. 
v o l . IXVI I i706>. Dee. i9S2, p . 1028. 
Sills p r inc ip le^ th® r^gar^eci as pr^vMlng g soma fossis 
apm whicti a p o l i t i e a l co»promise o f the dispute betneen 
pjad Pekist«tt be t fe roa^ peacefa l 
Tiie bfc#tfis f i rml® tfeat there eoyB 
be ao rea l m i l a s t lag &ettl eaten t of dispute 
¥tsicfo -m& ao t to 1>oth M d thst m y 
to <l«ci4e the issw® witlioiit tlie eoasent of both 
pa r t i e s , w u l d l eave a eouetuat ejtplosive 
I r jP i tmt ta t&e r e l o t i cas between thmm tv'o Govemesseiisf 
" m i r r i t a n t vAleh w i l l e f f e e t i w l y prewi i t tb® I^Plagiag 
of peace md security iR There fore , 
tfei^gh, B m a m £ l m & i e i s i l i t e r i s f t t i a i progressie was 
s proeesfe 3B wliiefe tt% eo^mcil o m M f i f mmcmsnTf^ hmme 
tlie i a i t i s t i v e , tfee «EniujpiBg p o l i t i c a l ^olut loa i*8S 
e s e m t l e l l y tti© ^ e p o a s l b i l i t j f ^ M tfci€ o f the 
par t ies to th« dispute ead the l? s g re^amt &nd t h « i r 
coopcpfetion ¥61*© the ia^ispessebl© Sjagr^dlecits. B^cret&tf 
Achesoa s|?oke fe^for© the S®tion®I Press Slab on S a n u n ^ X'df 
IB5Q tfc&ti^ 
Im LtBtemmt a©de l>y ^ tevenem. JJ^V* rtpresentisiive 
Itt the Secaritjr Souaail m F«l>. 14, 1064 ( i J i S p p r ^ 
fefilftsse in vhich hQ reviemd the s t ^ t^ iea by 
tm on trie profel©© of Kashmir* 
r o l * I f Hfirch 16, 1964, pp, 
I f eM- f ^ x y t ^ ) S , p . 3SS, 
3 . I M ^ m v o l , XXII ( 6 S i ) , JfcQU ^a , 1950, p . 118. 
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« l n l a a i e ^ r a k i s t ^ >e are w i l l f e g 
to b© sf sijisli us w b®, feoJUi 
the i«sp«msibility Is mt mm. Agala 
lii® sisa ml^ h& i ielpti i l tri^jida-* A^aM 
th& l i e s with people 
vb& wm the i r freedicKs v m e*^ 
p r w ©jT it*** 
The* jUisisted thfa, ^  cf reeamt assinot be Imposed 
f ro© aad recopi ised that th® leg i t tmct^ 
tettwssts s f feetfc Igi'^i® i a v o l w ^ i a t r t c s t ^ 
lateiissJ problems of lnw mcl at^er end p o l i t i e © ! 
IR s c c o M m m ifdth thi# r i&v i t s^isfegted a s f o i l s t i o a s to 
resolve the i r d i f f c r e a e e s peace fu l ly hy t&kMg a d i l i g e n t 
md b^QT&tas^ Msrsbftll l « a t his support 
f o r %hm cmtiauatlata; of th® ais4iati<ai anii aegot ie t ion 
teet^ea gre^st net i^^s of l ad ln md rak lataa Mitfe r®sp®ot 
to Easferoir^ tfest process cr |sesc©fyi se t t l eacat 
migbt brteg to e a?m©l«tsi<ai eia 1mm vfeieh had been efegrged 
%ritli g re « t aanfisrs.^ b e l i e f vts tfce prableis 
o f S.®eb!®ir csaaet fee e@ttl«4 l a l l e t ^ r a l l y by e i ther ps r ty . 
foo the two pnrt ies sho^M m&'ke aa ©ggree®©at aceepteble 
to botfe of tb«m. 
fh© sost iffiportgut th© bas 
been that of p l eb i s c i t e So Easfesir as a f i n® ! step In so lv lag 
I M ^ A t vol* XXX {4m) f O c t o b e r s , p . 434, 
^ 2M * 
the Kashalr prahlm^ li^lt ira l l c c thfet Eissliulr Is o 
si-Bjority state so c e r t s l a i y i t voulfi vote f o r PfiKistan. 
tmllfee iR^ is the thoHgljt that t M pert ioa of intJian 
sUfcsoatSaeat csi the f.'s^lsaia Iheoi^' - Kliiati 
ttjBte m'^ Mosllai itete. '* ' I t hfts h&m empfmBisfy^: **iree 
risd l !3p«rt iar ' as wel l RS auspices*' these 
xiordB sopport eceh other In $ s^ife^s^^tee to tbs vorld 
ma to escii party tbf,t the p le ls iseite feoiild K ' so f p l r 
tiiet ob ject ive BWi dispr-^ssioaate obB&ryers not er i t tc lE© 
tli6 la my m^* ^.f^aeJ^y iaspoi't&fit i a this 
t o the Ides of & f r ee ispert leS p l e b i s c i t e , 
to ^lew, tbe itjursatee to tli® Govemisonts 
of s m that ©e-als houM i t s |jiter®st 
fi^teciedl h^ b p l eb i s c i t e tmaer United M a t i n s * ®wspiees, 
so that th€ o»t0Gffie ymxM not hm held t in f r i r sn^ the resellt 
of eoereivR or tntimldaticas.^ in sp i te of the f a c t thnt 
tbere i f e so ohastces of f p le ls iscite to be held in KastSysirf 
tbe Govemsf-at of the United i tBtes s t i l l tiopes thpt . 
l ua l a vud FaKistsn oaa f l au a so lut ic^ thrsiigh the proeese 
Here liris-e msin a i f f e r e a c e s betwetsis tfee epproecfe of 
India fJia thot of th© , 
hm ik i j t ^M vo l . XXIV (foCB), p , 396, 
f o r L.itiest Gross* (I^eput^? i f , . , r en resmtat i ve to 0 & ) 
5t0t©.ti€nt be fore the .security Council as Feterodrjr Us., 
3 . imaift i f not r€04y for this cltbough, Pakistfsa wants 
Bmi eoasiders I t as ftindaseatsl f©ctor# 
- « 
of ascerta la lag the wishes of the people o f Kashmir In 
doing so aiiid that been th® posit ion f o r 'di y e w s 
ma i t Jio reeson t© i t . 
'tfliiile extsnaiag m l i i t o i r ossisteace to pak is tsa , 
the ms awere ©f sn^ thf f s s t thiit Isi<Si^£ 
yml^ d i s l i k e i t i t vies- g ives to the i r aelgfebowriag 
Qowt iy %dtb ti&caj thsj? vere not m terns Bt* 
tli€ m^tt^ms md expmm^d tti^Sx 
p0iiit thet the^ ti®^ j^tteasptM td approach tli® Ess i js i f 
m i t s mer i ts , m^ aot feel l e w that tfeetr 
e o l l a b o r a t i m %fith Pakistisn in er®© d-Ktease tfm 
m r i t s of th i s Esther the "seek to s s s i s t both 
l ad t s rji^ Fakistiai - md I th is with grest slticemty -
In f lnuing s f i r s t end etjuifeafele s o l a t i a of the Eeshmlr 
probles ¥e ags la urge the® to cooperate to that 
s o M Br.reo, Deputy represeiitstiire to the y .S . 
At th© ti!B« v h ^ Jiidih was m m r threat ctf Chinese 
Commaaist attack In 1063, tb© s t t l t u i e of tiae Onited States 
tovcJ^ the Kasbiair issue wa« soaeMli^^t comprosislag* I t put 
Undoofetecily, l ad l e a spakesisefi^ expressed cnxiety tJiat 
m l l i t « r y asslstencEt woalci iseise p©ljlst«Ri._/ • Gomra'nmt 
f e e l thi5t i t could wield B b i g s t i e ^ with respeet to 
Kssba i r . 
VBS Bpeekiag In the Secority Souncll © f t e r Soviet 
veto m fcO Feterufr^ 19©7. . v o l . a m v i ( 9 ^ 3 ) , 
Harch 195?, p . 
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pr©s£uV.ia oaa lodi© l a tui© of i t s mll ita^F sisi to t e f 
tiiut sfee should reash a f i n e l settlement of the dispute 
tfith P^kistea over i;ashnjir r i ^ urg®<l tfeet I f the dispute 
i^as to be peasej^il ly reso lved, there sfcoald fee b 0 ® t e r a l 
ts l&s h&t^BR the p a r t i e s . But tfeete telks fi'id not ssaeeed 
la feeiiievifig sa 
In i.964^ tfce O.;,* GovemsieGt sugcest«<l tti&t tfee two 
coaatr ies shoals eoaslder the p o s s i b i l i t y of rec-^nrse' t o 
the good o f f i c e s or o tbiiM eoaati^r o r person of t lteir 
choice to ®S£ist them l a br lug lGg «bi i »t tlie reeusptioa of 
iiegotietitms m ^ ia s M i e t i a g t M r t l i f f e r eaces . ^ 
Tfcei^ s ^ e e s l i g h t di&ag© ifi th© cttitw^© towsril 
l a s t o i r dispute tfee mdee l e red war broke out ia 1966 
b©t¥»ea India rnd Pekistas . flais w©^ thfc l*s«t tfent the 
valued t i ^ f r l eMish ip of feoth Ind ie sad PsHBtsa* 
SotiiJjagi "We toow, is? sore paSjaftil o r sore cost ly to ell 
eoaeeffied tLea ® f © i l S » g oat betwoes €me*s f r i ^ , " r e s e r k ^ 
presideiit jolmsoa^ MelcosjJag Mrs. I M i r s Gaadhi^ 
P#M» of l nd i a » at ^iggbitigtoii. fhe ¥©r h^tmmn lai^ia rtA 
Paniigtsii wjBS a t r a f l e ejtperisEic® fo r Amft lems* Tte^ 
1. md tfce time eaai© to vhea Bussia se4i®t«<i at 
t & ^ K m t a f t e r I n d o - P ^ war. 
Ikbd^t ^ol. i lV April p, S98. 
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fevoctretl cesBef ire fitonee. fhe did not oppos© the 
gcod o f f i c e s even of a Gosamaist coufitr;^, thcs Soviet 
iJnlm, ratber I t ®ppreciat«4 i t s e f f o r t s t iasblseiit. 
P r i o r to 1963, the tino-pak /iXls, the IJ.t.A. for 
alaost a l l the time '^mm ^"itfe l^sklstsa in 
O o ^ e i l * But sine© the tliee Pakistan becaise Interestedl 
Sa Chtae» i t hss s h i f t s l l t t i © fro® i t s po|ley m 
Eashiiir. i©^' the has refused to s^ipuort Pekistgnm 
anyssor® ia the Coms i l eM hss insii^t'ed m feileteral 
t s l k e betve€« the two d i spatmt part ies se as to fiUfsS omt 
a a e t t l e m G i i t of the disptite. 
fii© unitei. i.tates has & special tot«»rest in thi^ 
©ensei tb©t i f these two greet cofaiitri^s Sn the ©ttbcsmtiaent 
eoalfi ftod tbeaisel'jpas workliBg togetlicr tjb® elosest 
©ooperatioa, tbeia tlie siabcmtiuest %-oiald be Mimlneral^Jfe 
from attack ana they aoiaM bstt^ pr^oead ^ith the i r 
©cQROjaic ©as Sfociei d^mlQpmmt pt&gjtmmm m the i r h i ^ e s t 
pr ior i ty* l a tiae eteseaco of that coop6r©tic5n aad %fith 
higher teas lea beti^eea Hiea, the two couatriss create not 
ooly greet problems f o r themselves bot Increase, the 
burdIcQ apcB th« OnltsiS S t s t « s to be of assistaace to tteo 
In getting on vith the i r ecc^nosdc atid soc ie l developoeit; 
prograaaes cad in ftortherlag their netlonel iaterei^ 
- 2&8 . 
md the i r o ^ n&tioiiBl siev^lopsjent*-^ 
f f e o a ^ t J i « l t h « r fih© U B t i m n a o r t h e 
hes foisia s path to se t t l e sea t diirSisg thsae ft&Bra^ 
ii6V#rtb«l«8E the Afflericaas tako thst a l l these 
i^ le t^d e|spft5ecti68 have l l s i t « d viol@ace saS at eertsJa 
asoaients toelped t© svoid itf-ar bet^eea Ind ia Pakistan. 
tfcey regret grest ly tliEt l a d l e m d FekistKn fesv© 
been t© a gettl^^^at e i ther through tfee 
L®c«rit3? Ccaiaisil or Sa felleterel t s l k s , thst th is 
dispute to OGCupy so smell t l e e of the S u t e m ^ c u s l 
coajsjuaity. I t 1B ^erd f o r tfces to mmerstm4 vt^ these 
two c<ajatri«s wave aot fornix i t poss ib le ds r i sg a l l these 
yeers of Moodslied scici ot violence to take Joint eetlfm to 
eel® tii lg sittiatic® su^ to e l l s y th© s u f f e r i n g . Tfeerefire^ 
the U .S . md hopes that m i l ® md Pakfetes hum 
a rmponS£it>lli%f to the i r to the people of 
Eesbsiir m i t o the world ^ i tmmlty to s©t these issiiesf 
m tfee to f t o e l so lat ia® f o r the ssis© of iiUBnaity 
m^ pmo&rn 
MH e f f o r t s i s tJji? n.Jf. and outside i t 
1 . limmrK by ^ecretsr^ Kask at Kews Goaferea<^ of 
.^terch i.064. ii&ksiAf vo l . I (1291) .March 23, 1 9 ^ 
pp. 
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f a i l e d ia solving the pr^felra ©f Kashmir thyougfeoat the 
falstoi^ of the esse f o r sbost years pm the i l s p a t e 
g t i l l remains feetweeo the pa r t i e s eoaeemed* 
Ibere h©dl been certa in feators ^thich bro«gfet the 
o f Osle te sGlvSnt mshmlr p r o b i ^ , be fo re 
m& e f t e r Tfoe troo&les, md frsatraticaas thst t&e 
^•E.mcotiatei^d la sttbseqweiit yesrE ver© th« r e s a l t o f i t s 
bypasslfig e charge ef aggress ica egaJust Pak l g t « a . In 
lad leB v ie¥ t b i s wos the faademmtal f e e t o r . AE Urishs® 
H m m Grmaaticelly maiaciedi tfce members of the Co^meil . 
at the end of i l ls m&rBtbm speeei^s in tlie Charter 
e a j o l a s ujKm the wosincll "eo iictioii eoesistcsat with the 
e r l a e of f ee t that i t omlu " 
ao t ssscseed to i t s ecmeil itory r o l e "fcy bnieliSiig th® : 
Ggly f a e t of eggressiciQ m a e r the carpet , there caniaottotee 
a with e^'gressicm. I b ^ t ¥eS| i f we ©re peraitteS 
to o i d l i t^ the o r i g ina l s i s thet v i t i e t e ^ i t s ccac i l l i f c i^ 
e f f o r t o b & € r v e < i m ludim ^A-rit^r* fhi ! . s l l was dcax® 
by the ^^Uli* m the - in l t i e t iv®^ so m to © w i v e 
® formal e to persuade th® t r i b a l r s ldere s^ppo^-M to he 
f i r e d hy the M e c l s of f re «aon iffld ®elf«a©ter®ia®ti<m^ 
iifthmetulleh Khm, , the 
pub l icat ions , i ^ l h i , 196®, p . 131, 
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petbsr t h m coeme tfeea Into retmBt,, Eoveiref, tij© 
GOIIQCU sfeifted to tbe l&tm of p l eb i s c i t e leming fisisie 
th© Isaaes o f todipeet ma «ai2?e©t e gg r e s s im end the 
witlKtrewsl o f FaklstBS fo r «es f ro® Keshmir. This liad Ife^en 
tfe© fmdmsmtBl issii® o f d i f f e r ence between l a d i a and the 
^Jnited ctstes aii<i r ea l l y ea^ise of the f e l l » F # o f .'sub,se-
qumt c oae i l i s t o i y e f f o r t s hy the Ooited UhtX^ms through 
tte« USCIF isjd is«<liatojy e f f o r t s isaa© by A.a.I , . 
t^f^saghton, s i r Oigea Bixoa cad i ir . Frank Grebes.^ I^espite 
tfee f a c t t t e t the Halted i t s t e s applleid i t s pr&BBWe oo 
laGte f o r sceeptiag actSag la sccowlaatse vltli these 
e f f o r t s , Ia<lla mP^ted eves to ©eeept timm m tfe© 
ttBt tfaefee str^aghteaetl tlie ia tervent isn Sa Kasfetnir 
ead aot eolacide wltfo tte© i>tm& tBkm by l a « l l e . 
'ihe ha l ted fctstes t r i ed to s o l w tfm problem e l so ly 
memB of l ^ i le tera l a e g s t l s t l o a s b# t¥em the two part ies 
la41s mA P8kisti3s» Bat t i ^ m aegotiaticais f a i l e d ee . 
the iriews of t m eouXd a « t he j ^ c m c U e a . Before Xa^tie 
the accessicaa of eafi p leb i ss i t© la Eashialr tier® aot ttie 
primer^r issoes,, rsther the « i i th4rewl of the p sk i s t aa i 
forces from JCesfeair, m l a ^ l m t e r r i t o r y , was the f i r s t ead 
iQt@m&t isffue the a . j i . rjad tfoe U .S . did aot teke 
ffeese at^ dee l t ia d m t U s ia tlis fo lJoving peges# 
- m 
ser ious ly . Froa tfe® ver^ the Baited itete© 
^liiela tmd been the soisrce of c©iif3jet 
toet%«ejft find tUe so f®r as tbe Kashmir dispute 
cmcenjed. Almost emr^ feso lat ioa^ m thB dispute 
Sa tti© teear i t^ Cotmeil esaie frora the 
by India m the gromd that i t did aot tske into aecoimt 
the Indiou positioa of ttee 
AftMSt h&vlag tliroagli tb© lad iaa vi6¥ paint of 
m^ the Bttitiid@ toward the K.esi:mix> pirobJem, i t shcniia 
mmtimed lieiti that the l a t te r * is a t t i tn ia in practice 
%rcs Is favour of Fskisteni position oa the issue* Apsr^t 
© f r i c i e l s la their speeches 
statements bad expressed t b e i r stasia of fegvtog f r iendly 
re l e t ioas ¥ i tb botb the eomtr lea as lug cmc^Utnto^ 
m^ peeceftil seesiireig to se t t l e tbe Sfi tbe • 
®M owtside i t , t^ey, fititiaiis, supp^^'tM PeEisteai oleSas 
m lesbmir . ^»eteirer migbt iieire beea the reascaa - e i ther 
the tbs^oiight tbet iBdis was or tfee did ^ t 
eppreeiete the positics» of India with regard to tb i s 
dispute, or the 0 .6 . pertissaship toverds Pekisteo or the 
lacS. of Imowledge m pert of the of the f ac ts eb^ut 
the problem of Ksshair • i t i s veiy d i f f i c u l t to prodtee 
1 , Exceptions were the two UI^ CZP r e s o l u t i v e of 13 ^ugost 
i948 ma 6 Jmaery 1949, vhicfe imre accepted by I i ^ i e . 
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m avMeiace in support of the fillegetioii thet the 
¥es de l i be ra te ly s M ia ieose ly tekiag pro-Paklstea 
which spp©ered to m t U l a d l m ^ was r e s e i t « S 
by tb© laa ia f i Owemsssiit, Xflsilm press aa<i the l a ^ i i ^ 
pub l i c . PospStele rea&ass were alfso f s s lysed 
c o r r t s p o a d ^ t of the E M a ( a aewspaper of Ms<i^es) as 
f o l l ows : 
g t m t daal ©f stispleica s t i l l seems to 
ex ia t sea© eotmtf i#s , sot®bly Sa 
0ii lt«4 S ta tes , es to th® d l r ec t i oa ia 
ii^ich I n d i a ' s fore ign ^o l iey i s mvl&g 
md the s u s p l e i ^ a r i ses l ad i o fer^s 
e m s t m t l y eiroide^ e l i g a l a g he r s e l f with 
th is o r that b loe Furfiait o f m 
la^^p&aci^nt fo re ign jpolie;^ 
resu l t i s s e i t uc^ im vhm there wswld be 
few f r l eads l e f t ^ feat that is peth 
iBdi© has shessa to t read, csssfideat l a 
the b e l i e f that t roth ©as i wlttef itely a 
trtuaph over pover p o l i t i e s o r ^ . I p l m B c y ' 
I »di «tts sa«pris€4 to see thmt U .s* « l o a g 
%'ith tha ERfeJsrity cf the iii«gil>«rs of I h t Coascl l m m 
sBOfe Isspressed by the sc c e l l ed aad homm" end 
mastejiay p r © s ^ t a t i m of Fefeistaa* s by the thea 
Pak is tea i Fore iga Minister Ehaa, Ja the £»eearlty 
CoimcU t h « i th « so cal30«i more l & j i t e i m4 " I c g s l i s t f e ' * 
i . Kunars, J - a 
• op. c l t . , p.- XOii, 
I, Fehroary 1948. 
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eomplelnt presented ty Indls on the Keshmlr situation,^ 
/.gainst the legal argument of the indSon delegation 
Peklsten*! contention'^ was that the problem of Keshmlr 
was more than a legsl cese. I t wes e csanlfestetion of 
the problems which the tivo iiominlcais hed to face because 
of the coiomunsl laaseaeres taking piece In the {subcontinent 
following partition, l-urtheraiore, he could convince the 
delegates that the problem co ild be viewed correctly only 
in the context of th© disturbances In the Indian subcontinent 
following the partition. The real question as presented 
by Pakistan was not of invasion but why the Invosion took 
place, the main problem mb^ of ensuring to the r'.usllms of 
Kashmir the right to choose their polit ical future. 
Perhaps ell this suggested to /«nerleen& as wel3 es others 
that India, the coiBplainmit, had not come before the Council 
with "clean hands", rather both cotKi tries had become en shared 
in tragic developments. Therefore, the prevailing i^merlcan 
i . Poplai md lalbot, |nc i^a and Amerioa. p.7id. For 
India's leglBl claims see Indian view point in the same 
chapter, one writer observed: "in contract to the able 
p-rescntatlon of Pakistani Foreign Minister, .the Indian 
delegation felled to portray its case effectively. Indeed, 
i t has been suggested that this was a significant factor, 
causing Indie's init ia l severe defeat at the United 
Nations." Michael Brecher, The fo^ 
(Mew york, 1953), p.63. 
iJ. For details see the letter of the J?lnister of Foreign 
Affairs of P^lstan, fcir Mohammed 2afrul3ah Khan, 
addressed to the s ecretary General of the U.N., 16 January 
1948, CS/M6) and corr. i ) v.G.Q.h.^ 3rd Yr. , fcupple. for 
l^ oveiBber 1948, Mnex 6, pp .69-87, and the ©tatetsent siade 
by him in the Lecurity Council on 16 and i? Jenuaiy 1948, 
L . c . o . i i . j 3rd Yr. , KOB. 1-16, EgSth-Smh Mtg., 16 and 17 
J&nuary, pp. i)4->il8. 
- -
r e s e t i m wes t h ^ there vas no ^ostificsfeicm l a solvSag 
th® Eeshmir dispute cmiy m tiie fees I s o f l e g a l points laede 
hy Indie valMlt^r ©f th« Mefesreja'& aceesf ion to 
iRiSl© §adi thfi €ai «gst loi i of ?®klsteii»s aggression* i s 
a Smt t b e t tfee i s ^be r s of tl® secur i ty Comci l MeJiMSiig 
thm itfere i n f l ameed by tii© p r i ac ip l© of s «3 f »deter : s i f i8 t im 
mhieh P e k i s t m also eeemed to tspijold. Moi^over, ttmf vere 
&o tliat ttey ao t pa^ s<l«qaote a t t e s t l ^ to 
£ l e g a l e«s® r egeMlag 4efs®to ^ggressioa sad la^teaS 
tfcirevf ^ © i r e^pport f o r a so lut ioa mesa© of u plefeiscitc 
m d e r iattrnftt ioaal Bmp lcm withfiwt t ^ t e g t rsa^ le as t o 
f a l l ieioid«dg« s f t r i b a l en4 Pakistai i i lav-asli® ©f 
Kssfcsair ss ©13eg®d by I n d i a . B^m tla^ not l^rmd 
©Sthe aggressor Sa tfe© case. Ia<ii«i?iJifeseatf9cat m tfeis 
gttitt ia« wm by tli€ lad is® mpm&mt^tlvm Int tfe 
t-eesrity OomeU sa id tbet « I t be puttSiig tlie cs r t 
befar© tli© feorse i f Eecorit^r Coiascil of»mitto4 to emai^ltfr 
tb^t F j j u t ( e ^ s t a t l m feo^tilities) c t tite mr^ feegSiialiig 
but prcje©ed©<$ instead to aec l v i ^ tli« qttestloa ©f a ple-biseit® 
^ i c h , i f i t i s Safsot a matter f o r diseus^ioa lad d © e i » i m 
fey tfeijs body, sfeoiild cose tJ>e -rery cad.**^ 
ttm /.aerieea delegate reacted et oaoe, Kis cotsmast^ 
1. ^ymgtr^ l&SaU&li*-.* J^eti? 1848. 
MM* 
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i s notew^tfe^^ "One cajmot bnve ces^&t im o f h o s t i l i t i e s 
\ 
md ^ lo leaee one toes s l s o m onderstunding.** TIJIS 
fc-ss Ja support OF IP^kistaai 'S'ICM. Ftirthermore csi 
J ^ o M ^ X94S, the fi-mrtemn aelegat® decleJ^di oae 
Mm%& to see s supeiPSor foree nmt Into eros to 
dr l?e oat the i ava iers of tti^t ^ l l i ies from 
the speech of t t » delegate made be fore the i -^earlty 
Goimcil m Feb ru f i ^ 1D4S s«etB mrth motini lieres^ 
"How 1® I t pes&lfel® to laduee tis# tritsosai^ to PBt lm f r m 
3g>mm md Kastoit without werfere imd wltljoist siriiriiie fees 
out? I&et i s tfe© oaly my I t CSB tialess the 
trib©£aea ere s c t i g f i e d tla&t thmre Is to be a f a i r p l e f e l ^ i t © 
esfeurea through laterim Go^emmcat tbot i s ia f a c t , asdl 
that has tli« appeareais® of bsing^ I t was 
eiriaent tiict ageSsst Indlfsa eleiie that tli« t r i b i d 
Mvn&tm Mes t l l e g s l , tto© de legate g s i d that the 
tribal Snvesi^ of KsdftidLP ms aot complete y m^u^ifitdi 
ttist nothing ©feotiM fee ^ m e t© ev i c t the trlbesiaea l^y 
force* MP, fl€sSag«r had r ig l i t ly psmapked that J ^  ^tfee United 
Strtes* v iev to fee t ba t whi le India*® l e g a l positSsn 
vas strmg beeeose of the te® of pak l s ten ' s t « p r i t o r j ' f o r 
the lavssioG of Eaehsiir, th® dispute hcil e csasmma^ o r 
I feMi mtg., Jsati-'iy 
2 . XfeMf 240th iatg.» Febr04;iy 4 , 1948, p . 369. 
3 . Kostoger, trnfrntsM JJfcBl^^^t 
op* e i t «9 p* 106* 
• ^ • 
re l i g ioa® aspect dented by l i jdia."- ' ' 
I t figai^*^^ iTidien expuctattous, as the 
Oattea j.>taia£ expected to ti^ke "fi morn act ive pert 
'HSSliljagtoQ Is iaaom to f ee l tfeet tlie iJaited i t a t e s coolct 
w r K eoTOi^at ssore c lose ly with B r i t a i n fei etmtrlliiitljag 
to tim pi-osfcrvitim of peece in iM ia * * *^ Uimn Ind ie 
liitfodiiced p roMea of L s s t e l r in the t^cur i ty Qomell^ 
h^ti t m United HRttims to sap^ort I t^ pos i t ion 
m K.astiisii'. Mora o r l e s s , th« s t t i t a^e ®f the Oait©€ 
i,. bel io^ed thrA B r i t i s h l^a ia wes 
p i sn im®^ toetwem t m a MtisliBJS m the thgt 
t ^ d i f fo i ' ent j i^t loaa. India a e w r 
sgfeeii te th€i:r tvo-Qetioi theory, tf-iis hrs b em sn 
import'^ t point ©f d i f f e r eaee M the settlemsfc of tts® 
Eeafcrdr dispwie^ laf i ie agi?ee<l to pa r t i t i on becst re tligpfi ; 
W02 iio other of Btt&Minc her iasleprndence. It^ Ib dM 
not eccept the ttiinlKiaf; that heiixg a ®e3ority 
Ltete Ksshsir shotOd g© to PaKIs tsfi« retwrnlnK to 
l&dih I'rom the United fctistes^ lefirtJ mde i t « 
press QmS^mnct. &t on Sov^sfeer 13, 1949 that 
Ij^aifc wBs divided oa tferi-itorel rad not oa t i ^ l i p l ous 
ba s i s md tha?^ conf lJet in KeBtrntr ml between I'luclps 
rjaa H««iiiffis, cut between peop)« vho ymt&& fresdoiB bussed 
aa Ke^hmiri a c t i o a a i s s , %?ith 632 tb© popu1.»tlon |jwl31ng 
toeeUier . ca^ be l i eve rs in the t%?!0 fiRtian eory thet 
na t i oao l i t y went toy rel ig ion '** fepeecfaes of Ss-m^hfiVlnX 
I^ehrti ^ /.roerice^ SatiottuI book !5e%r m i h T ^ i S m 
p* 217, &ir Bc®egsl B « » in s statess«ttt In the s^cur i t j ' 
C o w c i l OS March t r i ed to mstove some o f th® 
isiECOiJceptioaE mtt prejudices; ^ f t sppesred to hcve 
GFE'thGr^a roana Kashsir dispntip m^ th« t "TIte . 
Kesbsir- f^aeatiofi ie ac t & Kfiadu-Misliia <:U€ation as so 
o f ten represeatea or misrepresented'*. , 
533rd Mtg. , 1 Marefo p . 3 , 
EmiLXsytiUteSt 1948. 
-K.!Uigdoai ma the United s t a t e s , being teken dyrinfe the 
esffSy cm th>: qu*. t i i o a , was more accepteb2® to 
p&klstan than to l ad i© . l a iR^ ie , tbt piiblio opiaion 
feecr^t b i t t e r tjbcmt the Rasliiair i ssae md tiis -ec i i r l t^ 
wes regci-ded by the I j s d i ^ new^peperi fo r .w time 
almost wliolj.y pro-Palsistea, e^e laa iag the I J . ^ . m < } t e 
imrato^, ut.ich htd a b s t ^ M fro® w t i a g . ^ O . t * ' 
relaetfiiie® to consi<3or tlae Icgc l fiSj^t oi' the disptl e sasd© 
XfidiciiE e3?ltlit0l of Its <5ttlt«de. w r e ©hoc^d e M 
excited W t-be oh^ lom Btm& tgken iJnitisd t t a t e s 
ea the dispato of Easte i r fe th« b^cor l ty Council • 
Gopsln Asfymgsr, tfce Chief mouthgieee of IndJ® on 
Egfilislr In ttm Corne l l , t r i&d to ©f-fec th® Indicia© 
im^JerstsiacI the pos i t ion oa 26 F«bnii I M S d^elari f ig M 
"Do sot fee l su i f^ i s^d i f I t€ l l yon tbDt 
the repr^sejststive of the so 
£(-r aa to xhht thfe coiaditioa imder 
vtoiefe the p j e b i s a l t e I s h ^ d shoiala be sacfc 
cs fe'Oiild s s t i s f y not sxir&ly Ssr.argaits, not 
aes^ly Pa^tetcn, bot a l so the t r I M s s e n from 
t te North '..est i i m t i ^ r . other words fela 
arg«52€at wes tistt t\m people ijho were r s ld ing 
K&s^iair sljould be g^l^eo l a d i a that 
the aader vhieh p l e b i s c i t e w s 
feeing to be heiU f t e r normr l cooditions hed 
hQ sucf: as i f e t r i h & m m 
voulo recognige cs sct is fceto i^* ' * 
IMMa FcUrurJEy li.^ 194S. 
So.3632, March 10, 1948, pp. 1 - 2 , 
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Behry e lso spo&e as s^ch et Jassiti thst " Instecd of 
di&ciisslisg taul sieelding refereaces in a. stralf.ht fort^crd 
taenaer, the nr-tloas of the Mjr ld s i t t i ng tn thst h o ^ fot 
l o s t Sn pover i^olitle's'**'^ ichns isa^e mother ecm-smt-
thfc Assentoly (LCfgls let iv©) nir-ti^ 
" I must coafess tli®t I bea i surpriss^l d l s tpesse i 
ut feet tbfst tfee m^efmm ve fees isot e w n been 
prDpetljf eoQfsidepasi tlms ciad ©etters teve 
given p rcce^mce* . -
m g m t great ly that the o f Ffckistnn 
should heve issr^ fitst^asBtis eli©ri;€>s ic the Security 
Cosaeil Against l a d i a hav© ao fo^mtiBtioo In ffsct . . . 
^^ t^xT iSKklug ^ ra fe rcace m ifclg iB^m to the ^eourity 
Coaacll af tli® tiRite<i Satlone set of fftltti . . . To 
feetrpf tfctse people «otiM be to h^tts^ t f^ tn&ic laeas f o r 
Omittd i L t l o a s stands or sfeo«I<l stsnd. r-t 
t, e Esoissest o f jscoesston we wiJiit out o f otti? wbi? to E 
imiletcrisl aeelsratlioii thut m mtiM ©^id© fcy tfes ^111 of 
people o f Kastoir UE ilfeclsrcsi Is m plels igelt^ 
rafereodtsffl.'* 
Infllatts f u l t thot th-- lr posit ion on the iB^m ae t 
tmderstood cor rec t ly . their e f f o r t s st: a p o e i t l w 
g . i ^ f a , PpUg&t o p - o H . , pp . ^CWSl . 
coatrilsution to j^olutim. of tlie Kesfeiir dispute has 
3!lsaii<ie?gtc»o<i. ' Ia<3|a»s posit ion vas that elthotigh, 
the eceesstcm of th® MstsareJ® of Jnsjm sa«l Kashfair to 
l a d i a on M QqZqMs- 1947 was per fec t ly a legf i l cet , i t was 
oa Jmiir.fjF 1948 i M t tte Indian ^overa^mt proposed en 
Mtems't icf i f i i iy sap^r^is©^ plebisciti^ to fee lield Sfi 
p r o v e d eertfeto p r i o r ccaiiiltiaas met, t . g . , 
fctihdrswal of iaired^rii f m t fliBs the f ir fet f t ep 
as sag.este^ is lauisjfi d r e f t proposal ws^ thet tiE f i ght i ag b# 
^ d e d . 
ffoe r^eoltttioB^ o f 21 Apr i l 1848 was not by 
India as ra aetioa s® th® pert o f t l® counci l . 
the resolut ion wes s p o a s o ^ tlis i ^ l t e ^ i -tstes elso, 
ms? she hp4 plpysd an iaport jmt j^te in i t s r4optioii, ©sny 
Xn^Sisas of tlie "srieif tlipt, tfse Qfj ite^ t-tstes ba^ sceeptsd 
thm F a i ^ tm ^ersicsa o f the ras i ia i r m^ sapportei 
'vBklstm^s to h^v© ci iJi tbe a f f a i r s o f Kashrair. 
I . L/726^ F a l l text Sn jML^aOsikt 3rd I r . , f o r 4pr i l 
1948, pp. Bml'A* 
2* Popls l pm j^ftdia md fiaeriea, p . 74# After tt® 
rejceticm of th is resftlatioQ by I s d i s PskSsten, ttie 
U .L . reacted »tonee» t arr^ci Austioi. declar€>a os Mssyj 
"fee tisv© aot lcod thet ther© i s appEraatly ao aease of 
oblig&tiOB Oil tfet p a H of ttse per t iea to the o s » « 
fhe par t i es coat iiere rjad esgcge very ejipcaslir^ 
©echiaei^ o f tise Dnlted ic>tiems rnd tte time df t i e 
di&tingt}i0h6<i men fro® el2 o^er th® ttien Mtmn i t 
comes to the per fomsnce or sxBeatia© of tlj© ter®s o f a 
r«&33«ti<sa^ they eey tfeey i^ill not concMer i t . 
''There i s somethiiig exeedingly wrong sfeout t f inf* . C/nit©<i 
Hj-t loas, t e cu r i l y GouncU, ams l^Jwat iKXS^ f Y r - , Bo. 74 
3(Ktla a t g , , A94B. 
- 2,70 « 
Indie dM aot like the plmlng of Pe^ lstsa on m etprf 
foot tag ^'itli |.ac£a as t l ) i « reso lnt ioa f«ithorS.s6«l tfie 
Ofilt#a fictions Coai®j0siim set op in Jaaaafy to o f f e v - . i t s 
good o f f i e e ® ^itli to hoth "iBi© res te ret ioa of p^mm 
md order a M to ttie hol^iag of e pl©feisclt# bjf the two 
govemmmlB . . . " Tills wr-s eetuelljr tfoe so la sihowli^iriBg of 
tfceir sgaJnst ttm war acts of psskistBa fcy 
tlt€ £,ecyjpity C o w o i l . 
maievji'essiita^aat ms striec^feieaeal wlsa Pakistaa 
uceepted th& presence oC i t s forces slmce Majr to 
J-^ishaiir in July 1948 be fo re the OSCiP ma aotbteg wm dojse 
b^ tli6 fc^etirity u^tiacil nbimt t t l c s i l i t e r j i r e g ^ s e . 
l od i fB s were o f the opMSm. thet th© Of^lted States , n% no 
tlme^ bed h s m ^ t aesy pub l ic pr «gs « r® oa P a k U t m to witfedre^* 
I t s troops fro® Eosfistr s o i l aawBCj i t loaa l^r m^ mvm a id 
mt c r i t i c i s e tlie uontinsilisg pmome^ of P a k i s t m i troops 
m imim territo*!?'.^ 
?ti© Uaitesi &tfit®ii lied c e ^ r t r i t d to ciSk Pe-(5i«tafi t© 
Ebide by tte© OSGIP reaoluttcais of /»uguet IZ^ 1948 s m Jaaiiary 6 , 
instead tl)©y urgesl lodi© to proceed witli p l eb i s c i t e 
i . On l & c i m t e r r i t o ry bsceu&e Keshslr lied acceded to 
on 26 October 1947• l i i l s fidtaisfcioa ves m obvious proof 
ot Ift^iig'e cfeeri;© ttiefc P»fei©ieii»s regBl ir troops vere 
f i ght ing in Eaeliair* In f e e t , i f there ever vm sny 
tkm^ to invest igate md esteb l i sh reRietea involvei^iit in 
th© Invasion i t M d a f t e r thr^t sds i se ion . tee 
But ih® CJoamissioia cliosc to procee«S i^ith i t s eone l l f to iy 
fvaicticai despite i-Ib c«32Jitteci aggressive ®ct. 
errcngemeats without estab l i sh ing iji the r«f?ioru 
iRgtead i t slfice h^m held in tfee United i t etc® thst . 
r.fter eeaeptlug Iiidi© l o s t feer clrlms 
ageliist the qtiCistiDS o f Pekistca*© eggresi loa car f o r tfoe 
^ f the- M e j h p r s J s accession md ihr-t these issues 
te€ca!3e outdated lii as mch &s the p l e b i s c i t e i t s e l f was 
to ^ e t e r j i s e the f a t a re csiapositios of tlie Ltr^te. f h iB 
Bmidmtie hsd been res^itea bjr lau^s thet the HeQurltf ^ 
Couaeil ma Ute U . t . aXw^s ignoritig t^i© cruet l^ 
ma t e r r o r , arsos muriler fey tfce t r i b a l nm o t f e r 
lavj^tlerE io K.®shjsir ^ i t h prtkistm»s egseat m a psrt ioipetion^ 
OKl^ t i e p r i o r ru3fila«aat or tli© cmdi t i i i a tfeot Pslt istm 
shsuls. wSiliilrew frsis KBshmiT oould br ing the poss i b i l i t i©® 
t- p l e b i s c i t e te Kashmir. 
lasliejis seera^ to be l i eve ttiet toepit© tec r^siai^s 
o f tbe ffleiiator, n a s t rn l im Jtirist s i r 0%-eii Ulmm 
tisfit eet ioas - the croseliSE by host i l© elesgntg o f th^ 
J a M a md Ksshiair f r o a t i e r m October 20, 1947, tbe 
laoveseftt o f pegwlcr F»teistan fo rces Snto t b s t st©te ia 
Mey o f X94S w r © ections «contrsry« to BUd **inccaaslst«at» 
with ia tcn ipt ioae l lew, perhpps ttst Ua i tea States hrA 
I , secur i ty Coimeil , Sth y r . , 
(HewXork, 1951), 29, p®rs For F u l l text 
see PP- 24.S2. 
- <2*7.2 . 
Ueteii I m p i n g ifes siippoi't to the Pai i ist «ni eherge tha t 
i 
hfefl feeea ia Keefcisir f o r the 
/purpos© of s e c w l a g ©cc©s.«-ic«a by " f r aad md 
Uaitea b ta tes , India ^mted , should 
^pp&rtesi iBdistt c&arg© of pckist®tii 
KehitJ re jeeted the proposal or ©rfe ltrrt ion and m 
eerly sett^emmt of<EDSti®ir d ispose , ©a^e toy the 
CosKiissioii, thoagh fi?«sM<3it fr^miai o f thm tliilted Statcsfi 
;iti ft l e t t e r ^ to h ia ©a /.ugust 30^ 1949 orge4 to accept I t * ^ 
I 'he 'Jet ier mrmd a l so thn% Urn dispute constitute^ 6 
'^gir-ve thre-ftt to pssee i s oS' t-onthesst Ael®". Kefem 
rafttsed to ©ecept tht pJapossl sn i^ h ie c t i l tude qiilte 
frosj^tfaet of Paklstsa^ aa^ Ssaiceted "anaigtsiEable 
sigas of i r r l t p t i o a " over th is " i a t e rvca t toa " so 
e f f o r t , li© hem rnBd® to aa^ierstma or solve 
the fmdsmmts l i s s m s irixrolmd" in Kmshmir 
J s r e m A se&ms epproprlatei 
^^ fiugu&t 31, 1949. Fu3i text in 
weptimber i g , p . 399. Clesaifit i l tt lee a lso 
®fide s t o i l a r appeal to isotb the eountrl^u. 
Tb« sa;se l e t t e r i ^ s seat to Peklsief i P»H» Liaqet A l l %hm 
Ptklstisa eccepted I t m September 
3 . For deta i l© s i s i r G»pta , 
f e f ss lij^ift regerded the as 
aot ^ Q l l y iaipertisl Ss tte Keste i r 
d ispute , ©r at my rot€ not f i i U y 
o f s t ^ ^ o S i s t , i t 
w s too ae ive to hope tbat iBcils %?otslfl 
uesept the sfbit^rati-m over a p o l i t i c a l 
dispute to Mlaicto a l l stetc-s ara gsaeralljF 
atarse s Wmt-* natimel mvm 
aetinfe auspices. Pof i^syJci 
I s ^ i s s ptiblie opIaicHS tee^e t&Um 
l igl itJy m ®&mtm ^ml&lQn. hy m^ 
i taa iSag f i r s oo her s t t M o© tlie 
w j ^ e t e d tlife Me^attglitoa America mm psittlag 
pm&mw&u to get tbsws® proposals sce®pt<id h j im^ie. I t s 
vBB lm,t to tfce CoMission* s w r t in the 
s f f e r t s ©f I.* l a f i i t was ags fest 
e l l siieli pjpessiir#s# On ?t!i Fjgbi'iii^ i^g© tfo© sofi^fpoiiaeiit 
o f -tlie l i i idu from YorUi 
*»It i s sstoaistilnE t© fi®« p r « s£s r f i s 
ialk« XfiSla eeceprt l i© p l m . But tfeis 
prsiisiir© sp^^eeM t© feav® a a l f 
ttstaral r t sex ioa o f salctog ind i e 
press S.& aoutrifeutJag l i s in 
ttoils prcssnj^ 
M&m the % i t © ( i b ts tes o t t e r M«st©ffi po^^r© * 
I* KBiJfijr©, 
e l t . 104. 
2 . f eE t Stii t r . Stipple, f o r Jmiiaiir-ftey 
pp» 14-6. liaiicsr llseae p f^poss la , tfct ©ggfessoi* got 
fe f © l r sad ®qiiit®ble t r e a t ® a t , Tlie l o g c l l y 
f^ ra^ed Fore#® r^ ad l^'llltt® o f the o f K a s W r m m 
to be dissolved tiB lavgdSag tr lb^gseu 
P&hl®tm R8ti<« i » ls Wfoo te^ thm amtamorplsoe^d Sato 
tb© Fo rces " . 
3 . The %hm president of tfa« t-ecaritj? Guimett* 
0 February IgrSO. 
- « 
taking a pro-Pefeistim stsmi*? ffee siost somci cxp lcost ioa , 
wbicii setaed from the ludien point of v iew, was thfct the 
viefitem were interested In obtsto iag railitnrir Issses 
in Ussbjsir, as the territory? wes of grast s t r s t e e l s s i g n l -
ricgljc©, vhleh they hsd no hope o f ge t t l ag i f RsshsBlr 
s^mfjiiied 8 pert ©f Inetie^ beettuse Is^ la was © uoa-eligriOM 
eoimtrf* Om writer* rcsifirK thr^t /.laerioaa pol icy Sa 
kos lMir diepttie h ^ bees ^ M e l y Interpreted Hi IscJi® to 
fee R reaction to i n a i s ' s reftispl t© e l i g a its€3.f with tJje 
' jRlted fctetee 3a the cold I s not©i^rt}^y Itere. Stxis 
jaiEfet b© mnde f r o a smm c<mcr«t« f a c t s . In iS^t 
t te 0*1 . suggested f i r s t the neae of General Welter Beae l l 
feiaitli^ m^ tiseft FX«f>t Ad^irel Chester y . ss 
U.K. p l eb i ge i t c Mff itoistrators la l e shml r . Kr . Hosittger's 
view be rigfet tlist t b i s th^jt " m B r l e m iat^rost 
Sa KasiiEtir hm 1 s t r a t eg i c sspect.®^ 
Ihe OiiitGd rmltm^ %h© s t r a t eg i c importmcse 
o f pe&istm aBtl Kasteair m m ®fter tb© B e r l i a blocfcad®. 
A. Joseph K-orbel tki»t o l tber the o r th«i tJ.E. 
hod my sacli ssotivos. In (Pr inceton, 1954) 
P'-mj^ see a l s o , Kuaara, 
p . X03J i ioslager, „t|3e 
"fti© interest of the |>r<istim©b3y, orose In purt f r oo 
K8Sb®lr»s e t re teg lc locat ion c lose to the t i t o o c ^ e r l n g 
on ^fgbfiBistea, s inKlcag , ? i be t , in j l l a rad P sk i s t ea " . 
Pop le i ena aa lbo t , ^tidla anti /.racrlce> o p . c l t . , p*7B» In 
f®ct ttel® trend i& Intllfin tblakini; b«<^s!e stronger 
sliKj© tfe^ 1954 /.stericrja ermB ai^l with PaKistsn. 
3 . Previously Amb^SEsdor Jii MOSCOV. 
4 . Be VS8 the wart iae Cosssm^cr-ln-Cbief o f p a c i f i c 
F l ee t ®Qd P s c i f i c Oeem cress . 
6 . :nosint€r, o p . c l t . ^ p . i l l . 
.t'onaotion ©f HAIO, tfee v ictory o f Goraciiinists in 
Chini; in 1949, the F^vr^ea a f i s i s WBO tfe© ea^ of 
sonopoly of the atossic bomb. Ihese ma$or 
bfjd l a t m s i f i e d the Cold War ead strengthened the s t r a t e g i c 
importanee of Eeshmir JUi th^ feyes.^ M d the h i^ 
gturted t© tts€ i t s pressure l a d i s Ifflpotl^ntJjf. Bwt 
Im t i r \;illim Bsrtcm supported the pakistsRi pos i t ion 
la en e r t i c l e to the ^ ^ n a r f 19S0 i s s w o f tte AsMirieea 
i u e r t e r l y , i q i />ffeir|g^ emj^ssigJug th© urgent 
iic-ed of PekictisR ia the s t retsgy egeiast aonnuniEia a f t e r 
the r©v©l?itioa. Be ssde the points i a tl-ie 
support; (J> fress the view point o f f ^pa i s t ion m^ 
g^gr^phy Kssfoalr ^es © p®rt o f PsKSstani ( l i > ^ M u l i s h 
Mebm* B ( l i t ) i sd i© 'boqM aa ©ray o f 
oceupetioa to hold Kssbs i r t ( i v ) Indi© ^es beeomiag 
©eoGosically week ea^ p o l i t i c a l X f mstafele ® ®oress out 
of Oitcls B lustSfig peese with Fakisteis ms tM only 
0scii|»«| Pnkistm b®^ m tbe wfiole s somd rMmcieil 
posit ion poXi t iea l ly she wos « i a moothet waters then 
her greet neig^il^osir;;' ( v i | p&ki&tm^ along v i t h the 
Is lamic KiddJa wss becoming mtUM^Bt at a tiise 
when 0 i l sowited f a r meh s t r s t e g i e e l l y , pnd Isfem coii34 
iiiell be tfcoMgfet o f #s e potenti f i l b a r r i e r ag-tslast 
CoanuBisffi. tlife t0$k m&s to Pandit f e t w ^ 
his Govemjsmt to be l e s a «ncotaprot»ising" <n<S © new 
BpptOMGh emlii hei to g ive ©o«t o f Kesbmir t© Pakisten , 
leavinfe 8 port o f ^eaffiai, iioatit o f Chenab, f o r is^dJe* 
f fc is w Q l d restore the o l d botaidsrfes the B r i t i a b 
ccaiMtt€<l the fftrBgio blimuiir" , "tfc© rocord o f Hindy ru l e " 
couM not feBtitle theci to my tfeiag isor©. MilliEffl 
Bfertc^, "Pak is tan ' s elciins to Ksshiair", f o r e i g f i A f f a i r s . 
Jsaiirry i960» I n d i m Pross wbb surpr i sed . 1st ® 
leading ert ic l© th « l^iMimtia^ tlme^ n-Jhet iBdien 
opiaiofl oeaijot so a a s i l y aadcrstsiid i s i^y 0 Jo^rtifil o f 
tL© fila^iiiig o f f o r e i m /tff&irs s1ioiil<2 hgve a l l o i ^S 
suoti" prop<5agi3ad6 s t a f f to d i s f i g u r e i t s pages . " . 
aJtedBaSaa-Jimf February' 6 , I960. 
India m& succeesfwl la res i s t ing tb i s pressure. 
gerliej? observetios wss quoted by the yiisfis , 
Qf Indm^ that "triis method of feriagia^ presiitire to ben? 
f o r otjEier i s soaetblag w^ieb the Oovamseut o f 
I s d i e m% I m i m d to ma^rst^ia^ jfet« m d s^ae^i "iior 
should they ev « r le&m l t « . The laost strong reaction was 
f e l t Sn i t m l i * Bskshi Gtaoil^ Kotasmmfed ss ld that 
•'so long e single fee^stri i s e l l vc tMe Mc^attghtoa f o m a l e 
iril3 Bot b « ^ r s s 4 f s s l B©g*s warning may a lso 
be w i l l l o se fri&xdMttp of Kashmir i f she 
m m to bou before the pressar© of Aag lo^mer iem bios 
md semptf Sa say sfeepe o r for®, th^ form*al6 
e^Qated tb® sggressor suci th® 
Fy^js^f perhaps was ccsifMeBi of tb© Seoorlty 
Coimetl wltb regera to tfsis eei l let ioa. T.lig. 
Bagfig, Patrlkja fefti ^i^rller ws'lttm in ^ a r t i c l e that ^ 
nee<i ao t f e s r tbe aeebiaaticais a© Im? 
ag sh© i s f i r © as a secaler 6t©t€» imd m I m g iss ttie 
S t e S L S O s ^ * B F e b r m r y 1950. 
4 . f s - t y ^ , ^muer^ ^^fJ^^S' 
Meim^ «Hol© of togio-AKerioen sad 13.K. i s Kesbsir 
iDrcJae**. 
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seeurXty QomolX is guMed In its ccmsideretion of th© 
KeshmiP issue by tlie Aaglo-Aaeiriean i a p e r l s l l s t i c view, 
i t , l i k e the Kashjsit Q&mls s imf i s sure to laset f e l l w e . * ' 
B.H. Rm spoke ©gsin&t tlie propegeada pub l ic i ty in t be 
Western Comtr i e s Sn Tsvour of His &pmoh 
deis^nstratet Ijwiie* s mgalsJss " I t i® iac<Mfpir«beiislfelc to 
why pm&mte should 8lw@§'S fee b t ^ u ^ t t o bear m Indie 
to geqalesee M the wJfoag, m d wby, f o r 0 attmge, Bom 
pregsu^e not b « brcjaglit to bear cm the ottmr s ide to 
ecqalesee l a the r i gh t on the Bme groianJs."^ 
blT Bixoa^ th « same. He f ^ l l l a to th« SEIE© 
©rrer o f coispro3l©ittg isfith though lie reeogniKCd 
t h » i b©th the eroEsteg of the f r o n t i e r of tb® fctete ©f KashiaiJp 
on 20 0etober 1947 tlse aioyemeat o f the regular Paklatsn 
£otmB Into the terjpitoi'i ' , were ^mttp.ty to aad IfK^oasisteBt 
with Satemat ioaa l Khet m s was ¥ltto the 
s o l o t i ^ i lie o f f e r e d ncisely, o f # pert l f i l p lab i8Cit « m ^ e r 
p e r t i t i m of tfm 6tate* ms^ perheps, tlie cliisaK of 
the O.S, aaistates l a th® M i a n irieM, iti® f isUur® of 
mediatlxm oataa @t a tl%@ tnhen f o r the f i r s t tle>^ Indiitn 
ottitud© m s d i s t i nc t from that o f i t e West on the !»s|or 
v o M problea i . e . the Koreaa viar, ^ i c h brought the s t ragg le 
1 . 453M Mtg. , i9S0. 
vrti",^ ^ -Gistija'giiislrtfe--'.^ - Australl^vv 5 « r l s t -
3 . Lyi79i , if> t-eptember 1950. 
• -
betv/eea Qomnmism md rinti-Cfvmisufiissa Bt i t s p^&M in 
this to viev the Ksstsalr pj-j-blem in tfe€ " 
l i g h t d' th^ iifw situeticm are&ted by this Sola str^tegj?. 
Moscow cofflseatotf ori the proposals itict 
i. stafel i8lie<5 tlieir om. ia Kaehaslr, 
the /iaglo-i^sifs'lcf® imper ia l i s ts w u l u postponed the 
p l e b l s c l t a l a e e f l n l t e l y imii&r ihe pr<jt€xi of lf>€k o f t .grmmnt 
bGiweea In ic mc Pskistea." '^ In the Or.itea Hr.tlons ??lso 
this cola wer stragtl^'f^ goiag on. co the m^t^fistion 
t 
of hewing e i^daalaistretlosi in Kssfcialr regcrde^ 
by tti€ L&viet Oaiou tad otf i «r Costs«aists as ® g rmd 
sistister r^ve uj tfiiie over tht ^ t a l c wliich 
s t rBt^g ica l ly f o r west* g fi^fcit rfCK^nst theU.^ .w . t i . m^ 
QhiUB* 
Ihts vss «ii important chtfige i^hich broyght th© 
Kashmir dispute to b new p a s i i i o n in Satematloniil p o l i c i e s 
BS observes by i . l s l r "KeapSng the CJ.fi. 
owt of Kssl-sair %;oij1c now feeeo®e one of the tests that oae 
H o c o f neticacis v<t>«2'- tpply to Inciia* s pol icy of fion-
alieaasent - c p.>liey wbish of great significfence rad 
A. he ported ia the ^ f Imi ia . August iSSQ. 
ij. i^ieir Gepi®, .g.^MdalX.JLJ.la^rA 
.j>C'lptioa.fy o p . e i t . , p. 
• 1 7 9 -
i spe ru i i ve nec^seity f©r India tin th- cmtext o f the 
deepenIttf; el6»vr»gefi bettreee the power t3loc 
Bat so icJr wss concerned i t ssw this aew 
fc-it»eiiofi froa^ ft a i f f e r e a i f j i g l e . was iat^rested ia 
l i f l d t f e i th# scope of ioterveat ian to itfshaiir h efitJse 
i t i a w l ^ ® ^ £ vlgoz^us nutiaii&l pride conscious-
Gees md not la deferejESee to the wishes of sny hlocm 
Moreover, India c r l t i e i s€d these propos.-Is th^is® were 
isecmsififtmt witb the laclliiii stend on the Eashmir 
K'ttli the fp.i lara o f lofidon la evolvSnr f.a 
EGR®EIS€AIT B E T W E M IFEE dispntmut P F I J ^ T I E S , T-H- ^ M A R I E S S FIS4 
B r i t i s h press st®rtetii e itacking Ind ia , SM.J1S-EJK6ZL.2MES 
c r i t i c i s ed Su these woria: 
"Mr, Ke^ru liBS been g iv ing us ell rJvice 
B set a s s e n t Korem csoKfliot. evidently 
fee f inds i t eas ie r to solve the problems of 
tbe worM %hm tli« In h is beckyei^ 
i . I h i s CoTifuon.wealth aeetiiig WBS an attespt Srt err^y X95i 
to nave the Keshoir issue discvssed et another in temet iong l 
foruta, a f t e r the appereot desdlock fo l lowing the Dixon 
report the United f3&ti<»is. Though the ves not 
B ajeaber of the CostsoBfeeeith, i t ynn aoteworthy that on 
S Jsnwsry i 96 i , the press o f f i c e r of the O . t . fctete 
Depsrtamt l i ^ d the Coa«Bonw6slth met ting, cod said thr.t 
obviotisly, i t hcd o f f e r e d an opportunity fo r disoussiog 
the Ec«hffiir problais in the solution of vhieh tho tlnitea 
estates 83so hnd been deeply intares ted . 
7th Jomii ry 
i ^ O M i L J L t e M , 3.7 jERuaxy i S 5 i . 
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inSift-United li i f i 'erences fsros® over both the 
dri^rt yfesolutSsai^ o f 21 bo^ the 
revised resolPtlon^ adopted bj t!ie Coimeil on 
30 March iilttisygh f u n . hm^ tfoo Heaci of tis© lad 1ms 
3 
had tsEuredl the i-^mrltf Coai js i l , Qn ?4sreh 
thet OoaBtitaeat Asssfflfely, tishish voi^IiS SThme .^fee 
Coastituiiois, ¥oalu ao t pre jaa ico liss issues before th© 
Council o r cosce i a i t g way. th© o f 
the Oaitfed estates, omest f,, Oross objt-cied before thm 
wpcwrity Souacil cm KJ resfe 
b«lie"5rc that I t I s iiaport&at thf-t t^»6 
.-aecurity S©uaeU hola f i f s i . . . tfcs 
olslier^tloas &i trie o f l a d i a 
In respect t© th i s Ceiastitiiest /-.sfiembly. 
Th€ ssEtter ©f the f i s e l c ispos it is ia o f the 
fctfete of Kmh&ir i t j^n l a t^ ras t l ons l 
question, & mjstter wi'.icii t M s SotJUcU has 
1. 
Tiry 
S iMd 14 Mereh 19S0) p rev l cu l i y eccepted fey 
botli Inu l s md rokts t in rn-'i o d o r s e d t l r Omn |}ixon*s 
proposfcls fo r d e s i l I t e r i - f s t i o n . 
..B., «>th Y r . | foJf" Jmunry -
Hftrcfc 1951, pp.25.7. I t was with t « o s l gn l f i eHnt ah&nges 
i i ) dropping e l l ra feruaccs to the U-Il. force to concede/g 
n poiat to In^Ufj, enci i 2 ) nlso those to the poss ib le 
d iv is ion of the « t a t€ to sa t i i fy PsKlstrn. But the 
provisicffifor a r b l i r a t i on r-nd i-he peragrepti relatinp, to 
the Cmstitucfit.AssesTibly -were reta ined. The cruji of 
the debet© i-hii issue of e rb i t ro t io i i . vhi l® Xiidlia 
re jected i t , r^ikistsu acce0t«di i t . I n d i a ' s et&ad hgd 
been supported by the .R. 6£f»Snst the 
J . 
4 , ^ 
eth Y r . , Mtg.» 1 March 19S1, p.3*10. 
A t ^ ^ i vo l . JUVIV ( 615 ) , Apr i l 16, 19&1, p . 631. 
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« i t h t o I t s purview f o r over sresrs. 
I t o l ^ s r l y f o i l s tfithlE the f i e l d of 
e x t cma l © f f ® l r s , Jilr BmegaX imu 
t©la tb@ OoaacU th^t the . .xtemal 
f a i r s o f the Q&v&mmnt of Kashmir ore 
feithia th<5 ecjntio3 of tht; Indiea Govemafitnt. 
The li«<5urit.y d o m e i l , there fo re , siiould be 
©nt i t lea to &ssum th^t tha of 
inc ia w i l l prevent tiic Gover^jsuent o f 
fro® ti!klsf. mciicm wuicn m n M In te r f e re 
wltti the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f th i s Gouiiel l . " 
Indln reftt2€a to aectpt f i r s t tit® d r e f t rese l t i t i a i 
md iBtvf tlH' revisea resolut ion because tix! orgwramts 
rirtlviinec4 ia sap* o r t o f i t by the O.K. m ^ y ^ © J e g a t i o i i s 
"pos i t ffi m t i r e l y ney sn^ f m t s s t i c tneory thpt Ewshislr i s 
tj kina of G-o-mm* B governigaty i s t^adetermincd"^ 
the £&Qt tlist i t hfti iseeedaa to I ^d i s ia Oetolier J.947# 
Kehai ,-aXso s«ri<ii 
4 M aot nsk t M Ouite^l i e t l c ^ s to 
tlm '^r.mit^ of ^©slisir* s aecf^ssiofi 
o r to aeterjBlJtje nMeie, sovereignty ••• 
fhe t 'aited Uetlcms tock ^^dvsntsge o f ©ar 
Sn i t ie t lve ia osir re ferrSug the matter t® 
tliea fiiti tLas th© «cope of ttieir 
H© refusc-d to amssi^Jer crbitra®ent ss the iigfet meacs 
o f s o l a t i m of f> cosBplfej; problem lifee dcsfai l i tsr iastioa 
eaa ©Is© h%omm i t ignored the bes i e f e e t s of egcreesioja 
by Bs« thftt tlie e'.iise of 
DrtoitrstioRf alrocfly arr ived s t «er© sought to 
i . Sehru, Iftdi^,*^; o p . s i t . , p.465. 
l W * f PP- 4S7-468. 
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clstoffeed* lif gav€ the reasoasi " F i r s t , i t seeks to 
g ive I'aiilstaQ ^ voice i a ststi^rs In wMSh pek is t rn , rn invader 
of the £»tf.te, hfts hr-m riglitlj? d^jiied jsny voice antdeir the 
o2d<?r resoltitimifi, end, aeconsSly, i t seaks ta t r ans fe r to 
,:^rfeilrstoi s tfee r ight to make iritr.l 4©eisioii2, whieh m a e r 
til® old^ sJ? re^l i i i l f lass raquira:! I n d i a ' s agrenisent." l i ierefoi 'e , 
though Indie wotil<i not ecoepi ttiSs r e so l s t l o a , she Koel-Ji h^m 
no ofejsetloa t© th€ I I r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ¥ l s i t l i i g the 
swbeontlnent "t© g^s iat fe^ augf.estioa, r/iviae md metlletion" 
la deteriaialiig how 4©i3iiit®ri2;etion ©ouia be carr ied 
/ilong vitJi tii® o f f i e i e X emdemet ioa o f th i s resoloticm^ -
s la^st f l l aec i iossor the- In<iisii preB& e r i t i e i s e a &ittar3|? tha 
i-eaurity Coimeil*5 jsdoptioa of tbe mg lo -U . - . . r e so ln t i c a . 
o 
Oae of tli^ oewspsp^rs eoa-s^t^fi;®' 
"^tie ^Bglo-U.s., r e s® l « t l oa om Sash.-sir ti«s 
detrpiy imvt l aa ia * s f e e l i n g s . Just ice 
tips beea s s c r i f i s e d to md 
sBadi'stlofl hes toeea tr«vc»sti€d f o r the 
coaveni<aoce o f pover politics* r o r sometiiss 
tfoe ^^scarity a o m c i l ' s prest ige h^n hmm 
lowered ^y i t s lairepressntctisre cbsraeter , 
but by rousing ccaitespt in B people, the 
•aost pessioaRtely ettecfeed to e c i l e c t i v e 
seesr i ty m ^ tfae f i r a e s t eaOHermt® to the 
machinery, the Comei l d m e 
iTMpsrab le daasgs to i tse l f . * * 
jkaSSS^M ^ nrtg., J^erch 1051» 
i i d t l ^ S ^ i a r i l i , Apri l i , i9SX. 
- 233 -
By thfc yea^ 1962, there ha4 eisergea two d i f f e r e n t 
opinions in the Security C o m e i l - One, o f sxteudlng 
i'urther te© r o l e of the CouQcil md o f af f fecti j jg dt^eilli^ 
tarlscitioa of K^shmis tfci-oiigb ^ rb l i i - a t ioa , which vres 
jCsvourea toy Pakistsa as4 tlip U.i.. with other Me s t e m Foyers. 
The otiicr, o f throvlJig th« onus oa the pa r t i e s themselms 
to proaeed with d i rec t c«»itacts to solve owtsteaaiag 
proba.e®S| thst mB favoured by Inclle isfl! tbe i?o\fiet Ualpii* 
tfce ^iow esaergeae© of Iisdls as b powerftJtl £orm 
i s ss l^ , independent o f my grinfit overt o r covert Safly^nce 
o f tbm fsakiag s d i f f©reRee isgk ^sttitusaes to the 
keshEiir problem", . i s i r he® rigfetly po Sated out J ' 
Sov thfj o r th^ otfe^r %esterfi powers m v e iM a© 
pos i t ioa to get sueeess lis p i t t ing prf„ss»re oa i m l a to 
ect ia aecoi^lRg to tfeeir vishes tiie United Hatirais. 
Mother f s e t Mhieh beuaaie eiridefflt vaa tb^t ©ti© o f t «o 
powsr bloos %50uld r e s i t t my stt^spt ou the pzrt o f the 
to put pressure tti« pa r t i e s to accept e solution 
wfeich mieht trrnaform Eeshiair Into some kSaoi o f e II 
mi^tifited t e r r i t o i y . 
the bebevioar might be seca in i t s 
c r i t i e i sM o f the C.c^, gad U.K. s tm^ sn these stediatory 
B i s i r Gtipta 
M M M m » o p - c i t . , p.233. 
E f f o r t s , ca Jaauejgr IQ^ IBm^ Jacob mllk^ lbs 
represefit^tlir© to the gavre a iiisw OBgle to 
problem i a t^e Csnaei l end eHege^ tiaeti 
"'Ihfc Us i tea Bt&tw of Amrlm P4id the 
Halted KSngsloa are cmtixming bb l^efore to 
iQterfei 'e So the s e t t l e s a s t of tfee EaEte l r 
ew&stlaii, pttttSag forw&M one p i en a f t©r 
^ottiBT ••• fhese p laas in e<mfiectioB vitfe 
Ea^as i r o f m tepsrlftlist i i a t « r « , 
they are a©t based au tlie e f f o r t to eebi^ir© 
B real Bettlmm%* purpose of these 
plgds i s In the totamal 
s f f e i r s o f Eesha l r , the o f 
the dispute- between lad l a end p^kisten on 
the questicfi of K^stet r , end the conversion 
o f Keshmir Into n proteotorete o f tlm Halted 
States of /.meriOG and th® % i t e d E S s g t o 
enaer the pretext o f renderiag as8 is tsao« 
tfiroagb tbe Bnltea i e t i o n s . F l a a l i y , felie furpo©^ o f these plans in ctmect lOB id th #slj®ir i s to secur® the introdu©ti<m of 
troops i a to an /Jsglo-./siiei'tcen 
eoloay m.& & s U l i t a r j and s t r s t e g l e b » s « 
egaiijst tbe snci tfe® Peop le ' s 
a e p m i c of 
mmmntB terowght f a r the r cosp l i ee t ioas Into 
%lm Kmkmtr <lisput^. 
At thst time tise K©re«a « a r tied led to sn iatenei f ioat ioai 
o f the Cold mw i a x.M po l i e i s e o f ^ e r i a a in 
/.si® were s s i u l y on th^ aeeiS of protridSsg e sailltarsr 
answer to the aos®asist ohal leage* In ttm p reva i l ing 
stnosphere, tbm t o v l e t oj^positic^i of « x t © m c l Interfereneft in 
Eeshmir was nat^sr®!, feeee^se 2f^<|©-Pj?3£i&tsa sub-coatfneat 
i-* M m K o p . c i t . , 
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tiM tmpnTtmrn i n ^.sia am^ ftasts^p, ^viife i t s status 
tmietesnii iedS miglit ^p-p&^T ' t o tli© tl^S^S^r^ && o f 
tti® possibUjs ar«a® ttie t ' «S, esteisa i t s e l f . 
I t 1® fi®t possited© t^ say tmv f a r tfe© So^iat ^ e v 
3i ist i f lea$ tot i n tSi© a t m s j ^ e r e o f susple ioa aiitf tmsl&i i , 
i t vm a tietiirai en ro l l a r ^ t© t M « t i f i g ^ etttier 
Hot miQttm ^id tlm ' -©stem ©Kprms tiseir m r r y 
of gmmm (©r coiiEfflmist) iiif3.mefi<se to ** 
l^tB vm iR^ i r ee t suppsrt t » ladliss pas l t^oa 
©fi Kassliiir m ^ since m v ttie bee^^o tlie isa|oy ^ 
l a f o re i gp po l i cy , Ht® mtt-CJoCTimist 
fore©© tmesm liit«iresl©iS in tv f tng to eu i the m t ^ ^ l S ^ i i i m t 
® f ©f tfe© nattnfi© ©f -v'sia t.ijile tho 
help ommtrtm t^ rcamm mu-alignoi. 
I t wag in th is t s^ text o f I n d i a ' s r^^Ajsal ^ aliiae 
hf mH T^ifiatery e f f o r t ® tfcat CSraliS^ l e f t tfe? 
to d i y ^ t ftegotiatiiosi© tiJO cliispats^t 
pa r t i e s • -mS This vas a nmr a w s l o i ^ ^ t 
^ i c h torn place as a r e su l t o f tlse faiajare o f 
©f forts* Um negotiatiofss I n a i a stressed t h a t 
the great s t e ^ d m t m t m ^ X ^ tttemsel-^s in t l ^ 
dispate over Sa s t e i r so that a n ^ t r a i cma itapiartiai 
eppro^sh Etigfct brrstJglit a^out» 
1. ^ i s i r Gupta, 
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I n I n d i a ' s TPt^v, as a o f tho Joint Coiasfiamlque 
o f ? 0 % g « s t i s s u u d o n t J i e t a l l c ' s r feetve©!i t h u 
Frifse M « i s t © r s isi De lh i , ^ tl-j© ii3jK>i*tsiit ga lR, yas th^t 
tli^ fiev r i s M s e i t © Aftgif j istratcr^ aee©r<ling ta a re^tjrt©?! 
lagyeerotst^ wouxa not te f p m a M g power but frot? a ras^l 
r«Bti / m i r a i ISa i tE fe©i?3g a c i t i s cn o f tJic U .S . 
fsigtat create ^^ f i l i c a t i o f s s , vas to go, (thoiagli h i s corplcstcitce 
tlDubt^d bf Thfi reported:^ "'-Klnirai Chests^r 
ntmltz my ©©fc hmc to v i i t 3x>fig®r t@ tli© 
pos t ' o f P l eb i sc i t e >^s5i?iiatrafcor as cfcotea o f o^cfe as 
asteirict ator ¥ t l l 1B a l l p r e b a M l t t y f a B ©« Bn ^stm 
fe. 
This was agreed rj?t "fecca^ise ITchna vas 
against t h e B . S , tjist tecims ^ as tlte Ifidisn F r i s c r s r - l s te r 
l a t e r |Sit i t?^ g r ea t are t^o €nfc"'ifig3,€?d in 
t l ieir i i f f i c i i l t i e s aisd o f ten p a l l ag^^Jjist esefe oth r . 
Hcfiee t t fe^i® li^osts© tb^ n ^ i ^ a l practice to ^m-^M feavtBg 
rep-ere i i tat i es ©f tb^se i^^'cirs i f j sa^y ©atter 
S£i»e Mnd tif a aemtr.53.lst an?! 4ajp.artiai appitiacfe, l ^ a t i s 
no mflmetljon an ^srj -pomr^ ssicfe less on ^islrs^t pf^rson 
l i k e ^^feairai B i id ts * ^ t i s s^^rej^ m ipfir^Ql^tton of P^^ 
1. Ti^xt ;iiri flQ^otiatiows b^tve^w Prtmf' UlniMtets of 
P.akistggj aK.i Ina i a r^wdipit tli© Easfe^ir 
of Kms^r Affairs^ pp. 
2. Jaites b^gan tin t7tte Mgae t 1953. 
•V, It^e larcss a l so ^olcoiasd t M s change* 
Mm pmctBt'm Times. /^gu^t 
r»ehrtt«s l e t t e r o f ^ '^.gttst 1953 to Udh^mm 
- L M M ^ J t l S M L S H M i r f J?, 15 
- 2S7 .. 
f a c t s ®f 
BeciJus© o f fet^r fselicy ©-f non-alipsiBtmt had 
reqiuested Fakiscai:? fir^t to vote vttfo the i n th.e 
on tii© issue o f i:orea» Bat i t mot ^ so, 
perliaps to Sup i » r t 3fer Kasiisir 
nmm. in M s l a t t e r ©f 3 1^53 the 
isefcd that f o r I n d i a ' s jiolicy o f n o n - a i i p w a ^ t , I t 
was esss f i t la i tliat tlie Kashmir -fs g©t S B t ^ l e ^ 
In fclg power po l i t i c s "becaas©, i f , K 'a^js lr beea©© ®lso ^ 
arena ©f c o n f l i c t betwem tbm g rea t |K>tieirs, tb®^ m t only 
atjd Fciicisti® tettt als© ttw3 peo|£l© o f Kasissir m u l d 
play a seeancl&rsr part* 
Segettt ions bKfa^ i t f r u i t s to Iridic tfPt as 
fmd^Btm contifjuee to rc?lr m th^ Westeiti b l oc , th^ 
f^asigfjatiofi e f ^ ^ I r a l Stunts y^i:- mm W the 
Paidgf t m ± ttie r i s e s o f wmte e d i t o r i a l l Y ; 
ir^ti^^peet, Stan m^ tiso aistmstatitig TomltB e f 
a i r o c t t a lks yltli l a a i a , ^ i r met resu l t i s tasat Htiglts 
i s goR©, tfe«r#1>3r ^estroyliig laie ei jt ir© faferie ©f agrert^ests 
reached under tfee cuspicea o f tfee tJuitcd Nat ions . ^ 
1. I n d i a y m surpr ised fes t^iat The Pawi 'Iri a l ^ g t l s y 
dospatcfe aiscoveresJ in Sd ina ' s sugnesticns ( 1 ) ^ 
iittenpt'* t© drlTC a b©t^ s€Msn the m,^ P a ^ s t m * * 
md (2> •'to create a s i t txat im ii5 -whlc^. Kashmir 
WW ^or 5C11 laractical ruppos^s cear.r? to fee a 
l i v e i s sue be fore the j a E l O l ^ t 
Tiees e f gar i^h^. ?i€!pt<®3b©r J '^ i tor ia i « 
"iit-ib ill the Bacfe'V 
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'2lil6 %rae n f a c t ttoat P m t & t m tIM not sucsseea in jSireet 
negoti ' it ions ifltii l u d i a t j e c^^e tho vas not i t s 
bacis f b r tupporfclng I t s 
mu.TmY - a j i S T . ^ E ro F ^ i a r w ' ^ sMn mrj-ho^LW 
orfT^fkt " — -
I M S tte f a r t o f tho tlnite^ States t^s the 
TO^t tfe© proS|Hsets o f a aego -
tiatesl betwem iR^ila ormr WBBb^tr 
m Urn m e an<l d e t e n o r a t e i r e l a t t 'ms bfjti/em I n - l a 
mil nm Ignited States m tAe othc^r ^a43cl. I t was a i t o g s m e r 
3 m^ se r ioys eXmmt infcro^ead int® tS^ o sltaiatiem 
ty vMch c!saiigcj(3 me ^Siole o^nfiext of the 
profeK® o f Kas te l r , Ono o f tl^e i^iaiR rc-asons ml f^t hmB 
hem F m t B t m ' B hop^ %hat hcsr estar ing Ifitt* wttli 
me mitBd 3tBtm m&M m ^ e me JAt^er to giim p i ^^ i s t ^ , 
-eeemsie silitiafy aid, f^ll moral bM i^littcal 
support in fisjdHiig m ^s icab ie ^att leeefit o f t m fssslsrlr 
F ^ s t s n , perfasps, lainuglit tliat as a par t o f 
tito a a ' r ^ g e j s ^ t m® tl.B. nm^d mippjrt PaMstsn %sn i t® 
slisjaites I n i i a ©specisxiy Kasissiri IB ru tum 
t, Ilje isetje i s dealt separate ly in tfee next chapter. 
The f o m ^ l iiRTifiiURcessefit o f U .S» ^Vsaiatmce vas ©aa© 
by ofi S? 195^ md the F « f 
was signed m 19 Kay 
2. S i s i r Ourta, p . 277 
3. tu Ptf^m "^r4tlstaii md the U.S. % yskint^ 
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for Pakistan* s support of the united t tetes on the cold 
wer Issues in the world pol it ics, 
AB has been pointed out e a r l i e r Peiiistan end Ksshmir 
were of stret4gio importance in the /iiBerican foireign 
policy ei! the military basis ageinit CosssiuniBt expansion in 
Asie. prime Minister, Sehru's v i s i t to the U . t .A . during 
October 1 9 ^ hed confiimed that the U . l ./u would not succeed 
in bringing Indie to elign itfcelf with the IT.J .A. in lt& f i gh t 
against Gonraiunism, Previously a l so , Ind ie ' s policy of non-
83 Ignment, ever since her Inaepeidence, had been misunderstood 
by the Americans, indiens were feeJing from 1950 onwards that 
the /jEnerican attitude on Keshsiir was changing more snd more in 
favour of Pakisten® In 1949, the Gossmunist overthrow of tiie 
Nat ional ist Government of China, supported by the Govemmmt, 
had caused the to find dependable a l l i e s in the region 
to contain Cotofflunism. Khen the U.i. . sew thst India would not 
agree, Pakistan was the obvious a l ternat ive to f i l l the power 
vacuum in Louth Asia, which was couse^by the withdrawal of 
Br i t i shers from the Indian sub-continent. the Cf,&. did not 
hesitate in having a military pact with PaKistan, which in turn did 
i r reparable damage to any s e t t l em^t of the Kashmir problem* 
Before the 0 . l « A * the main danger wai' the Communist pdwer 
while the problem of Kashmir was be fore PaKistan and she 
wanted to be mi l i t a r i l y strengthened against her neighbour 
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I i id ia , so titat sbe might Kas te l r . 
have h^^n th© reascm^ ^MeH feftmght 
^feoat the Signing o f pact t m f ^ct that 1st 
consequence i t Bad siieh r&pm'tmmionQ bear ttieir 
e f f e c t a lso cm the present Kas i^ t r dlstut'^^ M s 
railitary assistsfice haa <!tr at l iearings on tts© pr-^hlem 
o f Kssiiffiir b^t^men JiM^ia and Certainly^ In€i® 
pii5test©il i^a iB©! i t in eyes, 
a l ig i f f l i^t w i ^ ttie />, the mW ^ar nearer her 
ag^tpst f u ^ a , ^ 
di«S fi0t hes i ta te de ls^ i s vattiing F3kistt « tfeat th is 
aid cte^go tlie mntGXt o f , appro-itcSi toi t;*i© 
tiiscussioTtS OR set tXesmt c»f the Ir^iio-p-dkist^i t i is^fcca, 
e spec ia l l y m t h r ^ s m c t to tlie Kasfedr a'tlcing 
tlieir i s m o f soseVhat ±rr®l<Bvmt» m a^tlea, 
w i s t retaift fWtl l i b e r t y fe l£e«?p saeli forces and 
H i l t tarjr ®«|yi|3!jent in laie l a s t e i r s tate as %-e mw eofisider 
3aec©ssai^ in o f t l i is n<sm threat to in h i s spescii 
in the LoTt Safeha Hehru declared l ^ a t itie ^ i l i t a r j ^ a id 
being given Fi^ist - i * tfy tjfes States mB a fbns o f 
intervention in tiis problcas feetv©^ iK'Jia and pskisfcan, -
^dsich was l i k e l y to feave m m resell to then 
% Indaia vas a son-a l igned essimtry and i t dia not v m t 
any alii(3afsce t » tsoucfe the Indian subcsntlnent. 
Des|Ato tiio fi^ct thmt Fresiacsit, riscmbsMbW haa o-ssureci 
Sebru tJ^at this ® i l i t a r v %ia to PaJjisti^ v ts not givtm 
f o r use ag-4nst India* 
Lotter o f 5 Mareii ©f m h m to of Fa-felstan 
fell© preinous ^ p e s o f ii!t#rv«titlcwi, ^ l-'Urthermor^, fiehini 
d e c i d e d th^ ^ttedrawai o f J^Q® QIG 
O!isenr0i*»s group in ItashRir, as l ^ e was m w 
a p a r t i s ^ in Ifido«. afelstaa pnjbls^s^ tJbesc -fserican 
observers e ^ «o longer ^ t r a a t c i fey us as itestraxs in 
dlsjpate, hmGQ tlaolr pre0©Ke© tliere appears to us 
to ^ tmproper''^ remsrl^ed HeJiiu, 
tli©y®f(C>r0, tfe® nm e i tast ioR tli« gretaii3 to 
a f resh from €ttfermt prmimB tjio pro^le® 
o f I -B lmlr . I n h i s l e t t e r to pafeist-^ , lf®!mi -fcjr^t© 
t!iattJ,S. s l l i t a r j ' a i a t^ i^s^istas pitjduee^ a •gsjaxitafcive 
ehmg^* tfte e ^ s t l j i g B±tm&tt-n tliero^'ore, St a f f e s t s d 
rs^lations* isioro e spec i a l i y ^n the K^sfeMr 
pnsfel®®. Bacmtso ©f th is %?as ©f 
los ing 311 tfee so fai* gained ©s t te qti©stiofi» Th© 
previou® cliSisyssioES on cieoiB-tariSQtiof! ir^ Kastigjir b e c i ^ 
cisi3«tiiglesG tn th« fac© ©f tlse isrojected reteforcessetit 
o f the s l l i t a r j strengtli o f p a i t i s t ^ vitSj the he lp o f 
cdHtai?^ a id , ffoeipe ' a f t e r , i t vould be a r e l a t i v e l y 
sgiaii Batter %iiat forees F m i B t m ©aiistainsd in the 
area o f Kasiirdr by i t . Hiss© f o rces coultl eoig© 
o 
bacsS: at a hotar'S* no t ie®. I f , h©%rewr, fch^ Ij-iclccd 
Lofc Safolaa rebates , WS IX^ 97 tt 
f o r d e t a i l s see c o l s , 
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by ant lucreassjftg arsca |!Ower i n V f ^ l B t m i t s e l f 
tB o f far- g;r«at.®i' thm i e s l l t t a r i t ^ t l o n 
« f E/t^&isir fa^t f i t feeec^e® rather absurd t® 
taife o f a ^ m t a r i s a t i o B , i f f m t s t ^ proceeds i a tl-B 
airectioK tfee Isalp o f United States . • 1 
Vrnhm ffiM© r©f©r©fit's":tj<s ©no p^ipt 
ttjafc eotitrary tcj tl^a Soif^misfit* s s t^ -a that tJ, S. 
ffiilitarj a id to was ^ teKtrmtouB issu©* to 
KBMtmt' th® o f P ^ l s t a i ! Mssea i ' stat#a Cpart icuiar iy 
in b i s iistei^^iew t© the Wews ^ mn Ke^- f f; m 
^ .Tafisary t ^ i - ) ^ a t tbe aia Motald ke ip ifi l i v i n g 
i s sue , «f!xis Qmt onl|r ttiat you ^ ^ m s e t t l e 
tliis issiis 1st iore^ •of attss^ o f tfef^-^at to tise 'anas, 
siBless tit© pi-tiliMnmry issues s t i l l as-
t m qsiestion o f are s e t t l ed ta sat ls f i iet ioi i of 
P-sMstsm I t tafees i t m t fmm t^© r©gi©s » peaeeftel 
fisP a fiPlewdlir ferasfliig i » the 
pressur© £}f mrmn^ nm&mr^. Heferis, a^a^d, " I t i s a pa t t e r 
o f regret to t^^^t a f t ^ r oa r ^t tmptB t© riR,<i a 
s©ttle9?J»t o f th i s a t f r i c i a t la^ebl®©- o f las fes i r a 
sfisrles ©f ©-rents Should mpset isnv 
and p rew^ted my fut&re pregrss®^ i t i s mt serujlar tfe-
Ind ia Sovormisfit Faper,. ICssfeair (Wew Pc lh i ) 
PtntBtry o f Hsttemai . ^ f a i r s , aetofeer 
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Kasijsdr cm^Btim tfe^t has becosse jsaeh d i f f i c u B , }mt 
a sorlous threat Ijas arlsraa to Inaiia* s Secnirit^?. ^'e iaii®t 
V^Q a g r a w o f ^ b b b 
ConseqaentlF* stispaadex! Sfi ^m&mnt^ witii 
pski^taa te %psSjit ^ p l e b i s c i t e adats te t ra t s r l a t e s t fey 
tlie €»(S o f nmrni sa id tn tli@ Ind^fe f j s r l ta^t^t 
on Marcli 16, s i taat ioR fess ar isen ^ . e r e ^ sny 
o f f i c e r o f caw ao t feo « © » t r a l in 
th© i n Kastasia.^ 
Voieifig t m griwagices o f I nd i a o w r ps } f ista« 
n i l i t a r y the Indian Press md i » b l i e opifiion was 
f a r ahe^d o f the o f " ical Tr.aii^ a^ftion-. In tb© "wsrds 
o f tfoe Stafcgsni^^ Fyealer refdrcaiestEj 
thia s i^ as l i k e l y tc malt© a settlersent ©^er E a s l i ^ eas ie r 
wae "^ a piatsi hmt^'^*' The Hifida I t '^as fosred 
that my r . i l l t s r r a^ i s ta rsce to P iltisfe^ was 'Isosiidl to 
r e su l t If! ^ .e eacercis® o f matt© ®fi l a d i a , ^ fhe 
papea^ s is© neusetS ^Foite^l'S-'-stes o f tbroi^ng t te 
I M i . f 
2. Jotfit CosssKatiq^© o f ^ g s s t 20$ 1953 tbe Friise Minist^^ys 
o f Xn^ia F a k i s t ^ ®at>odying ttte Text in 
India g . e^ t 22, 1953t p . 
3- I M J - , Morcb a , 
M ' s ifitisrvlev %fi«!i Weij^ ana F.ei^rt 
15 195^, 
Bte Hinduy retmyary 19511, He-H-ow), 
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peaceful, sottlcsciertt o f t l j » Kasimlr prdWLm fey ti l fcing 
thB b a i l e e betimes tjse par t ies to Sisputte,"* Htnaii, 
tmconviRCs^S thf? PrcfSidoat B i s t ^ove r ' s asstirar^ce, i t 
HTotet bas found i t c l i f f i c a i t stsougji to r e s t r a in 
0mn a pippot l i k e ^yisgEsa® I t v i l l 
f©r I t t o control a cmmtrr l ik® 
partlcsiiarlsr on K a s t e i r , " ^ 
thB xn&xm n e^papa r s HTg©^ the I n d i ^ aovcrtm^snt t© 
t3$ie vigorous fgessures i f tli© par t i es cmcemed did not 
adffi0i3ltiQis# As a matter o f f a c t , the /iraerlc 
csilitas?^ observers vere s a l s s e^en t l j witfedr^n® frota the 
area by the fsH* IliDtigli, tlie stalcisate wnttms^^ ^.o 
I n ^ t m Sowmu^ist i n s l s t s a thai nogetiatiof ia on t^shmlr 
•cgul<! m t ecrndtected accejitafele tfs^sifj SIIKS© rski®t%i 
had r m & i v ^ islXitary aia^ tu th i s a negotiated 
settXes^it 0 f t^® Wa^teslr pr^sibim feecajse ©©r© d i f f i c m l t 
to a e h i w e . 
Since nov, as a r e s u l t ©f tfe© m i l i t a ry a ia to 
paitistaiii Uisiofi, feegaa to supp j r t I n d i a 
in tho Hf.H* outaide the the Vesfeem tisiufeitig at 
th i s tiiatj wa:. that my fiiitlou mt %ritJi theos vas ag»4iRst tJ^ee 
that lAic n^tttraaist nations ware h e l p f u l to ^ M U B I S S . 
Msreli 8 , 
IMi«t ^^^ r e a l l y the eoulfi s o t proirtpt p a l ^ s t ^ 
i t oaed i t s in i t s var egatnst Ind i a i » 1965, 
- H96 • 
F^istan l fSTuss ujlield this ^imf i^ t icu iay iy I t began 
t© Id^.-ntity Sofira ^tsmml^*'^ tt vaa igaiSe mtdm^ 
^ 'i^ mp ^ ttjat iRfilj. haf? entered isto a secret pact 
h^mis . Chifi.i an^ tha t f ^ S ^ t m * ^ a e c l s i o s t e 
I 
acceit a s s i s t ^ e © vas a r e su l t ©f t h i s <!@ireioji!<!nts 
I t was cm Secemfeer 9t tfeat durifig M s irislt to 
TticU^ t^ Bi l fta Kfmm&hch^ (Cos i r^ i a t Party F i r s t Seeretar^r), 
tlie Friser Bylgftoio reforr^-d ts Ka^sis* as tijc 
"nartlieiii port of In^ia, Khmshchev saia m Pmc^ntsr los 
'tite «|tirstiofi of Kasteir as mQ ©f ttie States 
Df tl>e o f I n^ i a bag mm 
decided by the peof^e of East®lr -•^lille 
in the of Ifit!i^ fitia ^ aii^ itj 
atmgsl© for poac-© ai?ri f ^ r tise is^aecifytl 
sol-atlofi 0 f imsett led srubXeiss^ wnfa tm'^&lf 
V© cj3irmot i^ ay th s^ 'afeotit 
a© R&t the Pmt at a l l , th® 
fsost active participant of -Mch i s P m s t ^ 
(^vm Imr ta ^Htlioist my 
benefit to hfT f;co|jle,**3 
tfecse ©aae i t tSIcsr that 
%tho ha i^ thus far nmtrul m ^aslaiir 
^ Q s e r e p r e s s t a t l v e s Ijad abstained ftom ' ^ t i i sg ^cnmer 
tfec issa© of K'lBtmtr cmmp isi l^e S^etirlty Council, 
changed their atm^ a^ id deddc?! to supro^pt M i a cc^faetely 
1. S lG l r Gupta^ a B » M S * f p: • 
3* Ccaatewporary vol^ 10, 
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as a r e su l t o f alliei^c© witli the United S ta tes , 
f a r as the stisteiscnts o f Bussif i « l e ade r s vere coiscensed 
tfee tn>i'-m vtGM irms es j r ess&S fo^ ^ h r t i on 3 J^i^ssry I 9 f6 a t 
^ r a hB Jsaid t i jat lio'Wlf^t leaders s ^ d '^'coiTGet thttt§&''\ 
aitfecjwgh tliey were not ''aaiced to do so*', an i^ ttoat ttieir 
optoioiis mrm expressed affter due csmsl.lsr'stiori gr^ut 
deHfeeratiofi". '^ I f tli«r® m j cold ^-^r eleisetit 
{ a s a l leged fey tlie Fak l a t i ^ i ±fi tlieis. I t vas f i r s t 
mtromrnd by p ^ s t a ® fej axitfiSjtg it^jpself v^^ lth m^V^s^ 
isilitflirar pact ; had dlsUirbed t t e ig i l i taFy a f 
the r « g l a® . The Htedu wrote ^ A t ^Fa^ t s f i ^ i rj^fl 
haire B^jr© ^ ^ once oji^ly touted tor tise nwpvoTt 
©f the totoc the ^ - t i o f iS * ' ' -
l ^ e cliim^e^ f ' ^ s s i m att i ta^® vas imisl^  ^tBtvtrhtng to 
the ps js is fc^is haa to tlie Hfiite'i States f o r 
e ^ a i l i ' yuequi-rocai mipi^rt, \m% got nothlfjg more than th® 
stiggestioR tij&fc tfeC' fee rcfoyrciS t© t!Ti@ 
lJnit€-«I fl3tiai?is. thef s e ^ a d to assunc? tfc-at hiiQ'-mm the 
i 'lissian lea^^ro haa sapriorte^ l it^i®, the S.S^ ^ © u l ^ 
as openly f^de vtiMi I t s u lJ j^ m ^ th©:# m v e 
feltterly diisappolfited %ihm tii# Onltetl st^t©s f a i l e d to act 
1. r©3cfitc€!it ecte© ever thi^ss statensents 
trecaus© ©f tli® f a e t tfe^ttlio Secretary o f State h ^ 
not ccsiB omt Us stipt^^ii: ©f the paitistaRi ©tagna to 
o f f s e t the e f f e c t s created by the liaasian stat£ir.€i!ts» 
3. Sea ^aatistagi Beys^gj^es-^^ (r^eerK^er 15, 1955) 
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as expected." ' ' PerJiars^ tfw iras to elssnge b-^r 
^ i th reg'JT^ to til© *>oTri@t I'fslsfi ana there t '^as 
a graving o f tti© mtf teport^e© o f th© wtm-
' l i p i ^ post«ro # f in the iJeited 
Tfie Torfe Tju^os r&ported^ IndJia welcomed the 
S o w i support f o r the tn^tm case m tho Kashisir 31 spate 
%ittl3-5tjt l ies itat lon in tfe® ©f Hehm, tli'^ ' ^ c l e 
b a s i s o f the l a s i i s l r '^cc^rl^teiy ehgtjg^di*' 
f s l l s w i a g ^ se r i e s o f aewloptPRfca e . g . t^® %erleai i 
!5 i l l tary a id to paidstati, "tl^ere ts mvieh incr^ ''sed 
Kllifcw^ poteuttai Sitting an the other It ©-^es 
a huge a f f e r i m c ^ * b&sos Xiiai-^i , , , so t 
onl|f surroisJ5diiig i f idt^ l3ut t l ie l r ©stistonee c^ a pa'kir>tcr# 
occupied t e r - l t o r y o f Kas fe ly fea^e ma^e a 
^ t f a r m m ^ ' f B ^ d WQhr&p m i t sjade U t t ^ dif ferctsee to 
i/hat extent P^iStasis ^ t© dcssdHltarl^e m I t s 
o f e e a s t f i r e MB® in icasiigiir. 
Tbe lud i s s s tfeat feetwcas th© Eiassism support 
t 
to t l ^ IndlB^ pomMlm tt® ^criozgi si^pi:ort to Pakistan 
on tlie prM.&m o f Kasisisir, there vas ©no fteitSsas^tstal 
d i f f e r e n c e . I n the i^ussiOR o f K a ^ a l r ^ e ^ m t cjf 
1, Homaa P* palmer. «ftie I?Rjte<S States m ^ pf^istssn", 
S s a i m i J H i s M Z t (March, 1958) p . 
S i s l r Supta, s i^eSSe , 
cold po l i t i c© ^as dcmfete^ by f^u a® f ^ r as leiSla^s 
ease %ras concemod, g®ttlf ig Bmssian mprtirt Ind ia 
m t cisstjfe the &©TFlet Union o f ssy kincJ o f s l l i t a y y o r 
l5o l i t l « ^ l SHp^ort, but , tnfsmtf i t was irs resistioii to the 
eff^jet o f gettit!g int© UiQ pacts ^ t h 'ms t^m 
a l l i e s as tlis leaders ha i ao s m r e t o f tiseiy 
o f Pesfctst-€J*s parttctp^tlm Ifi tlie p^ict* 
Because paki8t-4ii Sjatandetl to s t r e n g ^ e i h^r dcifence against 
Ifidl'^ and %m mtiv:at@d fey iier ^©sire to at-ai witli Ificlia 
f r o m ^ p - s i t l o f i o f s t r e n g t h ^ l e ^ l l ^ i n g feeicsfclf i # i t h 
tbGse pacts , Bussia® mpp&rt ml nmoXctm^ in I n d i a . 
As S i s l r Oispta feas ©bsersmds 
"i^i^rfc Tpm the f e e t iBcttJa p&sitloE 
vas f o r f i r s t tSsj© accepted a 
pawerftil nat ioat tisis ©ertiaiftly ^jas e ^ i ^ t c i l 
to i l l a s t i - a te to Tmttntm. m e f ^ t l l i t s r o f 
tpyteg to ssolire pro^l^ss I lk© KasfeBdr witSi 
s t r ing tij f ro® tsf tlie m r 
Su i t ed States Isclf Ifea^ fe ISfisse pacts -
the ^nxmcm nfXtit wmtBtm^ Stm ( 
Baghdad pact ( i n Asia to d e f a c e 
aga inst Coffissaajist expsnsion, IniSia op|:©s6d the® 
ce r ta in ly ^ e y oddsd to the Sefenct ImMmB u t I n ^ a . 
Speaising i n I^ jSt -^aibhi on tlJ^r^ , IJolsjii tfeo 
1, S i s i r Oupt3, Kaslamir paHlstg^ Halat ion 
0| j ,c i t . , p^ 302. 
t a t e r to be kao?® as fro© o «vards . 
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points o f increased i«lth ysgard to tliese Fasts , 
r i r s t mnt they •"affect i f it inattOy' ' , md'^t^dl %o enc i rc lo 
that Pakistan fcaa j o ln td tfels B ^ h a a a Pact 
o f "1 E^ecausn the m^^QT |iit>l&leffi Isetwean 
I f j j l i a PaMstsn was Ifce prnW-m o f Kasfesir, th® e f f e c t 
of inirolvlrig patcl^twi i n tfe© « o M war "fejr jolnlftg tlies® 
i.^stejm i s l l i t a ry peets w t i l d m l y to te Kasj js i r 
as ^ t vas ea in roasen o f I n ^ a * s eeneGtsi. 
Iheee added to X!i<iia»s Imrdf^ as t© l>eco«€ 
Bat a r g w a ^ t was tti-'^ t i t did m t b e l l e r e 
tliat FaMstoa ^ m i t aggreasiou against ''siieh a 
l a r g e swd ireasitr^ as Ifi^Sla**, to Fjulles, His 
t h i j ^ i n f v m ^ a t © U l t ^ r r t reaty d ia s o t tncr®ais© 
t ^ s i ^ B , "imt h w m ^ t peae® nea re r " * ^ 
IndUm fears eaiae %rm ^m Sm thm SE-m Comcil 
seetiRg 0 f Miuts twc in Kmr&std- l i i Marels 195^ tli^ F ^ s t ^ i 
f e e l i n g s « e r e tfas Comjc l l , In I t s eoEHimique^ 
o f March 8 , " a f f i j ^ u a th& need f o r m ear ly B ^ t t l m m t 
o f the Kashsjir ipest ioa the or lir d iycet 
t i s go t l& t i ^ s ' ' . I t ia ia was ho^ the last iat r <siiGstiofi 
i l lSJQBBs 13 Msrch 
Text in JM»SM (873), March pp.Mf?^ -
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which was out of th« fcKATO formation could be raised end 
eleo that the t5.b# aloag with six other memtaesrs of the treaty 
organisation supported the demand of Pakisten thst a U.iU 
supervised plebiscite be held to determine whether JtBShaiir 
should go to India or Pakistan. The Ckjvsmmerit of India 
could not beer this end protested against i t on the ground that 
to discuss the Kashmir problem V8& beyond the scope @rid 
functions of the LisiiilO, 
I t was criticised by Indian press also: 
"The reference to Kashmir in the Coi^unique 
of the fiKATO has caused Indie surprise and 
pain for it means that the &LATO alliance 
Is backing Pakistan in its dispute with 
India «•• India does not wish to ent$>r Into 
an arms race with Pakistan but our Government 
cannot ignore tbe„consecuences of the arms 
aid to Pekistan,'"^ 
In addition to i t , the Ueghdsci Pact Council in its 
coamunitjue^ of 19 April 1956 stated inter aliai "Specific 
problems whidi were causing tension in this area were also 
discuseeti thoroughly end frankly in a spir it of mutual 
comprehension. In particular the Council emphasized the 
need for an early settlement of the Palestine end Kashmir 
1. Nehru*s Speech on March SO, 1966, see Lok Sabhe Debatesy 
1966, vol.'ci, part I I , col, 
2. Kditorials "Voice of India", '^ he Hindustan Tings 21 March 1966. 
3. Text in the pawfi, 21 April 1966. 
d i s p i t e s . ^ Iiit!ia*s r ^ i ^ t might t)e mm frois A a i 
I8<aa Congress C^OTsitt-?© in I t s aeetSag Jjs J u m 
Costs!ttcs tli© rc fercnc^ to Kashmir 
$11 tfee r eees t ®e«t iRgs im KarauM itid 
o f th« GEA 0 and the Bn^rtatf pact Organisation. 
ttLs Qm.mmn ttie i n t e g f l t r ana the 
r i ghts ©f Ifidisi* " 
Xlie p a r t l d p a t i o n o f F a M s t ^ ia ^ these Western 
e l l i s i i c ss Bfi& ottesr ^e^elopsseats toa^igatei the fcovlct 
Uaion to use i t s ta tli© becuwity Ccmaeil in FefoWGry 1967 
m t M resolut ioa to t^ie Easbialr probi^sa* 
vet.© 01" the &ovi «t Onion started 8 nm eh&pter Sii the hietory 
0f tti© dispute» l3a<S©9tetedl3r, asfijor deveiopJKents 
fesd to th© md ihe fo . e l gG p o l i c i e s 
©r iR^i© end Psk l s tm^ eantlntJct to d r i f t epsrt . m a t s 
lici oppotca tfe 0 .6 . ssllitnry ©ssistsnc© accepted by 
pfrklstsn. lisala wmmnted the form^tiom of L L i m ^ M M ) 
saa the Beghded f'aet(j.9§5^©f wfciah F^klstcm became n mcaber* 
On th© of Hunget^ X966, iht Vestem wiMW vss suptiorted 
ijy Pakistan, t^tille India did not vote with the West e v m 
m a 8ln£ie Coimcll r eso lo t loa * over the fcu^jje dfeut© 
1966 thf d l f f e r m e e s wer® ©ore sharp. Indi© stjpported 
i . .goncresE Ra l l e t i f i . ^ e s . m Itidis 
Gcocress Cotaisittee, i84» 
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the sovereign rights of Kgypt and Pakistan emphasized the 
intem&tionel chereoter of the iiues oanel in turn supporting 
the stend teken by the United Ltetee with other western 
powers. In short, i t might be said, Pekicten was one of the 
Kingpins in the Western defence strategy in v<est and Southeast 
.Ada while India was the major non-elipied country of the 
region. From taie Western view point, Pakistan was at the 
least efi ally md India at the most a friend 
Though, the toerican press was not much or i t ic i l end 
showed only greater awareness of the "complexity" of the prohlon 
and had made'few coisments, there was a new sympatic for 
Pakistan over Keshmir in soioe of the ma^or newspapers of the 
VJestem countries. bun^pv Kyoress of London wroteJ 
"Mr. Nehru had no hesitation in attacking Britain* E ^ ueg policy 
in the United Nations. Be proved hiaself our open and dangerous 
eneicy. l e t Britain now he open about Mr. f^ehru for inprsbbing 
Kashmir this hypocritical maa, vto censures colonialism and the 
use of force so lo f t i l y elsewhere, is guilty of blatant 
eggressi<»i."^ No criticism could be more bitter than that one* 
to did the other newspapers e .g . , ggflp^ ffif gy^nfiYf 
Januijzy X9S7), ^al ly HUrrpg, Mflnshfistey 
The Soviet Union, having been aware of a l l these 
3 
developments vetoed the draft resolution , sponsor®! by the 
y . t .A . , Britain, Cuba and Australia on Februoiy 14, 1957, 1 . { : isir Gupta. KjB^ fesi.'^ ^ la!.InMii:Ig.HUJ^M^ 
op.cit . , p..ilO. 
Ihfi fctfttany fefflTO^t January 6, under the heading 
"tpeak Out". 
3* t/3787- l .U.O.iUf 12th Y r . , Sypplo. f o r anuery-March 1957, 
pp. 7-8. 
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vhioh isr^e reference to dssii l it&rissatlon, p l e b i s c i t e 
rau Ks U.S. Force. the l a a t i te f u l l 
sopport to the Indisa pos i t i aa on the provision to the 
drfcft resa lat ioQ to the introdncthm of the f©ree 
io Kmtmtr. ConseQUKiitl^', f o r the f i r s t time, tha veto 
the sponsors of the next to only 
propoelag t-f seatS 3 at ring to tmim ma p ax is triii, 
tot Gjfsliisg uo t o deas i l i t o r i sEat i ea , p l « b i s a l t e o r o 
f©rc6, to wbiGh th€ l aa i an pad voviet de legates 
had exprejjsefS thS,r strciBg opposi t ion. 
the i R a i m vi€¥ mB£ th? t sioee the IUl, irdlltnry 
hj^d fiom to r sk l s t an , the of a i i s l l l t s r iEOt ion 
wes o f no avai l# Tne prof jossl f o r fore© to Kehm»g 
vieif "egelnst iat©3ms-tioii®1 3»w ©fid Charter of the 
Unitedi I&t ioas lailess l ad ia aeoepts it.** ^ehra ss id ^'Under 
no oircumstansts M i l l ootoept efiy f o r e l p t fo rces oa our 
t e r r i t o r y " md he described the reso lut ion bs "©a t i r e l y 
ajiBC«aelir©d" end wrcaig" fiad the nt tempt to 
advmce sttp by step In a d l r e e t i m irfjich ye consider wrcsng 
©ad u n f a i r . 
In<3ie press a l so protested ogaJast the resoIutioB o f 
14 yetorwary iSS?, yfae Ximes of maiJB soaoestea thats® 
i . S/3793, a rebruj^ry i9S7, ifeMMP- 9 
X l m & M J M l s ^ tebnieiT 18S7. 
i a Fehr«.-ry i9S7. 
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« I t i s no p a c i f i c ect of ®«ttlej!3®Et, but a protrocetioa 
to irioXmcc to cppes^^Ate ®ei.ressor by imposing n 
f o rce on the t e r r i t o ry of th« aggressed. Bere i s l ie ithcr 
logic nor com85oaeeas« nor " just ice" , iehru sttack^a th@ 
i aa t reet ly oa 21 f^^hmrr^^ he ccil&d tli® resolMtioa 
^co l l ec t ive ©pprovnl ©t sggre'jssi<m'\ md peeosM sorae 
countries of deli feercie h o s t i l i t y to I nd i s , ^ Indian 
representat ive at the U .H. , Krlshim? Mmtm^ made i t c l€&r, 
speaking in. thf- b e « « r i t y Gouaei l , thRt "Hy Govemsssat hn© 
de l i be ra te l y olioses tin* path o f m iiidepeadeut fore ign 
po l i cy . H© presi-isres i^ill elbow ns ioto un d i e n a e n t la one 
d i rect ion o r fcnotfeer."^ l ad i g was: not s frs is l o f my pressures 
vlifetsoever vhisis night cone ire® tt»-e ya i ted fctetes ana the 
©ttier k'esteni coimtries so ft? to sjrke .ag^pt the i r 
stm& on tfee Kss te i r problem. Both the Govcmsmt of Indi® 
tfee publ ic opiaioaa exp^essesl tfcroogii Ifidien pp€ss were 
c r i t i c a l o f the Tloited States feecsascf o f hGt s id ing %ith 
ri?kistim met pleesSine pl febiscit€, derail i t or iasticsi pad 
O.fil. force in Ksshisir v i t tout having iray coa®i<3€rfctlo« f o r 
the rfi^gtd sitttaticK. Tlie linited t t a t t s biid no airrgla f o r 
I n ^ l m ces© md hsd given way to €.is»ppoititsj«ot itidia.^ 
S S - E l B i a i Fetoruai^ 1957. 
-^Sth Y r . , 769th H t f . , 15 February p»47 
3 . Pak is tea i s ¥#lcos€d i t m4 vrere s a t i s f i e d . 
Sie m'SiTl&m refresCTtrtlve oa the other lipud made 
i t ele#»r tfest a l l thst the r e s o l u t s a i d was tfmt tM 
latrotlactioa of sach fare® '''d^&ttm GonBM^r^tlm'*^ 
tfeis me of the Qlmmmtu -^Icb fi€€doci to fe® bomed Is 
silnd itt af^liteg s i?t.ea>t to csLScv© & settlenefit.'^ Tii© 
Halted states dM not BC&spt tte imlfst Bmgi&mntB to tise 
draft beeamsa, s^qciMIe^ to Bit Plersi^ Diiioa, 
effect of is to ejissaulsts the draft 
resolution t© siseh m e^tmt thrt the rtso'tfeig proposal 
-m^M not l»e lSlsel|r to m^ k® @ cmtrlljutioa to thr- settlen^at 
of the Egsfemir 
TM« i^^wiBt esse iljG nat 
Sfea icoviet preirioiislj, %hile explfiiisiag 
view to tM C o m e I I , hgsi tls^st the .^.mimt 
w©»la against McZnnlm te tfm drsft 
resoiiitiGa of p^'oflsicsas whieti && not mrm&pond to 
tlie %mm situi^tim M tte^ j KaBbmlv -fetilch f s i l tij t^te 
tatii the v i t e l iuteiriista at the people ©f las te i r , 
or ¥hicli are at irariMis® vtite the priiset'.les ©f ttm lt,M» 
ffi® ©nereis© of ¥€to fejr the sti^rted a neyi 
chapter in. the and pciklstim lel&ticms, sines 
XfeMM 
the Doicn, had elvays beeaa aljstoialng fross 
voting on ^^solatloa an tlic Kastealr pJ?obl«!a in UiQ 
t-ec«rifcy Gooncil for tfce f i r s t tirae wsed i t s vet© powp 
to prevent & jpesolution froa bcin.|t passed, n resolution 
which mB by nnd yss fpiro«rab3« tcs Pfikistm. 
A new Lope prose in Isi^la m<i eh© f e l t that ^t l€ast cme 
country wo»2<i sispport M r case aad sine was soaiewjisst sat is f ied , 
veto wes welcoaeii VfiTloas ss leot ims nf 
opinion IB ladi®. 
me P - t . GOsi tise Celt tlsst the soviet veto cowld 
hevi? one purpose to **pefp©tiicte iatematicmiil eofi f l lot 
md GisseoeioB two of /.sis's g£eet eosmtrles'S ^ 
Berco S b his speech ia the £ecanty Coen^iJ. In ti^ ie 
megtteg Flrog Fiisn reaetSoa was aotevorthyi 
'•It %B swrprlsing to m th^t the repres^t^t iv© of tbe 
soviet Oaim should ergwe thi»t the- voice ©f India i^lone 
slioal^S decide fefeis 0st©t esa aot tfent nf Fskistm' ' .^ 
f h l s w s the l^Bisistaai r#s#ntrfie£it-
Kbatevor might h^ve fesMi the reactions in the ccj^mtrtes 
of the vorlti vith regerd to Soviet veto oa the rKsolutioiy 
the feet r®»«5in®c that ©s #» result tlie Il.ci-A-
f»v©r© of it® pesit loa iB aesling witli tbe Eettesir dispato 
^^th Session, 773ir?l Mtg., 20 Febriiery 1907, p.£S» 
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Ena the veto geve m entirely new tax® end shape to 
pi'oldcffl, LiBce tbeHf daailltjpgl&stioa fecieeiste the 
main Issae of cotftniet bettte^a tt « pr.rtles eoncemed. 
Isal^ was oppesed to aesiilltasissetlofi sad th© 3jtit!i?0awctioii 
of tbe force in KhsUvAr f©r the otirpose of unidsrtgki?ig 
\ 
a i3lfelssicit€fi vhlle PeklsiFtj. fesntei almost tot?.l 4e®iXl-
tsfisssti-'fi UQM md sn earl^ plebiscite. This was \hB <il3es®a 
is th€ aftersi?t!i of the soviet Veto thRt brought thV 
Gunnar 
or '/-i V- Jarrtog md Dr, Grshe^* s ©ffortE t^ ? 
tbc deadlock be twm tlic t «> coiantries, 
Ihe s&ssc ^iew point the r e j ect ion by I n d i l 
of the Couacll res^iufcioii^ o f So^esijer 106? 
fifid llie £©cepta0ce of tlie fedian ma iht- esssnoiseatsf'^ 
toy tbe cpoREors of the resolution s^oiaed of 
r± 
vord •a€'allitsrij5atlffa* in ihs rssoXutiou viileh 
was adopted by the LeCi^Pity CosascU m liecember 
By this resolution Dr. Grehem was autliorired to v is i t 
the subcoBtioeat mce siore la order to aske recoffltsendetii^ns 
to the t¥0 perti^s. sad to fomalete witiiiii tbre^ months 
"ea eerly sgrea^ent oa dssiliterisgtloii procedures". 
Ill Qdiiitloa to U s ©suhosis m a rctiu«tlon of forces oa 
the btslr of the relevant Security Geuaell resoluticns, 
the reeoltstlcsa elso pel»tcd out tnpt both I^dia ami 
Fekl&tai 'Tooofcfjtise md accept" their coasaiitniterit^  miier 
the iB4B mu 1949 resdatlouE whicii ©sviseged the 
holding of 0 plebiscite la Eash^ir* 
a . I M d . j mwmbet 27, 1967• ' fhe Union had 
threatened to use veto powr in cas® emendncats mm 
not eceepied, 
is^SASsiS't ^^-t fcupplc. for October md 0€se©p?t>er 196^ 
pp. India dia not nccept e^en this fsnenaed 
resolution. 
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tiidia Bot accept m^ yeaoltttian o f Bsvegj^r 16, W 7 
Ijecaasc tM^ rosolmttoii referyefl ^essilltarlfAtiop* 
Iindia obJectefJ tfeat instead ©f noting India's co i^dLatiRt 
o f turm&r resoitition gave giorai mpport 
to t^e Xt^ e f f e e t vm art isclteBSJUt' to 
to i ^ i c h If i^l i^ ooxtld a o t ofc^^^tinii 
Isj t^m SfM^t m s sado m "1s t 
t957 tfiatt 
^fhe state!seftts ©adf fey th® fe^resentatlv©® 
o f l^je p^fwr® In t i i e ^a^ciirtty 
Cgtsacii m^v tlist eonUime as btCor© 
to disregard t M pru^eist sitmatlou lia 
i rasteir . Hits TOT© ertdc^it 
in f i w ije^ier d r a f t rc30lati0fi« 
The iiaporta»t ttiiisg mu that the I n d i m Qplnlon 
J M i e t titg. S05t 
Ij lS^tf i t s fell agMit f o r 
Ill®si©iti of Urmmrn 
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wrote that Or. desslHtarisati^ e f forts were 
'^doosoa to mv* ^ 
In sce@pilsg tite ^a^opssias ©f Oraha??, i^issioti 
PaMstau liad ehaisged i t s stajid on Kashsstr 
m vitlidrs^al of l^e Faictstafi forces from lasteir .^ 
that m vfcicfc ha^ hem affectitig 
aljsost mery steee Vht^ chmge ca^eas 
a remit of tts ^olniing tfee estens aXlanc^s, 
The Indtep Uecesber 1957» In s ^ t e of the 
fact that lB'5ia expressed tior consant to 
C^ © tMtig is mte^rtliy here that neither 
Xnftis^  iier f m i ^ t ^ ^as satisfierf %ltli fcliell.8» attitude 
in the CQwemll tli®8gfe this United States* 
vas snBfJvisat ©r^wpaltist^. oft the prcjljle®, 
p a i a s t ^ i press was aia© on ac-^mr.t of ttin 
res©lt3ti©n. l^e r©solutlc« %m.B cabled a 
/wrote rfee g a v n ^ ^ f h e oiPlgtinal f i v e po^ar r^Soli^tlOB 
aid Eot go f i r ana the aifjsafeimfcs have 
yodiicad It t© aiwjst ^yttiX^^s doc^scut, the pc^^ls 
©f tl'is camxtTf b a w h^m fed m hopes thst a i l , 
M t tfee CoKjsuntst w&rld, sup^erta pak i s i c^ ' g on 
rasfeissir snd that 4ja Unllod Ratieas tlj© 
pov©rs f lTs ly t>F ?akl st^R hm& a ngh t to 
^ y t h e l a t ter s e ^ s to Jsa^ © le t us doi®," Yh.^  
Desasd^er 107. By a n eritleiam o f ^ 
Pot -^Brs, pskisfcafi wanted to iRflusRC^ tlie® to 
get til© acc^BBts ^tfe lufJia at an © ^ r date* 
IMa for m© f i r s t ttoc tfeat Kts^ of 
P^istois, speafeing in t^® p o ^ s t m Rational Asseelsly 
©fi 8 Harcii tfeyeatened to dtessrt the ©stem casp 
tmlcss tJie the U.S. ^ of fered p e s l t i w support 
to her ever the Kasbmlr diS|aite| md Pmtistm isiglit 
a l s o «8haic® hm6a vim ^ o ® ® peop le ^ o a r e ssietiies 
because of pacts". He tast^ t 
wiless t!ie asdiator Br» Grshis^ sonethlng by 
the mi^ of ^priX to fairther a sottX^ant of th© Kashmir 
dispttte, VQul<& cmstttBT i t s foreips 
poller. 
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But t^e I^issIqb^ TsftjTOi to iJ© s failtir© bee^s© 
India doiaa its proposrai ©f ttfee of 
a Forco on tfee '^Asaa** Kaslagdr to i^ tsnr 
Side of territory wfeicli Imdia ciais^ '^ d vas really 
a part of IttdiSj. effieiai position of Xis^ ia um " 
Qxpr&sam^  ofi ^ Apyll , at a |jre8S eonfei^ce thit 
eoBSidcratioa ©f this ^ l e i i ignofr-s eer t^ f? 
basie is^wea md m^^^mrsi to pit uf on the aaee 
lewl m is mt us not be 
aec<3|t®d by us**. Tfe iissjbted ^oi*© tvo i » »a l i t i®s ^htch 
to ha (t) i^gression and 
CS) I ascossi^ to triuis "if thes® things are 
a f e i t t oa other ©attersf e ^ be d i scussed . " ps^cist^ agre^^d 
to feetl^ me ©f forces m^X 
iiitroduett':m of ti^ops into Azsd icasfcssir by inststing 
m a J^clironlsatiom the of t&e Mil? of 
tndtm tovcm from as lai^i in ^ t II of th© 
UHCXF resoiatl-jB of %gaEt» 
IndiQ vas strangle c r i t i d s o ^ to^ o f tiia 
Slid the for the f^llir- of tb© Clr^ S!© eissiou, 
to© of t^eis \?it>tes3 in f l o iE l td l i ty ^ d intrtmsigenee 
Xe3?t of the Keport, s»W.tt©d m ^ Hareij 1958* 
in I3tte Tr., for Jamiarj-tl^jrsli, 
f g y reifc TipQS^ 5 Ap r i l , 1958.' 
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l s fio longer airected ogatust F-aSiistaii. Ifc Is <Sii*©cted 
agai f jst the tJnltsd Sat lons i t s e l f ^ * ' 
Fress reactions fco the of Br, ©rahas ntjt 
so ©itfc^siastie in Itc px^posals were cal iet hf 
an tndim newspaper as ^^feasieaily p i^pa ic is t^ l and 
Mschie^cws^"^ Tim ItiOian in tts lesae of 
5tfe %irll I95B, Itiat place aggressor 
ana tlise ^grievt^d on tisc uame p ls^e ^ g ^ s t s m tjntisisai 
approa^ w & Mghly coaty©irGrsial profel©®, sitspisr enough 
i f facetl tmt mrimB aijd coBplleafeed tn tiB context 
of ttiB c©ia fli® riiaes of India ' s feop® vas that 
the r -p jF i ttdglit '"tli® last ©f a siPles of 
in 
l\n iMportmt point afetjuM b© wmticm^ h^ve thst 
siEic« used i ts veto tii^ had 
that m©^© iB titoe Soenrlty CotmcH ^ich dia mt f&mnr 
India* s paBitim m tl?© Kas}®lr diaiaite, co^M fee fa i i^^ 
fey tlic w t o Tbere c^c? a dJmge In tli© 
attitude of lat® Hultcd State® s^d i t started to 
to«ehi«g KaStoislr ?fl9|jut© in tJnlted Btatl'^fis 
and aiso in ta^ e csttt sia.e i tth t3se e^slKg of tiie 
'Democratic Fr^s id^t loim F. Eeninedj", to the «hlte Mouoe 
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In 1961 a new trend o f l i b e r a l s t t i t e^e towards Itsdia 
s ta r ted So f a r as tfce ^ i i s j ^ r d isp i tB vas c m c G m ^ 
H^er© w r e Bsmo f-irideat instit^eir's tstiicli ccelif ra^Jke e l e a r 
hcv itie United S iates avoided to r^lsctiss tbG Kashmir 
arotolsffl brought a bet ter tiitd'-rst:^!^^^ arsd 
between the two countries - I f j d i a aud tiie 
i%% Ruring feis Yi^tt^ t© IfirJi® md F ^ i s - ® iu 
l3ecemt>eT 1959, tHe P r e s l ^ ^ t sa$,a tttat ha 
esuia diseaiss thfe irastigsir Issno vith of lu^Ha i f 
Ifjclla w^tea to d© J?© the Initlatitre wist eo®e f^m 
Ijndia^^ J ^ e s Haggeipty ©^plaiiiadi fact ^^t Vrsmtdmt 
i-iseTitr^wer had enplsisiefl Xs^ariftg . ashingksn that 
lie ¥as wot tm 3 n ^ t l a t j j i f feswr, latci^fore lie m s 
not ^Siig to tetke tlie initiative? In sudh 
^Itfeoa^ PajtistsB ^as optimistic tlsat t^^ Fresiaeat 
^gfet USB feis innumm md g-r^d o f f i ces m iil® 
t© flew Belhi the IJoirefumcnt of tndta $jn trying to 
ps^rsuaa© Iiiclia so t^e Rasfeair i ^ b l e ® sliss'4ilcl settled 
one© for and tftoy ha^ pr^smt^d Pakistisn*8 po3^ttion 
&n K.islfflir bttforo ttie Iresldont im a Ijong 
I t vas h i s tour. 
2m The statement vas ®ade tkio VMtc Hons© r-ress Secretary, 
C, t ' ^ g e f t y , in Karachi; m tscei^ber 8 , 1959 a f t e r 
-ffleilciSi i-resident had attentl^d'a eotif^renco 
session vith President /grab* Sse tte Hov Yorl? Tiaace, 
9 Deceisfeer 1 ^ 9 . 
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iRSpitc- o f tho thiBlciRg in p o l i t i c a l 
c i r c l e s m l u d l a f ^ a t f o r br inging I « : ! i a and pjaclstfii 
c loser tcig©tlier "TKT." m ^ use h i s g o o d - © f f l e e s \ n^^hm 
was/'jmt v ' i l l l f ig to i n i t i a t e taUfes o » lahQa f^s h^ 
to ainctiss thing ^Ith ilsenhovser*^ 
he aid not ra la© tJie fCashjslr i s sue duriiig f»rt?0id®t*s 
Bt^'f ifi Beeay.se freBiAmt ^tsmho^^r a id mt 
siipport a^d m&ept ttie T'-Jlcistcni on l a ^ i r 
flispwto tli® i josition "^^ ss w^lcoaed In tOfSia (m^ i t mn 
r ^ l a e i in I nd i a that "m® *m€Tt€:ms hme mv cm& to 
ap 'Tcciate Mr. %tBdbm In keoping Inii^ ^mS t i l l s 
r ^ l m out o f the sold ami that "any vay, tfcc 
limited States Soviet Onion are at present agreed m 
l e t t i ng I nd i a develop as a n-^n-allgfied e o n s e ^ o i t l y 
bet tor appreciatitm o f each otber^s protelesss betweei I n i i a 
m ^ tfeet l .S, 4 la^csasse cinaent^ md Mr^. a ^ s l t 
fecHi brottght I nd i a smd c l o sc r Hon aii^tment -
( 
hm^ hmmoT^ l3£?cn giirt-afi a new perspeetiv-« &f ^ ^ r l e ^ 
( 2 ) After the lacossing o f KtuKS^j^Prcssi^iaot o f th^ 
The f i n e s o f Indian 6th Hoveis^jer, ''959. 
The Hindustan Xiracs> 8 Ifedssbsr 
K mrga S>as, 'Ttj l l fclcal r-elhi Hindttst^.^ Startdardy 
8 l iec. , 
-Ihe H nau. 16 i^Qcetaber 1959* 
t.eisailtoa B.G^ fergl iese 4fi qn a r t i c l e to tltncis o f Indiay 
17 necGstoer 1959» P^feistSR coultt not ga in aeytshing^ 
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tr ip to pakistsfi m agaiu disappaijited iAm 
p « s3 asi^ l pjtfelie opinion in VSkt^tm sjor© than Go'^ renasKmt 
Circ les^ beeaas© T lce -Pr^ fS i^^t liad m t ^ r ^ s ' o f support 
fssr Fa^tstao m the issue of Kasteir. i-irea tlse ^ r a 
Itasfesir" was not amjiioued in the |©tet Coisaamlqae issued 
after t^jfes hetrnm Fresident Ehssi ©f 
f l c ® Kaisier JoliisJiors afd<S(! ttiat 
M s iRStn^tiofis imst Fresident EcmeJiy were to "listen 
imd lem** ^^ tisat h© couia mlf rel^ 
vlwB te fT^Btdrnt nmt trmi In 
o f l i b i w a i attitsu^© to in r^gQr^ to b w ai^imtc 
ov&r liaBhaiir FsSclstiWi was due t » the f a^ t that ?r€Sic1«sst 
ICemeC ai^i^s had teo^si Justice to Isd i^ . i^olieies 
IMnkifig* At pmQmt laia© he bais aympstliy f o r t n ^ 
atwS respect for hor poliei®®*^ 
Titis tii!^ pHkists^ attaekHig an^ aecusJn^ 
and IPskisti^ Tpri^Sf .Ivme 11, 19^1, ^as reportsd 
as saving "Ifc© S^^B^ay Mstoistratiem ©©u^t to 
tbe ecssB^Qlc gap betv'eefi t^^ n€dg3hbours fe ^ch a 
degree Mltisiatcly %fi not he l e f t with any o ^ c r 
altematiTm tsut to accept India*® Xeadership,^ 
% Mav yorii Timogf 
37 Kareli 196I • rhough Usero iiro-pakistan 
bmsto r s ybo had b e m attae^jing Xo^Sia t i e e aua again. 
One of Russell, Chairmen of tlj© Senate 
fiJenrices C^^sisittcie described as one 
©f %or l ea » s most c ou^ s t en t f r i end aod tUv J5elsyu 
as "a toogogwe and hyis^eilte," Xhld» 
c^et^dl SJS 12 J^me 1961. 
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(3 ) Pr©si(!©nt Keunefisr vm ucfc siac^ r€sp©nslife t© 
Piiki8t0i3*s r®fK<JSt for /mortem sup part in regard to the 
fcasteir dispute^ Ins tead , im tii® Join css^ftmliiae 
at tfi6 €*id of fresident Triisit to ^^astolRgtou tn 
Sulf 196tt t&emly afflra*;^ tfe© desire of the United 
States see si satisfactory ssluticfs of ^ e Ea^jfeir isatie 
tfc® hope ttiat ja'agress toward a settlesiasfct 
woBld fee possitel® at m ©arl^ date."* Tfee sources 
tadieated at of ' t l je talks tl '^at f resident Kesi^d^r 
had declined to tm^ m actiire it>le in settling tho dlspite 
KaslaAr, In spite of FTOSident request that 
taie help x ^ l d sot^® i^ra^ loog^sta^dl^g tsistv-em 
Ifidaa srtd P^istim, BirtlseraK>r©» the sam mnrcm said 
W s i a e n t of hB^ ri»stat«i! the United States* 
backlfig f o r a mpersriseS plebiscite in fcashslr, bat 
1Q.S0 feat! iirg<»a not t© ferlng up ftie ts^itter at the nojrt laeetlitg 
p 
of thu Oenerai ^seisfelf:,'^ 
In ad^Ltiea to a l l these cfimg^s Mr* Galbraitfe 
tte« l^i® ^bassatSoy to In^la saia at press 
eoiifercRce in Calcutta on liiSJt tiiat ncitliiig 
be wore s g ^ s t tlio policy thoii tho 
atgaiBst I n ^ a of m^psms g W n tm^er tlie &gmmm%m tJ.S^ 
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{ ^ w n M s s i i t fi©t t m t m y m W i n ^ ^ l a m d d e s i r e d 
t^jat teuflioB befcwen fafeistan Ind i a tfe s lu i is ised. ^ 
I 
( 5 ) F u r t l 3 © i % o r e ^ r i R g Hehna^s v i s i t to t h e 
in 1961, K^stJelr uss mt tij® Ij^twecsj Rehm 
m d tmmi^dff t t e u ^ ^ e y ©©Mia aiscui®® i f t S s ^ r©a. 
lissfcead l e l s r a ^ s g s o t l w s w r © F i r s t '^to e ^ v l f i e © 
® fiattlei suspicious mortem iszlJllc I n ^ i a i s not 
heading tovarfis S©iri@t HMor, in-^gerife to l^ssias* 
breafeiBf © f tl je t e s t ban m<i wneoficfeTwea about i t s c o i i s s m i e i c e s 
on Itie health and pea©^*" '-llie second -was an 
exeliiang© o f p o i n t of v levs^-dt l i Pr^sMmt Kenirscn^ th© 
forhapSj tSie - s l i i ^ t chmg© 4k ttits a t t i tude 
I M i a ths s fr#r of gsod-offices 
i^ieli aa^e in J^nary lis M s InttmrQ^ to 
President m4 Retire on J s m s T r "^t 
K e u n e ^ mUM b © ^ ^ ^ G o t r e m s e n t s to i n d i c a t e ttie^r 
vouM be ^TOeable to accept tiie good o f f ices o f a p^m I 
fsattjais^ Bxic^t^lm ts> Itetfc ©omtries^, l^e Ijetters w r e 
se«t ^vllfe tbo ©f oxpliriiiig to tk® o^yFavmssimtB of India 
m ^ V s ^ l B t m tfe© o u t H f i a s E®ia l e a d 
1. .Tbe .Stetommy 23 July, 1961. 
Hdifejyial - "^tm Miseiofis''-, Z M i * t Soiretaber 1961. 
3» laie Hoy York Tto^Sy J^inaary 1962. This pe r s^ as 
diseloSQd l a t e r , wm Eugme B lock, r r e s i d m t o f 
tlia ^©rld B^mlf, successfully racdiatedi the 
Conal Uat©r dispute betvecn India -md paicistan* 
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to a satisfaefeotT settlement of tlie Kaslmir 
neHxm re^ectc^ the o f f e r m Smrn^ff ^ t 
e^pl-lnet! on 2 Febmaiy tliat ladlit disliked as 'a 
oatter ©f principle mf third parl^ feecomifig ail>itriitoit» 
or m& t^eLt&r m i^me* Ee mm& i t Gtmr ^ a t aitliou^li 
Etigefi© Biacfe b^d asme ©Kcellcsit iM settling 
C ^ a l Water® "a ^ I M party eomB in ^^ere 
tms issue Qf sowreignty i s introlwdW In tliese matters 
oidy tfee tw© parties ec^icera^ c ^ tas^ aboat It* 
'"it aftar tlils mr t r^spmse" otsserved 
m tnMm cr i t ic , *^tliat Mr, feecs^i© fiotabiy eastious 
in MS references tc la^ ia mO. the impT 'Osion V.r. r.nohn^ 
Mmm^ was aof^atisig In^ia^s foreign p^ltey gmmii 
im m^ n^S^A^"" Md mat Had India hm^l^d i t di ' .ptecit ie^y, 
emld pat ^ ©isis of r& jmt im on Faieistaii tjy 
aceeptlfig tfecj p^^fosal on eoR^tion Ifcat no attmpt t/ae 
oaa© to rev ise paioMscit© lanS o t i s r ontdrnted m g ^ m m t B ^ 
Jnstosd, sugg«stica3 was aferuptly r®|eeteS I r Isdia 
h 
md <i»lcxiy accepted ^y Fsfeistan*." 
l&ISe Jlie®© l e t t e r s were sent ^ m fch© paMstas*® 
reqgiest (8^058, tt Sma&rf 196a> for a seotiitg of tfe® 
Security Cosmeil m fCasfesir vm pmaiRg* Icnncay mob 
ciulck fftoiigh in s^K^ug these letters as he was not 
wUUfig tfe3t P"kist3is sljould raises tfce issue ia the 
Couaeil. 
2. Keesing's Conteerpor^. Mpii^mn^ m i (1961-62), p. 
3» Re was regarded tm the '-estein Coiantries as a pro-
Comunist favouring fSb^ Qmttst xintcn^ 
Bhatta ^ n n Hj.ndli8t^ Tliagg!* Corrp^spondcfii 
in V asbiagt^n, vrote in a a r t i ^ e 'fe^Na Mindast^m - Times y 
10 JwXy 1962 xmder capt ion! 
Reach crit ical point." 
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The C. 3. reHisal to ^ y active part Su pxtttng 
pressure on Int^ia to e«?se to a settlement of Sii© Kaslioir 
aisfw-te witlJ P ^ s f c ^ aasf® paMstoa |sjt the ^^s fe ion one© 
» r 6 l a Seeunty Ccsineil s^sd tte r e ^ s a i of 
to accept th® o f f e r of tfee TJ.S. astaa Faffistan 
maeceed in approacfetng tli# DHiring ^bata in 
Seeurity Oeaneil^ onee again tlie {felegate 
'^t^rmsm sa^^sted direct tiegotlati©i3 bstvsen th® tm 
parties. Be tlsat vm "eoniiliice^l that a 
t i l ^ Gofifer©iis# Ind ia m^. tsDU'ld 
enslli! tlie parfciss t© aseertaiu tlt« procise areas of 
disagrc^iaent tndaee a spirit of coraprasiefi,^'^ 
llie delegate did not fsat fortSs his support to ewy 
©onercte action on tlie part of the Secfurlt:^ Coiaseil to bring 
mmt d«rallitapiiBatlofi a pl0telscite i s Kmm%r» J^ather^ 
Wm tisCfF resototions of iagmst 13, 1^8, 
January t ^ fctiat tlieoe roJiolutton® pro^de i^e best 
starting point for sol-slng tfce Kashsir-
Once again, ilse So^e t veto mer tho I r ish draft 
resoltiticm^, of O'une 1962 In me Security 
CoiKicll, gme ch^ee to th© overt^aielEitng and Pairistani 
tmt in I7tii Tr^, ^Hipsas, for April-Ttme ig6S 
p. 
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critlelSB of India nod tbi^ Soiriot 1Jnion« 'Oie iroto was 
tisctf h j t^ te Sottot tlKlos because of India's orpos i t i® 
to this resolsation, fJie reproseaatatlve^ K r i ^ a 
Meuoa feed fo i t stmiigl j Ijecawse "Xn passing 
tlje r^soiMtioB i t v-njL iimt ais<2Jsargliig a du^ 
tfesfc v l l l ill mf vay l^e mrpsses -which tsativated 
i t* Besides^ i t i s mt til© tectic® of the Seearitr Ctssmcii 
The uncosnsitted 
cmmtri-ss in partiowiay shonM fi©t liov bscosje p ^ i e ® 
eltlsor or a^tiir^ly to ^^  nssolMtiofl of this 
Mr. ^^hm compl^ine^ that tli© pt^wera %/sre 
ali!B©8t a g ^ s t Iis^Sia m asatters that created 
p-assioiiate f « e l i m s iR tfeo ©oiastry*^ 
a wfeeiasiit r^aeticfH ^ th® ©f ir®t© hy 
the IKiSB was ^oisei in the Qe^efsmc^it aftd press critleises^ 
Koijowad Aii that tlie Bm%et "^eto appeared 
t© hi® as a laattercf faet regret great 
He cr i t ica l of itjs Borifit m-to sMd that "the Indo-
Boviet a^ i s has eisceSQiled t&roia^i po^er p o l i t i e s SBII i ^ e s sa re 
Ha^ya os&hs, 23 lisue^ oee Fprolftit Aff^i jrs He<Sord« 
vol. 8, 1962, p. 116, 
3. Tb© matters v®re life© Goa Kasiitnir. 
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fcactlcs in p^rstiadifig neutral c©im tries t© ^tiidlS 
support m such m i x ^ r t r n t qoejstiott,"'* 
Y^iaef* cr i t ic ise was notewortliirj 
" V - e s h < m l < 3 s p a r e m r e n e r g y o n g ^ t t i j f t g 
sngfT ^tie tlRion f o r i t s veto* 
I f there I s m t t© he ^ g r y with, 
i t i s ^UT f f i ^ c S s m d a l l i e s . Utjt ©Rly 
ha-ve ^ m e p r c v i c m s l y l l t t l © to 
b j a s i l c - B i i s e a t l e a i l ^ , they mr^ cesTscting 
witfe Wpiofi to vooing XnSia , 
iB tlie Unites ais© tSi^  critleism of India 
becagi© tlie sajjs tasfe ©f tfe© "TOrlc^ ipr^ss. The Beu Tol^ 
I'lm^^ coMieistea e ^ t o r i a a i y t 
'^Xfe© ^pport of Irisii re8o2ixti»n 
lias eates©^ F.M. BeSira to ccsmpl^r. Tshessently 
India, fis® im^^mtskt ^ o a %d.ll In tMs 
eosntry toifsrds India i s pi^bcQ^ly less 
vlds Sj^ead m^ befor©* Bot cleai^y 
tiier© gas disapisrovai aad disax^potntiseRt 
St aose a^t ioss i R ^ a tskm reeentir^ 
notsbXy tier resort ^ aggression in Soa 
reft isai % s^ttieKent ©is tfie K^fSlasir 
issiie» Sa l^tfe cases India d^s^ed her 
iiiasge ia tMs esisBtir at t^© time 
weskeaed tli« pss^cs-keepifig ^ d . d i s p a t a 
settling ©f me H . l , "3 
the Hew rork Herald f r i to i e vas 
reported t© hwe said Krlsdjua nmon m^j decciiD 
Misself ^ d Mr* lelirtt iato belicirteg tliey scored « victofy 
l I M s t ^ , nmm^l. I t 1962, 
r ^ i t o r i a i t "Tfee S©vi®t iTeto'^, .Paklgtari Times, Jtm« 196?, 
Ifeis tiae als© P m s t ^ vas mn&pmt of intenti^^BS, 
3. Qttoti?d i!5 the Indian lacierees. 27105 Jime 1962, 
. m • 
m the But the Btasfeair issue, for 
^ t t e© hmME i s litaraif Faidlst^i iM trftrng 
^ t h the idea of fliJ^ting Couammiet CJilaa to o f f - s e t 
Indians na.rtatlo?3 with Hua^ia. Comsmtn China, as 
India fesfi xearsed t® i ts sori-eii'^  'io^s sol fee l o^im ?^ W 
the 1^3? f o r frantiays^-, 
me y^ assfaiatttoit St&r^ i t s issue of ^tme I ^ S 
criticixeS Sehjra «ts '^Qn© of the isost lempoiaaiar ©f ^ e worl i ' s 
that tti© ai«| ©tlier liad Iseeo^ 
'•quite fed ttp" vltix Mis. 
The IfiSiati prmBf bmim not&d s l l these erittciss}^^. 
concluded tb& facts find this %ias tteliUflng of th© 
•Pie^illpd^B^^ fil^i^s* Gorrc^trndrnt in va^Mngt^ii tljat "vit^ 
Hf• Kism-P IS© loiig«r atnsBglF for In^iia, 
trsda-tionax forcos ^ p&Xitics cons is t ing o f milit^r 
tacticians, oM-sctool aiptenats aad aisapiisiiiitea ideal ists • 
took thm off®3Siw« Speeches Sis Cof^ress newspaper 
CDSsiBttts shasr^ ea^tleai of Jntia. cstepaifn 
Mim helped by reports of I ndo - ^oWt iscgotiatioss for 
fighters m& Eomtijig distiRist of tniHa's Defence K iu i s te^ 
Bat the aggressiOT in India changed the 
atrosphe*© asdi these CTtttelms mt hesr f -^ r rea i^ ing - • 
© f f e e t s . 
% --^ Jit Bhetfea "Inao-U^S, Belatiois® Bsacfc Cr i t ica l 
P o i n t . « ^u l y 1962. 
^ S2B • 
piiu mh mm: 
I 
t'itli tlie Chinese at^'.aclt <wi'Ifi<lian t e rp l t© !^ tm 
Octo'feer a my chapter starteS tn 
relations and ais© iti SRd J yelatloiss 
over Kas|jBir» iilutje mm th© Vmi States eeased to 
sapfort P^lstJ^ liearte«lj, as oefore, m th® Fasfisir 
a ms iat ®f the finsis f - ^ B t ^ i the 
got success in iisltiatiog direct m^gotiationis fe@tw€rt 
l l l ^ a F ^ i s t ^ ©n i i s ^ t © ©f i C a ^ i r . Thi? U .S . 
ssilltsry E d^ to l&'^ia aroused bitter ent le i s© iis l'ai?istae 
aurl referral ttte qaestiisn of to 
l?!^ ? Sesiirlty C^iascii feeeaase of the faijjyire of f11r©ct 
rjegstiatior.®. I^ ls sas© a fact tliat F^ s t i ^ i t r X ^ 
cmwlme Chisa a®(5 feod a temiaai^ a g r e ^ ^ t vitfi tt tmXf 
hmmm of tiio fact feat the isllitary aM %'ag cxt^tSea 
to India billets tn irlew added to I ts defcRce burd^s* 
Ihe ^ ^ Britisto as3ist§»ic© erne t© Ifidia ^ as 
to Indj a caps^ia of facing the ChMm^ attain. Bmt ' 
pafeistajn estild not isear i t as me bacm^ afi^aid of In-Usm 
iBllitary str«»gtfe after receimtig the sailltary aid fro® 
the and the Britain, % ^ r i c m vritor fso^Jitea mit 
tliat insfistoa throiighout this period tlhat at<! to 
India jshowld not bo of such a ©aptitude aa to upsot tfe© 
feaiaiice betmm tl^cs, md mre iir^rtJintly, tfeat tia© Kastelr 
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dispute mrnxOA Us settled m th© for shajteg 
up 13ie defence of India^"^ 
V'liile India accept' a m^ apt^recta ted tlie extern 
0.S. ffiSiitai^ in her ©e l f -de f^ce , eiai^asls 
aitt logie to fe© that the eutl jro^ of Slm-lnaiE® t^ai-
ifi 1962^  presented pak i ^ t ^ ' s a l l ies uiVti 
tiie sost ©ijportaHif? isoia^t t€s ^pply their prc-ssare m India 
to to a sett3,©n^t F%ist% over ^.asia^ip.^ 
the settlement sli0i22d b& rmrfs fmrmr^blB t© P ^ s t ^ , 
Fresidmt Kesnedy*® l « t t « r t© pfesident at the 
md of October 1968, vaa th© f i - s t W^S^ e f f o r t to ©^tract 
assur^aice from tljat i t voui.i mt m^m my eortr© 
in Easfesir as leiig as host i l i t ies lasted 
Meaiise l ab ia ' s power position Ctiifia sight fee 
affeetecl as a result ©f Fa^i^t^asi new BH t^os 331 Kas i ^ r at 
^ a t tiiQB, I® M s letter , E f^ineds^ "argedt ttet the t-yo 
couatries • India fafeistaa drew together if! 
called^, was a mmmt of cotwti peri l*^ But p res id^ t 
in fcis reply to tlais cofmaasicatiofi, 'was reported to hare 
talseii a ^'fina l ino" •iris^a.vis the Tsilitajy ai<! to 
India declljned to giire aasy assurJsnee o » Kasttgjir» 
1, I'tmk II. frager, vmis tmi A Faijtire of 
Diploiaaey", Orils^ U (Pail^ 1965), 
Th^ Bev Yofit Titat^s^ J ^ y a y y %% I963. 
31 October 1962. 
l^a^y Howiaber 
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l o t k f i s ^ s . Sfi i t s i s s u # o f fidrecfeer 19, 
the re|s>rt frets I t s correspo^deBt In Karaefci, 
Tt^ that ttier® ^ s ''acut© 
in tfee GoiretmeRt and &mng. t3i© people Cof P^^lstan) 
tai^fc mm J^i B r i t a to fa i ic ja t@ p i t preasare ©n Ind i a 
^ a t tym apportam© «o®ssit to reacti ^ s e t t X ^ ^ t wilti p% i s t an 
o f til© eest lona i i l ispit® o^er i^© eantTOl (£ la^t jdr . *^ I t 
was, pyob^l i r * Sir response to tfels ^issipf&iMtmmt that i n 
nev^er I962, ^m tiie htgto power delegatlois fr^m B r i t a in 
United Statss to to discuss %hB arsss 
requlrmef i ts o f In<lia, ttje^r a lso nf^cmm suceessf i^ In 
, ps rsua i las Wio <loir®rfi«iit o f I ^ a t s to reopen negotiat ions on 
tfee E^ lu s l r spiesticso aud otli©r i m ^ T t m t pf^bleiss 
p s k l s t ^ , ^ t^at tifgo tbe ciftiSfj ^ht^h tl?® 
f®r fr^Sh n©iot iat i ^ liicr©asifig t m West* s eapacltF to 
InHmefiee l&lRklfis In W w Beifel, was the t i w s i t u ^ t o a created 
W t^© ChSaese ijfuraslc® o f l isdla. oa Koirc^er a d r a f t 
h 
aano\nQfC«m«nt' was i ss^ea s isolt i^n^tis iy item hoWi Hew B^ltii 
aiisS Bavait^isdi, s y r ^ ^ d u g tliat P ^ s t s n i f r e s i t e t m6 
1, fhe CoizRoawaith 
Secretary p f Br l ta i f i , Eyssean eena tlie tJ^S, 
^issiStJmt Secpet^^ry o f State , fmiTBXX E a r r ! © ^ « e r e 
ah© two filploisats ^ ^ bad e f f o r t s t© g©t the 
©f tsotii the GoTreiroents i d ^ regard to tl^e 
s t a r t i s f o f tfcuae fi®gotlatlof5S* 
tisc priise Miiilster had agreed fco ls©14 taiics m 
Kasbiaif sasd related o^tters after i s l t a l dlsmsjstes at 
a ainietertai leve l , 
X&e ffilnlsterial taHfS^ tti© Fs^istan 
1®?! b j A» Etotto m^ tti« iR^ian <5®legatioR lioaa^rt lif 
aaraar Bumrm Singb pnsro^ tot?® ^^  f^lnri? aftei? tht six 
rmm^B ^f held tfi f^^istsn aisa luata 
dasiBg Bseceb®!' 19^2 a Jolfit ©o?®®®!^©'^ Issued 
©s May ^ ^ 1963, t ^ parties recorded with that 
tio agr«@i3€st co»l<l l^ e roscb^^a on a ©©ttlesaent of ftasisrslr 
Tft I f i ^ a ^ i s did fjot ciiiM? as a m r j ^ m ^ .Ute Indi^, 
« *« I ts "py^viscstivft 
aetlon jte siinSJig tfe© toier agre^iseat 
wtjeR the Kashmir talirs liad Just t© 
tmacrlSiae Pi i i i i ' s tmc intcntioiRS^ 
rjiercf was a smng^ I t 
ifos a fawouratile os^ idiicfe pilrl^tas to n& pn0pficts 
for m B&wly settlaaent of the ptd^lm. ©f Kasiasiir* Mother 
i»lso a«e Jfehrii's Qtsttmmt in tlie I^ls Ssfeha on 
13 Aigttst, 1^3 on theae r lntoteriai talfejo, foreign 
'^m&t 1963, pp. 
uinmntm Yioeat ^ 1963* 
3. mJsto^JaffiSiSt ^Hay 1963. 
- aae -
factor m ^ be cit©d bere. Bi© eftanged atfcit^a:© of tis© 
,tri5ited Sta tes , on tbe Kaste l r p r o b l ^ , was, as Ind ia 
'' " 1 
l ^ ^ W f l l t » toeemsse ©f tis® '^Fait f U r t n t t m witto * 
m^t Sine© lisdla efit^re^ the present series of aiseiissiotts 
^^ith F ^ s t s a oYBT Kasiiralrt tu term ^fV^B^ m^eratrndingf 
I nd i a km m&dQ gmiB md Fmitstm hm l o s t growid. In th© 
©ptaioft ©f obsoinrers im me i t i s largej^ 
^ e i s coBseisus that ttsis fesd happeaed an^ S F«Mst«fi B&s 
a g ^ stepped tap her aiploisatic lasd piiess otrmatrB agaisst 
Is^ia m^ aencefortl^ C«>i8simist Qsiiia hmmm 
m additioaai ©bst^ l© $n tfee ©f tfco settlement of t^e 
Kashmir d i s^ t© becQtis^ tfee d e f i e s lud l s agaii^it CMfisse 
attaclc was tit© ©afii objective i t ' ^ ^ e d 
to tc^etfeer Inaia ana pi^ists® hmmxB^ tlse 
vas,, as was ©ade cl©ar hy Bowles in »5at the 
mtmce mnM l>e a l e t easiis^ i f ^ s © two m m t r t ^ i^iiia 
togetlier", md that botfe were ^rainiBg 
R REFIOISPCES IN A^nta in i ixg s i l i t a r y FOPC •^ S OB the 
1, Easwar Sagsr, tfee c o - r i ^ p e m ^ t of the Bl^du in 
wotc in an artic3©. ftie Hindu 12 .%igiist 1963. 
a. Kaswar aigar. "'Iisdta P ^ i s t ^ j Chmm in tteiuking*' 
Ib id , , 7 April 
3* SiJIiaSBt ^ -^^ i^ t lo'^ les* TtKclnation as 
iireT^^Bbassadbr to Jnaia vas by th© Sen^to 
Foreign BelaticsriB Cossslttce o?i 30^ 1963, 
. S27 . 
Iftdleas were relesied, es T.V, P®reswp«® vrote la 
& letter fro® i^merlea^ to the ymlfaa, Express tliat "^hmK^ 
to w&klwim^B iatrnas lg^ee, Seslnair i s m logger e sr-Jop 
In eontext of Indo-ZSaericefi relatSoas. For the 
f i r s t ia th« 14 year history of tiie "disspote" It is 
Ificie, Pc'kistan, tto^ is rer^rded as s reusonabl© 
party, les.^i by laport^Qt /JdeiaistrstJoa lesders."^ In 
til® dfespt'tcfe hopf s raisc-fi tbist "n prime bssls exists 
for tfo® oai^erstfsaAg betwea the end India. Indi® 
hss opportsmity to pisy h«r cai^s directly eaa 
fo tbe present day the problem 0f Eesteir rffiseios b€itmen 
la^if ' liiid ?ski@t«8s* i t i ther the United ctates^ sor ih© 
lftiit«a Matiims, nor tfe® fiegotiatic^s m^ Ml^terml telMs 
hetmm tfe® tig© parties - IMi® m^ Pakists®^ aor the 
medi^tim md goo^ o f f i c e s hc-m hem able to &&ttl& the 
dispute . Bvm the sSev&st&tSng m^ml^r^ mr in 19^6 
b8tv«©a the t¥o ao«ntri€6 faJll,e4 to tering ebowt s final 
solution* Liase th^m, tbe oegotiati^ass hpve fa i led- iow 
the DOVi€t tJoioa hes decided to g im isiiitsry eid tsf 
Pekistsn in July 196S. 
^fter havlag f g i l ed to brteg the parties^ India 
end P6kist«aj toe«tl}«r tl5« Osnit«it States lies no^ gtartea to 
i M t o - S x E m S t 28 Mey 1963. 
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iBBlst OS blleterel negotist Ic&s so as to resolve th© 
Eaehffilr problem. 
fhe ebow fiiac^aat md dinmmsiom m fehs Kastelr 
problem sjoke It tliet la^il© is sot going to accept 
the mlutim of th« Kesimir problem beyottc her nstional 
Interest m4 prestige, fhs OnitM states or asij^  ©tlier 
?5oiifitry ©rmot fore® e of t^e dispute s^hlafe is not 
acceptab le to l o d i a . l o w p l e f e i e e i t e and i t f ^ r l M t i o a 
®r© not tfe® issuea before ia4i® rather tto© liberation of 
AtM fcssiimir (pert of Kisshs§ir-.la<lian territory) from the 
olwtt^es ot Pakisteia is tfo« oaly issm- t^ feicfe 
eoiasMeretion. 
aiAPfBB ? 
since the Saceptlm of the Pfeklstaa isllitery 
fJIignc© vlth tlie UftltM States ia th® sointioa 
of tb© profol€si0 twees la&ia aad Pakifitaa besom© 
d i f f i cu l t . If not iffipos^ible. Because of ttm fect 
that the Uliance has, since thm^ feeea estoitteriug the 
f r i ^ a i y f^iaiioas fcetnesa labile m i th© on tlie me 
b ^ d pad toetveen ludls md Pakiatfisa m tfae o t l » r . u.&, 
Military Pr^ et with Pe&istaa ch^ugeil tbe wiiole eontsxt of" 
tM isKwes existing IsotKeca ttm tvo countries India 
md Paklstaa^ ss tliis alicraaant of Pakistan with the Caitecl 
States, me of the tm seper powers of the post waf worli, 
s « t tff ® focal point of 0014 li^ isr tmsloa right oa India* s 
horaers* 
In th« eerly post-war period after th® laain 
elm Isefore the Hiilt^di Ststes was to caeirol© coataiu 
the Comcsi!ii8t lefid-snas in Surs&la* ini^ia rna Pakistan 
were th© t ^ iistan coantrles «hiefe might m iraportiait 
role, itilylsg theaseli^s irith th# la l i s fight 
agolfist Somoaiem* Aftcsr th« wlthdraital of the British 
fro® the iRcilfea awbeontlneftt iji 1947, th6r« exlstetS e power 
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vscOTB in the area the Urbm ^ eafeM to f i l l it ap by 
©llylug le^ie iteeZf ©p.alnst th« GommniBt eoantries. 
^t the Use of fear iii4©pesdmc« to 1947^ ladle hud declared 
herse l f iaQiJ»alipi€<i m y o f tlie tiiio p o w r hlocn 
mB ao t v l l l i n ^ to s M e with tte© b l oc . i:he l e s t hope 
of the m s torn svay Keisra, f a r i n g his v i s i t 
to tli« HfS. la Oetolser med© it © l e ^ , both Iji his 
pub l i c speeeli®s and Sa M s pr ivate t s l k s , that India 
not herself wltfc oae bloc egainst the 
otiier rebels f^llowiisg mi iis^^pencleat rorelga 
j^oliey.^ Certi^Snly, tfc^ he^ms f e l l f ^i£appolate<i with 
tfae l a d l ^ sttltod© to it^ policy of fr^ rmS^g a ring eroasd 
tils GtfmmnlsZ couatriss fey aei3®s of liileteral ol l ima^s pmx 
teu^im&l Tills policy vm « part of tlJ© ^ e r i c m global 
strategy* fb© COTiaijaist ©irerthroM ©f the Ustionslist 
OonfemaeBt i a Qhinw^ tu ^^ t© that f©ars o f the 
!3ijit©<S States stressed tlie neea o£ tise to fiad out 
moi^ t s l l i^s te tliis regloa ot A&Ib*^ 
2 . fbe same y e a r ferotsglit t h € ©tio. ©f tifes teerl^oa i l tonic 
loiaaepolir ©s i t wes Ijrok^ii by lii© Koirlet tTni^® l a Septeafeer 194 
3. Previei3sly» la ttoe perioji a ft « r the of tte 
wer Ataerle^ l>olley Sa East eaa £ioutli Asia i^ as bai l t ro«R«i 
the eonc«pt of colleboratl<s» with Chla©, mtSor tbt lecdershlp 
of their eiiy^ ChJcng Kei-sfeek. fia^riag tbia period the 
dl<l oot experleitce say special fc&re ©oncehjlag a possible 
exteisslos ot iJo^lct lBn««ac© la ladifi. Bather it wes the 
security of Westens Sarope lad to e lesser extent^ of %;est 
Asia tbnt vlrtaslly moaopoIl^eS jiajsrioca attention. 
Vcaakffitareaaiii with the collabcrfitlaa of Earlsh CbiatKirs ftrya, 
"/aerie®* fi M l l m m iilth Fakistsni Tlie EvoltJtioa Course 
of m TlaeRBy Psrtnership", „ » vol* a 
J^^lly•October 1966, heta Publishiag Hoose, 
Sew J5e3bi, 1966^ p. 7S. 
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SSace Sefersa ©ppearedi to the es semsulist 
fiati»/4a€ricia md the thoMgfet th«t In^ia ¥oul«i not 
agree t© foe lallitisrils? with i t , the elteiastife 
before wss Psklstars, whibh Important for the n.s. 
itt buying strategic bases fgatest the possible ciicpaaslm of the 
OoffiffiUBist powr.* 
ffte Hortfe Atlantic trmt:^ Orggais^tloa in 1949 wss 
foissed te th© sector es a of «siitl»CoiBS»Bist 
^g iosa l <ief©aee eystt^ ©f the 0!islt«ci stetes world 
In the sistem £«tster the deffaoe treaties with 
J epca, ffoallsad, faiwaa, tM plilltpplaes mA Bmth Eore®, 
Bat iJi® isonthem Sector, aossppisisg tfe® MtMle Egst aad the 
Bontfi iigien eeautrias m m strat^gleally importeat from 
tbe 4siericsa view poiat^ was s t i l l sndefea^e^^ Betwea 
Eastern m^ K^str^rr. flisllimcs tfeer« wee e g»p 
to be f i l l ed tlint ths jjoSiey of the contsSaiaettt 
of CoiKsmiss Bigbt feocoae sueseseful, Amrl^mn ssw that the 
lonAisg ^ab sttt«E were ^iisy with tJieir pr#oec«p0t?,on 
« i tb ler^el, md tberefore, were not inellBei to listen to 
tbe Western reesonlng of brSaling tbes® eo«atri©s into ber 
« l l imo® BfBtm in dcfence of the •free . fbey slso 
isae® thiit Indis ¥as *po88itively* n«utr« l . In sneh ©irciirostcnces 
the B^L^ rofaitod tliut tbi© $ep eouM only be f i l l ed up ^itb 
1. Cbskravarti. .x^ia.. SoeflKfi.,^,MerlsEL^ p* 130. 
2. ^long vitb HAlO, tbe I4arshsl3 Plan 1947, md the fmrnm 
metria^ 1947 wre the other sjeasares imp3€aci3tea by 
the in this 
I t s filigiiTOist yitU tlis three non-iireb Mesli® f tomtr ies 
of Turkey, xraa jad rBk l s t s a . Ii^aq was the oaly 
^reb eomtry whleh « e s w i l l tog to sid® witli tlie v. ©stern 
I raq with ^fghariistea f o r m d ifm •uorthern t ier* 
nt the Hiacile ^^st teafedi^tely terdarJnp e few s l l e s sw&y 
from sov-iat t c r r i t o f y . to order to bo l s t e r ihe defenc© 
of tfc© &otitfe«H2 tlie essaoraged, po s i t i v e l y , 
s l l igna® eisong these f o a r Kiddlfi Eastern coe s t r i e s . 
Apeft from P0klB%m* B s t r s t e g i e ifflportaa<se f o r tfoe 
Hm rfeletioa to th® of th€: Mi^ isHe Isast, the 
©sstem vlufi of Pakistm forms tli® Westei-a bsnja^as-^ of 
QO-atlieast Asia. &o Pai^istaR eawM isseia e l iak bctwees 
tbe Soatfceest ^slfiR ead Hiddle defeace s^p'stems*^  
Borth-West md Eaehsslr'e innd&x- Pskistroi 
control) proximity to Agis, pm^ Bast rsKla^sa's 
to f i be t gM border hsd feeea othm* etratcgio 
rmBm^ for Am^ifsm Interest in isc^vtog b a l l i t e r i ' »311raca 
with PaMstfca. 
Pakiiitan*® thjaklug f^om that 
i . For Setsl ls of Pakistan*® strategic md 
vslae SS6, lord Birdwood, "B^flc-ctions on Fafeistea 
to intanaatiosfil an .pnertft^Iy, 
(Sprtag^ 1955), p.6, Also « « « - He.w York, fis^sy 
February S, 1955 - C . i - iulsj^rger*s ©rtlcle. He cel le i 
Pckistcas e abstirdlty" bsat of Sismense 
strategic tad g6o©0litlcal Viloe. 
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Of the She did m% feel m^ threat either ide^logiosl 
or territorial, t rm m^ of tb^ Coaajaiiist povers. Keith 
Collara*r. reiaarfe seems t© fee rlgfet to s Gei'tiiia extmt tbot 
as f^r RS tlie iusslogtosl r i f t betveea tfee Ccpitallsin 
md tb«5 Soviet Coaaanisjs ir®s concerned, 
••raliistsa ha® no strong eosvistioas 
the fealfiaee of right«owsii6ss.«* 
But PaiEistsai fears vgtb fether thm ast 
ladtR cad AfgbeaSstafl mre beiog sappopt^^d ^f the 
OfiioB ia thei? disputes vlth PaKistsa. though^ the Zmt&t 
aid not itn w ight toehtod India end 
4fghsai©taa opmls tfe^ .^DiiP iftfE tlgnedl by f&klBtm 
the lifiitesi Statef, sb® was « t l « e s t , alv-syfi sfapsthetie 
teigsfds tiiass. 
Bvm Sosaiucist in Pakistau*® eyea wm not 
daag^rmie, thoiig^ Psklstfa hud s^tiGM slogcu "Hladi-Chtel 
Bliai Bhfii" lo iSSO©. ^oiammist Ciiics hsd bmeo, mfuBing to 
tske sides %rit|s ladle es far m ttoe lado-rskieteni ciisptites 
were emmmed* I t was cl€«r tlict wh®tso«ver tbe apprehensions, 
Poklstsal Icgfllershlp hod from Ctoinese md B&vUt quarters, 
were not so ssuch becsus© of tii«»lr being Coaisajnigt comtrits 
m tbey seemed t€> be tiie result of their close relations 
with Xa<iio Afghenietaiii Pskistsn* s neigisfeo-Jfs wltb . 
Yorit, i9S7), p.17. 
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wfeoa peEistea he<l l<Hig stending disputes. In Psfc-ictaii* s 
fox^eiga poliey, the jspia dmger vms fro® ladla, 
Fr^jp, tht "imtj bssl^jsl^sig tjf lo,^ spea^mc;®, Paklstm 
ysiS faclljsed be v^ry frl^sxaiy '^dth tiae 
PsEistss ss^ that i t res In&lm 9t3Mm Mljalster F^ahr^  
was g3.vm pit^fmrme^ to v i s i t tfe® ti.fv. te oatofear 1049 
h^amiffi^  fh*^  f t r s t .axtss^^d ijsvitf?tSoa 
to offistj?! ^ i f i t * trtsd to irav 
tls€ IJ.&1. sttmtloB towas^a her, ^ f o r a S^-tei kss invited 
the for F^tslar Bebsion 
had ileeltirei is O^gtofesr thst thn sad 
© tSMleT taeologicsl isa thf,t .vakistesa 
oeirer CoiaisHiaisr®.'^  f i a n c e Mii!iist«.rj 
^hsmmed, spoke of Paklstea's ©f lisi^rlegQ t^olmlolaas 
t0 fc«lf Jut of i ts Jjadostri®! ^I^v^lopmmt.® Pakistsal 
a^wtioa t^ the ©msttty of fri'^ntsi ^sat^rps'lzG tes 
h&m s® stroag th»t tfes juaericca ^tmm i^. IfisiSSMJiSSfe wes 
to mf that ellmist® ferulgR imestmmt was 
io Feklstea thm in lisdig. 
In 1060, Prime KiRioter, llaqoat jlli Khan's 
v i s i t to the ses^ad m iroport^t purpose in ian«feQcing 
1. fcak^ta^aseal, M.S. iftl^i^ayiSaJil-ii^Mtl* vol . 8, 
ios* i -2 , Jol^-Ocitober, IS©©, p, 
IliigJIi^SLXMiLlimfit October 194?. 
Bofiliieas A^ e^k (Nev Tortc), October 25, 194?, p. 109. 
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t&e Aasericms* m pmpomm^ v P e k X s t m * s ^eteapmlaetioa 
to oppose aggressitm md showed liis devotion to tUe 
eaeoiiragemeat of private aatarprise. Fortlier^sre, fee aai© 
i t elesjp tli©t eoaisiiBiisiB was ineoo^atlble witli Ps^istsa^s 
Xaessic way of l i f e . ^ I'fce result was a asos?© fevotireble 
respoBs® fro® the Aiaerio^ Coiagr#ss m^ t^e press tlimi 
policy of a c a - a i i ^ e a t * His viens were ®ppr®elat€d 
by the a® "feeart wsresliig".^ 
I t ¥08 Paklstm's ef fort t© draw Aaserlcas attantioa 
towards lierself dariag tfe® Eoreaa war fey ejctcadiag her out 
spokm support t© tfee sad, coMesaliis Borth Eo re^ 
aggression- i s tbe feeginslsig, Asseric^s did m t pay 
e t t^ t i oa to the attittiie of V^ iB^m rethtr thay were 
l»usy ia applauding lii4ia of liar aoceptsnee tliat 
3 the gggresfioa had feem oomlttcfl by Sortii Kor«@» E l iMS^SB 
in i t s ia@ua of JulyX^ ^^SO, appraelata(3 ttie 
of G^ahi »*efi4 tlie aaaaer l a i t s Govemsmt h&a 
mtowm^ thm ^ l e e of sjsji-ltlad^** At tb© sasie t lae , la<31a«s 
ebstaation fro® the vote mi the "miting for rasolatlm 
Sea for details, sprachae la tha •Liaqttat A l l 
Biiaa. .ASjLfi^  tCao^rldga, Mass*, 
p* 
2. May 1950-
|>ld« y June ao^ 1950* 
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In the Q.H.^ idcntic^ letters^ to Msifsliell 
Joseph Btelia of th^ Soviet t^Rlm^ F*M« Clemeat ^ttlee 
of Britain sad President Hariy framea of thm urgifig 
n mA negotiatiaas in as ee the 
setting of tfeo th& Pmple*& E#po1s21c 
©f afelae showed A^m ^soeriCrfa entlmgiag® fos ladia , v iiod 
the pi?©possl ves l>y tfe® ipOr&tnTy of Sean 
3 
j^chesoa. 
In cctiBtraet to Ihe XaiSi^ attituSet the s m H e m 
policies in Koree imr© trigoroosly supported toy ttie Psl^istani 
delegate to Ifee P^W.*®, Mobasaad BaJtrtillafe Efeim end P.ll# 
Liaqeet Elian* 
file . ef forts to emelm^m a peem treety vith 
^epm Inii© baa sot so|>port8d_,wer® supported by 
Pekiates* ms ttot happy oirsr tli€ satm^r in ^Meh 
Ij^dia preetiae^ hier polley of tiadar tb© 
Isadershiir of Sehjpa^, ttion^ I t clesrly *©ali««d the 
is^i>rtme« of ©asurijig that m.4 sot «go the Cbiaa way.** 
1 . XrntMm gr m% nm ibbi^ 
5* 
U t ^ e , SegsloB Sf First Coaisdttae-
Vtetaramerilt 
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At tbo tliae, vhen the . wbs busy in fomuJetlng 
Itr rl l lsnce si'stem after the comifig of J^oto Foster 
m ^ ecretcTy of Ctete, Pakistan c?,pr®£.£.ed her interest 
in collective security raovee vftile Inula and othci- non-
sHfnsd A&lm eountries their vigorous opnocition to 
the creation of fpilitcry elJianees. The success of the 
Lovlet Union in breaking the Americen thonaomacleer 
monopoly in eptember 1953, compelled the United ^ tetes 
to consider th© demand of Pcki^teni Government ay i-oon as 
poELibie. 
Peki&trn in reality wanted to he strengthened Bgctn&t 
India at- '^^iUli® L. Hat?; tat ooiated outs 
"Pekieten is an exoaple of e nation hevinp 
emonc her neighbours one other nation 
larger end mt& povmrfui thon hfcri^elf vith 
which her relations hRve be^ -n con&tmtly 
unfriendly. Vhot neighbouring nation, 
which in Pakistan's cese is India, is therefore, 
the most Importsnt, constant, end tht 
controlling factor in Pakifeten*^ foreign policy... 
Therefore the main problem of Pekleten's 
foreign policy has been where to turn for support 
in her aispute with her neighbour, ond for some 
recires.;-. of the pover aisperity betveen 
that neighbour and herael f . " i 
And the U.^. VBL the country, to \sihich PaKisten 
turned for support, using Amoricffli fears of CoismuniEt 
i . v; 13I leal ... E a t p , , 
(Nevr Kevm, 1966), p. 171. 
— 3S>S <•» 
expfiasion md tbe pejtcjf of all i«aa#s foi" the aeiitsliaaeat 
#f t^e CoiBisiislst t ^ d mms for i ts ^ m parposes* I t s 
mT($t i tse l f ©gainst ifl^Sie, 
ii@@tr€dt£ssiisg IMiea stiperioxlt^ on the mboontlnrnt^ mSi 
enllstiiag siippoi?% for i t s eeee on Eesbiulr. On 
-Eas^Qir problem F d e i s t e x t r e s e l j r .Insecure ^ith 
In i t 0C3nsiders tite foraible -oeenpation of tiie 
greet#r pert. ®f • waters 
of la^ ® .riwrs t&tt riew irrigat® 
Wmst . Ill' P^istan* s vims^ Md im pmsm&e in t&e 
Etratsgioell^ imps^mt md pFedosm&tXy Muslim velle/jt &t 
Kfl^nlr IMisa. ®iip®ri®rity in tlit BU^oontinemt* 
P ^ i f i t ^ mmdi f m U.S. help in i t s seareb. for 
s@eti.rity, after being 4i&apip©iiitM bf Britain m^ tlie 
.Nuslis eonntriejS' of t^e Kindle p^tstsm vmtBd to 
g.8ia si^ ppespt. fro®, tliese 0otiiitri«6- last tMy mf&seA t© bo* 
ffee aosi«snwieltlt t© t^m SMSB M h p ^ t g t m 
hemuMn t M qmstims betvem ani ^IKI involved 
tm C&mBmmBlth mmh&rn* The sonntri««, who 
feeii last tlieir inaepesdi^ace, « f t « r ^eving struggled 
for i t YiB€«r the timm^r of t^rr i tor i^ . m4 netionaliea^ 
^rsb Satloaalis®* not lUte tli© concept of Pea* 
Isasois® ©f l>^i»tan. -Is liaa their ^m s© aaa^ 
intefnsl proteless to cope lelthf tiaey m m in no position 
. 9 -
'%o bear responsibilities ebro®<i end give ©ateiri©! belp 
tQ P^ i t t gn in ease of m o»tbr#iiE oJT hostilStiiss hetmm 
India nm Pekistsn or feet ween p^ i s tan m^ other 
c^mtry* Fartlierjg&ret tbey did not to Sispleege 
IntliB, the largest non-i^l^ed mstiQ!* in th® ^ 
siding witli P^ is tan in her 4is|«ite with 
Ttos Pei^ist^ 'deeiaea to enter into a is^litarsr allienee 
vsith tbe !!•£« beeeti&e of lier ^ m l m to str^gthen herself 
vis-SKiris ia€l® m tlie qsestion of Keglisdr ftsr h&rgaining 
from a position of strength, one of tbe f sk i s tml writers 
bai resar&ed tbet in rakist^n t^e danger of oonqiient 
® CossBsaist psifer ¥®s ^esjr reoot© ^oompersd wii^ the 
lameAlete end continniag denger of forcible i ^ n ^ r witb 
m$% of tbe F^ i s t sa i s tbouglit tfeet Fakistea*® 
e l l i ^ c e lifitb tbe C.S* was wrtb less tjf i t did not strengthen 
F l i s t e n sgainst InSia* In fest^ instead of the Comfmist 
oomtnes , In^ie m& the reel enew in Pe^ettui 
fhe PifeistsBl Affibessaior to the Hohaiio^^ A l l , 
fo r the f i r s t time Seelerei, while speaking at a eieetlng 
of the English Qpe^lug !ini<»i in Fronsiaoo J ^ e 
thet was againat neutralisis m^ definitely 
1. It* ^haea ChaMhri, ^'P^istaa ana the Bnited Utatoa'S 
^^ 
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on the side of tlie Heat, "lio not couot Pakistsa es e 
HQwtrallEt ixatioA of A^iS^ Oar lissic sys^etliies em 
B%roml7 ^ t l i the lest**,^ tM eoaiiig of the iiepabllisea 
^dHiaietretioa ia 1963^ LisealsoMer m Presid^t^ and Joim 
Foster Balles es the Ceareterjr of Ltete^ tlia door i : » 
ofoae^ for F^ i s t aa i d^saaas* PtHles visited Psklstaa i a 
Mey 1963 e@ & pert ©f fats t©«r of tlie f^MOle ssst ©ad 
Soutii Mtrnm fie maie ea cm Jtme 1, 19S3, in 
a radio report regerdisg fei® trip tfeet "Fekigtan i s tfee 
liirg«st of the WoBlm aetSons gad a high p©eltloa 
in th€ tfee stroag p|»lrltti#l CmltJi laarttel. 
spirit of thm people isake tiiem a Scpmdlal^le bul^arK sgla^t 
By acjv rekistea bed started to isaire strong 
postttoa la forjBttletioa of t&o foreign policy. 
f^ftm thB% tli# visit ©f tbo Peklstsai liinsy eolsiasader-iauchlef, 
<5ea0rel ^ u h Kiisa, the visit of Governor G^eral Ghulaa 
Hohagu^ eiS to tile 0.&* tool£ plaoe* i t ia earlf jpecember 19S3 
tbat the /mierieaa Vim Fresiaeat, l ixoa \rielte^ oa 
his Asies good wil l toar* 
l ad l « yjss definitely sgalast eay xiad of mllitory 
ll^^iesS^ l^ f i tg^ .mi^t in , vol . XKflll 
« B4X « 
paet to tli« area* Xt mm in that strong 
originated fi^m F^ i s t i® lii«lie®t®d thet th^ 
£3611 e adXitafy aid Bgrmmmt 
with ruoioars foitsed suspicion in 
opposltlcm was ^n tm groimdsi CD i t be 
%Q til® goals of indie 's f®roign policy 
keying as greet m m^m as poseifel© f t m from eold w«r| 
id } i t Moiil^ ^ s o create iasnperelil© oosqjlisati^ns in IiiSo« 
P^ i s tan i relations to India* s seeuriti' 
On Ilovember 1 9 ^ , eMressing a press mntmtmmf 
^ewaharlel Hehru indicated his gra^e concern vith regard to 
tbis 4evelop®6at. He saidt 
" fh la is a matter on eonstitntion^lf 
or other^se i t i s none of our eoncam wiiat 
Pakistan and the are doing. Bat 
prseticelly i t i s a aatter of the TOst 
intenaa concern to QS and sosse thing ufhich 
wil l have very far-raechisg consequences on 
the lithola structure of things in i^oiitli Asia 
and especially on India end PaiListan."^ 
Bext day on Sovaiaber the Indian i^obaasador 
called on tbc Secretary of State to seek infonsatioa about 
the proposed pact.® Yha reports regarding the projected 
1. Is/hich, later , becasse true when in May 1964, Pakistan 
signed a military pact with the 
2. Chakravarti, B.S., li^dja fipegks to /iBerlca, P- 130. 
3. Gupta, i^isir, 
M-aMSBSs PP« H77-78. 
IMJlMaSlfiSLliSSSt Soveaber 16, i9S3. 
5. Poplai end fe lbot , iBaia p.87. 
m M ^ m Qiliterjr eid to F ^ l s t m were severely crlt lelzed 
hf lehfti. 4M aetnaH^Tf i s no td se^ 
that the reporta of pi^Jeeted America i^Iitsrir eMf i^ether 
with QT Mlthottt tlie pro <|UQ of Peklst^a oi l i tary beses 
for the Suited States^ as a bomb shell to md 
i t s wes perhaps? next only to that of Pekistes's obBtmmt 
of the trlbaa lavesloa of Eastiiatr ia reisef-Jsed 
Melori r l ^ t l y * Bfehrw tlie prepose*! pset for 
bringUig tbe eold to tlte door step of ladle end warned 
Fe&lstaa th&% aegotietloas begaa ta ^agtist 19S3, aad then 
tjiider wey^ to solve ttse Kesbadr dispute itfoiild be broken o f f 
i f Kmmftl deeided to go tbrongb witfe tbe aid pact. Addressing 
tbe ladiea Per l i ea^t lebrtt said that **tbe witole oontexts 
of tbe august egreea^t oa Kasbisir v i l l ohange i f a i l i t a i^ 
aid comet to Pefeistm^.^ thm Hebra aede bis objeetioas 
to eaeb m. allie^oe between tbe U.S. md in end oot 
side the Parlie^ent of ladia. ^pproeebe^ issde by Iftdle 
tfeJfoai^ diploaetie eliaaaels, to the evofeed a© 
satisfeotosy reply. It wafojptueate tbet further diplosstio 
epp;m8<^es vere giireQ t3p eM iiisteed of keeping tbe laatter 
fo r eeeret diploaetlo ae^t iet ione, publie ststes^ats mm 
i88d« ia I »d ia poi&ting out our ob^ectioas to the ai l i tery 
X. ae j i^ , Asia 
pGblisbiag House, Bombay, 1964^ p.263* 
2. f^e F^g t^esmen^ December 24, 1953• 
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BBststmce to fskl&tm^^ o^bgxvq^ m i m i m vriter . 
(• 
h 
no ^ttmt in the 
Xnatfiad tbey epse Bnm^mxi® «t eosai^ere^ 
as m indiiaa ef fort to iaOlueiicG jaaeirieMi foreign policy* 
liitbottt m^ syspathy for ladieoa o1lJ@etio&s« the U.S. seeiaei 
to essiime that Indie Sid not iifiiit s i l i tu fy aid from i t to 
defend herself es i t ms her om htit 
at X^mt i t had no right to object to.FaEistan's 4eslr« of 
a@0»ring s i i^ for itg o\(i» thet tjyse, the 
U.S. hadi Seei^od to silititry ni^ to loid 
thsre was m ^ s s i b i l i t y of i t s aith^raw^ in mw 
particularly th@ nevs hsa the 
ir^mmmae of In4ieii opposition led the ^m&hingtm correspondent 
of the l eg tos^ f iises to mmmtt 
ft ©atter of fact the op^s i t ion of J^wahsrlel 
I ^ m of I M i e wais ^ pronomced that the state 
j^pertcmt feat the had to go through %iith 
%tm «igreeisent or fee« up to the consequences of 
tuning the leecler^ip of south mi& o«er to 
neutralist Ittii8.«3 
this commit laede i t t h ^ the Mmlniiitrstion \ 
vm put in en mcoafortiO^le position ^ the reactions of 
inOia* 
Unptm^ S is i r , SSJUEULSUI p M Q * 
2. Cfh^revarti, i M I a / f^figrlffflf 
SSEJMLnsSS f Fehmary 8, i0S4. 
0a Febrosfjr JL984, replying to ttie debate In 
Lok Ctel^a fm the Mdress, leUm it 
elef^r that l a opposing saeh a eillStsfy pset "OIM? mmaem 
i s net so siaeh to i l l fealing egsinst Fe^i6tan« 
©ertainly not 4m to ©nr i l l feeling egainst ^set^lc®. But 
I have f e l t stsoagly tlist tlsis? gt«p Is & w^oag step esa & 
step vhicb ©Ms to th© fea l isg of ifisecarity in i s i a * I t 
i s , tfeerofore, a %?roag ©t^p froa the poist of -wl^v of pesee 
aaa rmovtl of t^asioas."^ U l g j a i H t l S ^ - S I S i S 
*<fo dr&g Fakiston iato %h% Ili4<lle Eaat mime^ 
Ofgaaigfitioa wi l l bo to ^rsg ttee i ^ l e of tise 
IndiiKi subeontitimt iato m vajr md ng oae 
BBf thet tills i s a ^ i o h doas a©t 
emmm I M i e » part of th^ territojy of 
luio-p^kistaa stsp-eoatiaeat cioiisot be 
tlregged iat© ailitcJEy co»®S.ti8eate 
itfithoiit Xadia also ImiB® €r&m into it^"'^ 
Ilie press opinion in In^ia m^ stron^y oritiOEl of 
the proposed pact, feat i t reflected the «4i«fippoint«eat of 
o friend" rsthor tfeita my overt b o ^ i l i t y . Ko®t of the 
editors of the vere tmeble to mdersti^sd wlsy 
the united Stetes preferred tbe friendsbip of Fekistm to 
thet of India* This he i i e^ in m editorial of 
can not helieve that the ohieot of 
Washington is to alienate Indie f i^a the 
Sehra, Ifl^lft'g rOKigfli, PaUsyt op«eit* , p.4?I« 
f i f October 22, 19S3. ( O w r Edition) 
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U..'• end weaken the forces of tiesiocrecy 
in Asl© •«• ive connot conceive of s more 
unfriendly ©ct toxverd India than the 
ccmc3tisioQ of the proposed egreerjient by 
the 
Times of Inala wrotes 
fricsKSc- ere disiaeyea ©na 
distrefcsed by the appearenee of whet Q&a 
only be cie&orihed bb the cloven foot of 
Imperiellsm. In the context of Kashsilr 
the open eralng of one of the parties by 
B foreign power can only be constrwed as 
an unfriendly ect to the other, fchould 
that situation erupt into warfare the bletse 
must rest squarely on Vfsshiniton ••• 
India cen legitiraeteHy ©a(i does regard such 
action as e projection of the^policy of 
inaitesBQJt end mcircleraent."^ 
Xfi tfjais, not only pro-Ck?enuni£ts vere critice3 of the 
proposed plliance, even anti-Coim'^unists or pro-4mericsns 
did not find much to sey in fcVDur of the American policy 
of ®rsis aid to Fekisten, I t wes a pro-^merioen periodlcel 
which eG?l6d the U . ; . decision fooJish, m4 
characterized the Indien Governtaenf s f'esction as "psychologi-
ce3 5y nerfow end Inhibited" and edded thrt "there is no doubt 
that thifc country* is innate goodnessj and humanity wiJl survive 
the pre&ent stupidity of the toerlcen Govemsjent and the 
IkM** Decetsber l a , 1963. 
I'^ n e^s of India. December 17, 1953. Editorial under ihe 
caption ""/he New Imperialism"• A3SO see further cosiraents, 
•y^ e liindUf J^ovember 24, 1963 and 12 Deeernber 1953. 
Tbought^ December HG, 19S3. 
hysterln of our pol it ic laas" . Only one aei^Bpaper the 
Stfltegffi^ oould eeknovl«dg€t l€ft&t om merit of the 
proposed elllences & focus for the ejcpres'^ioa of the 
feeling of liationel unity It has served a useful purpose • 
the e& ladia sees it*"-'' It did not me en th^^ t the 
sme mwBpap&r we® not erltlcel of the proposed mil i t ©i^ 
eid to Pe^isten by the United ^latee. 
mkamMm..-. .I^MS 
The fomsl ennoonoement for the assisteoace wee 
t 
made by Mohemmed ^ l i , P.M. of Pakistea^ on Fcbrufti^ 22, i984«' 
ihe aovenment of the United fctetee trie^, to ooavlnce 
the Indian Ootrernment that the pact «ould have no effect on 
India bec8U(ge Mericene mtQ ewere of the lndi§n resentment 
whioh might fol lov the signing of the Psot. Being well 
informed of this presumed edveree ree^Stlon in Indln, the 
President, iiisei^ot^er ennounaed en Februsiy laS, 1954® 
^onuayy ae, i964. 
The Bern, February i964. Previously, In e Joint 
Coiiuni^ue, on February X9, 1954, furkey end Pekisten 
had announced their intention to study methods of eshleving dkn 
collaboration on various aattere including smens designed 
towards strengthening peaoe and security. vol.30 
(766), March I , 19S4, p*32?« 
p.fc.PM vol* 30 (768), March 16, 1964, p.401. 
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that ths United Statesi "gravely eonoemed over the vee^ness 
of defence s^peblllttes in the Kiddle East", was complying 
with 8 request ^y Pakistan res' ^llitsi 'y aid* He selds 
"Let me {seKe It clear tl^st we shall be guided 
by the stated pmposm md requlreraente of 
the siitiiel security legislation. Xho&e include 
spscincally the provision that equipment, 
materials or services pi'ovlded v l l l be u s ^ 
solely t© jaslntaia 1 r a c l i j l e n t country* s 
Internel security end for Its legitimate se l f -
dQfenae« or to p e ^ i t It to participate in 
the defence of th® area of which It is a part* 
Any recipient country also laust undertake thf^t it will 
not engage in any act of aggression against any 
other netios, fnsso uadertakings afford adequate 
adsurance to a l l nations, regardlees of their 
politloul f^rioatetion and tn^etever their international 
policies may be, thot the arms the tinited states 
protfMss for tlif^ defence the free world wil l 
in no ^ay threaten their owi security* I can say 
i f our fsid to any country ineludlng Pakistan i s 
aieuse?! end directed agoinst another in aggression 
I w1.ll undertake liamddiately, in accordance with 
my constitutional authority, appropriate action 
befor© vithln and without the ir.lf. to thwart such 
aggression. I would also consult with the congress 
on further steps*" 
In addition to this announcement, President Eisenhower 
had also sent s personal letter^ to P.M* Hehru of India on 
Febrij^jry 1954, in which h® ®8sur«d Kehm that the ©etion 
••is not directed isny way agolnst India", that he was 
i.. m i Text, i M ^ M pp.4€K3^40i.. Also seeUlSKJ^lKJi lSSt 
26 February 1964 and r^barary 26, 1954* 
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reoammeiKiiiig to CongreBs the continugtion of Americeo 
econofflio eiKi technicsl eld to Indie, end that " I f your 
Qav&mBient ehoold coaclude tbr^t elroumstaaeas require 
aii3it®ry aid of a tj-pe contemplated by our mutu®! eeeurity 
J^egi^Xationt pleeee be assured thst your request '«rOUld 
receive my raost sympathetic consideration"* Farther he 
eisphesi^ed that this step "does not in eny way effect the 
friendship we feel for Indie" md thet he "wi l l continually 
strive to strengthen the verm and enduring friendship betifoen 
our t ^ countrieE*'* l^ehru was also assured in this letter 
that in case the eid is "misused", he would "undertake" 
appropriate action "to thwart such aggression"# 
in&pite of a l l these assurencea from the president, 
there was en immediot© outcry end violent reactions following 
the proposed pact in India* The H.t, aov€rni!3ent*s action 
v88 denounced both by the Indian press end public bs well 
bb the Government, Hehru rejected the American o f fe r of 
roilltpry eid and eaid, we object to military aid being 
given to Pakistan, ve would be hypocrites end unprincipled 
opportunists to accept such aid ourselves."^ In hia historical 
i . » ^954, vo l . l , Ko.ia, part H , 
col* 970. I t wee also public opinion in Aiserica that 
India would not accept tailitary assistance from any 
foreign power because of her policy of non-alignraent 
with any of the power-blocs. 
- -
t 
^tatement^ of Meroh X, JL0S4 in PGrlienieiitf Mehru objected 
0 the p»ct becGuee " I t bMb to our tensions* I t sakes i t 
misoh sore d i f f ioa l t to solve the proMems ivhich have 
confronted indie end Pakietan*" He went on to eay, 
"The DJilitery eld being given by the United 
itetsc to Pakistan is a form of intervention 
in these problems which 1E l ikely to have 
more far-reaching results than the previous 
types of intervention." 
In the game etetement, iehru made the reference to the 
problem of Kashmir and csKed for the withdrawal of American 
personnel from the U •U • observers• group in Kashmir, as the 
vaa now a partisan in India-Pakistan problems*^ 
Undoubtedly, In giving military aid to Pakisten and 
in setting up the LaiiHQ a few months later , the American 
objective was to secure the defence of Louth-^aet Asia 
egain&t Communist exjpansion. As Mr. John Jerrfgan, the U.e. 
Deputy /.scistent Secretary of Utate, said in Phil edelphie on 
April 3, 1964, thet the U.t . aid to Pekietan vas for common 
defence and there was no baaie for Indian foara.® Xhis U.fc. 
objective vas eccepted even by Hehru when he said in the 
U Full Text, Ibid.T cols. 963-74. 
3. Whatever direct or Indirect implicetione, this pact had 
on the problems of Kashmir, ere discussed in details 
in the previous Shepter. 
3. Text in, vol . XXX (773), April 19, 1964, 
pp. 693-597. 
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lieme stetement In Indian Perllament tb^t he had no doubt 
as to th© sineeritj; md good v i l l of President BisenhowJ' 
toward lndie«^ But how eould Amertcens not rsellse the 
feet thet Pekleten wentcd mllltury eid for building «p its 
mllltery strength for use agelnet ladle and not fo r defence 
egelnst possible Coiniiiunlst aggreeslon, though Peklstenl leaders 
n@v@r mede this feet e seoret. Later on an Amerlaan 
Perllamentary Debates^ On.olt.f, eol. 968• 
2, isven after the signing of Its pact with the for 
Instanoet at the anil e Conferanae uhich was convened on 
Leptember 7, 1964, the repreeantetlves of the United Stetea 
and p^ l s ten clashed on the question of the definition of 
the iiiord "aggression" i s Artlole IV, paragraph I of the draCt 
treaty. ( In its f inal forss, the Article provides that in 
case or an aggression or artzied attack against any slgnator;^ 
to the treaty, each member wuld act to meet the common 
danger in accordance ¥ith i t s constitutional proces&es)* The 
Onited btetes desired the treaty organiSf?tlon to be exclualvelj 
a bulitfei^ against Comsiunlst aggression, end argued that the 
treaty could cmly be invoked in the case of Comnunlst eggre* 
sslon. While Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrulleh Khan's 
argument was that the Conference should not dlscrlaslnete 
between various kinds of aggression. His conviction iras 
that "Agrression Is ev i l " , rnd."there are no varletle® of 
ev i l , no varietlea of aggression", It ms necessary to resist 
i t ^ e r e y e r i t eame from. (i.ee, SMiSimJUMms. i^epteaber 
Finally, the was compelled to agree to the 
omlesion of the word "coniounist" from the prepared draft of 
the treaty organisation. But at the seine tisie, the ti.f^* 
^ecretaryof Ltte oulle© explained to the Conference that ti^ ls 
government vaa not ready to aasaaie any obligation la ease of 
a quarrel between two non-Cosimunlst estates* C^'hich, perhaps, 
did imply the quarrel between Indie and Pekiatsn)* Therefore, 
the appended en '^underatending" to the treaty atatingt 
•'The United fitatea of Araerlce in executing the present treaty 
doea ao with the understanding that its recognition of the 
effect of aggression and anaed attack and Its agreeajent with 
reference there to in /article IV, paragraph i , apply only to 
Ooioiauniat aggression or amed attack, It wi l l consult under 
the provision of Article IV. paragraph 2". &ee m m t j f i m 
voi .vi , part i , 
i96S, p.8S. AIbo see, iLtk*^., vo lTmi <1796) September ao, 
i964, p. 395. 
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eorreepondent;, after a v is i t ta PaHiste;}! vrotet 
average Petfctsteal thinks very l i t t l e 
ebout the Comiatiiiist threat, i f he thinks 
of i t at ©li . His hostility is towereie 
India rsth€r than the Soviet Union. Md 
he esaumes thet in the event of a show-
down ^ith India, the /imerlefin militssrjr 
supplies he drai«n upon."* 
Hehru, further, questioned the essuranoe given in 
president Eieenhower's letter th^t the ©id v?as merely me^t 
to strengthen Pakisten, so %h&% it oould defend i tse l f egelnat 
eggre&sion, end elso to ensure security and peeoe« Be seids 
**lt i s not clear to me what kind of eggraseion 
and from i^ hiit quarter i t is feared. I sss 
to see any danger of aggression on 
Pekisten fro® any q u a r t e r 
As far as peace end security were ooncexned Sehru 
reitereted that i f there had been a fio-V^ar deolerotlon or 
non.j^ggres&ion Fact, 
"OhviouUy that \;ould have oeaeed tmaion 
between the tu<o oountries end in surrounding 
areas and produced a greater feeling of 
security in both countries Now i t Is 
in the context of this rejeotion~of our 
proposal for e declaration that m 
have to view this military aid from the 
ynited States to P e k l s t a n « . 3 
SI^UJew, I Q ? ^ , , i m x a , 3 m Q 7, 1966. Article by 
/uT. Steele. 
g ftsfeat» op.cit* , coi. 
3. l h l i » t col* 369. 
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to say that the Amerlo^s vere not awere of feds.lB%m*® 
iiotifes behind the pact, is wrong. ?he fact remains that the 
discussions in the Lenate Foreign Kelatlone Comaltte© isede 
i t clear thet g^ ome meiQbers of tha Lenet®, at iaest, ^ere ewere 
of P€skistan*s reel objective- fbe siiigacs wes opposed by 
Senator tiriXlieaj J. rulbright of Arkansas. He deelereii 
" I think the deeision to supply arras to 
Peklsten is an unf&rtunete mistake ••• 
1 have the greatest reapect for the people of 
Pakistan, && I do for the people of India ••* 
Their mutual d i f f icu l t ies have threatened 
war, go ve are not unaware of the tension 
between them end therefore ehould have be(»i 
extremely careful in our relations with thesis. 
Furthermore he ©aids »% disapprove of this 
move end 1 wish the Be cord to show clearly 
my disapproval, because in the future when the 
results of this policy are evident to alS 
I want i t to bo l;lear where the responsibility 
rests. 
7he then O.c;. ^bassador to India George 4llen opposed 
the pact on the ground^ thet; 
''There is one issue upon which perhaps 
@a> or more of the Indians are united 
in opposition to the tinited states. 
That i s the only ie&ue on whi&h there 
i s strong feeling. I t is the question 
of ^er ican aid to Pakistan on that 
question they are a l l against us." 
1. fififlmfffioi^fll,, J^.Qoydj. vol« 100, 1954, p.481. Also see 
2. U.&. House of Representative^ Congress 83, Session 
fiowng^tge, m i F e i P g.^ame, I b t i s t y s i . 
I^ecurit^y /.ct of 1984 CWashington, D.C., 1964), p.630. 
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Celler, iiesiocretlc Oongreemea fop New York had 
opposed th® paet even befor© the formal mnomammt was 
aeaa by pekistaa 012 2a Febrti^ri^ 19S4* ^peeking before 
Q public meeting uad^r the fiuepioes of the Ifiilian Leegue of 
after his return Urom hi& v ia it to India and Pakistan, 
He bad mid on Deceaber 30, 1983 in H©\«f York that high Off icers 
ift tb© O-fc- Departasnt of mtrnoe believed th®t "a ®ilitarii?ed 
Pakistan is escantial in view of Indie*s noutrelity in th© 
©vent of boviet invasion of South-i^est Asia", and "frankly 
from %ihat I have se«n the Pakistan Army, %i)ltb or without 
/«^f^rioan fii4, would not be of dooiiSed advcmtage**' Bis viev 
was that military sict to PV i s tas woula not b® worth the 
cost of "0 diseffectcd end hostile Indie"« Furtheraor®, he 
t 
bad rightly presoadeds 
"The Bussian and/or Chineso communiete would 
cut through Pakistan like e hot luiife through 
butter. Mr. Kehru and his Cabinet f e l t that 
in the event of thet eid, they would have to 
match Ipekieten's now miliiery strength by en 
ejtpansion of the Indian Army. This would 
greetly impede th@ eooiel m^ economic programmes 
that nr. Ilehru has in mind to advice the 
living standards of 400 laillion Indians* 
i&tserican aid of this! chareotar would bs gr ist 
to tha Gommmist propaganda mill," 
. . Cdller had suggasted that "tho best aid that m 
can give to Pakistan in the etruggla ageinst Communlats 
it to build up p^ ie ten ' s eoonoay, which is beacially weak* 
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X %»elleve our mphesls should be oa economlo rather then 
sillltai-y pad mm^^ that Defence Oepertaeat Off icers 
might see distinct edver^sg^s in their present programme. 
" I t might boost our prestige throughout the Muslim Middle 
i^est, but fiiBe<lvsanit$!ge£ sre greater• & U^c.-fakisten 
military agreement in the minds of the Xnaiane would bring 
the cold, i f not e hooting mr into Indians midst". He 
went on to say thet ''we should maintein the friendship of 
both countries . Pakistan end India* ¥e should help eeeh 
country in eirery possible way. they ere indeed ii»srthy of 
our Gssistence . but we should not help the one at the 
1 expense of ^ e other". 
Formsr ^beesedor to indie (and to be reeccredited as 
s 
j^mbeseador e second time in 1963) Chester Boviles wrote in 
oppaeition to the Peet in the He^ i,cgder; 
" I t le bad arithiietic to alienate 3(S0 a i l l ion 
Indians in order to aid 80 million Pekistenis 
vitio are split in two iectdons, divided by 
1000 miles of indlen territory. Inateed of 
adding to the stability of the eubcontinent, 
this will create new tensions and eoepicione ^ 
and thus further contribute to its insecurity."*^ 
^^ g^fSt^gffifla, Janur.ry 1, 1964. 
SMJLsMaSts 
^XXVXI irebruery 22, 1934). 
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PrevioufiXy elm Mr, Bovl©s bsm to ti&ve 
said thfit meny Indians "honestly bello79" that the oaly 
r©aeonfi»r Peklstea's reedliiess for m&riQm Ellitsi-y fil<l 
" i e to atteispt %o get afoeetl of Indien la their oim tregic 
i i t i l e aras rec«" and mmod that the possibility should 
not be overlooked that I f the ga^e iBllltPi^ eld t9 
9Bi&istm^ Euasla might of fer India and other countries 
i ts own version of Point Four*^ 
Though the had played an important role 
in supporting the proposed pact, a nuaiber of letters published 
in I t by well imovn personalities and experts on Asic® effs lr© 
opposed the projected alliance* Letters from prof* VJ* Horisan 
end some of hie Oolleaguea of the University of Pennsylvania 
ana Dr. K. Stanley ^ones vere note^rthy. Mrs. Ileanor 
Hooeevelt also apoke against military aid to Pakistan at e 
lunaheon meeting of the Cltisena Conference on international 
iitConoBiic Onion at vhieh prof. Bokharl, Pakistan's permanent 
Bepresentatlve to the U.M* ^as present.^ Horman Thomas, 
the boelelist leader also opposed the alliance* 
The above facts made i t clear that though Pakistan 
weloomed the aimounceioent and FaK Government Of f lcta la took 
yhe Statesmen^ January 8, 1954* 
The I0.2.64* He had al^o been an ^morioan missionary 
in India for forty yeere and had written a bioBraphy of 
Gandhi. 
3* jEmUteS-JMait February 27, 1964. 
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e ieediiig part in defending end praisifig the proposed pect 
la tbtife was an etisosphere of "piablio Glsisofif 
etid o f f i c i a l ellenc©".^ Fiablic olamour was la opposittoa 
of T&ther then iia support of the di^el&ion of the II.L. to 
extend ratlitarj? sid to Fs^isten-
fhe thtn Tlo© Fr«»ld«Qt Hixoa,^ aeaetor Bussel^ 
and Wiiliem Kno^Iand Eep^tblleeE Leader) were aoio&g 
the vigoroisi^ supporters of the pQot« Senator Mllilam 
Eno^land had arg^d President ilEenhovar to ignore ob^eotlons 
{itad® hy mala end este»d military aid to Pakistan* His 
argument'^  was th@t ^^ to ^t^hold iUtierioen aid because of the 
protest of neutraliet indie would he disooureging to those 
netione willing to stefid up end he counted on the side of 
the f m i i^ad ^ a t "these netions isight then think 
i t wee hotter to pley la^ e g®»e of Xndien aewtrellfim ^©n 
to tlirw in their lot with the free netions*'. 
8 series of three artielee pabliahed on August 10, 
^ugufit and iieptenber in the a^ ev Bepiahiiot 
Seltg Eerrison rightly nerr&ted hov end vhy the United 
States eeme to t ^ e the deoision of granting tssilitory aid to 
Im Jemes Spain, ^Militery iissiatanoe for pekl8ten»S 
.gfi^t Jsnuery a , 1964. 
m A u January 7, 1964. 
^ i M t 3 January 19S4. 
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Fekisten end 3Lat«r to net ttp Bou%h last Min tm^tf 
Organlsetiofl tjliJleh l^gkleten joined as s ra^saber. Aecordlne 
to him, the Onited St^tee vm Inf3««neet1 in taking wpibla 
policy hy the opinion of oertalfi proisinant British o f f i e l e l s 
that Peklstat^i should groomd to f i l l the irsetium created 
hy Brlteia* s ifithdJTeMsl fyoro the anh-aoattneEt of India* 
Apart fro® the British 'Knsivlfind « Mlag*8 Republican 
desire to get tough i^ith Nahru played m- importfsDt role in 
shaping this policy* a>elig iU Harrison eonolttded by saying 
1 
that Vioa presi^lant Ki^on *urge<l this alliance (vith Palcistm) 
not for i ts purported defenoe value against aggresiion but 
for the very reason IP^iatan had sought the aid • as a 
eounter foroe to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal 
Nehru* 8 India* • ^o lender, i f many Indians euapeeted aa @uoh« 
glie fegjlgassJIaaltePf ^he A»©rloan paper had 
slfio vained the O.s. against the proposed Bilitiery past. 
The view of ll«s* jusbaasador to P^ i s tan , Hildreth 
might aeem aone vhat oosiplex* Cnoe replying to a question 
i ^ e^e r the aid aeeured fron the ^•S.A* oould be uaed against 
Bharat in oase thi^t country attacS^d Palciatan the iiiabassador 
8aid in Peehavari 
1# Ko¥| Hison i s the rresldsat ©f the 
2, Quoted in "aie Hindu^ January 19S4. 
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"Why not? in defence of her independence 
egelnst eggreesion from any quarter e 
eountry em aee Aiserloen ©qalpamt*"^ 
l^aklstan end signed the Mutual Bef^oe 
stenoe Peet in Keroehi 
vehefTient ladisn opposition. 
J^s^ie F ao l on Mey 19, despite the 
The signing of the Millt®ry Peot with Peliletm 
ehenged ^ e v^ hole contesst of the problems existing hQ%mm 
Indie and Pekieten* The impaot of this pact was very 
serious on Indo-Pektsten reletlone perticulerly in respect 
of the Kashjsir duestion.^ fhe bilaterel lndo»P»ki®tfini 
relations nov essumed a triangular reletionahip, the 
Onlted btetes as the third party. Indian friendship toverds 
Pekisten was, at least, froeen for the time being by this 
paot and i t greatly affeeted the hitherto prevailing goodnees 
and willingneee to oofflpromiee in the settlement of I^do* 
Pakistan disputes vhioh i s olear froai the fact that the peet 
iifiUlt April X, X064* And i t oame to be true when Patelstm 
used American military veepons in its war against 
Indlo in 1966. 
2, fhe pact vas signed by Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan 
(Pakistan) and the Cherg*d' a f fa i rs . Jofeyoi S iu.i;!M£&on« 
deputlEing for Ambassador Horaoe KildsetL 
provisions of the gact sees to 
Full f&xu pofluments on Merloan TQP^lSR ftfflflUQttfli'^'gg^ 
Council on Foreign Beletlone, Hew XeJ-k. pp.3?9«383. 
3. ^ i s has been aeelt with details separately in the pr©vio»« 
Chapter. 
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hlnaered the mv md chengea the context of negotiati^^ns 
fiXreedy going on in respeot of th@ Keehmir question. 
Xr: IndiMi ejresi PelKiet^ beoame a part of th® foreign 
policy of a Greet b^^ras© by noid Pekisten becerae 
e member of the Western niliti^ry bloo enS ms playing its 
esatia®^ role in the cold war ©gainst i ts unaligned neighbours 
rather then against the bordering Comaiunist notions* Aotuoll^y 
Indians f e l t grieved m^ insured ageinst both Pakistan and 
the United states. 
Fur^ensorey aid to FalKiBtan beearae a lasting and 
irritating iseae in I]|do«AiS9rie&n relatione ¥hioh no 
of goodwill md understanding ootild remove."Even the shre^wleat 
strategist in the Kremlin could not have planned the present 
etate of eatrangement in lado-Aaerioan relations", observed 
an Indian vrriter.^ 
Another oonsequenoe vbb that apart from the faot that 
the ne«iy eatabliehed military relationship between the tinited 
gletes and Pakistan fundamentally ehfinged the foreign polioy 
'India and her Neighbouret Hostility on Eight ^ d I,eft«, 
i m a s L M i f i i vol . 46 (1985^86)» p. §39. 
2* Bhargeve, 'O'he United States and Indies fhe 
Farting of l^e Haya*, gqw Beoubiif*^ 30 August, 1064, p*9« 
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orientation tova74s eeoh other es mil as towards India* 
Changes eame 0vm la tlje ettltu<S«s of ott)@7 oo^ntrloa also* 
fhe most lapojrta&t amongst t^ea vas tlio Soviat Union^ the 
graetast rival of tha United States In the Cold 
strategy* I t vas In reaotlon to this paot that the 0 
ome out with i ts f u l l fledgad support to the Indian oase on 
E-aahmir in tha United lietiona* freviousl^t i t had been 
neutral with regard to india^Pakiaten disputes in and out 
aide the IT«tl« ^otuallj^ i t was heeausa of thia paot that the 
Soviet prafflierf Bulgioiin and tlie First Sforetary of the 
aoiamuniet Party of the Soviet Union, Hikita Khrushchev^ 
during their v is i t to India in Daeamhar supported 
Indian and /ifghaniatmi olaissa oonoerning Eashmir and 
?e< 
3 
pefeLhtoonistm reep otively, againat Pi^istan*^ fo quote 
Eelig Harrisons 
"In oontra&t to the tinited whioh 
stumbled a lmst inadvertentlir into the 
I&do*F#^i8tan arena end eolies periodio ef forts 
to hring ^ e two protagonists together, the 
Soviet union has played a deliberately 
divisive role in South Asian relations* 7he 
use of the veto on the Eaehisir question has been 
Kflflfiinf If ^ffffltflfflggiEfiiy yir^g^iyftfit voi . io , x m M ^ ^ p^u&m* 
'Xhe United States did not ti^a any notice of these 
atatements whioh affooted the issues of the Baourity of 
P^istani so i t f e l t 80&ie% a^t irritated and astonished* 
&elig Harrison. * troubled India and Uer neighbours*! 
g 'or^^ig^^airsy January 196S| vol«43| Hew ITorK^ 
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the euttiag edge for \AxBt bas ^eodme e 
broad Soviet ^nositmmt to a <*progre8&iire** 
liMlia m ogiiaet a "reiOtlonerV* rekistea* 
Tbis hme plaoed tim Hsitedi ii%mm in m 
exttteooljr ai^verd fosltion as eaoti inist^ea 
of soviet support of prcfs^t® 
for imoquivoe^ lumlag from 
FakistfiR* Htaoh of the isotivo idhlAS 
iaorofis&tig assertion of in^epatiSanoo from the 
atiitd<S Stetae ooaas froxa the fsot that the 
Oiiitad States holds to the ontl^Cosfflamiat haels 
of the alXienoe and seeks to remain above the 
battle in Indo^Pakistaa dieputea*'*'^ 
tladoubtediy, the aetive involv^aant of hoth the 
United states and the Soviet Union in the Indian aohoontinent 
have made the tmaiona hetveen India end Pakistan siore 
abrasive ^ the preaaures of the Qold War* 
During the Sues cr ie is in X966 alaoi India and the 
soviet t7nion aided against the United s|ate8 i^ioh waa 
supported by p^ i s tan . Soviet Vtalm ms support^g B^grptigEi 
ease and ms the ^reat ohampion of President Haaser« But 
the united states and Pakistan %fere not ready to see tlie 
2 
sphere of Hussian influenoe to groii in the area ooneerned* 
This made the aore inoiined towards Fskistsu* 
certainly India preaented a posture of friendship ¥ith 
1. Now the 8ituati<^ ia ohangingj the soviet Union has also 
proposed its militarjr aid to F^iatan* 
fatfltlei,;,Wftf^L A stMdf M l aMg QftBBMUIlas 
(Pa||bXished Ph^DissMationy gniveraitt 
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Soviet Biiesifi ma Commmist China eftar ttie pm% was 
she @oii<l®Miiid tiiie aXlime« also* fh is attltudo 
of our a m the me hand oraatcxi <lo%ibts about tha poXloy 
of &ojiri»«lig»fflaiit in tha of tEia ^iserioaii dafander^ 
of fffeodoffli and on the othar| our opposition to FmtBtm 
heoosia ati>onga2> proiridad a natural and aoiy ontlat to har 
hulXUin faaiinge* fhoa tba atiXltaty elllaaoa "aharpanad 
Xndo*?^ tansiona* I t baoama a aonet^t faotor in tha 
reaction and comtaraotion i4}ich oharaotari^ad aubsaquoftt 
raXftlona hetwaan tha suapieioua naighboura** 
praaident Naasar of the also wae affaotad 
t^is militgry paot of tha t^ith P^ iatan and started to 
lose faith in S'l^iatan* Zndia lent her tvHl support to 
president Hasaar of whan during the sues Criais^ he 
waa in a o r i t i o ^ poaition* VlhUa aooapting a iarga @«»itlngi»t 
of Indian trbopa in tha tr*ll« Bmarganoy Foroa^ aat up to 
patrol tha Egyptian-Xaraili border, pre&Sdmt Sasaar refused 
to aooept any Pakiatmi troops as part of tMi^ and aXao refused 
to see &tihra¥ardy» I t vaa not unl^ici to President Haaaar 
that Pakistan nas a Western stooge end aXso that i t would not 
Xika to see Marioan infXuanaa irenish from the Middle E&it 
X. ijUBBel Brines, p g .maor&a^tiMl .as^aaialf iPell n m 
presst x,ondon« 1968, 
s, 
' ^ ' 'i . * - ' 
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oompl^t^iisr tjhiela QBiSQ seemed to pr^feirt i^ as a 
tmt tti@t tor tQenomic si^portf egi?louit)irel 
md s^gietmite Pekietan tiied to too maoli 
upon the U.S. 
fbe oo»fidqii€iioe& of t^is sUitf^l^ paet broogiit 
to a very eo»plea£ position and added to its rdeponsiMIities 
m £&t Gs I t s rex&tloni India and F ^ i e t ^ ^mee emeexiiod* 
impQ9tmt ^1116 mB ^ n t the neittier to 
mm^ indie nor peSsietan^ ^ hostiHa mt^honys mte 
to appeasedf i ^ o h was not en aas r^ jol)* I f tbt 
wanted to eppeaee onof the oth^r isiisadlately got annoyad» 
F ^ InatanoQ) whan tlie !!*©« did not take notioe of Soviet 
leaders* atataisenta in India agiinst tlie intereat& of 
Fi^iatenf ^aicistenis bee^ao very eriticsal of the msSi 
i t vaa to eatiefy theae Pakistania that ttm UDS* ^lahaasador 
to v m u t m Boraoe Eildretli in his atatement in E a r a ^ i 
reiterated Asierioan support for raaoliitione on l a ^ ^ r * 
However, In addition to this, in a meeting of the BBATO 
ooiineil the endorsed the oosmniQne iastietit 
eitlled for a settXemint of the Kash^r diapnte on the haaia 
of tl*!* reaoltttiona t^ioh is^l ied a plehiaoite in the State 
It 4yooh, sSiMS*! PP* 
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o f BUUf hed i n t u i t e d t h i e mm with other i n i t i a t o r s 
i n th© CoisioiX iseetiiii*^ 
^ i i g l i Ps^iatenis ffiHt for the ^ m t , the 
ini11sgi@ r e a c t e d l ^ i s aove M t t e r l y * Agckici i t m s In 
response t o the d l s a a t i s f i e d l&adorsbij^ i n I i i 4 i a tl%at t b t 
HfS* o r 6 t e t O | BHil^e h a r r i e d t o !f«v M h i liEUsediateOsr 
Qftor tlie ead o f the E,«riiohi o o o f o r e m e m m to 
f3.ssi@s o f XMift«s o f p o s i t i o n to t h o p ^ o r t f o r pf ikis tm 
fit BEnm Qmtermm^ l!bo Mimt^ asss t r&a hy DttlIo@ 
i n o f m a t t a ^ W liidia$ 
to® supported by tit© United He r o i t o r n t e d t b e t the 
j ^ v m t o r a ^ s t m the trnited s t g t e t m m f o r 
imrj^ofie®* Ftirth«ra©rOi s ^ r e t e r y o f Ste t© 
m&M i t o toor t h a t ^ o i t ^ i tho ll#S» a i ^ mt heU^ire thist 
Fefeistcsi M aay {iggr@»«iiro doei^Eia against InSisi tn oase 
o f g h ^ ^ t h e t i o f i l fitte^i K s r a o h i ' s goo4 r o l e t i o B s i d t h 
the Kost i^oitl m& th^ l a t t o r vouid etipport India 
v&U miV (S?3)f Maroh 19| Wm^ 
C e r t a i n l y reforonoe t o Ksshair i n the s e a t s Oomell* b 
l a e o t ^ m » n o t v e l ' m m t * 
a * But ^ e aid not © i ^ ^ r t ladift p ^ i ^ t s n a t t e ^ M 
h e r i n 
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IMltea Uotlms .1 
Piisistm crltiolfiQd m m the oessiire «@oaoffli© 
sid to Xfidia ana the of erms te Xsdie m a lai!*ge 
30aie« I t Qcone^d 17•a* md oth^r netims 
for siipplariQg ems to India ^otli diireotly and indireotlF 
tbs^ogh the isediysi of aeonosiifi Siid, vhieh might li@ tieed to 
divert i ts f03007080 to amamants* I t mB m B@|)teiQ'6er 24, 
lfr» r«E. noon, Forelga KlsliteJp of epolse 
before the Seewity Ootmoil in torU that I t vfts pertinent 
to observe thet ladiD was ^ s o recalling eid fro® th@ 
and otli^r oomtsie^^ eooaoa^^ la nat^ss^i but 
ootnailir isilit«ii*|r in oliorooto?*'* AoooMing to hisi the 
mm^ India spent on def^noe oXone ms 140 p^r dent of 
P^i6ten*B total btidgeti yet Pakisten never oleined tlie 
r i ^ t to Qtteetlon i^at India did ineide lier o^a territory 
tho s^gh m e roeolt of "thin oolo8s®il emseisents proeremffloi 
i t ie Pekiaten vhioh should eoa^leia of a threat of India'® 
MarW 11, Indie mlmmii this atatesaeat while 
in PeKlstcn i t Jed to i n t r y i n g isore enti^Aaerioon 
simtimeiitt Bat the feot reasiaed thet the unreserved 
aoviet support to Indie pui^ed l>eleifitan oorapletely into 
Weatem Geiap# B a r i ^ Eapoor, soviet Union end 
Xndo-.Pm8t«n R^atioa6«*| lafaiitfltifflfll 
^ew Oelhi , p , ^ » » » 
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eggressidiit"'^ 
eifiini Bit^t tb© London OteXaratSoa (Jiily 28, 1988) 
of the Beghded rmt O'fK.f l^m^ fuarkeir 
e!i<t P^ i s t ea ) , tlie Sucf^tary of State, Dsllet It 
elmi^ ia v/ashlngtoa after his return f^om the Londoii 
Confereaoe %h&t vMlo M s dlploi&atie talJ^s in tonSon has 
streiigtheii^a omSt^em^ m^ nBoralQ of furke^^, Iran sDd 
FeKiBtea, m^ DdMXs the hed h&QQm sord sloseljr eesoelated 
vlth the f m t olosar aeeool&tion, m he 
put itf mly agre@iaaiita leading to supply 
of ralliter^ ^qtsipm^t'* r a ^e r thgfi my mi4 daf^oe oamsltmmt 
o 
bf l^A to aid thea in tda mmt of m outeida atteok* 
Clcsrlsr refused to he involves in m oiattsreak of hostl l itiaa 
batvam India sad Faklatan, a^paolall^ baoousa the parties 
Septeatear Pravlouslir SIEO Paklataoi 
Fritoa ^Ixiietar Hotiaismad J3.1 vaa reported m 4th ^as^uary X964 
ia Qemf^  as having said that the aSonomic aid to 
Xadlia was Indireotly for s i l i tery pts^oaea $m turn* Hgic 
york giiaeisy SmmtS' 5, X964* la Maroh 1968. l^ ooA. waa 
r#port®a to hfive said thet dcapit® Kilitory aid to 
P^iatan, India had four or f i v « timas the lailitary 
atrangth of Palsletm, aad the rgtio m » aspaoted to 
inoraesa* P«M« ^odn thraataEiad tha that should 
PakiataKi fa®X her Indapssid^ca In jeopardy "wa u i l l brei^ 
a l l pacts in the world ^ d ahaka handg id.th those whom we 
have made our fiaemio^ for tfc® of others." fgav ^ orfc 
limBMf Haroh 9, X9SB* 
JbOBltti ^^ly 1SS8« 
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to the CismrXiot oould dtf lae the term "eggressloa" in 
dirfereit ways* h^iB loiS t© gr@©t reaeattncat la Pe&lstan^  
Do11©e vas ss'ltloise^l the ^Mfct^ lOEdtng aetjspapey 
of pn^istBUf for eaylag me tfelsg is I^ oadoa another 
i s Weahlrietoa and that 
« I f tl*e MletereJ treetiee^ to 
impoge on the tlie United States no greater 
omlgatl f^ l^m tb® copply of ®i31tary 
eq^ipm^t, then «thet wotUd he new in thea?««« 
Hie Lmslon Secleretioa of Mr« B«ll©s wuJd 
have mesnizig onl^ r i f^ under a nev series of 
treaties the tr.O* steads committed to aenS i ts 
armed forces to ^ e eia of aajf of these 
comtric-s whleh laey he fro® oatsl^e."'^ 
When i s ^leveaber the U.K.- md France used the 
Affisricm erm© supplies to Its lATO al l ies agsiasi Egypt, 
the ineffeotlvefteee of ilioerioan esstirssioes mB tullf expoeofl* 
^at^c^ly Indiene hed no reeson to eatpeot that iiaerloe iKould 
intervene on th« sKl® of iraSie in case of Pekistenl eggressloni 
Bilateral Agreeaseate of cooperation ¥lth the three 
MuslliB neiBbers of the Begh^d Pact vere signed on 
Karoh 1959 la i!nteara# 
tmia wa« an evidient proof that PakJte ten* s primary 
in iseeKlng sillltBry ei<S f«>n the United stetea me to he 
strength<»je<l against India. a ncn-Coisamist oomtry* 
heoaujse Pekistaa vas afraid of an oythreaK of host l i l t ies 
between the two* f t wanted a clearout aesurano® fross the 
U.B, thst ItB fflllitery eld could he used against an aggre* 
ssion which might not "necessarily he CoBuaunlst In i t s 
origin*', fhe pAya^ July 30, 1968. While the B.S. was not 
ready to comiait herself agalnat India vith whoa i t wanted 
to he on friendly terms and i t was because of this fact 
iieclaration. For text of tJie Declaration end the communlQue 
seeiia&iliM voiaxxi * , II0.999, August X8, I968,pp.^2«273. 
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beeetise the reason for tlnited States pollt ieel intervention 
in the dispute egelnst ^@lo*Frenoh aggreeslon had l i t t l e 
to do ¥lth the foot of the tslsuse of Ameriem supplied arms 
to those two ootmtriee* Kow oould Indians feel secure 
that the B.S. vouia tek® approprtete step® In favour of indSa, 
In ease P^lstr-n used military v«epon@ given by i t , against 
India. 
Kehru rejeoted the Pakistani proposal for Joint defmoe 
in i95@* on 24 4pril 1969, Ayub Kf^ m had auggeeted thrtt 
**iii the event of an external threat both India <»nd PaKistan 
/ 
should defend the eubeontinest in cooperation witli cech 
other's^ Sehrii, however, rejected the propose^ for a Joint 
defence eaying, " I do not understand lAim people say ' l e t 
us have a coismon defence policy* • Against whcHQ?**^  the 
United states v^anted that India and Pakistan should resove 
their differences* Therefore !tehru's rejection had disappointed 
the Policy makers* But they isere unwilling to give t^ 
hope* i^verell Barriman told the Senate CosHsittee on Foreign 
Bel fit ions that Hehru* s rejection of i^ yub Khan* s o f fer might not 
be "the f inal word". He eiqpressed his agreement® with the 
^SJEtiWs ^ April I960* 
S* ^he KifidUy 6 Hay X969* Ayub Khan again spoke of the 
usefulness of an agreement for Joint defence of the sub-
continent* ^ Roveaber 1969* Sut Indian P.M* rejected 
i t in a decisive fas&ion* 6 HoveoBber 19S9* 
3* £»enate, fei^fiWlty M vo l * ! , 
pp. Harrita^ was at that tiise a private citieen 
but his views apparently rejected the general sentiia^t 
of the i^isenhower Adtsiniatrati^m* 
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vlev tiiet the "ought to pursue i t , pursue I t quietly^ 
hovetreri not vlth puhlioity ••• We ought to me our 
InfXuenoe towards getting both countries to direct ttieir 
fflllltfiry efforts more towerd cosHBoa defmce of the ®uh-
conttnmt md less sgeiiiBt esoh other* i think I t Is of 
v i t ^ importaaoe to both of thea thet they work together, 
md perhaps they can work together without a paet". Any 
vey India ms reluotent to accept the proposal of Joint 
defence because of the fact that FeHletan had mllltery pect 
vith the H.ti. Evs wel l , end she did not see eny threat from 
my country to her security except that of Pekist@n« 
A ver> cooqptetent and Inforsied ^ssarioan %>rlter in e 
aeries of three brillliastl.y written artlclee^i referred 
earl ier , anelysed thot the cost of this blundering Amerlcea 
decision, which had only a marginal and doubtful militiry 
advantage, m^ very heavy In political and diplomatic terssa 
to a l l the three parties involved « the Pskisten end 
Indie. In the case of India *i^at began m an eoiotional outburet 
hae hardened into an enduring aenae of injury* • I t wea 
concluded by most Indians th^t i t vas * essentially an anti« 
i * Selig s . Hari'ieon, •India, Pakistan and the United 
States*, in the fimtiimuMlS* XO, 24 August and 
7 ^September 1989* 
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Ifehni manoeuvre "designed to force hie hena"* Th@ a i l l t e fy 
fieoesfiity (I'or the aid) is so qo^stioneble and P6&ietiit)*a 
preooeupatioa with India so con&piouotis that i t nakes eanse 
to them only in these terms* they oannot seriously halieve 
the greet O.fc. simply blundered into ® ^istel^l^ 
^inee th© singing of the military aid peet the 
and Pakistan could no longer consider the «. 
a permanent member of tha U*{9. security Council - as neutral 
in respect of ^ e Kashndr question lying on the agenda of 
the Gouncil, Iherefora^ Indie successfully pressed for th© 
withdrawal of American natioaals in the Ofesorvar Etrvic© 
across ^ e ceasefire line in Kashmir* 
fhis pact has also had importmt consequGnces to tfm 
internal political developments i«lthin a l l the three 
countries concerned • in the sense that the hancis of the 
unfriendly ciritcs of l^e United &iates end Pakistan in 
India and of India in the United States and Pakistan were 
strengthened* 
in consequence, Indian objections proved ineffective 
and Pakistan started receiving heavy arms from the United 
I3ZM«i ^ august 1969^ p. 
For details see • Previous Chapter pp« 
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states, the Indiaa Gov^s^ment was c o m p e l ! t o spend mre 
mousy OR arais (thereby ending to ladle 's burdens of foreign 
"fhe resouraee energies of lodie sad Pakistan, 
Instead of belag devoted to the de^elopmeat of their 
beeKverd eooaomles aaa the improviiig of the stmderd of 
l lv iag of their tvio peoples Of^ me to be used for m arms race 
(despite the denleXs of ladlen spokestaen vith reapeot to 
Indie) ^ i ch did good to no body, not m m to the United 
iitetee and the *free vorld* in %^oee interests the eld to 
Pakistan uas started to have been proffered", reaerk^d 
M.6. iie^an quite rightly.^ 
India* s attitude to the Indo*i^a]£i@teni disputes stiffened 
as a result of this milltery peat of Pakistan idth the 
the political pertiee In India supported a s t i f f e r end 
stronger atand v l ^ reference to Pakistan md ettaeked the 
Government*© policy i f i t did not meet the demands put 
forward iQr them* BTehru expressed his regret (Hid diaappolntment 
*'that at a time vhen ve in Asia should be bending our energiefi 
to the task of developoaant, a new factor making for tenaion 
1. Ka^an, M i a in m U AffUlrff ^^mr-m^ op.cit . 
pp» fhe president of the governing Congress 
party of India, Dheber, said thst Aaerican ailltiayy 
aid to Pakiatan had imposed an indirect burden on India 
by compelling her to Increase expenditure on defence* 
IMJIiaSilt January 1966« 
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and in stability shotild hsva been Intfodueed by this arss 
Indis opposed botli &&AtO end Baghdad Peet while 
Pakieten accepted th@ membership of these two ellienoes* 
Indie opposed Beghded Pact beeause i t created far greater 
tension in West AbSm than ever before which resulted in 
Mglo^French military attack agalnat Egypt in X966* 
Hehru mB criticised in the i^sierioan press, ghe.. 
Xprk fimes in its issue of March 26, 19S4, editorially 
criticised and accused Kehru of a double standard of evaluation 
of C<^yniet and non^aossatinist arms supplies to soaie ^sian 
natioi^s, because he Indicated lAiaerlcan policies ( in particular 
of 4iB©riean military aid to Paislatan) for having created 
•insecurity, imcertainlty and instability* in 
But there were some distinguished Affierlcans who supported 
I3ehru*s tfords and spo^e against the iidlltary pact* Chester 
Bowles, foriaer iiaeriesn Ambassador to India, crltlclaed the 
aid to Pakistan and asked for *ncw realisiQ* in the United 
states tQTel&i policy, abandoning Its *Haglnot Line* concept* 
Furthernoz^i he questioned hoy the Security of £>outh iisla 
had been increased by U«£>* aid to Pakistan when I t had 
antagonised India and Afghanistan (where I t had opened the 
Beb.T (30 March pt* I I , vol# IJ, no.27, 
cols* fdCMUiakS* 
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door for lerge-ecele Soviet John 6h«sm®ii Cooper, 
tomer 0.&» Amb&fifieior to maia , aleo mode eomaents th^t th© 
^ovortiaieat not tdte into consid&retion ttie 
reperousfeions of AM on enother friendly com try Ilk© 
Xndifi*^ It was early in thot the forier Seoretery 
of etete, Deon Ache eon disfavoured the aiilitary pacts In 
Vieet and bouth Aeia*^ Welter opinion is mxth 
aentioning here. lie sharply analysed the damage done to 
the cause of the Onited States in Asia by »eatmglin6 
elliences* in Louth Asie# H?© have elientated India and 
/.fghanistan by our meddling and ve have not made secure ^ ^ 
adherenae of Pakistan . . . Hie daotige done to Anierloan position 
fey the Pakistan ^tangleraent elon© is enorasously greater ^ sn 
%jhat oen fe® done to repair the damsge by eeonomio aid.*^ 
A gr&at oontroversy arose over the plene a f f a i r 
in Hay 1S@0 between PeSsistan and the United Btetes as 
i t involved the Security of Pakistan* The plane 
had taken o f f from the airbase at Peahawari eo Pakistan 
m J i M H f 256 August 1956* 
3. bm h U article in the H f t K i ® April i96( 
a i U i l a i ^ f « leauary 1966. 
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Bmn^ of the dagger of m imsae^lata Bo^ l^ot threat 
to it@ seeuflty* The Pakistm GoverasieiEit protested against 
this end inforiaed the thet th « iiao in the future of 
FalLidteiii dirf ields m m Amerlaan airoraft woul^ 
( 
have to be more firialy ooatrolled.^ fb ls ft!r^©r i t clear 
thf)t tlrie U.tl. y&B interested much more in containing the 
£»oviet Union than in strengthening Pakietdn ageinet l£»lia* 
But the reeult m&b ^ust the reverse, Pakistan was atrengthenod 
sg^inst Indie* Neither Xndie nor the U.&. could resist th« 
usd of Aiaericen military aid against Indians in 196S* 
Owing to thip pact India could not regard the 
her !3seqaivoeaI friend, fhe i teel f could not sake 
such gains as i t had expected* I t Pakistan could 
enjoy i t s advcntages* Between India and the there arose 
doubts I misconceptions and Kiis«»imders tendings« 
I t was laie lailitcry aid^ in ^dverrifefei' i Q ^ to 
India during the Chinese attack on India (October 
%^ich added fuel to the Pakistani cr it ic ise of India and 
Da^^ Mflv 
^ i i f i lM vol. XLVII (1223), December 3, 1962, pp«837«838* 
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th« Onlteti States* prevlouely also, during his visit to 
the United £»tat@8 In presiaent Aynh hcd spoken o«t 
^ I 
strongly, egainst etiy militBry aislstaisee to Indie* 
^t the Natioiisl Free© Clob m July 13J W l , the pakisteal J 
ppesldeat tasmea hlvsstl^ thst say IBOV© t© providie mlUlttry 
6514 to India "wowJdi pat a streln on our r@l»tioiastilp %flth 
^morice" 
Xii41« reediXy aoo«pted U.S. Mi31t®ry eM durjjig h^r 
emereenoy, In splt<i of the fact thet Kabru had previously 
rejected a l l tha proposele for th« saawi. 0»ee, ^ e a 
In August tbe U-rS- Hnder Seofetayy of Stat® (enn former 
^^assador to Xndlm) Ch©$tar Bovlfes stated on Mb 
return to Washington from a v la lt to ladlfin sufeeoatlnent 
tliEt In the avant of Paklatenl or Indian aggression on eeeh 
other I tha usas coiaiiltted wye '^ to go to th© 
rescue of the aggraefc!e4" CoJMenting on thlE iehru 
July 1961 • CoacfientJng on the 
U.t* oon8l4eratlon on tha atllltsry aid to neutrals In 
1961, preaiaant Ayub eald thi^t I t i^uld "open 
floodgataa of anaamants for India"* JEbS-SlBlSflt ^ ^^ vtly 1961. 
v;hll0 th© tiefanoe Minister of Indie, Krishna ManonYntde 
it olaar that the proposed asaandsient to tT.S. Ifutual 
£«ourlty Act parmlttlng O.fo. Military aid to "neutrals" 
would have no effaet on India's foreign policy of opposi-
tion to military aid and military alllanees and non-
acceptance of foreign military aid. the Hindu, 16 Jiily 1961 
i k i s l " , vol. U160), September l a , 1961, pp.48?-488» 
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said In the Indian Parliemfit thot India ms act onder 
my other oouatry*© proteotion, tbnt India had not eakod 
fo r suoh protection end that there was no ooaiattJTsent on 
th<» pert of ths United ^^tetes to com® to Indie's reeeue in 
dsse of Fak is t^ i aggression on India*^ 
^ d when the II.&, rtished naesive arms aid to India 
dai'ing the Chinas® aggression, Pakistan took i t as a direct 
threet to itg om. sseurity. though the United i»tatea had no 
6uah intention end ms gi?lng loilitery aid to India against 
a aoffiawiist China, faklstan's arguiasnt was 
thet this aid might he used against i t h^ lndi& in spite o f 
the fact thet indie had eesured the tl.S, end other Western 
powers, supplying eraic to that country, t h ^ these rrms would 
2 
be used exclusively tgalnst the Chinese• In his letteit 
to president Ayub, {^resident Kennedy tried to convince him 
but he refused to accept the U.S;. point of view ®ad 3JI hia <5 
reply he said that large scale supply of isilitary equipment 
1. For IfQ^ vol,86, 17 August 1961, 
cols, mi -2773» 
Coimienting on the decision that Pakiatsn would 
be given more military aid, P.H, liehru said i f the U.L. 
vented to give more lallitery aid to pa&Ss tan "Jaaoving 
that the main target of Pakistan is India, let her do 
go we ere not afraid of it* Jilthough we can not Batch 
the in military strength, w© are capable of defending 
our country^, ^ e Hindu, jtily X6, 1961. 
^ew Igork fimee. October 31, feiiailer letter wee 
from P*M« Hacmillan of oreat Britain* 
3. ^he Dawny November 8, 1962. 
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to Indie vo\£L<i not farther the catiae of vorM peace sad 
late^metionfil tm^er si finding espeeially between the three 
caighbouring ©©entries of India, Felcistea end China. 
The United States* position was that military eid 
to Indie was given only beoause of the eniergensy oreated 
by Chine's inhesion of that eoontry* I t di^not take any 
notice of peki^tan* s vehet^^t protests end oisfitinued 
arms BhXpmmt to ind.ia» PeEistaa m^ n©t roBdy besr 
eny iwre the expenaion of the etaefgenoy oomi^ent by the 
Keatcim Po«ere to Indiii beeause i t inould tiave meant a 
continuous build up of Indian military strength egf.ins£ 
Pakistan* 
My vtyi tlie fevoored indie Ignoring F^Sateni 
ob4eGticnS| end i t was on i m ^ 30| 1663 that in a oomiamique 
president lennedy end iCaosaillen reaffirmed their "policy 
of constinising to help India by providing further military aid 
to strengt^jesi feer defences ageinet of renewed 
Chinme coismm^ attaok"*^ 1MB annomoemtnt vas called 
by PakiiteQ ®a an ** unwritten al l iano«" between the Anglo-
^Qtericen bloo «nd "unoosamitted India"* in feet, l^akistanis 
resented that ^without entering into a forassl allianae with 
the Nehru Adalnietration, {^resident EennMy and Premier 
MsMsMs.% vol, JOLIX (1266), j a i y 22, 1963, p. 133. 
- • 
Keemillon Have now decided to bestow upon India many of the 
* benel'lts* end eeourity normally eoerulng to members of 
e military allien©©".^ 
The U.t, ttete Depertosent, however, refused to 
eeeoBimo^at^  Pakistan as far as military aid to India was 
ooneemed. fhe l^efenee &6£retary Bobert MacMamara stated 
before ^ e House F o r e l ^ Affairs Qowsittee on Haroh 25, 
"Cur sillitrry assistanoe to India has deeply 
troubled Pekietan. as ^ou are well awere. 
Niverthelessf i t i s important to the entire 
free world. Including PaMstan, ^ ^ t India be able 
to defend itsel f againet Chinese oonmunlat 
aggression* mie United states has tak^^ great 
peln® to assure the Government of FaKisten th&t 
our aid to ijndia wi l l not be at the expense of 
Pekigten*8 security to which we ^re ooimaitted 
under our mutuel defmoe agreessnts.'* 
I t was against the U.is. Hilitery aid to India thst 
3 
Pakistan became interested in having an allianoe with 
China in 1963. i t s c f feet on relations was not 
good* Bo tilt Pakistan end China considered Indie to be their 
2 
i . M L M M * Stay 2, 
vol. t (129?), May 4, 1964, p* 710* 
3. Full Text in Peking heviewy 15 Meroh 1963, pp. 67-70. 
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comcm eaemy. CommuaJLst China declared Its open support 
for Pe&lsten in the avent of indo-Pekistan war, ena labelle«a 
I M i a {3a aggressor. Qhina inereesed mtiv l t^ on the t lao -
laAleo border© which forced the Indians to a large 
pert of their ari^ on the Chinese toorder and thus helped the 
ffiuch emaller pekietanl arms to fight the Indians to a 
etend s t i l l . 
XmrrF,^ 
A critical point vas reached among the; ^ r e e countries • 
the pakiaten^ and India . during the undeclared Indo* 
pftkliten i^ ar ef W S , ¥h«i the United ttetes supported 
neither If|dia nor Pakistan and isaaediately after the out 
break of lai^ge*scale hosti l i t ies between iioposed m aims 
embargo^ on both belligerents. 
i^oyfflgyi^g ou M^yigftft Fpyeign, aaeii^nffi J-P^fit Cotmcii on 
Foreign relations, 1966, p. 113. This statetsent was made 
by Amoasaador Arthur Goldberg, United states Kepreaen* 
tative to the United Ifations, to the security Council of 
the U.N* on September 17, 1965* He saids United 
states envoys and hopes to continue to enjoy friendly rela* 
tions with both Indie end Pakistan. I should l ike to 
emphasise thfst we hrve suspended arms shipments to bol^ 
countries since we want, in support of the security Council's 
resolutions calling for a ceasefire to help bring about an 
end to this conflict end not to escalate i t . I t i s the 
sense of the C^ecurity Council's resolutions thnt ^ e r e be 
a prompt end end not an intensification of hosti l it ies" 
i^epnrMn^ Ol P j l j i l t n . October i i , 1965. p.602. 
U.K. Bocumenta g/RE8/8Q9 (196B). Eepteiabar 4, 1966, and 
fe/iBS/S0Cl9i6) bepteober 6, 1966. This arms embargo made 
Sardar s war en fcingh say in I,ok iabha on j-ept ember 20, 1966, 
that the U.S. Government had niore or less <* confessed its 
inability" to do anything about its assurances that arms 
supplied to Pakistan WO?J1CI not be used against India. 
Kaeslne'a Contemporary Arahivefl^ December li . . l8t 1965, 
Keeslng's publication l,td., London, p.21117• 
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In this vrsi* Pakistan u&ed t&« uptBS mdtjlo* 
Inaiens protested agelnet tills ee thejr eav ^f^t Indleiv 
feare et tbe time of the signing of the U.S. military peot 
itflth Pakistan vere proved to be true* They oosoplalned to the 
tl#L. ©gelnst the use of its isllltsry oQUipfflfiRt by Paklsten 
egelnst incil© end asked I t to do something eo that Peklstan 
not use these weapons end apologise for this use* 
Pakistanis also accused^ India end complained against the 
use of Amjtlcm Btms by Indie* lOiey were perfectly wrong, 
India did not use weapons* this wee clear from the 
feet that en incHen Goirernsient spokestaan alleged on 
Septesiber 3, X965 ttifit the peklstan Government had refused 
Observera permlaslon to v le l t t^e Chheab sector to 
check the presence of tankS| and comosented that without 
tenks and aircraft **Feklstan would have not dared 
. i^oh Its latest adventure" and that the U.6. o f f i c i a l In 
l^elhi were reported on ^©pteraber 6, to have informed Washington, 
efter visiting the Indlen side of the Jfeamiu front, th|t 
Q 
Pekisten was using American eqtil^mnt against ln<21a* I t 
was-ttie Indian Government «ibo allowed the O.S* Observers to 
i * Bhutto's reisark th©t iifaericen MllltRry aid ultimately 
enabled India to * Invade Pakistan* 1® noteworthy* 
Dawa^  November 2E, 196a* 
2* See, 
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Visit ^ e Xnaian ei^e of the Idora^r and the observers hadi 
Sim no ^raerioen. equipineiit vith the Indian troops*^ 
In reply the United States did not sey even e single 
vord either to India or t© Pakistan* 
In sueh a situation the position of peliistan wes taore 
serious t h ^ ttift of Indie* Indie was reeeiving military 
herd.vare from e wide renge of eountrle8,e.g*;Britein and 
the Soviet Union* While Pekistm relied eliaost exoloeively 
Si on Merioen e<|iiip8i@nt. 
kliatever might heve heen the repercussions of the 
United l>tetes Mllitery eld to Fekisten on Indie, the ^ e r i c ^ 
and Indian thinking had heen quite different on this iesue* 
I t thought in te&rica thct the aseietanoe to Paklatan 
to Sjsprove the equipment, laobility, training end organisation 
of i ts force would render less rather than more l ikely a 
P* ^ ^ 
2. JQEtit-SSaSl* September 12, 1965. 
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».oviet attesapt to overrun or subvert the country.^ fti€ 
fflilitery fild was oaly e p«rt of th« sssisteae® that th€ 
United Estates offered Pakistan. The eeawoiatc sl^ a In a 
lerge vplurae beJjig pledged to i t on tii© ground that the 
beeltfey development ox ptfelstEn th® feest Ijistapen^ of 
Its prsoe sad ®tebi3ity egolaet any internal or external 
threet® (from Coomtinist comtries ) . 
Hext reason wes tfe© view of th© Unit©^ 
the toast way of serving the lnte:e8ts of the free world would 
bci to 6trengtliea both Indle ©nd Paiitstsn snci this ooala be 
brought about i f both eomtr ies isoveol forward in p©8e© towerds 
eteblJity md ©oonoiRic developsaent. 
Thirdly, there wat no presumption in the United fei^tat«8 
thEt i t s milltsry eifi to Pekisten wouia pos© my threat to 
Indian security. In American view there w©re vest dissimilar-
i t ies betvesn the tuo with regard to thoir and etrength. 
Their assessment vm tligt udth indie having nearly four tiiues 
the eree of PsKistBH, tour tiaies the populfttion, probably 
ten timei' th^ indnstrial bee©! end superior strength in KKSSt 
other measurable dimension, how could i t be thought that 
I , For a revealing history of discussions leading to the 
Asierloen decision to eld Pekisten, s«e fsolig b . Harrison^ 
•India, pekisten end the U . o — t h e Oese History of a 
Mi£tcfee» aew lieoublio. 10 /iUgU£.t i9S9, pp. 10-17. 
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Pekistfifi would constitute threat to the security 
of ladle? !i:h6 Fektstim Govoraiamt hea also assured the 
U#t# Govetaraent th®t the ©ilitary would be used for 
the aeelgmetei aoEmon purposes of defence against l.ovtet 
attack. 
ma if ia spit© of its relative veeimess and © f f lo la l 
pledges, Pakistan vould dare to launch a hopalaiB aggrasalon 
@gainst India, perhaps the authorities aasui»di that 
/.3j®ricaa lafluenee would be adequate to forestal l the action* 
But this iiraerisfii a&i.umption was proved to be wrong when in 
August Pakistan attacked India and the U.c. could do 
nothing.^ 
im.,Mmm.Mm, fmr-
Indie did not and does not bellave in th© extension of 
the Riilltery pact Byetam to in her view /jaerican 
rallitery aid hae tand<sd to harden Insttaad of softening 
local confllcta. Xt brought cold war to tha door of 
the Indian subcontinmt, while ladSfl did not want to be 
involved la tha cold war r ivalr lae. India has baan a non-
For details of American Point of view se© folbot and 
poplai, ffl^ PP* BS^BO. 
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eltgaed ooontry 0n<S Is not ellgmd wltto tltfeer of ttie 
tm bXoGS* 
ladic did not believe that the polisjr of ©ntengling 
allleao®® was th© best one to secure peeoeand stability in 
Asia because i f e eoiaitr;^ btcaese a member of bloc, I t 
woisld naturally becoiBB the enemy of the other bloc* In such 
6 situation rivalries vfould not be lessened, insteid they 
would be inereesed* 
iio India thought that by ©Hying i tse l f with the U.fe., 
Pekieten had aligned herself with me of th« two power blocs 
whioh i»«s soustter to be$i@ Indian eoncepta of e foreign 
policy based upon non-alignment vfiti^ either of the two 
power bloes. In her view Pakistan* s elignment icith the 
West endangered Indie's security by bringing th® clashing 
interests of th® major powers to the borders of Indio. By 
joining the Baghdad Pect end bLAfO Pekisten had also pres«*aably 
sought to strengthen i ts om general influence in intemetionel 
a f fa i re , en influence which India suspected. Hot only 
Pakistan's elliat^c® affected £>outh Asien position but by this 
Pakistan had also taken a position different from that of 
India in V^estern Asia, where Indie f e l t that its tecurity 
and other interests could be best served by encouraging 
•neutralism' and by keeping extremely friendly relations 
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with Bgypt| befriending the Arab countries and cold 
shouldering Isreel i olelas* Pakisten on the other side, 
being aligned \ i^th the V/«dt, has been supporting the 
I s rae l i elaisns. 
India did not and does not agree vith the on 
the point thet the great disparity betvcan Indian end Pakisteni 
strength was the guarantee ageinet Peicisitfini aggreesion? 
I n d i e s hed been citing meny exaisplest i t wee in 1948, ^hon 
Pekietan wis very veak, thet i t sent i ts troops Into iCeshmir 
to l ight ageinet the Indian er^ny. 4gein in august i9@5, a 
fu3I Hedged mr brok^wt between India and Pakietaa, 
la which the Ifitter used U.fc. railitery equlpiaent against o(f4r 
aountry despite the feet thet i t had given assurance to 
the not to uae them against Indie • a non^CosHsimlst 
country* 
Fekietan had referred many times to e "holy-war" to 
liberate Kashmir from India and thet vas why India auepeeted 
thet Pakistan wou^d not use this soilitsry aid only for 
defenoe purposes* £o Indians believed that Pakistan was 
Interested in ^ r i e a n arms in order to improve itg bargaining 
position against India. Because of these objections of India, 
Amsrican aillitary aid to Pekietan had been certainly disturbing 
friendly Indian*American relations time and again. 
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l a spito of the fact that; th« 0.6* isoistlnusd to 
give ffilXitery eid to I'eki&tan ageinst GommlBt expcinBlon, 
i t did « o t i t a g s i a s t any Coasuiiist oauntry l>«t egoinst 
neutraliet Indile, on th# eontrer^', the s t i l l 
bcrlieves thc^ t wiien ceillsd upoia bo Pakistan voald 
horiom* cobinsitaitiuts afs sn ally aM a^ f a mt^ iaber of 
t© assist the in its ei'forts to eoateSii CoiaisuBisra. 
But there had becta oertein instances vhen PakM taa did not 
do so* I t was because of the IhS'mA, that Bi^AW extended 
itii protective umbrella to Cemlsodie South Vietnam, 
even though these eountriee were not meiabers ^ f liLAlX). In 
the eufflffifef of 1962, wtiea thsi^e wgs o feeling that the 
Pathetlao might sweep to the bordoriK of Thailand, an 
American force of 5,000 to 6,000 troops was brought to 
Theilmd with the concyrrenee of th« Th«i Govemb^nt, in 
order to boost the aioralc of the people in &onth-.f;®st Asian 
region.^ Some other merabers of liK^sto oIbo sent toisen forces 
to Thailand on this occasioni but not faliisten. V^ hen question^, 
the Pfikistenis pleaded thet 5Pbailend had not aslseiS for troops 
from Pakisten. What was the Araerican explanation? Pakistm 
vas in no position to supply troops since i t was afraid of 
a l ikely attack from India* This vas a wrong reasem as India 
1* For detei2s tee, June 4, 1962, pp«0O4«dO6. 
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hed then ® bflgede ef troops in the Congo md wes 
filso contrifeuting the largest amtlageat of tfoops to the 
fl.N# Force in 0ega» Th© feet wes that PeMstan did not waafc 
to do anything in deference to the wishes of Chin®* How 
couSd the feer of ettaok from indle not prevent Faklsten 
fro® sending, vsithin a few montfie, some 1,600 troops to 
Itest flev Giiinee, to eonstittite the O.H* Force th^re? 
iAtiother instcnce ms when in ^ e Bs^ AfO ffie«ting hel4 in 
London in the beginning of Mg^  X@6@, Pakistan refused to 
support the action in towth Vietnam.^ 
s^ eiuQine that vhile o'Qteiaing lerge smlz 
military ©id from the end ^oJjilng the lailitary 
alllences of bEikfO end pakieten h«d at thci seme time 
giiren en essar^ce to Chine thet the building up of Ite 
adlitery strength would in no vay hs directed agsin^t 
China* 
I M O^B^rver, Loidon, h®d rightly commented on 
jwiy a i , 1063, that " i t is eignificent, however, that Choia 
iin-lei had told a vieiting PaKisteni delegation recently that 
I ^ M ^une 7, p. 9^4. 
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China would defend Pskieten throughout the vrorld as 
Pfiklstsii defended Chine in CdflJO and 
Furthenaoore, Xndiens have been unable to undersimd 
vhy the should be so auoh worried about PeKlstmi 
protests against coraperatively much smeller militory aid to 
Sndia vhich had to defend herself against Communist China* 
Fcikistenis eomplein of the military eg&istanoe reoeived 
by Indie fros the in I962.@3 md 1963.64, totalling 
i66 million dollar©, hfilf in credits end helf In grent®^, 
^hil@ Pakistcm itsel f bed been given mueh more massive 
aiilitery eid fey the with the evowed object of oonteining 
th@ Cofomunist Chinese, v?hom they are no%; befriending. 
According to ^mericen nevepeper reports the eid in military 
herdvare elone t i l l the beginning of 1963, is said to haVe 
been of the order of i . 3 billicm dollars* Thomas Bredy 
writing from Karachi reported that Mr. iieen Busk declered 
in Karachi on May 1, 1963 in the G:.riTO Council that tJ.&. aid 
to Pakistan upto date had been over three bi l l ion dollars* 
"'ihe figure on military aid in the nine years since the 
alliance wee formed has been kept secret at PaKisten*s request*"^ 
X. t&e The Daway April l i , 1963, for the Text of the 
Lxtraots froa Frimier Chou i^n-lal* s interview with the 
correspondent of the •Associated Press of Pakistan*' 
2. Figures given by Ghakrevarty, ladlg 
p. 139. 
3. Ihg myj ifoyK Urns , my 2, 1963. 
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I t 1& not posBible to f l a a out the e^Bat f igures o f the 
pmount of raUitary a l e . Anotiier f i gu re quoted f o r the 
period ending the f i s ce l yenr 1959 e-T?ounts to 981^7 mill ion 
do l l e r e of .>iiich mil itery eciaiptuent v.as worth 5(J6.7 mi l l ion 
d o l l e r s and the retseinlng 446 mil l ion do l l a r s h&d been ^iven 
f o r aefeacs© support ana d i r e c t forces rupport.^ 
"She continued f low of ralllteiy P K to r m l s t e n , thus, 
has been 8 matter of fcrev® concern to India as Pakistan end 
Gbiaa bev® very cordial de let ions , PekSstan received th© 
f i r s t subraerine &s a g i f t from the i m i t ^ r tetec on 
A ugust 1964. f b e uuestivoa sriSGS ^ sgs lnst ^hcsa i s o 
sutome'ln&f needed.*^ I t seenjs that the /ATnerieanj; are Inclined 
to be l i eve that Pakistan i s r ee l l y s f r a i d of ImliP end not 
o f Gorsmunist China* Certainly i t i s supposed to use i t 
egeinst ind le md i t i s Indle u-hioh ruey Df* Rfraid of pekisten 
rether than Pakietsn which should be -afraid of i nd i s , 
because of the f a c t tliet Psk is tm* s security i s gup,rsnt©ed 
through aiiXitery pacta l i k e end end it has a 
sepsrete fallitery eid agreement with the 0 .6 .A . md , 
paradox ice l ly , i t hcs now obtcined eJs'O the proteeticaa of 
the Peop le ' s !t©publlc of Ghine. ind l jns ore unoble to 
understand that i f PaKistrn i s r e a l l y s f ra id of Xnaia, why 
-i" John C. Campbell, Kefenpe of the Middle x^gst, 
iPreeger PufoliceUons) ieoO, pp. 20U-a0l . 
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i t h64. oonsietmtly been refusing Indie's of fer of e 
11jo*w6r pedt* 
There is a very sound remork mefie by Selig Barrisoni 
"Pakistan hfis been able to acqtiirc a 
disproportionately strong power position relative 
to thst of India through alignment with the 
United i^tetes. An an ally permitting the use 
of its territoryI for atrategio intelligenoe 
purposes. Foicistan h«a Qommmded from the 
United i iates an economic and military aid 
subaidy, such larger than her else would otherwise 
%farrent. liawalp^di has bam emboldened by 
this to think big end presa for Indian oonoeasiona 
f r o » a position of a r t i f i c i a l l y induced strength, 
"^ The special nature of the Pakistani link (with 
has been scarcely understood in the 
Asnerican refusal of Indian requests for supersonic 
aircraft , a ir -to-air missiles and heavy tanks, 
e l l of which has been given to i>©Klsten."i 
Professor H»J. Morgenthea^ an outstanding authority 
in the f ie ld of international relatione, xade a correct 
analysis of the situation arising from military assistance 
to Pakieten \^en he wrote in en article in po^mentary in its 
issue of May (id64} as followst 
"fhe a l l imce with F a k i s ^ has from the 
outside be&i a useless md counter-productive 
instrucomt of ^er ican foreign polic^l it could 
1, iselig S, Harrison, 'Troubled India and her Neighbour*, 
" - - vol . 43, November 2, January 1965, 
pp. 322 
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truly be esdlea e aiplomatio act Qgalaet 
natwpe. For the mtllt©py t&to^B of Pekistea, 
built up vrith our massiire support, 
have as their primery target not tlie Soviet 
Union or ChJUie* but ladia. let \m have an 
obvious vitel interest in the politieel oad 
economici syooess of Indie, aa iotareat far 
trgfisoeaciiisg ^ y otfcar we have la Aais* Our 
military swpgort of PeEistan has forced 
India to divert a proportionate fraction of 
it£ scaroe resouroea to military purposee 
and anxious to prevent India's collapse, 
have bean eompelied to raplace at laast a 
part of thoae diverted xesourocis with foreign 
aid. 
' 'it was possible to diemias t^iia arsiament race 
with ourselves as a ooatly absurdity until China 
inveded Xndie| and in the aftersath of that 
invasion, FaKiatm reached a political and also, 
i t i s generally believed a ai l i tery understanding 
« i th Chinas Everything points to the likelihood 
that Ghina vfill invade Indie on a large scale 
a0 soon as ahe has solved her logistic problems. 
I t is also obvious that vhen this happena a«id 
India is fighting for her l i f e , Pakistan will 
bring the veapons supplied by us into the 
camp of her enemies while wi l l support India 
improvising e crash prograaaie after the 
invasion had started.** 
But the did not help India during Indo-Pekistan 
war in 1966« 
So long as India had suggested that because of i ts 
d i f f icu l t ies with Pakistan, the United l^tates should not 
proceed with Pakistan to strengthen their Joint plans against 
the danger of Soviet aggression, ilmericans had be^n apt to 
be resentful. Sometimes American support to Indian positions 
had been resented in Pakistan. 
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GHAPfJiB n 
umif^mi^m I,TATDS KET^ATIQHS 
M M 
At the heart of mfijof Indian*A:s@rlean differenoee 
QVeT East ts ie has hem the so ealled "Chine Question**, 
Kver siciee the eosEBURXlste took over the control of mainlend 
China in the year China looms large en<l important 
hoth in ^ e Asian aoene and in l||<io»^eriean relations 
heeause of i ts strategic aignificanQe* The two oountries -
In^ia and the United States • approaoh this * question* froia 
profoundly divergent pevspectivea end follow different 
policies toward the tm Chineae Oovernmente i . e « , the 
Comsiuniat China and the nationalist China* Hot only the 
two countries d i f fer on the matters of the reoo^aition of 
CotffiBunist China end its representation in the United Sations 
or on the issue of disposition of Korea, but their relations 
tovard Chinese Communist ii^ves 3n other countries ahow 
quite varied points of views e*g* Communiet penetration into 
Tibet or Chinese policies toward South^East Asia and Korea* 
There were no v ita l d i f f e r^oes between Indie and the 
United states t^ith regard to China before i^eptember IE, X949,. 
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the day when i^e Commurilsts ovtr threw the government of 
Cliieng Kfti*gh6k« fh® leaders of Indlea ndtionellsm es 
fis the ^iserican people ana Govemaent bad a number 
of ties with Chine and friendly, admiring relations with 
Chiang, had long b a ^ viewed by both eountriea ae en 
outateiiding netionallBt leader. After SepteoiS^er 1949, 
there mre two Chinas, the United States reftieed to reoognise 
£*eopl6*s iiepubllo of China, dotainated by Cosimimists while 
supporting exile government of Chiang on Formosa. On the 
contrary India recognised Cocamunlat China and ain^e then haa 
been advocating for the membership of Communist China in 
the united Mationa. 
India* & aontact vit^ China dates back in the ancient 
tlBief from the f i r s t to the eleventh eenturiea end had 
ineliid^td oonaiderable travel and trade md hrd se@ri the 
spread of B^ddhisas froa India to China* Bo with polltioal 
synipathiea and hietorioal samoriefi Indian nationalist leaders 
tried to review cmitaets between India ma China in the 
modern tincica also. KabindraiiBth TagoZ'e visited the Far ^ast 
in 1024, and Jawaharlal Mehrta eontaoted the Chinese leaders 
which exeited great pyblie interest in both the eomtriea* 
Japanese aggression against China In X931 end 1937 
outraged Indian as well as 4i3@rioan pufolio opinion and India 
became more interested. India did a lot in favour of China* 
- 3 9 4 -
Indian newspapers called on the l^eague of Hetions to apply 
mllltBry sanctions agelnat Jepen. f^ iren th@ Congress Party 
pfiSf'ed resolutions end organised demonstrations on "Qhtne 
Oey" the commfflidor of the Coffloanlst Ited Chinese iilghth 
l^oute Ajjniy appealed for helpt e privately s'jgppert^d Indian 
ambulance unit was sent to China* Hehru irisited^ China in 
August 1939 ma in febutBry 1@42 he brought Chiang in touch 
vltki other Indian nationalifit& at the t l a » of his visSt^ to 
India to appeal for store support egalnat the Japanese at that 
crit ical stage* Chiang fai led to persuade congress party 
leaders to support the Allied war e f fort , yet Sehru called 
his visit as "a greet evmt i& India" as a result of which 
"the bonds that tied India and China grev stronger"« 
Unlike indi« , ^er ican contacts with China were of a^ore 
recent origin end of a t!K»re concentrated and Intense nature* 
prior to World War Second, X93e-194S, i t was through a 
century's intercourse at missionary tmding and politieaS 
levels that the United States had come to Imov China* fhe 
1* Indinn Annual Register 193^^ vol* XX, July.X}ecetsber, 
p* ZI2B* 
vol* No* IV CmO-1943), 
February 21.28; 104S, p• 
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Firi^t aiilfi©©e«iiaisi"l<3aQ fraety^ was acd« In 1844 whieli 
iR ways scwght to limit the mcroeeliiBefite of 
foreigti pDvers on GhitiB md to resist the \^hittli»g dom 
o£ sovereignty by BusBisi ^est Buropesn states 
afli<l Jopaa. By this siippo^r^, the OQlted States vas serving 
i ts om econoiBiQ,. and politioel aims of preserving a unitedi 
md indep^dfiat Cbine^ bs neSl as the interests of the 
weak Chinese government* I t wes heoause of this owtlook 
that the Japanese invasion of Chine in 1930* s promted 
great Indication in the United JjtateB^ end the Aaeriom 
gov^masnt refaeed to recognise the HanchnacHd regime jiet ap 
v 
by tibe Jepenese* Thert; conteets inereaeed in range 
they beceo® ©lliee during tlorld t^ rar ix^ andy bacass® very 
intiwete Subet^^ntiel ^©ricen help for several years 
supported Chiang* £ efforts to seet hi@ dillitary end doaestio 
problemg-serious in nature* 
ge»wine interest of the Onited 6|ate8 in China 
md its d^elre to elevate her to the status of a truly 
great power ^as laade fu l ly apparent by president Boosevelt 
lote in XiHB^ »rged the Congres® to leg&lise Chinese 
Melloy, WilUem M., (Gon^O. ^ 
vol* X (v^ashington, D.C.s Oovemment printing Off ioe« 
191.0), pp. Ifi7«305. 
in India alto* 
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iBBBigTaU^ai &8 " aadU ioa^ proof ttiet ve regard China not 
onl^ as B partn<ir in veglng vsr but that shall regard 
feer se e pertncr in the days of peece*"^ I t wag because 
of the United States, Initiatives that China became a 
permfment cembar of the sacurity Couaoii, e povrarful osgm 
of the United Sations in X94S after Morld Vfar sacond.^ 
On tha one heiid tha United Stataa wai trying h@r bast 
to strangthan Chiang ^ i l e m the other hond the great sooial, 
aconofliic and political ra^ae^a of the Japanese occupation^ 
vith the attwidant gtrasBas on c iv i l var had mderrolned the 
fomdations of the Kuoisiatsng government- The continuing 
ineffaetlvenea& of the loilitar^ foreesi becasie a ssatter of 
mounting concern t& ^ e United ^fatea. Tha maaaaa of the 
Chinese people had become l^aarjp not only of the Koosiintang 
Government and ita corrupt administration but also of the 
long and seemingly fut i l e etrug|le against Japan. American 
stood aside and pressed Chi^g K.ai«£hek to seek a compromise 
settlem^t with his Communist rivAla* United states was 
infact, diatraestd to see the s i ^ a of disintegration in China* 
MJE&t ^^ October X6, 1043, p.266. Full 
Text in XfeMis PP« 224.286» 
tme par East 
3# V/hich bad continued for fourteen years in Mauchuria csnd 
eight years in Chine proper. 
« 3 9 ? « 
Slie United states ma evere of tbe faot that Cotamunlat 
victory in Ghiae would hight®n the threat posed by tlie 
soviet Union. There was a bitter oontrovercy In the Sfnited 
titetes BB to whether the United i^tates oouia have prevented 
this debacle.^ But Washington^ ignoring the eorruption md 
of th© Kuofliintsng Government, olung to the hop© tht?t 
i t could miom^d md that b etrong ma United Chins votiia 
Tinelly emerge to tok© its place b@si<le the United states 
as the dominant stabilizing influence in the Fer East. 
I t on December 16, 194S, that presideitt fruman hed issued 
m iisportant policy ststeTCnt » ith regard to Chine. " I t ie 
the firm belief of this Government^', he seid, »*thst e strong, 
united and dearacretic Chine i© of the utmost importenoe to 
the succees of the United Nations Orgenisation end for 
world peace". Be stressed that a divided and disorg^niefid 
Chine was "ax undermining influence in world stabil ity end 
peace now and in tiie future". Furthermore, he stressed tJiet 
while i t ms the policy of the United i^tetes not to intervene 
in the doisestio a f f a i r s of other nations, at the same time 
i t wes "in the oost vitel interest of the United etates end 
e l l the United Nations that the people of China overl&ok 
no epportunity to adjust tlieir Internal aifferences promptly 
X. poplei end Talbot, SBs&lU* P* 
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by mems of peeeeful negotiations". Ke also pledged 
fineneiaX assistanee for the reoonstrtiotic^i of the eotmtry*^ 
But Indian government and pubiio opinion tooK these 
developments eelsily, Chiang had fai led to aohieve 
edminl8tr«ti?e end social reform and was fu l ly dependent on 
the support of the United btates Indians were not enthueiastie 
for their gowrnroent. 
I t me the greatest fai lure of the policy of the 
United states in China or in the Far liaat where on Oepteiaher 21, 
1@4© the Oonmunists ©stabliehed the so called People's 
Eepoblio of China md proclaliaed frankly th-t i t was a 
gmuine Communist government based on Harjiian principles, 
fhe f l ight of the beaten Kuominteng arisiee to the island of 
Foriaose had the ef fect of profoundly shocking ^e r i oa ^ 
and arousSng a l l i ts latent anti«CoBitounist instincts.^ 
CosBsuniet China «ras recognised by the iuoviet Union, 
titfo days after its proclamation. Five Uaatem European 
countries recognised i t %;ith in a week md the reisalning 
i^atellites • Horth Korea, the People's Hepublic of Mongoliai 
and the derioan Coomunlst Bepublic accorded i t recognition 
"United States Policy toward China", i)»t.B.^ vol . n i l 
(338), Becember 16, 1945, pp. 946-946. 
2. tawrence M, Battistini , ,nna„,AaAflf P * ^ 
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vlthin a mnth* it ^ae onl^ after four days of the 
inattguratloa of tlie Chinese Coainuaist aepublls thet a 
isiao-.5©viet Friendship ^sso®ieti<m was organlased es & 
mess org©nlJsetion "to foana ma consolidate peternel friendship 
and Cooperation betueea the Chinese ©id Lovlet people end 
to develop the interflow of kno\>?l®dge end eKperiens e of the 
two greet nations'* 
Indie and the United states d i f fe r on the question of 
th® reoo^t i t i^ of Coaiaunist China* On December 30, 1949, 
the Bndien government recognisad the newly procleitaed 
Central People's Government of the People's Kepublio of China, 
vhQreeB the Onitad spates rejected the Coismunists* olaioid 
to aovereigoty over China* 
m m * 
Shortly after th® Chinese Communists oeme into pointer 
over the %!hole mainland Prim® Hlnister Kebrw told a group 
of reporters In Hew York that «the happenings in China are 
eufih that they oonnot be ignored*"^ ilnce the time of the coming 
1* Alfred L© Jenkine. "Present United States Policy toward 
China", j^w^Xs Afifit^ eiW Of FffilltifffiX. m i 
bOQifll ficianft^, vol . July 1954, p. 84. 
EmJ^SSlLJlmMf November a, 1949* 
4 0 0 ^ 
of Conununlsts Sn power In China, Itidls hes hem inelSaed 
to BGQord a certein «aao«nt of de f ace to the Crovemmmt of 
h^d Chine* For Mew Delhi, i t waa siainl^ a question of 
Peking's being able to maintain effective control over 
nearly six htmdred million Chineee and to rule the country 
vfith undiEputed authority* fhe tinited Ltates policy of 
refusing to reaopiize Gowunist Government hes been a 
qi3it6 pugzling factor in Inaia.tinitea Ltates relations* 
i»i3ring his v i s i t to the H.S.iA.^, ffehrti had pointed out 
the need for recognising " rea l i t i e s " , ^ and India recoe^ised 
the "res l l ty" after Ifehru's return home. He took this 
decision in consultation with other members of the CoiBs»>nweaAth*^ 
India did not to i^ait for aetion m far as the 
recognition of the Cosisunist Chinese Government was concerned* 
Peter Calvocorensi explained India 's attitude as follo^ss 
»Dhe Indian Priaae Minieter, PanditHehru, 
was eager to establish relations i»;ith Peking, 
because he believed thpt ^ e Chinese Goassuaist® 
could be veened from IdOBcov? and that Indie ipd 
Chins could together constitute a third force, 
ti^ich might perhaps build a bridge between 
b'eshij^on and HosOow."^ 
1* Nehru visited the in October»November 1949. 
t a M 9 m PP. 431-432. 
3* For details see towmal 
(Gomacwiwealth Parliaiaentary ^SBociation) 
ja^r , i2(l05O), p.l64* 
Moyal institute 
of International Affaire (London)^p. 335* 
4 0 1 ^ 
Xn4ia*e attituae vbs esiplaiaea by Hehru oh Meroh 17, 1950, 
lEi the lodiea perllefflent, thet XOvle was reoognlslng the 
fact of the Chinase QommlBts having come into powar an^ 
affaetlvaly eontrolliag tha aiaiolmd of China. He made i t 
clear thrt It was not a question "of epproving or disapproving" 
the changes, but "of recognising a laejor event in history 
end dealing with it»# Fortherjnore, he said that India was 
s f t is f ied th©t the new Government of China was a stebl© 
Oovemment and that there vaa "no foree likely to eapplent it*»»l 
1'hls aho«8 that Indie* @ approach urea baaed on the ^efecto 
theory of recognition of governments in International taVf 
according to vihich tJ:ie new governments should be recognised 
as aoon as they are, in fact in control of the v i tho^ 
going into the nature of thet govemnient.^ 
Indie has been trying not only to make the world siore 
acceptable to China, but elso ^ meke China tsore acceptable 
to thp w o r l d K e h r u and other Indian spokesmen in reisking 
positions hed often reiterated their contention that there 
vol- 3, pt. I I , Uo.B (17 March 1960) 
col. 1609. 
2. lichuman, F.L. . ;intemational pQlitio.!y The isestiny of 
the v;estertt £itete eyetem, McGraw Kill Book Compmy, IfiC., 
«ew York, 1948. p. 143, !Jhe United Stetee also uaually 
followed this policy during the period from 1793 down to 
the f i r s t f^^ il6on Mrainiatration. 
3. November 6, 1964. 
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cell be no ecittlem^at of the prohlm^ of the Far isast c 
of touthoLest ^sia uiiless the eentral faet of the 
existence of the People' e Qovernment of Chine was reco^lEeS 
jmd ected upon hy §11 th© aetions of the worl4 ^ i o h are 
concerned with the stability of that ssstor of th© glob.^ 
'^he Government of India holds thet peace In A&ia depends 
partly on the recongnitlon of the government of Goaimunlct 
Chine, fhle contention ms made elear hy Kehrw, When cm 
fcepteraher 19S4, after the Korean cr is is , he bleaed, that 
e great pert of our present day dlf .ioultie s certainly in 
the Far iiast, " i s due to this extraordinary shutting of 
om-B eyes to the fact of Chine".^ Indie thought thet the 
intematioaaCL ecceptenoe of Gommuni&t China vould have 
eymbolic ise^ortaaoe as a reeogniti^m of the new states of 
Aaien peoples in viorXd af fa irs .^ At that tJAe i^slen aountriea 
w,re fighting for their frcedota frf;m coloniel powers, .'.nd 
the recognition of any newly emerged country aight fee very 
inspiring for o^ers . 
indie reoognized Coawnmist Ghme not because she liked 
1. BS-BSdJi, August 10, 1963 i ^ m ^gv^^y) 
2. lok Sabha Debates, vol. 7, pt. I I , 15-30 l^epteaber 1954, 
eol. 
a . Talbot and Poplai, If^dln nnd op.©it., p. 106. 
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Commuaiat bloc &fi4 also not @lie veated to «fia 
support from the Coammiset countries. dia not in^^fid 
to pose, any hostile Bttltodi© towards the TInited £'tat®Sg but 
i t recognised a simple fsct l « e * , the ^ietence of the 
People's Jiepabllo of CLina. In Indian ©yas, th© Ghinsse 
were f®now Asisais f i r s t , end eosfflunists ©fterwaras^, as 
they were msvere of whet thel" vould do is futui^s. Bvm 
S^rder F.M. Penjiifekar, former ladien Mlsoesador to Peking m^ 
V«K* Krishna Henoni had expres^^ed doubts that the Chinese 
were properly to he classif ied as Coiniaunists at a l l * bardar 
Peniicker^ after a four year stay in China ae the XnaiaQ 
Ambassador, was coaviaaed in IWd that a "coiBisiinity of approRoh. 
a consQionnesjs of understanding", linked the leaders of indie 
md China. ' 'Political issaea apart, there were no differences 
f t al l . . . On matters like the freedom of Asian peoples ©nd 
the need for social and economic justice".^ 
India was not ready to reoogniae %\to Chines separately* 
And as late as February 1956 I^ehru made i t clear in 
Perliaaent$ " I t patent that we cannot recognise tv;o Chinas, 
we om recognise only one* Md we ham deliberately recognised 
ie aolJert Strausjg Hup®, /ilvin J . Cottre31 James and ^aaes 
K. Dougherty, op.c it . , p* 19m 
one Chine beceuie that ve@ th^ reel China* Obviously, 
i'ormose i s not Ghina'U^ li© there ma no Question of 
recognissing Formoee againei Peking. 
Bi&liind the inflien deeisloa t© seek <jontacte with, 
cultivate, md befriend Cosaaunist China obvi-wsly, were 
certain hopes, netionel interest ana objectives, ^het were 
they?^ Ihe Government of In4i® thought f i r s t l y , that i t 
th^3 inaiire the friendship of e poverfuX neighbour 
end meke oei^ie)^  the t&^k of seauring our frontiers. I t 
Mm hoped that China would re spend to Indie's friendship and 
that e basis for avoiding conflict mti mlsmd era tendings 
wuHi be eeteblished. ?hi8 nosmeli^ation of relations with 
0 big neighbour mn cm&idetud a better guarantee of p©f,oe 
on the northern bor4el$@ ^en e lailitery buildup and a militery 
posture for i t was thought that the njoney thus saved sdght 
be better spent on eoonotaio development to provide inner 
strength md security to the country. 
More then this oUier interests could be served through 
friendship with Chine. India 's view was that the Chinese 
revolution could be kept in the main stream of post war 
Asain resurgence end thus be humanized end normelized. Speaking 
vol . I , pt. 11, No. SCFebruery 25, 1965), 
tfflyeyas, ghtof nm% f i - U QmSteals 
i:'dited by A.H. Helpem, McQrewHill pook company, New 
York, pp. 203-201. 
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in the In^im Perliemetit Sfehru seia, <*oiie of the dominant 
features of oar age Is the r ise of md I t totally 
Immaterlel whether people I t or aisl lke Iti i t is 
^ Hore is a feet as big md solid ffiot as m^ • the 
faet of the eaist^ee of th® People® b Qo'V&mmmt of Chine* 
But isome oomtries ao not reaogni^ie i t l "^ Indie* & belief 
wes that through inereeslng contacts with tli® outside world 
end aessociation with the world aotsmtmity, Chinese policies 
could perhapsi he invested with « een&e of regponeibility, 
md the rigours of the oold war oould be softened end thus 
would contribute to the cause of world peece* 
Thirdly, Indie was influenced by enother cmeideratim, 
nomely, that she mB already involved in a bitter dispute 
with a neighbouring eoimtry, Pakistan. Therejfore, 
inviting the enisity of ano^er neighbour, both big and 
powerful was neither good politico nor good economies* Later, 
Pakistan*s military alliance with the weat was regarded in 
India as primarily aiaed agf^lnst her* 
naturally India offered her friendly hands to 
Cossaunist China, " for the peace of Aaia depends upbn these 
2 relations". 
^^ flb^ ft gfibftl^S, vol* I , pt* I I , HO. 6 <25 February 1066), 
col. 809. 
- 406 -
fhe mitdd states md India bsve not seen eye to 
eye on the issue of feoogaitioa oi Communist Chine. The 
former ^id not md 4oe6 not fecognize the Peopie* e Bepublie 
of Chine l^oeuse of her strategic interests in the Fai^  
The interest is to use fonaose as & deterrent military 
hase Ggainst Comtsunist extension in the Fer Kast and i t 
regeraed Uie Conmmist Chinese regisie, elntost before its 
birth was ooi^ieted, as a potential instrument of aggression 
in the Far East. 
41thou^i Great Britain and many other v/estern nations 
friendly to the United States in time r0coi|aiaed th« new 
regime I the Meriesn Government almost overnight developed 
a policy of fervid support for Kuo»intang Government. The 
Covemment fees contlntted to reoogniae the Kuominteng 
regime as the legitimate govemisent of China while violently 
opposing every move of Bed China to worm i t s way into the 
United ITations. ^erican hostility to the new Red China 
could be seen from vhat the thm Beoretary of stete^ 
IKIheson pronounced in the Sutsmer of X94dt 
"Lhould the Comnonist regise lend i tse l f to 
the eijss of Soviet Bussian imperlelisai and 
attempt to engage in aggression sgaSnst 
China* B neigh^urS| ve and the other lo^b^grs 
of the United nations would be confronted by 
• 4(3? « 
a situetiott Violative of th« principles ©f 
the Halted Natlon^^ Charter and threataal^g 
peaoe and seourlt^***^ 
illQSg with th@ politieal of^siOsratlmEi there m m 
formal and tli&o£*@tioal erginaanta as far m the ^erieaii 
reoogaitloa of China was Utme th® tim 
J e f f a r s m , th@ hm in mo^t hut not a l l parioda of i t s 
Q 
hietorsTf applied thraa er l iar la of ( i ) o c t r o i 
over the m a c h i n e o f Statet ( i i ) govom%ent iiith the a s s ^ t 
of the paople or at least without their open opposltim^ 
a!id (3 ) th® villlngaess abil ity of a regiiae to fui l f l l l 
Its intercsational obligations. Atserioan recognition me 
aelayed or prevented in ease of several tatin iUnerlean 
regimes^ of Soviet union, Hanohukno and the Franoo Govemisent 
in ^painf as th^se oountries fai led to meet the aeoond 
and third standardg* 
In caee of Gomcmnist Chinef^e Oovemment^ j^erloa has not 
reoognieed i t beoause i t ha^ not met Jefferson*® second 
criterion and has repeatedly violated the third one e*g« the 
^f Halloa jfefltftfi jjaa^ 
(White Paper)«(Viafftilngtofjs U^li. Printing Of f ice , 
1940), p. xv i i . Also see aMJUMSt i©^®* 
2. Poplai and tfeltoot, op^oit., p. 104* 
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sgeressioti of Korea oherg^d to Qhi&B hy has not 
hem |>ttrg€d Peking* s subaequtnt aotlone* So ^ t r i o e 
has eontinued to recognise the Hetionallst Government as 
i t retains it@ legal status despite the Comnisiiat'a 
oontrol of tHe mainland.^ 
I t was not l^efora tha end of that the United 
i^tetas* attitude against Gommiist Ohina*s recognition 
hardened. Slough i t had gtjggested to its friendly nations^ 
that none of t h ^ ahould reeo^ise a Comuni&t regi'ia in 
3 
China i^ithout previous consultation with the others. fhe 
publication ©f the Oepartinent of State QS 
ifflam^S-^faiC^JlDJS^^ on August 4, 1949'^  had an 
6Vid^<se that the t*#{&erletn Oovemment had washed Its h^ds 
off the nationalist regiia© and was waiting on event®".® 
I t fess «iot f>repared to underwrite the Chiang govern-nent, 
though I did not i^uite Itnov what to do about the 'Pefc l^ng 
Oovernisont* The faet was that the United states vented to 
PP» XCI4.10S* 
a • Britain, franee, Holland, Eeliium, Auairalia. I M l a , 
Pakiatan, Nein SSealand, C^^lonr and ^outh Afrioa. 
mSiMSxm, Hay 26, 1949, 
4» M i ted £ ta te a Bf lat iona wife Chine ? Department of Stat® 
6. Bundy McGeorge (Ld.)s "jCfeg 
iiMfiSiLiiOgia:^.^ A^hmm" ^ (Houghton 
Mi^^lin, B o i i ^ 1962), pp.179-180• 
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know i^ether Con&sunlst Ohina passed into Itussien ort»it 
or nott so ^^ delaying recognition until this become 
e lmt and vas looking forifferd towards «Chinese <Sev©lopm©nte^  • 
Ol»viou@ly, the tinitea states vlthheld recognltic^ on 
grouadet the i^eking GovemiHent ( e ) vbs subservient to 
a * f o r e i ^ itsperiallem'end ( b ) had maltreeted th@ H . t* 
oltlsene and seized military harraoke In Peking (January 6^1950) 
housed the oonstilar o f f ices .^ Meo Ts&tung*s 
prolonged v i s i t to Hoscow in December 1949 was interpreted 
by the United totetes a© sR evidence of Chinee© subser.vcenee 
to fcovlet Bussia. Of| ^ enursy 12, 1060, Mr. Aehegon sjeds e 
statement, at the Hationel Press Club, expressing hie fear 
end alleged thst Soviet Union was trying to detach four 
Chinese provJaces, neaely, Manchuria, Outer Mongollat ^^ongolia 
and l?lnkleng. Previously, l^ fr. mh^&m had bluntly warned 
the Soviet Union anid the Chinese Coiasiunlsts against under, 
taking any expansion outside China. He had promised the 
United btates would encourage e l l the developaients" now and 
M M M U R N J I M M M M D M Q M . M M F PP* eoe-so?. 
Kr* toy Henderson* e statement in l^ ew l^lhi explaining 
why the O.^-.A. did not recognise Gofflsnunist China. 
For the incidents of maltreatment of the tU;;^ . natlonala 
in Communist China, see- XKVll, ( 2 February I960);, 
pp.l4*17 and 40»44. 
^latS-BttllgJ&la, January 23, 1980, pp.lU«118. 
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in the future" vtHoh would contribute to en overthrow 
of the Communist regime.^ 
Puhlie opinion in the United states vas not r^ ed r^ 
to eilow m ©arly deoieim towerue the recognitiaii of the 
Peking regime* The United fcitate® Government, under 
eonslderable pressure from Cmgress, hed replied that 
reeo^it lon at that time i^ould divide the country and 
^eoperdlEe Congressional eenotlon of Asieriean foreign 
polioy, not only in Aeie end Africa hut in Europe as well* 
KQ eompromise was in iight.^ 
In the early 1950, the American M®ini®tratlon was 
faced with one prohleau how to deal with the expanEion of 
Cocnmonism in Asia* There were three reasonai ( a ) the 
Mministratlon it@e2f was divided on the question whether 
to recognise Bed China or not, (b ) the ^Freeident ^ao trying 
to resolve thc:t division} and (c ) the British and uom 
thirteen netlons either had or were about to recognise the 




IiiSJEMB» August 6, i049* 
I>ecember l i , 1949. 
January 1, 1950. 
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oenator Kfii0wlGni<l ami £>eiietor i^iilth of NeviSeVB^y ^ 
both argued IhBt the United l^ l^ atee should hove isede e 
my efrort to he3p Ghlsng Eei-Shek hola the Isldn^s of 
Formosa and Kciven^ off the coect of Chine* Senator 
Enoiflan<il*@ thesis was that while the U.S. has opposed 
Communlesi sucoesafuli^ In Europe, i t was i n d l f f e r ^ t to 
the expeneion of CommuQlsm In Chins and bouth«&a&t ^sla*^ 
Hoover (Bepubllcan) In his letter , ssid that I t wm 
hie strong belief that "m should not raeognime the Somgmnist 
government of Chinaj we must continue to reconglsse and 
support the ilati aa l l s t Gov®rnsient| m ehowld, i f necessary^ 
give naval proteotlon to Formosa, the Pescadores, and possltly 
Halven Island,"^ Senator a'eft said he thought that they 
"should take steps to see that the Communists do not oros© 
over into Formosa, and I would use the Hevy to keep theia 
out i f neeessery-"^ 
bmator Knowlmd*g vie^ that the tinited States 
*©s in a w r se position in the Far-Bast today then before 
Feerl Harbour, and hie assertion wee thet unless the 
Adrainistretion succeeded in aaintaining Chiang Kei«£hek 
in the Chinese islands, the U.S. positions In OkineMa, the 
ii* j^f iJlteSt January 4, i960. 
im> 
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PMllpi^ines Biid perhaps even In Jupm vould h& tmtene&le 
the !Bight be forced to withdraw Its to 
the Kest Coest of the llnit®4 btates*^ 
^his thesis VIS strcmgly opposed hy the Btate Departstant 
end by some meabers of the Joint Chiefs of Sta f f , who 
regarded i t ea a highly exaggerated and alarmist estimate 
of tha situi^tioc. the o f f ic ia l s of the f^tata i)0partfQeiit 
were of the eplaicja thi^t if they followed the Kaowlanrt-
MaoArthor thesiS| they s i l^t very end up by holding 
Formosa and losing the confidence of iehru, India, end 
other potential a l l i es of the in bouth-Jiast jisio. 
Instead, the &tate Department was maoh tsore impressed 
with the estimate of the situation taade by Prime Minister 
Hehru during hie v i s i t to the United j^tetes, October-Hoveffiber, 
1.949. Hiie vas the eatimcte whioh was given to ^nerican 
o f f i c i a l s and presujoably formed the basis of Kehru's deoielon 
to reoognize the Communist regime in China. Aeoording to 
g 
the Nehxu thesiss 
1. Ihe problem was to blook the expmsion of Gowtunism, 
end for thie purpose to eaooarage those in the Chinese 
f^ee SSlUSStiMlaMt ir^uary 1, 1960, 
im. 
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Qossmmlst regime vho favoured en independent Chinese 
polioy, bgsed not only on friendship u-ith Mosoow but 
on good relet ions with the West ee v&lJ, 
2* OoamiuniBt Ohlne^ %;BS divided into three faotlons* 
Mao Tee-tung, heed of the Peiping regiae, wee for a 
strright pro-Moseow polioys Chou iin-lal, the Foreiigja Minister 
Mm ted to do business wit^ the i'est as well, Lili^&an, 
Feiping^e f^inister of Labovit^ had enormous pomr in end 
perhaps control of Kremlin's policy in Maachurie. 
3, I f the West followed a hostile policy towerd 
Peipingi nobody in thet Oovernment ^ould be ebl€ to do 
laaything except follovi the Moscov lSne» Moreover, i f Chine 
ves coafronted a hostile West, t4ae Chineise Comrnwaiets 
Kotild have en escctise for their feilur© to deal wit.'^  the 
oconooiio plight of the country, end might even be encouraged 
to carry on their military adventures beyond the border® 
of China-
4, I f , hovfever, the Uommuniets were recojp&ieed end 
forced to trade on en e^uel cash basl©, they would get more 
help frosi the l^ 'est than from the Hue si ens, they would have 
to l&alse responsibility for the economic congitloas of the 
country and they would probably develop an independent 
policy totally different froai the small Slavic State cctnquerAd 
- 414 -
by, the Gofflmunists la E&stePti Europe. 
^though, the Aaerlcsa o f f i o l a l s realised a n 
thfie4 featorsf they did not mnhe up their minds for 
recognising Gofsmunlst China on aocount of other factors. 
^he signing of the iJino-Sovlet freatgr of Friendship, 
iailence end Mutiiiil ^sslstemce on felmTBty 16, 
further gdded to the doubts end misgivings entertained 
by the authorities regarding th« elms and ob|6Qtlves 
of the nev; (Bed) rulers of Chln@ aM the eccoatpenylng 
2 
Mgs^BmmtB on the Chinese Ghangehaa rellvey. Port iirthur 
and £>elny contained a number of substsntlel conceeslone 
by Moscow to Peking* fhle Fact mbs aimed against possible 
futura Japidaiieee aggreeslcm or any thiM pover asaletlng 
the Japanese In aggresalon md bound th@ two natlme 
cioeely together in a defanslira alllanea« 
ITp to the outbreak of the Korean war, tha policy 
of th® United Btetas towards Ked China was ona of strong 
unfriandllnass^ suspicion and distrust md alnce than, 
we may aayi i t hag bam a policy of uncamouflaged 
hostility* 7he antry of the Chineae Cosraunlata Into the 
ISLI^ m PP- 643-646. 
« -
Korem waa? in 1961 altered tt»@ «hol« picture ana forcea 
new policy decisions. , Trussn-r-'ee/.tfeui' 
differences ©rose over Formose, tbe use of Chleng'a troops, 
©nd 6 "llsilted" mx-sm "expeaaed" w®r in th© Orient to @ 
ibe removal (April 11, 1951) of the 
MaeArtliur m^ arlticlslng th© reluctano© to Foraose 
es "eppeesemmt and defeetlsm".^ Be h®<l told President frustan, 
^ e n they met on Wake I si end on October 14, 1®50, thet be 
did not expeot Chinese intervention In lorec.^ gevertbeleea, 
one result of Uils entry of Communist Gbina was that the 
United fctstss as viell es the United Metions hardened their 
ettitude toward Coaraiunist China, so long as the wer wes 
to go on* 
secretary of defence, Ilersheil told the f^enete Cosisittee 
that the Onlted £»tfites did not intend to re^erd Cotnawalet 
aggression by b©rtering ForTOsa end e sest In the O.K. to 
Peiping In return for e Koreen settlement. 
Britain shut o f f the sale of rubber to Peiping on 
10 May 19S1. The United Nations Political and security 
Cevlonp Daily Bey^, 8 June 1961. 
In his message to the Veterans of Forelfn Wars on 
28 Auguet 1960, General Heejirthur had spoken the eeme. 
In June 1950, he vsoe made O.S* Commander, under the 
U.li. aegis at the time of Korean cr is is . 
i & y u 
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Coisi:^ittee v o ^ an erms embargo againat Coaimmlet China 
( 
on rtay 18, 19S1. 
there were tvo important objectives in the then. 
United States Far M«st®3?a policy. First was the eerly 
cmclusion of a peace treaty with Japan which vould restore 
Japan's sovereigntjr and make i t en anti<»Gom(aunist bastion* 
Moseow and Feiping had insisted on ticking part in a four-
power pact with Japan« fhe s e c ^ objection was to aeoure 
internal peace in Southern jlsia and strengthen these new 
fiatlons against Oommuni&t iaperielism* To this csid the 
administration intended to ecntinue economic aid to the 
1 
pef^les of thie are©** 
V<ith the fu l l - sca le ^trance of China in the Korean 
var, msi^ voices in /^merioa clamtireS iot a blocka^le of the 
entire Chinese Coast. )^erB $lemande4 the "unleashing" 
of Chiang*® army in Fonaoaa with the support of Americen air 
end naval power, aoase ex.tremist& haS e v ^ ad^voeated, at 
one tiae or another, the unleashing of an air attack on the 
Chinese mainlrnd. 'But the Truiaan and afterwarde Eisenhower 
Administration carefully pursued a policy e4 md 
contented themselves with iiapoeing an economic embargo on 
I . IMA* 
- 4X7 -
a l l goods of siilltery to China. The free notion® 
were celled upon to support this embargo, fhe Ontte<S States 
had also, in its determined opposition to Bed China, stepped 
tip i ts @amomlo and military assistance to tlie Formosa 
Oovemisent ^ l a n g Kai-Shek* 
Meanvhile, United Ltates hardened its attitude towards 
Chine by signing a Peace Treaty^ vflth Japan at Sen Frafi^oisco 
on i^eptea^er 8| 1961- 'i'his was a step forward to r m m 
S&pm. against the Communists to protect i t from fa l l ing 
into the hmdp of the Co^muniet bloo either through military 
egi;resslon^ or Interna^ The isiplioation ot this 
treaty provided for the inclusion of Japan In the fe'eatem 
defmc© syeteiB. 3 epen» s prcalraity to China and the Soviet 
Far Last together vith the terrltofciel settlement® conneeted 
with a SepmesB Peace Treaty had iiade i t m Kaat*Keat iseue* 
fhat mn the roa@c»i m y^ India decided not to be a party to 
/ 
the J apaneae Peace Treaty^ as prop&sed in the joint United 
States*0nlted Kingdom d r a f t B o did the soviet bloc as i t 
was against the Coooiunist countries* 
Documents on Interr^^tiQfial A f fa i rs 1051^ pp«611«6a@* 
my^v Of latf.^ynat^^Ml MMm P» 462. 
j^ffgflyt,^^,! Q^ i^tstf July ss, x m , pp.i32-.i38. 
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Wk mmnmm^MMmMmm} 
in 1933, the ItGpubliQBti PresMent 
took over ohargi?), a new 'get tough' policy of th« Kepublleans 
stnrted es iBf a£ their pollosr towaraa China 
But things, however, ilaiproved after th® <le©'th' of fitelln 
on Moreh 6, were olear signs of soviet bloc 
mtiklng nomesBimB md relaxing tensions* Agroemstnt on the 
prisoners of v@r was raai^ed m 8, 1953 end a oease-fire 
was affected in Eorea on July a?, 1983.^ Indi® was also 
satisfied ¥ith restilts end her selection as th^ Chairmen 
of the in Korea. Vie may say thet internetionel 
tensions mm ©aged to some extent a bettiJr eiiraate 
wes f e l t . 
iate in 1954, tha United States conoluded ® defensive 
sailitary pact^ ¥lth ForTOse whioh provided that in the event 
of an ®ttaak on Forasos® hy Bed Chine, the United fcts^es 
would promptly ooae to the defense of ihet islend with road, 
see end eir pover. Coismmist china ms dedioettd to the 
1. t^ ee Chapter Third, 
2. Mutual Defence Treaty between the united states and 




protection of ^ a t sh© considered her security, es well fis 
the desire to eld end ebet the spreed of Cosawiism which 
mt Intolereble to the imited t-tatec. It. was in November i@S4 
thet ttie debete (m the Issue of recognition of Gomnjimlet 
China was barred in the linlted states.^ !rhst ves the 
cllffiex beoeuse Communist China had failed 13 toericans 
©£ spies.^ Senator Eaowland urged a Chine blockade 
unless the ^isericms were freed,^ But Dulles, the 
i ecretery of ^tete, ruled out blocking Chins for hc^ 
5si3ings and promised ir.i,, vouid 'react vigorously* withoijt 
sny step violetiag its "international obligations and 
impeirlng the ©lliance of the free sstlons".^ tiven, 
president aisenhoiser's view was thrt felockede of Chine 
"wi l l emoiant to war action".® 
I t wee the general understondlng in the United States 
t 
that a l l ectlons of CMiojunist Chine were elmed to force 
the United ^.tates meke three mein conceBsionsi (1 ) Diplometio 
recognition of the Peking Governmenti iH) Admission to the 
United Rations, end (3 ) return of Formosa to Coamunist 
Chine* As things stood et thet time, there wee no prospect 
1. !£he Tiroes of ^yidie^ November 1954. 
2. 29 I^overaber 1954. 
Ibi^. t Ji!8 fiovember 1954. 
4. Ibid. ^ 30 November 1954. 
5. the Hindu. Z pecember 1954. 
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of the United fetetes mailing my of those eoneesslous. 
! 
In the opinlm of most observers both Western bhA Asian, 
Chinese actions such as the iiaprieoning of 13 Amerietns i 
only served to postpone the of Communist China*s 
re Go^ i t Ion by the United Setions.^ 
In Februj^ry 1965, Lscretary of 6tate while 
talking to Foreign Policy /^ssocietion, made i t d e e r th^t 
the bssic purpose of the United L-tates in regard to China 
was to ©ssure th&t Formoee end the Pescedores vould not 
be forcibly t&l&en over by the Chinese Cofmwists as Foreign 
Minister Chou, had said thst tiriey vould use all their 
forces to take Formosa end treat the Coa&tel islands gs 
the meens to that end.^ 
The formal Mutual mSeriQe treety of December 1964 
v;es buttressed by Congress* ^oint resolution of Jenuery 1965 
GUthorizing the Pre&ident to u@e the ^er icen ernjed forces, 
et his direction, for th4j defence oyf Pormose end the 
Pescadores - agelnst, of course, the Chinese Caamunists. 
reported R. belereman, th^ Hindu correspondent in 
the United states. 
2. fhe a m J M U l f f i f i S * i-? Februery 1965. 
3. Text In vol. So.818, February 7 , 1966, 
p. 213. 
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fhe Treaty md the r@@olutioQ beeeme ttie law of the land, 
md they ere ® pert o* the £.tatutea evaa today, embodying 
tb® or f lc ls l Chine policy. 
Th© year 1958 brought about e fateful ©xtenEioa of 
the 1965 aoctrine. I t an importent yeer. First oft 
iittguet l i , th€ Itete Oepertsient raade public ® long o f f l c l e l 
oieuiorandum^ entitled " United Ltetes Policy regerdlng 
ficm-recogjilticja of the Chinese Comramlst iveglaie". Th© 
st©t«®€Rt seldt «The United stetes holds the view that 
Communisas* s rule in Ohina i t not permanent and tbet i t 
on® dey pess. By withholding uiplosetie reaogGltion 
from Peking it e e^ to hesten that pessing."^ I t alted a 
host of factors es warrant for ittv policy decision, end 
finelJy took o cetegorical stcnd ae^inst any '*two Chinas" 
solution. 
iext came the Forcoose st ra i t crislE which resulted in 
e further enlargement of th® policy in support of the 
Rationalist position, on October X@58, in the joint 
coMtailQue® issued at the end of discussions between 
Ibid,.T vol. XXXIX (1002), beptamber 8, 1968, pp.38S-390. 
2 . I M M M P . 389. 
3. Ib id . , vol. XXUK ( i O i l ) , November iO, 198B, pp.721.722. 
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Secretary of utete Dulles sad General is sliBoChieng 
i t w©s stetefii " I t was reoo^iissod thfit tsid@r 
the present condltioni the defence of thci vuma^s, together 
wltii the Metg^s, Is closely related to the defence of 
Telfeiai end Pengfou (the l ^ e e c e d o r e B ) I h i s brought the 
Offshore islands within the scope of the ©ppllcatlon of 
the Janufry 1955 Joint resolutim, end th© Istfjyer*© conditional 
"tinder the present cSrcumstences" could hardly he taken 
®s offering ®ueh of en escape eleuse for the future. Ihis 
lesue of Formosa, the legal stetus of which v&b s t i l l to 
be detersined, feed been riveted firstly t^ thet of the 
Offshore islands « undeniably en Integral pert of China. 
on June 1962, in his stetement^ President Kennedy 
reaffirmed the ©tending Ainericen policy with respect to 
the defence of Foriaose end the offshore i£lends established 
under the Pormose resolution of iTanuery i9S6,^ thot "the 
United States will teke the action necessery to easure 
the defence of Formose end the Pescadores". But he 
reiterated that "the purposes of the United Stetes In this 
©res are peaceful end defensive."'^ 
^^ zm'f P* m . 
a. Text^ 'iggOTPn^ fi, m 
3, Sfee p. , Also see, 2bS-MJLJjE>JEkJUm£» 
©11 of June 28, 1962. 
4. ijo.fi»?goJit.g on AnmlSMi Foreim deletions 1962^ p«a98. 
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Ever sSnoe the time, Coannunist Gblne earn® Into existence 
In 1949, India fees been pressing the United stetee for 
reco^iaing the Peking Oovernment ena giving rormoaa to the 
Peoples Bepublie of Chine, in the Indian ayes the United 
I'tetes has been very unreasoneble with regard to this ise»© 
of the recognitioli of Cossmuniet Chine* Inaians f e l t i t to 
be very odd that the Onlt«<l Stetea did not reaognig@ Gomtcmiat 
Chine in 1949 vfhile prior to this i t hed recognised Coaamunist 
though noi«| this is&tio involves many other 
and international o<m@ider{»tions vhich hav@ mad« th€ way of 
recognition d i f f i cu l t - , but thet was not so in 1949. fhon 
the United wtetc© could very easily recognize Communist China. 
But Formosa became the greatest obstacle in the way and i t 
s t i l l remains So. 
Both Indifi end Communist China ere Asian comtries 
vhile the Onited fctetes in non-Asian, their national interests 
di f fer from one another as we have discussed, previously, in 
this chapter* For India Chine ms f i r s t an Asian country 
then CommuniBt. Peace and security in Asia were given priority. 
But the interest was in containing the spread of Comtaunisti} 
• 484 • 
i n AelSf f o r t h i s pyrpose Formosa ms found to be an s n t l -
Gosrauni&t m i l i t a r y India <iid not b e l i e v e w m i l i t a r y 
measures. Upon the p o l i c y tovmrde China • the i n f l u e n t i a l 
Sev i^elhi d a i l y Indus tan times oooimented e d l t o r i a l l y s 
vh®n the United B t e t e s c r i e s s h a l t to 
the spread of Gosffltsalsm Jn ^ s l s she must 
r e a l i z e th©t t h i s cen be achieved not by 
fliilltery measures but only by 0 p o s i t i v e 
p o l i c y of economic a l d , « * 
Dnl ike the United b t e t e s , the indl im stand on the 
Chinese recogni t ion beeed on th® iaer l ts of the c a s e , and 
vas not compliceted by bsiv ' p o l i c y f s i l u r © * , »antl-C0G5amiOT» 
or opposi t ion of Interna l publ ic opinion as was the c a i e with 
the United t^tetee,^ t h e r e f o r e , the a t t i t u d e of Indl© to the 
Communist v i c t o r y in China was quite d i f f e r e n t from t h e t of 
the United i t e t e e of iSmerioa» The dowafs l l of the Kuoalnteng, 
in I n d i « i e y e e , was not only the d e f e a t of a corrupt o l i g a r c h y 
thet e x p l o i t e d the Chinese masses f o r the b m e f l t of 0 small 
s e l f i s h c l i q u e , but the d e f e a t of e regime that had made 
i t e e l f an instrttnieat of Western i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e r e s t . ^ 
atof lt iSSMjUffiSS. 7 August 1 9 4 9 . 
J . a . Kundra, i m X m 
o p . c l t * , p* 1 2 S . 
3 . Lidgar Mclnnis <n.uckno^ Conference" , j^fit^yneti^Qnal JouraB l^ 
Winter 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 1 , p . 3 . 
Also see Mark c . FeorJ " Ind ians and tlie s o v i e t i^orld" 
ii^astfern /ipri l pp. i O - 1 8 . 
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I his vss so despliEe the feet thet in the early years 
of Indian independence the Chineee coamtmlets hed nothing 
but contempt for latiependent India, its governinent and leaders* 
For months the Chinese press hed Indui^ ged in v i^ld atteoks 
on indepKident India as "an egent of Weetem Irsperiplism" • 
i^ ven after their victory in Chine the oo»iHunists followed 
the s®ffi© ettitu^e which was olear fro® the reply of J^ ao Tse-tmg 
stated on X© October 1949 to e message of greetings from 
the Indian Gommunist Partyi 
"I firaly believe that relying on the brave 
Uoiamunist Perty of India and the unity and 
;jtiuge2e of ®11 Indian patriots^ Indie will 
certainly not resiaSa Jong und^r the yolse of 
iiaperielis® ^ d its collaborators. liKe free 
China, free India uill one day emerge in the 
looiaiisst and People's Democratic familys 
that day Mill eaad the imperialist reactionary 
era in the history of manitind".^  
febct did i t mean? It meant that free India stil l 
needed to be "liberated" through the esteblishment of a 
totalitarian C<mmmis% regime either of an indigenous or 
foreign brandl it vaa clear that to the Comimmlsts the 
achievement of political power on the mainland of China was 
merely the beginning, not the culaination of their revolution, 
end Mao* 8 statcsaent darkly hinted at ^e i r other eojbitious 
^ ^ Comaunlst, Boiabay, January, I960. 
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interaetlcnal goals* But Indie refOBined strongly Imperturbedl 
either by the ehsraeter of the Chinese revolution or its 
ha3f«>e3cpr©ss@d aaibitions and beoame anxious right from 
the beginning to befriend Mao's China. 
In presKitinfe: his oredentlaJs to Mso Tee-tung, Chairman 
of the People's lepuLlic of China, the Indian Ambassador, 
bardar Panikkar, vent far beyond the usual diplomatic 
poll taxless and saids^ "The peoples B^publlc of Chine and 
the Republic of India, repres^tlng the oldest ctMOfflunitles In 
the ¥orl^ er< nov. In a position to cooperate effectively for 
®utusl advantage and for the welfare of their people* The 
t w sister republics of iisia, which between them contain over 
c thin! of the world's population, can through their cooperaticm 
become a great and invincible force." It was beeeose of this 
feeling that the first ambassador of corraunlst China, General 
Yuan Chung-Ehiei was received at the Delhi railway station 
with an ovation the like of which was seldom accorded to 
foreign embassadors arriving at the Capital* 
To placate CoBjaunist China India refused to recogniee 
the Nationalist Govemmetit at Formosa. Nehru went out of his 
way to criticise the United t^tates for her non-recoenitlon of 
1. Broad cast from Peking aedlo in mgllsh on 21 May 1950. 
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Cojuramlst c^hina eiad repreetedly urged the powers to 
aeeept "the fa©ta of political 31fe" in Ksst Asia as fee 
understood them. 
-The i?ol6 which lndift plcj?ed in the Korean wer beers 
on it the B0me impress of e desparate enxiety to keep on 
tha right side of Chine. When the war brofe© otat in June, iSSO, 
India acted with the western bloc and supportea the United 
Netions* reaoltition c^aemnSng North Korea as m sgeresLor 
end celJing for ceasefire end withdrawal of the northern 
forces from ;louth Koree.^ But when Communist chine begen 
to shov resentment egainst the steady advence of the iJaited 
l?stion*s forces, the Indien ettitude underwent e aerked 
chenge. in feet. Indie simost identified herself %»ith the 
Chinese view that the crosrlng of the 38th perallel esaoimted 
to a direct threat to the security of China, and if Peking 
had sent its forces into North Korea, it had done so in sheer 
self defence. It wes, therefore, not surprising that when 
in February, i9Si, ©- resolution was moved in the United 
Nations General Assembly conaeraning Chine ee sggreesion in 
Korea, India voted with ^soviet Bloc against the resolution^, 
L ^ y r U y . , f f t 26 June i.960. 
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stetlag thet the proposal would prolong hostilities in 
Koree ln«leflait©l|' isight Qsipsnd the conflict Into 
e gla&el war. fh® reprosmtatiw of indle stressed thet 
the Oovernmeat of inaia wcs not convinced that the 
participation of Chinese forces In th© fighting in lores was 
due to any eg^resiiv® intention. It was laore probably 
to iti-i feers for the territorial integrity of Ghine.^ 
A few months leter (18 May) Indis elto refused to participate 
in the Onited Setions General /.esembly vote which imposed sn 
arms eaibargo ageinet Communist Chine f-nd Morth Eorce.^ On 
this issue l^ ehru hims^ slf ©onaoraaed the Militery aj^rjtolity 
"thft is seising some nations", and expreegecS concern over 
certain ststerotmts in th© Unitod by tho "highest 
fiuthoritiee" over the Far i;eEtem situation and sala thet 
•»ell this t®lk of the blockade of Chine is not talk thet 
l66<is to peece or settleffi©nt'». 
As far as th© Korean var wat concemedf the iimerloan 
view was that International Goraaunissj vbs- trying to fschiove 
by force whet it could not otherwise achieve« So there 
to toe no appeese^ant. Insteedi force haa to be met with force. 
IMdo. p,22l, 
PP* 2^7-i52S. 
3. gfli-alamentara:, vol. i , pt. i i , no.e 
l i s February 1953), COIK. 453, 466. 
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I f tiiie I M t© tti© ootnmualsts jaoet be Massed toif It. it 
wes & col«i wer issue for Mericfias- Purthfemora, for the 
Americans, the fsct of Coramunist eggreesion, doubtless inspired 
by hussie and Shlna, justified talcing unilateral 001Ion 
in Fox^os® end in the Internets oif security end postponing 
th« recognition of Comtnunist China t i l l after a settlsment 
of th© toreen i&su©,^ 
On the other hena the iCoareen Mar had two aspects for 
Indie (e ) eggrestion hc<S been eommittea by North Korea and 
it he«s to be resisted} (b) the Koresn war had the explosive 
possibility of bQcoming a laS'ge scsle world war end somehow 
that had to be p r e v e n t e d L o the approaches of the two 
were quit© distinct frc»:i ©uch other. Indie not ready 
to accept the United States view that Ked Chine was an 
aggressor in the Korean war, Hau, the representstive 
of Inaia to the United Hationa warned while speaking in the 
i?oliticel Committee at Lake ^.uccess on 20, 19S1, 
that the branding of Bed China as aggressor wowld not add 
to the credit of the G.N. and Instead of solving any problems 
1. Eadio address by President Truman, September i , 1950 
on the "Aims end Objectives" of res ist ing ©ggresEion 
p p . 0 - 1 2 . 
2, le^rii* g ?m3 Qmrma^^s A m , pp. 104.114 and 
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would only make tbem Insoluble.^ 
Furthermore, the differences betveen Indie md the 
United ttetes arose over the signing of th© Japanese Peace 
Treaty. India refused to perticipst® in the Sen Francisco 
conference held in September 1951, for th® aignlng of the 
Jepeneee Pesce Treaty^, though she ms invi'ied by the 
N 
United Ltetes. One of the reesons wee that th® treaty was 
being signed without the participation of Gcmaninlst Chine, 
vhich should take part in any settlement of fer Haatorn 
effairs and the other that there vies no provision in the 
treaty to restore Formosa to Qhlne. These rsesme were given 
by the Covamatent of Indie in its communication of August 23, 
3 1951. Indie's view "wasthat th© Japenese Poace Treaty on 
the linee suggestfed by the United Ltates was likely to 
4 
increase tensions in the f^v hmt , bb it wsfo aimed against 
GoMmunist comtries. 
IlLg-Ute^f J^ cnuery 1951. 
2, Text in 
pp. 61i.©86. 
Ibid. T 606-608. Also see, .a.L.B. ^ 3 September 1961, p.386. 
4. Debate in the Indian Parliament, 
tf vol. XXIX, 3<1961), pp.619.620. 
For details s©tr ^^rliemgnt.ery, Debsteg. vol. 14, pt. I I 
No. /.uguBt^9Sl), eols. I3S0361. 
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Suited rcs^stlon to the l a d l m note m s 
sherp. Vbether the Indien note was based on syaipsitJsy 
with the Contmmlst bloc or n^t , i t s e f f e c t vas tlie B®me|. 
oa tSie Jspsp.eee Peeoe Treaty Ind i e ' s views h^ppen^ 
to coincide with thoee of soviet Huseie^ and Goxrounist Ghina-
in i t s reply^ to tlie Indisn note on August 2S, 1961, the 
?Jnited states sharply hinted thnt th© United states was not 
going to hma over Formosa to Commgnist Chin®. Instead the 
IU£# deair® wat to b«il<l up JapMi as an a l l y against the 
risKs of CommuniEt aggression in the Fer According 
to a soffiKiopi the Indian note w®s " f l a t l y re j tcted" by the 
United states "\!fith sI&ib of I r r i t a t i on s th&t were musual 
in i t s diplometio exch^ges vitfe non £>telinist Somjtries. '^ 
The United Jitetas was neither ready t© recognise Commmilfct 
China nor to recognise Comaaunist Chinese sovereignty over 
Farmoaa too* 
In f®ot , ^ latevsr might have been ^ e tierite m^ 
demerits of the Jepenese Peec© Treaty, the United Etetee 
1. For the iioviet note eai the Japanese Peace I r e a ty , see 
the Soviet note of Key 7 , 1981 del ivered to the AEoricfiai 
Mbessedor , A. Kirk, in Moscow, Peop le ' s Chlnfi. v o l . I l l , 2 
(»Tuiae 1, 1861, Guoplement), Soviet note of Jun® lO, 
1951, C D:S'lS r u r y ' 1951- f ' • 138-143. 
IM I^M September a , i 9 g l , pp.3£7-388. 
Eor^jgn Policy Bullentjlnf v o l . XXX, 36 iJlew York, 
June 1961)i end I b i d . . Nay 4 , 1961. 
4 . p. 
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%res ver^ much <ilspief,se<i by the standi teKea by Indi®. 
iivea the United states presg commented es 6«eht "Nehru 
Is fast beco®iag one of the gre«t dlseppolntments of the 
post war era . . . Wh©t has gone wrong?"^ Indian public 
opinion also "believed Merioo to he ectually seeking vjer."^ 
India could have ssore dlplofflatlce1.1y dealt with this 
Treaty uhil© refusing to sign i t . She coula have avoided 
launching such a big public attack on the Treaty and made 
safe the Interest of her neutral positlm. fhe open 
controversy led to a lot of bad-feeling between the two 
3 
countries. one© again indie felled to raake up the mind of 
Araericens to recognise Communiet China. 
mother point was that the United ^ates thought of 
the chineee ravolatioa not as a relatively natural Asian 
development, which it was, but es a Msscow-directed plot, 
which must be frustrated in order to preserve the world 
balimoe of power. The United ^.tetes* vested interest was, 
August 28, 1951. 
2. Chester Bowles, AabassadQy^ P.30. The new 
U.b. Aabaseedor, Chester Bowles arrived in India in 
October 1961 and found himself unable to realise "how 
beaiy the relations between the two countries had 
deteriorated", ibid.^ p.3. 
3. Kundra, ^Agfi m.m.^jMhsMMf 
op.cit., p. 146. 
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the ident i f icat ion of the western position in these arees -
Middle Ef}Bt and south l)»6St A@ia - with ree l s tmce to 
CoBwiunist aggression, hu the mein pi'otBgorilst of th© policy 
of "oonteinmeat of Communism", th® United states had become 
interested in the meinteneac© of 'vv'^stem power in Asi© 
Just at the sncKRent vhen other viestem countriet were evolving 
in the oppoeite d i rect ion. I t might be said that the United 
LtBtes policy was to be based upon the assumption of l i ^ l tab l * 
hos t i l i t y between a Coaaaiunist China d-minated by the l-oviet 
Union on the one hand end e Pac i f i c is land chain, including 
Jepan, dominated by the United ttatcs on the other, fhat was 
the reason for the ^ e r i c a n s ' th iming ihr^t the Communiet 
government in Chine had given them l i t t l e ground for revising 
this esstimption end thst i t s interventitm in Korea and th© 
treatment raeted out by i t to countries l i k e B r i t a in , which 
were quick to reoognisse the new regime, had not been such as 
to give promise of c i v i l i zed re let ionships , to i t did not 
recognize the People 's i^epub3ic of China.^ 
India did not agree with this United i>tat©® thes i s . 
To Nehru on armed conf l i c t between the me^or Asian powers at 
the Vtiry moment of Asians libereticai from western dominanee 
would be the ultinifite treeedy. On October 24, 1949, Kehru 
Kenneth Yonger, "v/estfern Policy in /»si8", l^ec.if'io /if fairg, 
vol« 25, So.2, June i9S2, Mehmond, Va, Inst i tute of 
Pac i f i c delat ions, pp. 119-126. 
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hed made his dlegnosis olear. "lela the mother of continents 
end th© cradle of history*s mejor civilizations ift renascent 
today. Ihe devai of its newly ecqtaired freedom ie turbulent 
because during theee pest two centuries its grow^ vbb arrested, 
frastretion wide spread ®nd asv forces essentially 
netionaliet vere seeking political freedom; but behind them 
was the vital urge for bettering the economic condition of 
the maseee of the people* v;here nationalis» was thuarted 
there was conflict as there is conflict today v^ere i t is being 
thwarted, for e^tsple in 6outh i^ est The troubles and 
dieccntente of ^ i e part of the world and indeed of the 
greater part of isia sre the result of obstrueted freodom and 
dire poverty, fhe remedy is to accelerate the advent of 
fripedom sod to remove It was on 18 February 1953 
^ a t ilehru aald in the Indian Parliament; **The whole of Asia 
is very wide awake, resurgmt, active Mid someviihat rebellidxsf***^ 
Md the set up of CoBusunlat Chine, the defeat of CTationallats 
signified the post war iisian resurgence and thus i t was to 
be recognised, i^ccording to Indians, the United states* 
refusal to recognise the Communist govemioent had always been 
contributing to the numerous difficulties confronting 
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negotietors in the Far iufist ever slnoe th® Chinese 
lfit«rv6ae«3 In th© Korea on February X7, 1963 ^ehru 
Meaied^ mach of the trouble in the Fer f^ ast on the "non-
recognition of the reality that is China" and th» eooepteace 
of © "sajsll islsnd off the sosst, a© representing Ghlna", 
His contention vas thet "this feet is the crux of the situation 
that has developed in the Fer L.a8t. tHie non-recognition of 
reftlitlQs naturally leads to artifioial policies and 
programmes end that la exactly what is happening." 
the Indian press also vmt far in oritlol®ing , 
Merican policy of non®recognition as "one of the aaost tragic 
and eoatly major miatakes made by the democraciea in recent 
years''.^ the Hational Kerald eharacteri«ed It^ aa "a firat 
class blunder in history"* 4 number of nevapapors blamed 
the United states for being so intransigent as to leaire 
Chine no alternative but to seek the close friendship of 
Moscow, ^ e Tribune^ in the fa l l of 1961, lam^ted that 
so few Americans grasped "the obvious fact" about Nehru's 
China policy, v^ich was "not deigned to strengthen Communist 
imperialisffl but to weaken it by demostrating to the people 
of China that their friends are to be found not among the 
iayar^ayM Kfl^rw'.s ipifighg^ A l^trJE f^ P* ^S* 
the llffle? imsif August 20, 1962, 
3 . the m m a Merm$ ^a , 1952. 
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Commtmist States eJone but everywhere,"^ 
hvm before th© Chinee© entry into the Korean war . 
fiji Indian oolumlnlst, J.K. Baner^i, suamea up the American 
o 
point of view tm Solloms', "Th© essence of the Fsr iieetern 
problem is the chellange of JS®v China to the cJitia of the 
Ottited Btetes th®t the entlr« Pacific ocean stretching 
right up to ttke shores of China le the security zon^ of th@ 
United L|etes." But the Indians wondered as to v^y should 
the United Spates b© efrrld of Chins, China after all hoa no 
fleet of loagrisige bomber8^1 ike no\» in 1969 vhm i t has -
or 0 nevy which could pose any serious threat to the imited 
btetes. On the other hend, India did not lack columnists who 
cslledi attention to the other side of the coint 
«*In the event of e w©r with the Vest, the 
Chinese vil l neither be eesily destroyed 
nor forced into subuission. fhis feet 
nay carry m weight with tl«>se in the 
1^ 0 believe not only in bergainiag 
from strength but also in e show of strength, 
but people with reason throughout the world 
shudder at the, thought of its possible 
consequences 
I b O m t B S f October 30, 19Si. 
2. lltaawfilt^m, ^leaijiflgilt December 24, 1960. 
BSUMSBm* Februery 6, 1956. 
"Vedette" made this observaticsi after a trip to Chine 
where he found »a grim strain in the Chinese character . . 
no eJihibitionlsm but en essential pert of the collective 
national mind... a detersiinctlon to resist armed attack." 
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The Baited poXio^ r towafd Commuiiiat Chine vas 
hardened after tbe oomiag of B«pul>liean8 in the ^hit® Hotiae 
in 1963• Th9 ladlefis vero aieneed by it* Mdressiag e 
Joiiit «®S8ion of the Parliaaent, President 0r. M^eo^TB 
Prasad pointed oat thet we recognized only the Pelting 
government end held thet their elaim to Formosa was completely 
Justified. He went on to eay that it was oleer to his country 
(Indie) that Amerieen support to the Nationalists, %fho 
were not even fur© of the loyalty of the people cf Formosa| 
had kept the regime in heing end encoureged it to pley the 
role of 8 Government in When the ii^puhlicane caae 
to power in As^rica they aettzelly urged Klationeliate to fortify 
the shore islands like the Tachens, md use then as basee 
for raiding the mainland. This policy of "wjleashing" 
Chimg*s troops was now being changed, but it had been done in 
such a way as to alarm the Peop:^ e*s Governoent of Shine and 
give then) the impression that a large scale war against 
China was being contemplated* 
How had the /Americans done this? Dhey had done it by 
signing a Mutual Security Treaty in December 1964 with 
Chiang which not only gave him liberal help but permitted 
i^erica to maintein air and navel bases in Foxisosa* Further, 
SbS-MMiif February 82, 1986. 
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In order to ass ist in tfe® evacuation of the Tachen Is land, 
I 
the AEoerlcans brought in l a r ge navel arra a i r forces o f f 
the Chinese coast. Indian^ assumptSon was that "the resu l t 
of these moves has created the Impression in China that a 
mas&lve attack on the stainland 1& being planned. The 
consequence has been that China has no\«f esberked on universal 
conscription end Is In process of ra is ing new armies of 
meny la i l l lons" .^ The Indian suggestion was that I f the 
i ' lat lonallsts evaluated Quemoy and Hatau and the Americans 
withdrew their naval forces from that area, l^e s ituation 
might be restored. But At ves not c lear to v^at extent the 
Ataerlcms would or would not sapisort the Ket lona l l s ts i f 
the Coismunlsts drive them out of Quemoy and Matsu. And in 
Indian view this itoerican policy of "Keeping them guessing" 
was highly dangerous because If In the f i ght ing o f f these 
unimport^t is lands, an ^ e r l c e n warship wore to be h i t by 
Communist Bombs, the resu l t might be a major ^ar vhich nobody 
wanted* 4io this was an explosive situation which was to 
be avoided. 
United States was becoming day by day mil itant as f a r 
as i t s policy towards the 4sian countries was cmcerned. 
India was strongly opposed to th i s . Instead of acceptSng 
Ih id . f Crit lBlzed ed i tor la l l j^ . 
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the decisions of the Geaevc Conference (i.9S4), the United 
states Secretei^ of Stete Dullee organized the 
by vhich e group of countries led bjr /.raerica put forward 
e Monroe iJoetrine for the protection of south East Asia 
6g@inst Comntanism. iSehru's coiom t^ met 
"I say one of th® biggest factors towards 
ensuring Security in South East Asia and 
in the per aast is the recognition of 
Chine by these countries end China coming 
into the United Nations. There vould be 
far greater assurance of security that way 
thm throjigh this south East Asia treaty 
Orgenization and the rest."''' 
SMm^imu Mi^ Arm* 
Following the Bandung Conference, (18-24 April 1966) 
China proved it self to be Asian first and Communist next 
as it accepted the principle of Coexistence. In turn 
Siehru became much Impressed and supported the irredentist 
clains of Communist China to offshore islands and Formosa. 
On 31 March 1965 Nehru said, "So far as we are concerned, 
obviously we can have only one broad approach to this 
problem which flows from the recognition of the People's 
Government of China. Nobody, of course, says that there is 
separate State like Formosa because Formosa claims to be 
China just as China claims Formosa to be part. But there 
1. Nehru, Iflqj^ flVs op.cit., p. 91. 
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hes been e genera l , wide egreetnent of one obvious f e e t , end 
tl ist i s that the I s lands oC Metsu end Queinoy, which are 
four o r f i v e miles o f f the maSnlmd ete d e f i n i t e l y part o f 
the mfilnlendi end an enetey force there is a constant 
i r r i t a t i o n end constant denger . . . Yet the occupetion of 
Quemoy end Metsu by other forces continues" ifJehru w<aat 
on his my supporting Cojamunist Chine, even e f t e r Indlea 
t e r r i t o r i a l integl^ity hed been v io lated by Communist Chine 
by constructing the ^mkiong-OartoU roed through i.edekh. 
On 7 September X958, ISehru said at his monthly pr'.ss 
conferenceJ 
"No comtry emuid to l e ra te an is land X2 miles 
from i t s shores being used es a bese f o r 
Btteck on i t . Ind ia , the re fo re , f e l t thst 
the o f f - sho re is lends ifonediately, and l a t e r 
ForiBosa too, should belong to the Peoo le ' s 
republ ic of China." "But^this " , he added, 
"mast happen peaceful ly" . '^ 
I f )dia always t r i ed to br idge the i i ino»/i^rican 
di fTerences end pleaded f o r -Chinese accord. During 
h is v i ^ t to the United s ta tes of ^ r i c a and Oanade in 
December 1966, Hehru urged f o r the end of the Trade Ban, 
end brought the issue of the recognition of China into 
the l i ^ t vh i l e speaking at Ottawa on 23 December 1966. 
Lok £gbha_i)ebatef, v o l . 2, p t . I I , i^o.30 (31 March 1955), 
c o l . 3894. 
2 . ;,ha g^fitegffiBBt Ca lcutta , September 8, 1968. 
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He seid^ that y i l l e p ract ica l ly the rest of the vorld had 
eOGcpted, t^e faet of the People 's Govemiaeat of ChlRe, I t 
was large ly "the end some other countries vho heve 
not approved of the idee^ I imagine toecetis© of unfortunate 
occurrences, l ike the Korean war . . . whether you l i k e i t or 
not Chill a has gone through a raa^or revolution end you cannot 
measure a revolution by the noriael yard st ick" • Kehru 
was s t i l l hopeful that though there existed a wide gulf 
between the United Statea of /userica and China and a lso 
a great de&l of ho s t i l i t y . But i^ith a certain twist In 
circumstancea, i t wou:id probaMy become much leas and 
But the United States remained adamant in i t s 
attitude towards Communist China. In a personal l e t t e r of 
7 July 1966, to Chiang Kel-aheK, President Eisenhower 
af f i rmed hie stand thet " International Comaunissn a l te rs 
i t s tact ics from time to time, but we heve as yet no 
evidence of any change in i t s ob ject ives . The American 
people and Governtnmt realisse th i s . Likewise, l e t there 
be no misapprehension about our om stead fastness in 
continuing to support the Republic of C h i n a T h e United 
S|ate8 was not going to recognise Comasonlst China. 
i . The E^dustan Time^, 24 JDecember 1966. 
^he fiev XOP}^  aifflegf 8 July 1966. 
( B ) mu i^m w w mr iA w 
m o E m a z m M i i i 
^he epprocches of the Uo entirely differ on this 
ls£»e from ©eoh other, fcver slnoe, the over throw of the 
!30tloiielist Government by the Coneiunists in Chine, Indie 
has be€n sdvoceting for the seating dC Coratntinist Chine In 
the Bnited Sletions y^hile the Onitcd States has been opposing 
the seme as she has not recopiised Communist China though 
it has been in existence for the last twenty years. Both 
the countries have often clashed on this issue In the 
Dnited Nations. 
It -wss at the time of the foraietion of the United 
Nations in 1946 that China (then under th© control of 
nationalists) was mad© a permanent member of the e^o^irity 
1 i 
Council because of American pressure or tactics. Perhaps, 
thm the United States l^ hought that one day Chin© would 
become a poverfu} Centre Asia end thus the Dnited States 
of America vould have a strong end faithful elly in the Far 
mat supporting its policies in the United Hatlons. But 
this did not happen and the Chinese Comfminlsts have become 
instead the maior Asian Power. 
1. tee p. 
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a f a mmi^ G ^ M n mma mm m ^ppfp^y QF m, 
PQI.Icy: 
First End fore®o®t reasoning in the United States 
bas been thrt Communist China should not be a member of 
the Onited Nations beoeuse the Notionalist Government retained 
its legal status despite the de Xeoto control of the 
mainland by the CjDroinanists. Walter itobertson, Assistant 
Secretary for P^r lie stern Affairs made it clear on 
July 30, 1964* "The United Hatlons is not an organisation 
of faoto goveniment8«so i t vas not liable for the 
membership of the United Rations. 
Secondly, they argued that by the charter the mefflbership 
^es supposed to be limited to the "peace loving** nations 
who were "able and willing to discharge their duties under 
the Charter". That was etrenthenged further inore by the 
provisicn that any nation against which enforcement action 
was taken should be liable to suspension from isembership in 
the United Nations. Thus the United Nations was not set up 
"to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be 
good before you get In and not that being in- would make 
you good."^ theeefore, the United States, basing itself 
on the principles of the Charter, took the position that the 
1. Usksk'f vol. (79X), August 23, X9S4, p. 262. 
2. l i M ' t vol. m i C786), July 19, 1954, p. 87. 
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Commmlst regime vas disqualified by its oonsisteat record 
of opposition to the principles of the United Kations. " I t 
is relevant to recall that th« Chinese Cotnmunist regime 
heeeme en aggressor in the latter part of X950. Ite ermiee 
invaded Korea and waged war against the United Hatlona 
Coiaasand. They contributed largely to the killing, wounding, 
or losing in action of about 300,000 soldiers of the United 
Nations Command, izicluding over 100,000 iUaericans", remarked 
Secretary of State Dulles at Nev York on March 29, 1954*^ 
Furthermore, later, he gave record of the Chinese Coaimunist 
regime at the G^eva Conference thrt it continuously denounced 
the united Nations. I t had been the subject of enforcefaeat 
action recozsmended by the United Nations. In i^ outh i^ ast 
Asia it promoted aggression. "All of these facts combine 
to m^e a case such that we do not believe that the requisite 
vote can b«: found to adrsit the Coiaiiunist regime to represent 
Chine in the United Nations."^ thus clearly in his opinion 
the Chinese Co!omunist regime was not qualified to be seated 
in the United Nations• In the United States opinion, "The 
position which Communist Chine represents, if it were accepted", 
would mean the death of the prmoiples of collective security 
.^iUff vol. m (772), iipril 12, 1964, pp. 640-641. 
a* HaM-i vol. x m (786), july 19, 1954, p. 87. 
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md of the Onlted l^etlons iteelf.^ How could an aggressor 
be admitted to the United tiatlons'? /^erlcans took the 
Chinese aggression on Indian territory in October 1962 as 
en additional proof in support of their policy. 
ttee third ground on which the United States opposes 
the Chinese Goauaanist admission to the tlnited Kations is 
their co£iviction that there is no need of Communist China's 
entry In the United flations es the nationalist China Is the 
inember of the United nations* They refuse to recognise 
Communist china for the same because "recognition of Pelping 
by the United Estates would inevitably lead to the seating of 
Pelping is thst body"^ ^ d this entry would symboliise the 
existence of two Chinas, ii^ hioh the United States is not ready 
3 to bear. 
they support the Hepublic of China in the United Nations 
because in their vlev i t is a Charter member in good standing 
of the United Nations and its representatives there have 
contributed importantly to the constructive vfork of that 
2. Ibld.^ vol. XXXIX <10U2), September B, 1968, p.3a7. 
vol. XI,V (1174), IJecember 26, 1961, pp. 10S7-1058. 
w » 
orgealsatlon. If the representetives of the Chinese 
regime vere to he seated in thelJ^ place end given China* s 
Veto in the Security Council, "The ehility of thet hody 
in the future to discharge the responsibility It hes un i^er 
the Charter for the maintengnoe of internetlonsl peaee and 
Security would he seriously impelred,"^ 
there have been other consideretions also. Most 
important of them seems to he ^ e Coranaanisyt hostility towards 
the United ^^ates of America. Speaking on Deceaaber 4, 1958 
©t California, Secretary Dulles remarked as euchs 
"The Chinese Gomfflunlst regime is bitterly 
hostile to the United States. I t Is dedicated 
to expelling all our influence from the 
Western Pacific. It is determined to take 
over ^ e free peoples md resources of the 
area. I t violates all established principles 
of international lew and of civilissed conduct." 
In his view Its recognition seating In the United 
Hetions vould so Increase their prestige and influence in 
the Far East, and so hearten our allies there, thnt tlie 
g 
Communist subversive efforts would alsioet surely succeed. 
i . j ^XXIX (1002), September 8, 1968. pp.387-88. 
Also see statement by Adlai Lstevenson in the General 
Assembly on October 22, 1962, ibld.y November 19, 1962 
pp. 786-791. 
IfeM., vol. m i x (1017), XJeoember 22, 1968, p.992. 
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/igelnst th is the Americans support the Government of the 
republ ic of Chine because I t controls the s t rateg ic Island 
of Taiwan end through I ts possesiiion of a slsiable mll ltery 
force -one of the l a rges t on the eld® of the f ree world 
In A8ig.preeents a s ign i f i cant deterrent to renewed Chinese 
Cosssunlst aggretEion. bo the recognition by tbe Onlted 
Nations and the united states of Communist Chins would 
seriously cr ipp le , I f not destroy altogether, ttiet 
Government. 
To the proposal that i f li^d China was admitted, the 
United btatee should pul l out, Thruston B . Morton, Assistant 
Sgcretery Congresstonal Belations, commented^ that to do so 
would be 0 complete ano un just i f i ed surrender to the 
i:;ovlet Union « @ surrender as abject end as tmwarrented 
as any the sien in the Kremlin could dreasj up. I f we should 
quit in 8 pet sod sulk on the side l ines bt^cause we l o s t 
e decision, the Communists would be handed, without cost 
or sec r l f i ece to themselves, a golden chance to achieve a 
dominant posit ion in the United Nations and to make i t a 
creature of Lovlet Union. He went on to Sry, " I a® 
convinced that i t i s to the interest of the United states 
end to the Interest of the anti-Communist netlc^is to r e s i s t -
as we have - the entry of l ed Chin© into the United BJ at ions. 
•i- ^eSSM vo l . XKXI (788 ) , August a , 1954, p . i58 . 
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iind . . . tliet ye should stejf in end f i ght the Communist 
purpose inside the United Weticme es hard and with the 
same f irm purpose that we ere f ight ing i t on the outside." 
So the question why the United fctetes did not epply 
the seaie policy to the ^ioviet Union, JLiutiies rep l ied , 
" Ihe feet is thet the Soviet Onion hes not been found by 
the United Ketions to be en oggres&or. There i s nothing 
compareble in that respect bb f e r as the record of the 
Soviet Union i s concerned."^ 
I t i s sometlines argued tl^st the Chinese Costmuniet 
regime does not hfew© to seet the Charter tests beceuse 
the Eepublic of Chins i s already a member and the eo ce l led 
People 's Kepublic of Chine inherits the r ights in this 
respect of the 1 epublic of Chine.* "The feet i s th©t", sold 
at ]3ew York on September iiS, 1958, "the membership 
of the United Nations had e choice o? whether or not to 
bring into i t s midst «nd to give veto power on the security 
Council to e regime v^nlch has r isgrent ly def ied the United 
Jiatlonsi . . . which is the te^: f o r expulsion." In the 
United Spates eyes i t wee a substantive end not a procedural 
matter to determine whether or not "the Communist regime shal l 
be seated."^ 
^iSsi*, vol. XOCI (786), July 19, 1964, p. 89. 
SJ. p i d . , (iOQf7), October 13, 1858, p. 664. 
3. I S M M (786), July 19, 1964, p.88. 
I .est ly, In the tsniUd bfatee view the aaain author of 
the exclusicn of CofflMunlst China from the United tJ at ions has 
been communist Jhine i t s e l f , with i t s continued ecdlctlon 
to violence at home and abrofad. The leaders in Peiping had 
daniBged their own ease even more by fe5i:p3icit3y demsnding; 
tlif't the Unitt d nations eciinavFled^e their so ca l l ed 
" i ' i i h t " to conquer the rail3ion people on Formosa.^ 
xMUi^j^-^jjimjiL 
Unlike the United L j e tes India recoiyiized Coramunist 
Ghlne while r e j e c t ing United Ljjetes plea that rormosa ws© 
the leeit imate government of China. In her view Goimaunist 
Chine's wes a lege3 entity which contro l led the vhole of 
Ghin© pnd pi eyed an teportsnt ro l e in the w r l d p o l i t i e s . 
Hherefore, India holds to the present Uey thet i t sh uld 
be recognised by those netions who h^ve not recognized i t 
unt i l l now. In eccorusnce with i t s des i re to br ing China 
3nto the vor ld community and proiiot® the csuse of world 
peoce, India advocated samitting the representf^tives of 
^ o l . XLVl ( x i 8 3 ) , February 1962, p.3ii0. 
For detpi led account - vhy the General Assembly hes 
repeatedly re;}ected the Peiping regime's cleifn to tske 
ov&r the United Nations sent of the hepubl lc Ghino 
end vAiy the United i^tetes has been, opposing ti-ie same, 
see the stotements mede by L t e ^ ^ s o n , ' U n i t e d s t a te s 
i.epresentatlve to the Generel ^•^sembly on December l,i9e£J 
end on ijecember 14, i96L, I b i d . , Jenuary 15, 1962 
pp. 108-117. » ^ 
CofflSGunist Gbine to the Unitfed Nat ions . The People's 
Kepublic W8S, f i r s t of e l l , the oaly governaient vhich 
eou3d de l i ve r tht goods so fn r as mainlend Chins was 
concerned, I n d i e ' s dt-legRte to the United Nat ions , 
foenegRl M, heu, maue the ina isn view c l ^ s r in September J.9S0 
while speaking be fore the Generel Assembly, 
"Kby did we recognise thle new Government of 
Chine'? For a var iety of reesons, the ruEin 
reason being th r t , eccording to the b t s t of 
our Knowledge enu in fona f t i on , i t i s sound 
and stab le ^vemment As I heve raentioned 
in ay a r e f t resolution^ end g-s i s wel l known, 
Uie Kepubllc of Uhine i s e Member of the 
United Nations end e permanent member of the 
Security Council sna as such thet Kepublic 
hes e number of ob l i cs t ions l » i d upon i t by 
the Gh&rter of the united Netio.'js, fc.'ho i s 
to f u l f i l thera^ ft Stete cen not f u l f i l 
ob l lget ion except through some covtrnment, and 
obviously only s governacnt exerc is ing e f f e c t i v e 
control ^ver the t e r r i t o ry and the people of 
the republ ic of China can f u l f i l the ob l i ga t ions 
l e i d upon the l epub l l c of OhSna . . . But how 
can we require the fu l f i lment of these obliga tions 
fna yet deny th/^t government i t s r i ghts under 
the Charter, one of -which i s the r i gh t to be 
represented in the United Nations'? To deny 
r ights and, in seiae breath, to i n s i s t on 
obl igat ions i s c l ea r ly 11 l o g i c a l end inconsistent."-^ 
secondly, India thought that a solution to the problems 
of ilsian countrleg vnuld be f r c i l i t R t e d by peaceful 
— ^ — — Uteet 
i . U.K. General Aesetobly (6th Lessons ) , u f f i o i a l hecordsj^rienr.r; 
v o l . 1 (New YorkJ Auther, 1951), p . g . 
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negotiations ^Ith the new aomsminist reglue of Chin© 
provided Chins* s entry into the Councils of the k.'orld 
V'8S eccepted* It was GIBBV from the speech of Prime 
Minister Nehru to the Perliaaaent In September 1964, when 
he saldi i t "emted him hov this streightforvfsrd ouestion" 
of rtcogni?;ing Chine's crcaentials hed been twisted around 
f;na rafede the cause of In f in i t e trouble. Ihere would be 
"no sfcttiement in the Ffci* ^est or iiouth-usst As ia " , he 
continued, " t i l l this mejor feet of Peoplci'g Government of 
Chine Is recognlred" end i t wss ©llowed to come into ttie 
United Hetions, There wes a f a r greater assurf«ace of security 
thet vBy then through bLAiO^ -'because i f Chins came Lito 
the picture, sh® would eSiuaae certeln responsib lJIt ies in 
th® United Nations."-^ Actually Nehru was eraezed to see 
thet the United Nations which wes sponsored f o r the purpose 
of world peece and security could not do iinything f o r the 
membership of Coiamunist China. Previously on February 18, 19S3, 
he hed seid in sn address to the Indian Psrl issjent U tabhe) 
thet "the principle of miversaJ l ty with which the United 
Nations started has been departed from. A great country 
l i k e Chine i s not elven rfccognition at the United Ket ions . . . 
i . LoK Sflbhfl Dabfltea^ vo l . 7 , p t . 11, i39th September i.9S4, 
co l . 3690. ^ 
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The feilui^e oi' the united Nations to give recognition to 
8 o'.>untry which is obviously stehle md strong has given 
r i s e to fresh problems oi: © universal character."^ 
Uvtring th© Koreen w®r (1950-1963) this issue wes not 
given much attention but es soon a® the wer ended, the 
dominant tone of the Indisn press was that there was no ' 
3onger any excuse f o r delay in resolving the quest ia i of 
Peking's representation in the United Setions. fhe Hindu 
eoramentedi^ 
" ^ e future of Indochina ana the s t ab i l i t y of 
Southeast /isia depend on securing the good 
w i l l of the Chines®, I t is more then ever 
necessary thpt the internaticaiol position of 
the Chinese Cfovernraent should be recog?iized 
and that i t should be associated witti the 
e f f o r t s to bring about a lessening of world 
tension." 
in en ed i to r i e l , the fc»etesman insisted that "Chinese 
edmission td the United llititionf, to some a r ight and to 
others en impertinent, is to the judicious one of the 
points borgeined for."*^ Thus, even ln<ii««n press supported 
the stnnd tel^en by India* 
1. Nehru, !A .mr^UO. I'.qXX^i op . c i t . , p. 169. 
IHfiJi iMll , 10, 1963 CKtsMX^JgjO^) . 
3« |he Statesmen. August 8, 1963. Under the ception 
"Tumult end thouting". 
The th l r a ground on uhlcfc Ind i r advoceted Peking*s 
representation in the United nations was thet I t would 
strengthen the t i e s of f r iendship between Indie end 
CotsRiunist Chine, which would have e selutery a f f e c t upon 
the internetionel s i tue i i on in Asia. This v lev made 
e x p l i c i t by Eeu while speaking at the United Metionss 
"IndiE h8S h i s t o r i c e l end sliaost immemorial 
t i e s of culture end f r iendship with Chine. 
For us, s i tuated es ve ere md tifhere u^ e are 
the f r iendship of Chine i s des lreble end 
na tu re l . v;e wish to do every thing 
poss ib le to promote the f r i end ly re la t ions 
thnt now prevsi l between us , beceuse w© 
f e e l thet a f r ee and independent Chine 
merching with India w i l l be the siost e f f e c t i v e 
s t a b i l i z i n g f ec tor in 
I t was beceuse of these divergent views thf^t the 
two countries had cl eshed ti«ne m<i again. f o r as the 
Korean war was concerned Nehru seids^ " I ara convinced 
in my mind thet there would have been no Korean war i f th© 
Peop le ' s Government of China had been in the United Nations^ 
i t i s only guesswork - because people could have dealt with 
Chine across the t a b l e . " in h is l e t t e r to iJeen Ache eon on 
1 . U,H. General Assembly <6th Sess ion ) , i ^ m i S l u b S S a a S s t 
Plenary Meetings, v o l . i , o p . c i t . , p. iO . 
2 . I.ok f.fibha Debatesi v o l . 7 , pt . I I (29th September 1964), 
c o l . 3689. 
- 5J?7 -
July 19, i960, he msae i t c l ea r that our proposal f o r 
brcsKlng tho present aet-^dloek Ifi the Beewl ty Counell , 
so thet r^presentetives of the-?eop3o*s Oovermaent of 
Oblna can tr.ke their S€ft In the Council ena th€ Union 
of Soviet soci f i l i s t Fepublios esa return to I t , was 
aeslgn<£<S to f u l f i l the pol icy of p©6ce in the United l e t l ons 
endi not to weeken I t , B® t^nt cai to say, " I t mbb made on 
i t s merits eund @lso in th@ hope that i t would creete a 
suiteblc atmosphere for the peaceful solution of th« Korean 
problems I do not think thot the edmission of Chin® now 
would be an encourBgement of eggreesion."^ But united 
otates wes not wi l l ing to discuss this issue, " i t i s highly 
inappropriet© for the Security Council to concern i t s e l f 
v lth this Que&tion et this time", seid Austin, United states 
4:0presmt8t|ve to the Security Council in his etetement^ on 
i s t August, 1950. H© vas strongly opaosed to «ny action 
of the Council lihich aiight leave the Impression thet the 
question of the termination of the sggresjiion fro® Uorth 
ICoroa could be contingent in any way upon the determinstion 
of the question of Chinese represmtet ion. Moreover, he 
declared: 
"The f ac t of sggrossion cannot be obscured by 
undeleted istsueWi Consideration of the 
1 . M s L S ' f vo l . m i l (678 ) , July 31, 1880, p. 171. 
2 . 14 August 1980, pp. 245-246. 
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Chinese represenfeation Issue In eny 
reletionship whatever to Koree would divert 
and distract from the greet QolJectlve 
e f f o r t of the United Hetlons."-^ 
Hehru objected in 1953, speaking^ in the Perliesjent 
t l i f t though the United Nations wes founaed on the pr inciple 
of Universa l i ty . But i t did not eccept people 's Republic 
Chine's membfcrship. has I t not © breek from the fundsmentisla 
of the U.N. Gherter? Indie also believed that i f Chines© 
ComiBonlsts vere seated in the United Nations they mvtld 
hev€ beome more responsible and better facing the nations 
of the world. The United states thought otherwise. In 
the i r view the argument that the Coiamanist Chinese regime 
w u l d be "reformed" I f i t were In the United Hationss was 
wrong, "The If.N. i s not a reformatory", said Dulles on 
2Sth beptesaber 1968.^ With regard to the conception of 
universa l i ty of the U.N.O. , Dulles coiujaented that there 
i . On /sugust is, 1954, P.enry Gabot lodge, the 0 .6 . nepresen-
tat lve to the 15 .n. re i terated: "To eduit Chinese 
Communists before there is a peace in Korea is an 
insult to the- entire pr i rwip le of co l l ect ive security 
v'hich ve In the United Nations are sworn to uphold as 
wal l es being an a f f ront to the menujry of our deed. 
I t woulc be a proof that ve did not asean vhat we 
said viit^ n ve soleaaily declared our hetrefl of aggression." 
^b id . ^ vol . XXn (791) , August iiS, 1954, p.280. 
ii. See pyJLJlafBgnt^fy i^lJfitiM^ vo l . 1, pt . I I , No. 6 ( 18 Feb . , 
1953), co^. 488.489. 
3 . , v o l . ClOO?), October 13, 1958, p. 564. 
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vs£ debate e t len Frencieco es to vhethfT the United 
Nations should be e universal ins t i tut ion or whether 
Its ffiC'tabfershlp shou3<i be s e l e c t i v e . The choice v;as in 
fevour of s e l e c t i v i t y . ^ 
To the indifcus, the Chiricse were f e l l ow /.siene 
f i r s t rna Cominunists e f tervards i l i i l© to the Asaericans 
they primarily Qommunists. Llnce the Bandung Confermc© 
in /,pril i9S5, the InUians started to have an impression 
that Cornaajnist chine was boing rapid ly dram in to the 
o r b i t of Asian powers ana to that extent i den t i f i ed 
l e s s with 8 Commuaist bloc aoJBinfitedi by the Soviet Union. 
^he. „{;4,t8tesmffl| f o r instf^nee took note of Gbiae ' s pledge 
" t o the ideals of the United Netions" a j i ch wes embodied 
speech he quoted an extract in 
support of his stand, from the report of t^-Qretary o f 
u t j t e L te t t i a lus to Presiufcnt Trumen n the resu l t s of 
the oan Freaclsco G'^nference v-hlch crested the U.N. 
" I t wes pointed out by n numbt-r of delegations end 
pert icu lRr ly by the deleeetion of the i-ovict Union, 
that i t would be unfortunate to heve e membfr persistentl ; 
v io le t ing tho principles of the while u-ntinuing 
to rtrjjaln o :iembcr of the Qrgnnisatlon, such a^ S 'sembcr 
vjouIu bfe l i ke e cencerrus i rovth eno ought not, i t 
\vas thought, to be essociated in any wey vith the 
oiEcnisat ion. In the end this view prevai led at the 
Conference . . { j m i P M . , 
, 
i-'eperfnent of i t s t e Publ iegtion 23497, p .49 ) . Then 
he said ; ' M n c e then we h&ve hed some prfictical 
t-Aptrience. CoRinjunist nations which becerne members -
and which cannot be expe''leci because of the Veto -
heve not in f&ct been reformed. They heve used fore© 
in Korea end Hungory and have consistently ref^ubbeu 
the e f f o r t s of the U.:;. to put pfeKc© end order upon a 
stable b c s i s . I f the Chinese Comcaunlst regime 
brought into the U .N . , i t w u l u have shot i t s w y i n . " 
•lit , o p . c i t . 
'Toiii m 
by inference In the f ine l communique issued from 
bsndung. Thst Coroniuoltiue, said the newspeper, raede 
ahou-iifi-I.ai "a psrty to suggestions that th€ O.N. «s 
orgenisetion should be used in various benef ic le l vays 
ma that the U.N. Charter sh.ula be in Indian 
eyes, Ghinr h&a strengthenea her claim to e seat in the 
intemetionel organisation by i aeat i fy ing hersel f v ith 
these semtlments. inaie did not l i k e , iyecretsry of Ctate, 
i,»ulles' suggestionii fox* the acceptance of tuo Chinas 
in the United Nations. Ihe Fii^au, in l-loveraber 1953, commented 
thet "Kr. iiulles' suggestions th&t Peking mey represent 
Chins in the General /,seeffibly, v.'hi2e Forsnose (with tho vpto) 
v;all s p © ^ for the Chinese in the security Council seems :KO£t 
improper end unhelpfu l . "^ Ihe /mericen eveluetion of 
Formoes was understood in India t^ bt* crucial to the 
whole sltuf.tion. .l.tetesgienls presupposition, vhich 
has not proved to be in e>;istence, was thpt i t sffemed 
"pretty p la in , i f e violent solution of the Formosan 
probJe.B csn be avoided, recognition of the Peking regime 
ss chine 's true representative in the U.N. w i l l not be 
Vf.ry fjsr oiff."^ 
i . . .d i tor ie l , "iia.r.aung Balenc® bhe . t " . The Statesmen, 
/.pril 30, 1955. 
HiSJUoaUi Novt^ffibcr i y , 1963 (VieeKly_iieview). 
The ttatesmsn, April 30, 1955. 
Pr ior to i9S5, i;fae titatesma^ did not consider the 
entry of China into the c i rc le of U.li. raerabers so urgent 
as to ; }ustlfy overhssty action. Noting that Peking's 
"be l l i cose association hfiS not subsided", the nevspeper 
deemed I t proper thct "rtpr&sentetion should mlt upon 
Chine's di&association f n m aeeression ©gainst the Republic 
of Louth F.oree ana Ite sponsor and protector, the United 
Nations".^ I t wes by early 1955, th^t even tl^ e,, c 
had Qome to be c r i t i ca l of continued exclusion of l.ed 
Chin? from the vsorld body. 
the time when the issue of the American eirraen, 
imprisoned in China^, cfime before the nnited Nations, 
most Indians b f l i eved thrat the Gh'nese Government had e 
case which Gt l ea s t (serited b hearing in Kew l!ork befos'e 
the U.N. errlved 8t £ decision in the matter. I t wes en 
occasion fo r the ert iculetion of suspicions in /.sis thet 
the United Nations was being too patently converted into 
fcn instrument of United btetes po l icy . The united Asia 
concluaea thet i t was "sbundently clear . . . ( tha t ) the 
charges are on the ttftiole logit imate" . I t continuedi 
••^slsn opinion has by ana I t r ge accepted 
the Chinese version. The U.N. ftrbitretlon 
I , ibid.^ October 4, 1953. 
13 /.roerlcen airmen were Imprisoned by Communist China 
08 spies in Hay 1964. 
J ' ' ^ 
nsove inaicet.-d beyond cueitlon the grovth 
or « dangerous bias .n the tJ.M. o rgmiza t lon , 
directed prlsnerily m^alnst the ch'^nese 
Government, For how can the by i t s 
own recent conventi-ins, have's^viy concern in 
so domestic e setter as the imprisonment of 
spies? md i f i t .tuatj vhy was no more teken 
ageinst the rac ia l po l ic ies of uouth ; ; f r ica , 
which by eny stemderds are a greoter ain 
ftgeinst inte« i@tlonsl et iquette thm the mere 
imprisonment of s^ples cloaked In tmiform,"^ 
I'^ het did the Indian Govemmmt do"? I t supported the 
v i s i t of Secretary Oeneral Hamarffk^aid tn China tt> that 
en eraiceble settlement of the dispute might be reached, 
fhe hope of the indien press was that i t raight aark the 
beg:lnning of normeJiBetlon of re lat ions with Chine. The 
f.indu com®©ited thet the incident might h©ve been "a 
measure of retel iatJon to the recent pect between the 
United I tates end Marshal Chaing K a i - . - A n d the same 
newEpeper l a t e r on, declered^ thftt Peking's action was 
"obviously related to other Far Lss tem problems such es the 
crmistice in Korea, admission to the United Nations and the 
presence of the Dnited ttRtes land end navel foro<»s in 
the P a c i f i c . " 
Ab e result of the Americea oirraen's imprisontaent by 
Gomoiuniat Chine, the tiiaenhower Administration's attitude 
i . i iditoriel in pnited Aeia^ December 1964, p.263. 
The HinduT December 18, 1954, 
3 . W A ' * January 17, 1966. 
heaam vexy herd,. In July 1©54, president Elsenhower 
(ieclered that United states of Araerics was "unalterably" 
opposes xo China joining th© United Hetions.^ Even the 
a^bete on the issue of reoognltlon of Feklng regliae hed 
been berred in the Congress of t3ie United ^.ttJtes^ and 
i„enator l^ow lend ureed for e China blockade.^ 
Heniy Qfebot Lodge J r . , th© U . t . representative to the 
United iiietinns wfefc reported lo have &eid on Merch 18, 1954 
et th© imited Nations, Mew ^ork, th«t i f necessery he 
vo'i3d not "shrink" from using the veto to prevent the 
seating of Cofiffliunlst Chine in the U n i t ^ Ketioas Leeurlty 
Coiineii 
fiehru's view point was quite d i f f e r en t from that 
of iimerloe. " I t l a not" , he sa id , "© question of the 
admission of China to the United Nations. Chins i s c^e 
of th© foiJtnder members of the United Nations. I t is merely 
e fuestion of who represents China. . . I t 1& real ly a 
question of credentia ls as to who repretentsi China."® He 
LtPtesiaBi;^, July 7 , 1954. 
ii. The !i;imes of Ind^c, 22 Soveaber 1954. 
3. Ihe New York Tlmes^ 28 Kovember 1954. 
4 . Xbld. . 9 March 1954. 
8. Nehru, Indlfi,' a 'g'Qrelm yPllay.i o p . c l t . , p.91. 
He was speattlng in the i.ok tauha on 29th ^epteinber 1954. 
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added that i f Chine was given a seat in the t>nited Nations 
it' i^ould o&suaae certain respons lb l l I tes in the United 
Nations end would abide by the Charter and the resolutions 
of the United Nf.tlone. ^'i-oflietimes the united Nations passes 
resolutions giving certain directions to the People 's 
CovcrriKeftt of China. The response from Chlnts 1st "You <So 
not reooenise us; we are not in the United Nations} how can 
recognize your directions ' ' " 'i'his Is an understandable 
response. Instead of adding to the respons ib i l i ty and 
laying down ways of cooperation you thus shut the door of 
cooperation end add to the irresponsible behaviour of nations 
in this way, and c a n I t security, the re&ult inevitably Is 
thst the Influence of the United Nations lessens . I do 
not want i t to lessen, because i t i s one of our biggest 
hopes of peece in iJhe world. 
Dulles ' policy of entangling a l l iances against the 
Communist countries was not a solution as f a r as the 
problem of world peace was concerned. World peace cannot 
be brought about by threats or by having tnllltsry alJlances. 
Nehru believed thut the two major protangonlsts were too 
powerful to be dismissed one by the other, then "you have 
to co - ex i s t " , understand and deei with each other in fi 
1 . fSehru, Indians Forelgai Po l iev , pp. 91-92. 
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rest reined way. In esse co-e^vlsteace Is re jected, the 
alternative wouJd be t«ier and mut^ael destruction.^ Ke 
held thfit In the Interests of Wor3d peace I t was laperotiv© 
that Communlet China should be recognized inside and 
outside the United Nations by Qountries of the werid. 
Communist China's claim for it® seat In the Security 
Council was supported by India end others even in an 
eloven-naticHi n m - o f f i c i e l Conference^, held at New Delhi 
between 6 end 10 Apr i l , 1065, in which China ®3so participated• 
The Conference adopted, a number of resolutions demanding 
Inter ©lie the laaiediate l i f t i n g of the embargo on trade with 
China, seeting Communist China In the Security Council and 
i t s recognition by al l countries.^ 
During end a f t e r the Bandung Conference (18-24 April 195Q), 
in which twmty nine nations of Asle and Africa participated, 
Chou*i.n<*lai played his cards with supc-rb s k i l l md declared^ 
that he had come "to seek unity, not to quarrel", that 
China, althoui^ a CouBnunist country, had no desire to publ icise 
i t s iueology end thr^t e l l that i t sought f o r was noimal 
1. p. 93. 
2 . BjSiaiL§lmJLUaS&, 7 April 1955. 
3. Ibid., 11 April 1965. 
.filso see pp. 4:;i0»426. 
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re lat ions with e l l Asian sici jerrican countries, "pa r t loa la r ly 
her own neighbours on s t r i c t adherence to the pr incip les 
o f co-exletence agreed upon between India mA Chin®"* Thus 
Chou En- ia i expressed whet Nehru wanted, the fr iendship md 
mutual relatlcais between Asian countries. Th© Qhited states* 
charges of imperia l ist and aggres3:jive motives against 
Comimmist China seemed to !l©hm merely suspicious and 
d i s t r u s t f u l . 
Indie continued vrith her ©f forts to seat Peking in 
the Security Council* " I do not thlnK" Nehru said to the 
1 ok ^ebhe on March 20, 195<5, " that so long as the Chinese 
People 's Bepublic is not admitted to the United ISaticais, 
the situation in East Asia w i l l return to norraai." ! In f a c t , 
i t looked Q& though the sert ing of Communist China in the 
i-ecurity Council had become one of the ma^or ob ject ives of 
Indian foreign policy* In spite of the fact that Communist 
China had violated Indian t e r r i t o r i a l integr ity by constructing 
the Sinki8ng«>Gartok road through isdekha in 1958, Nehru's 
sympathies f o r Peking remained unshaken. 
The United ^ a t e s continued to strengthen i t s t i e s 
with Chiang while Indie put forward a resolution in the 
United Nations for the edaission of China on 16 September 196?* 
i - Lff^ W g v o l . n , pt . I I , No^ii? 
(isO Ms«sh 1966), co l . 3046. 
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Tol l Ksiti Inaia proposed » s s "metter of urgency ma 
importence" that en Item entit led "the representation 
of Uliint In the Unitea isretlnas" toe inolu^ed In the egead® 
of the new sest ioa.^ t^vm the Pekletenl Press went eheed 
e r l t l c l sSng the /.mericen stfenGs 
"Ihe Ls.i,. stand c»i this l&sue Is not on3y 
unethloel end in v lo lct ion of the rules of 
Intematlona" Lew governing tJie recognition 
of governments end states , but i t c mdoclve 
to the increase of international tmslon and 
bit-temess.* '^ 
Inal© opposed the suggestion of some countries to 
bring the Ghlna-Tlbet au- st ioa to the United Nations on 
the ground thut there was "no lega l Bt&nd open", because 
"Chlae i s not e member of the united fleticns nor Is i l b e t , 
the question shoula not be b r o u ^ t to the Onlted Nat lens. 
'iha countrlejs of the world expressed the i r hopes v lth 
thecoffiin£ of the Kennedy Aaicinlstration In that I t 
would teke e new look Into the Chine problem. In February 1961 
lord Cesey, iitistrcllu't minister of a^Ktemel A f f e l r s from 
i95 i to i960, said J ' ' I t I s becoming mort and morp d i f f i c u l t 
to j u s t i f y keeping aed China in quarantine".^ B r i t a i n ' s 
i . She Hindu> 19 September X9S7. 
ii, l i d i t o r l i l , "China's Leet " , P^^lsten lliaeat 
18 i epteraber 1 9 ^ • 
3, S;eld Mr, Uesel while speaking st e pre^e conference 
fcpcaneored by the Council of Uorld A f f a i r s . The Hind us ten 
I'lmes, October l959. 
4 . Ihe Ijew York Times^ February i9toX. 
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Lord Home early that yesr , as Foreign secretary accepting 
the United states aHegatlons thet Chine had been 
unconcli latojy and publ ic ly esserted i t s be l i e f in war, 
saSo that "A l l thfit i s true, but th€< facts of in temat ions l 
l i f e require thet communist Chine should be seated in the 
United net ions . " * 
I t emasini, thet even growing pressure of World 
publ ic opinion could not make the United states accept 
the membership of Cotomunist Bhina to the United N a t i m s . 
only case ciiange seemed thet a f te r f i ght ing a delaying action 
f o r yfoars, tiie United i^tates vos forced in 1961 to accept 
debate on the Chinese representation issue - where before the 
discussion bad been on ^he procedural point of whether the 
isRU© i t s e l f should be de^^eted, Line© the issue begen tc 
be openly debated in the U.K. General in 1961, 
lnai«3," Br i ta in and others have consistently voted for the 
accreditation of Peking's representatives.^ In an eddress 
before the /t!&eri08n Association f o r the United Hations, 
United Nations Eecretary-General U. Th« i t expressed hiB 
opinion md observed thet : "Today the influence of Peking 
on World a f f a i r s is unnistakable and i f i may aey so, I 
wonder i f i t would be wise, or even poss ib le , indef in i te ly 
to ignore CItiilna, especial ly when dealing with problems 
a f f ec t ing peace and security of the World. 
atuii^tlia vQifiRg^ i^ onUox 
ii. America's Foreign Po l icy , edited by Harold Keren Jacobson, 
hCandom House, New York, 1968, p.523. 
3, Ihe flew York Times. November ii i , 1963. 
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<C) sorTLn Dir.nm t 
I t xms CbinesG aggression on Intlicm !er i " l tory in 
October 196;?, thit brought I n ' l a acd tho "n l tod ..t-^tes 
very cloco to tjn jorst n-i each otfr-r^s Ihonf^b 
, In'^la aec5e|,tea the n i l i t a r y airl by 
the f'nited ^ ' a tos of Asorlca imd'^y ^^entiedy •Msjlnistratlon, 
I 'or Indi • i t w IS In a r i f - i n t e r o s t and s e l f - i e f cue© to tik© 
'rtllit'-iry airi fr-in ^^h^re pvor quarter of the world I t eamo, 
and on the other the 'rnitod ^^tates w i l l i n g l y provided 
' l i l i t a r y an'' material aid as a part of I t s global, strategy 
to naint.4,n toalanco of jjover in ^sia against Corspiunlsto. 
/^tliough, Inf?ia has always bef?n d^Jng i t s bost to be 
frico'^lly aw! c^oprrativ© with the OovemTmt of Cowmnist 
CMna , Compnist C.|fiins not provo to b*^  a s incere f r i e n l . 
mu-iT^ 19591 Chou-t'n-Laij in -i l e t ter ' ' to liohm^ 
f o r the f i r s t time, <|i2rsti--ned tho ©stabli^Si©' b'>imdary 
between India JH^ Chin=a, He contended th i t tho ".. 'ino-Indian 
boimdary ha<! never dolifnite^** and th'at tbe S'^eallod 
Mno Via a product of tho B r i t l s b po l icy of 
aggrt^ssion against tbo T ibet Pegion of C'^ln-i" m^ t f te re for r . 
1 • HotG&'. ?<enioranda md Letters exchange?^ and 
.^Igpgti, fM 
KI^II'-' r-apf^y i j j H n i f l t r y of Hxtomai a f f ^ H T 
Oovt. o f Indi3i, pp. 
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m " I l l e g a l l ine '% tbon, rso s p c e i f i c te r r i t o r i a l 
claiffic vcr© raafle, I'he claiffli to 50|000 aquarc miles of 
Tfidl-'H t e r r i t o r y wa© p « t forwar<1 by Chois F n - l a l only on 
SeptGEnbor 1 9 5 9 I t vao slgnlficaarit sand a a a ^ n g that Hif^  
Oo'mrnTsent of Ir?dia bad raade fKirlir-r pwblic ?1oclaratir>iis 
tif'^iralng the est'-ibliahad bound-^ries of China 
h ^ not quefittorrd the doe l a ra t i China could feav© rtal-'^ Qcl 
the questi'^n, i f i t hod any -I'^-ubts about the bound'-iry» 
But i t <^id not do so* India was tiurt griovsd becauGa 
thi3 boundary dispute van an en t i r e l y nev m<l d G l i b w a t e 
Jttempt on the part o f Cbin-a t'« give an unfr iendly tw is t 
to the long history T^f pRacoful f r i end l y r e l a t i ons 
betm'cn the two oountrioo. Cver slnco t1~e timo, InfJi J bocinjo 
inr^ppendent Coraraunist China o , ' ^ into existence, the 
r e l a t i ons betveen t^efei.'o countries refaaifiod extremely co rd ia l 
apart f ron v, few d i f f e r ences on 1' ibet. ' ' n r e a l i s t i c a l l y , 
t ^ i a never thoa'iht that ^-hina woul^ ^ bohavo in sueh a 
••jnnnor. \ h ' t t ag tho react ion in India to tbo r i so of a 
i/firlii:e and m i l i t a r i s t i c China? In ^^ n^y eventt China was a 
neighbour viith a coima n border of miles an?^  China, 
helped in the e a r l i e r years by rJoviet Bisasia, vas © i l i t a r i l y 
strong, l o r Ind ia tho choice wsis e i ther to eabirk on JI 
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huge d'^rence budget In order to defend i t s tlortbern 
f ront ie r s del iberate ly postponing hopes of ra i s ing the 
stan^aycls of l i v ing of i t s people, or » to eoneentr-ute on 
••^ll<?'yiatlng tlje grinding poverty of its pcoi^e through a 
feol^ prograraae of industr ia l ant! agx^cultural advance 
thrcragls p i inn^d nev0lopro?nt» hoping at the sam® tisi® to keep 
the C!iincse neighbour s a t i s f i ed by a policy of frl^n^lsJ^ip. 
In the oarly years a f t e r indeir^naence, India chose the l i t t e r 
I 
a l ternat ive . 
Previously, the Governuicnt of China, canceale<? the i r 
t e r r i t o r i a l clsdms, even i^en the two coiantries negoliiated 
md signed the 195^ Agrees??@nt on " i feet . Though i t vas 
concluded to sett le a l l outstiinc?ing Issues w l to consolidate 
th® frienclly rolati'--ns betwer-n thr» tvo countries, the 
preosjbl© to this Agreement indicated th^ ^ wider purposes 
of- th© treaty . The F ive pr lneip los of peaceful co-pjcistenoe 
w r e eaboAied in I t f o r the f i r s t t i w . ^ ono of th© f i v e 
pr inciples was "mitual rospect f o r eaoh others t e r ; i t o r l a l 
integr i ty and sovereignty", w^ich o lear ly laiplied that the 
borders of cach party to th© treaty vere teovn to the other* 
Had China believed th^t tho'^e a t e r r i t o r i a l dispute of 
&.K. 4charya, India and China » A Brlf!>r rmrvev^ 
Information iJervlce of M i a , ' i g J ^ f T p p T ^ . 
^^hito gaper I op*clt., 
3« Sec .Mgw^r^tft rubl lcat ions 
n iv ls lon , 1962, p ,2 . 
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any size about the ©ntlr«» bo«n'1«i.ryi %'as It liot 
the tiiBG to raise the «|u©stion ^en the two coimtr^os mre. 
solemnly pledging the "territorial IntojsErtty'* of <?ach 
other"? 
I'ris© Minister ^ehru expressed hiraself, t^ -hat he felt, 
before the lok on Hoiyetijber "It is a strango 
turn of clrcurastaneQs that WE In IITKU A who stoo<^  for nesLce 
and wrfe^f! for it udth al l our miitht should su<l<!enly h^^ 
drawn into this d^gorous situation ma b© faced with the 
possibility even of var» I do not thfnKvar ¥i l l come*"'' 
In October 195^, When Behru visited China, he ®entl-^ n©d 
to the Chines© leaders that ho aeen some napjs nublljshed 
in China vhich shower? a t^ r^ ng boundary betveon the ti^ o 
eountrlf?s ani ad-^ e^ f that he was not worried about i t , becau^c 
the boundaries of In<31a vers? quite clear antt not a m-^ tter 
of argu^nsnt. The Chinese Priiste %nister re-nlle'l th^t 'these 
were really' reproductions of pT'-^liberation maps, an^ the 
People's Oovernwent "had no tirae to v^viae theis''.^ 
Government of India rf^ognlsed the force of this argument" 
an(! dli not pursue the matter ftirther.^ 
1. Ho^ru, Fi^ tliev^ op»clt., ^^ohru'e 
doubt became true when China Httactfed Iwiia on 20 October 
1962. 
S. v^hUe f m r I op.clt., p. hq. 
3. i m . . p. 
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Again tn 1956, when Chow En-ial visited Inaia, 
referred to tho wrrng Chinese maps, especially in relatif^n 
to the Eastern Sector, Choti En-lai said th f^t he had accepted 
the iTHC^ Jfahon J-in® as the border hPtween C^ i^na me Bvreia, 
hp would accept this border vith India alao.^ On Pist 
%gust 19^8, the Gov^ rni3«nt of In^la -irew tho attention of 
the Chinese authority s to a map published in an official 
Chinese m^aaine'*, v/hich inclmdei in Chinese territory four 
of the five Divisions of Iriaia*s ?Iorth-Eust Frontier \ency, 
soiB^ ? areas in 'Jttar i'^ radesh in the J^ e-^ tor and la-ge 
areas in Ladakh. It was pointout that as the People's 
Govemi^ rnt had been i'i power for nearly nine years, corrections 
in Cvinas© *T}apa sh'^ ulJl not be delayer? any longer.^ 
Chou ^n-loi wrote*^  to !?ehru a^witting "It was true 
that_^ border m^ntl'^ T. va- not raised, in "i^ h^ when 
negotiations \?erc being hrld between Chinese an^  Inclian 
sides for the Agreement on Tra^o m^ Intercourse between 
Tibet r*?gion of China and India. This vas becauao conditions 
were not yc t ripe for its settleaent."^ This cm be cited 
1. Ministry of/xt^rnal hffaire, 
New Delhi, p,3. 
P. ilte China notorial» 
3. i ^ t e Paper 1 op.cit,, p M 
See the rerly of Chou 2n-lai on "lantaary 
5 . p. 
as one of the aaiaing admissions of aissisRilatioii in 
!?5o4ern history* How <lld time beeorae 'ripe* In 1^59 for 
the »^ iST5tite to be ralsi^d, r«»asoTi woulf? harv© beon ttiat 
thit time China had obtcal?io»! effectlvo enntrol of I'lbst, 
naving ^ut -^mm th^ "popular p??b€llion tlhiere, an?' the Cbtnese 
array was well-pntrenc^e^^ across bordero of In^ila. 
CiiSna rais f^^  tr!<? only vh^ n 3h® vas in a 
position to subject t.ho issue to tlie ar^tr^tnent of aras^ 
This was cleirly contr3:-y to tiie srsirit o- good ^Jbb'^ tirliness 
an^  Afro.Asian solidarity. 
In 1957, Gvinf3 bttJlt n road across th«? Aicnai Chin area 
of India* "ot only China waited to icut forwar?' her «lsi?s 
until she became strong in Tib'^t, but also imtil she 
through clandestine incursions r'^wte are-as, occupied 
parta of Indian territory* This Chinese f^ t^aimd nn Indian 
patrol in this area in the sus^r of 19^8 and in reply to 
a protest referred to their "frontier gwar.'s" hwing 
detainsd the Indian pfittr'>l because they wore in Chinese 
territory. In addition to thes© incursi'^ ns» in t^iiy 
Chines© artaed forces caiDe to Khurna^ -^ Tort in I^ ads^ M^ , and 
arrestod an Indian patr-^l party Aksai Chin raado 
other incuraicns across Indian territory* '^boy further 
poi^rated into Lad'-Jlch In October anf' opened f i? on an 
Indian patrol nearth® Kong^ ta Tass, idLlling nlrc Indians. 
Ten other nembers of the party were taken Into custo<!y 
an'? iseted owt inliOTai? treatment. China ha^  t^ iits by 
already feegim to resort to '^orce antJ to raise tension In 
the border areas,'' 
The Sovernraent of Inc^ la was not in favour of drastic 
steps I btit trfOl-! thf? f;rirv«st of fstttiatlnn, 
give sm assurance that past mistakes not be repeated 
an^  that India could no 3.onger talf© chances with hfr bor<f!er!? 
in the north an?! north-¥eat. Sir^ ulfl the necessity arise, 
h® added, Xn'^ la woitl^  not hesitate to talk in the language 
w^ sich the Chinese seeoied to un^ 'erstand - that of forae -
in defence of her territorial integrity,'" Nehru sai-l in the 
1.0k Sabh?i on PS August 1059, "V?hilc I io not vish to take 
alarmist vi'f?w of thf? situation, we shall naturally be 
prepared for any eventuality an'i wlthr>ut fuc^ s or shouting 
e^ep vigilant 
'•'ot only vas %?orrl@d abr^ ut the situation ereate# 
by China, but thc-rr was strong elrtlcisiB in the worl«3 nr'^ ss 
of Chinese action in the Indian bor<f(erland, Ths entir<^  
non-Co!Rtnunl8t press in Bast, South-^ a^st and "^^ est Agia v i^ce*! 
sympathy for Inrlla and con'^ etnned Chinese agi|re?3"5iveness. 
t* Infllft China op.elt., pp, 
I^nrtTi^ t.fin Hmrni October P9, U?. 
Sahhf?, ^MtffSt Vfl; 33t 19, B^ August 10^9, 
cols. an<? 
Tfio ^vestem Etirop©, Aaerlea and Yiigoslav1.a, a l l went 
the sa^e way* y^-rtis^cbev, lEso erabarmeet! 
I r r i t a t e d t)" the Gaines© b^bavlotir towards Ind i a as the 
Grinos© pol icy was doirsj "harm to the esmsR o f Crjinr?5unl sm 
In Asia* Th© Soviet Pyiroi®?' declarf^ d tli^ st the Soviet 
would b o happy " i f there were no ror-- l u c i ' e n t e and i f 
th© ©Kistlng frontl<5r disputes w e se t t l ed by way ^ f 
fr lGRdly negotiat ions, ' ' He ii»entloned i t in a ma^or po l i cy 
speech to the Sr.ppGW® ^ov lo t . ^^h© ^r lae Ministers o f 
the two eotintrlos eat in Apr i l i960 in view of the deter lornt lng 
relatioriS betw©nn Ind i a and China, ilehrn was tm'^ble to do 
fr?uch because of the mounting t ide o f publ ic opinion against 
any sort o f n «got la t ion9 . Thf^ir ta lks s o r e l y confinBOd 
the serioys fU f f e rences tn regurd to the understand!ng of 
©von baaio f a c t s about the bor'^Qr. Hovevf^r, the two Prlise 
^ 'misters agreed t^-st o f f t e i a l s o f the t w Govern^nGnts 
gShsuld m&t and examine the re levant docuT^scnts. %cordinj?ly 
during tho l a t t e r h a l f o f i960 the teams of o f f i c i a l s he l i 
thr- o raectii^s in Pelcing, i::elM and Rane^opn, spread ov^r 
t^'ree seaslona respGct lve ly . 
Thft so cn l led " forward policy" VQ?I forced In 1961 
b€cau9© Jl©hr?) ^as t o d^viop* sons© .vl^oTafx^i/a and take 
U ilinduatan ^inaat October 19^9, - tiovcnber 
aetlon s^rt of conflict^ In order to aaGuag© public 
opinion. The purpose of this policy was to est0i»ll0h sotre 
aymbolle posts both in Ladal^ h and in IK'^ A, Perhaps, 
i^Qhrvi frased it tmclor pr^ssyre from the oi^ rosltion parties,^ 
By the csnd of th<? yfar In^ H ' established abtjut f ^ y posts 
along tho bojyjer. 
r.oiiowing this China becanse mrr^  an^  sjore salve. 
• any in 196^, Chinese tuooos stopped up their forwarf^  
t^atrolling In the Wcjstem Seeto^ .^ In July Chinese 
troops encircled an In l^ian post in the Salv-m Vali.0y, On 
"^"ily 26, 1<56?j the OovQmwJnt of Ti^ ffia vrote to the Chine:?© 
Sonremmsnt t^at, as soon as tho carrent tensi-^ n ha<i ceased, 
India was prepared to enter into disctjssions on th« basis of 
the OffieiaELs* Heport« ^'hil® votes on pi'elirainarv ^^ iseus^ iions 
to case the tension were beiii? ©xehangei, the Chinese troops, 
stjiddenly on %ptetnber 8, 1962, laarehed across the well-
established JaJt?, t i l l then, peaceftil boundary in the I^ astem 
Oector, viz,, the MeMahon I»|nef ?'hen came October 30, 1962, 
vhich is ftar^ed by isasaive attaek by CJ^ ina in both the 
I'oatem and Eastern i^eotorf^  of the border, overwhelming the 
limited Indian frontier posts* "The Chines© arTRleg - still 
described by China as "frontier gu- rdjs", thoia^ they w r^e 
1. Ueo Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul, The JtnFv^ (^ Jew 
1967), p» 281. 
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operatlng taor© than a hundred allcis beyond the ofoa where 
they In 19^8 - marched well Inside Indian territory, 
and on October J^ reralsr Ciiou Bn.iai put forward 
bis t^ Toe point urotiosals for ceasefire and dlsengagerasnt*^  
In/iia dl'^  not accept tbese proposals as these aTtjtanted to 
''ietatlng terms to Indict smd rso^ ant that China will kfietJ 
•l^ at they have t^ aJcen bjr force, and nc-gotkt© with India in 
reg-'r'' to rest of thely territorial claims. By aecer/tln ?^? 
the»f? India vratild haw not reiained consistent with hsr 
national dignity. Thereforthe slrapl© and straight forvar?! 
eotinter proposal vas inadf* by In^ia, vhlcti was that the 
(fun on the border, as on Septetnbsr 1962, should 
TfifttoTTfdf and therafifter the t%fo coiintr±:?s sh-tJld enter 
into discussions* But Chinese answered by further raassiv© 
attaclcs deeper into Indian territory. drapsatloally, 
Oil ?Jov©Tsber they annoimced theS^ unilateral ceasefire 
and withdrawal declaration* ^cordlngly, the Chines^ forces 
withdrew ?o f^.ist behind the Mc^ lahon I«ine, %?hlch they cfulled 
"th^ 1959 of actnol control'* in the Eastern Soetor, 
and also PO k»mm behind their latest aggression In 
1. For details, see GovernTwent of iQc^ ia, Ministry of 
'^ xt.ernal Affairs, .^ jnteflf Memranda n^d f^ yfii^ i^ tiff^ f^  
between the GmTernwmts of Insll^  gn^ l C^^na, lofi^  
lOfi^ , Pn^nr Ho, ¥111, y-t. 
which they&rther Identified with the so called line 
of actual eofitpol" in the Western Sector, left th© 
Chinese in illegal possi«%sslon of tU.,500 square cslles of 
In'^ lars t ©jrltoi^ In Ladatihf Inclu'^ ing th© fruits of their 
latest aggression In this Sector* In^ia {declined to accept 
those unilateral terras of the affgresQwr, but stated that 
she will not interfere with the eeaseflrn. At the same time, 
India asked for restoration of st.'Maa gna antp of 8 September 
in i l l sectors of the boundary as a condition precedent to 
a mutually-agreed cease-flro, A stalemate r^ nsued as the 
Chinese relected t^ i^s Indian proposal.'* 
'^teant^ lie ot.h©r non-alles^ ed eotmtriee hafi bee<^ f??e 
extro'T^ ely worried an^ l in order to break the stalesatG and 
to provide a b%sls for agreed cease*fire arrangements» the 
representatives of six r^o»Asl/in countries, (Ceyio?^ , Burma, 
Indoneala, Caohodls, tJ.^R, and Gh^a), at th^ call of 
•Vs. Bandamalke, Priise Minister of C©yion, inet at CtyXomho 
between 10th and 13th Beceraber made certain 
P 
proposals , for ceasefire ®id resuisptlon of negotl ations 
vhlch beearoe !mowi as Coloabo nro|?o8als, The essence of 
the proposals were: (a) th^ it in the Sist, the Chinese aust 
1. .iMia PP» 6-7. 
Tor Text of the Troposals '^ee iMji*t 
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withdraw to the l^ eMsthon ^ ^ the In i^lan forces mist l^ fj 
allows to their positions right w^ to thit lifjo, 
%n thR also, the %li4ese ?mj9t ^tharaw ^ l o woters 
and the area vacated bj withdrawals wero to b© regiix-ded 
a® de-militarised zone to be aduiinistred by civilian posts 
of both sides until a negotiated settlement of the border* 
In^ia aec©ptod th®s© proposals in toto» But China 
announcing acceptance of the proposals "in principle"? flatly 
refused to retire from its ailitary positions in the 
's'i, th© "V^ ice-Pressi^ r^ of th© Teoplo's Hetmblfc 
of Ct'ina, toV 'a correspondent of the Swedish Broadcasting 
Corporation on Q^bru^ iry 17, 1963* thnt"th© Golotnbo Protjosals 
are nelthcir a ftotrstnand. nor an arbitration decision. 
Chines© Govemaiont is not obliged to accept them I n tntn"« 
Marshal Cb©n ^^ so saidt "Tb© Colombo proposals contain 
contradictions md fallacies in logic 
In a note dated 3 April 1963* India stiggosted variows 
contractive steps to reao3«ve the problem including international 
arbitration,^ Aft^r slat isonthR, in a not© on 9 October 1963 
the Citinose rejected the suggestions and accused India of 
h'tving proposed these steps "to negotiations irawjssibl© 
1, B.K. Acharya, c^in^ op.cit,, 
p. 13. 
Quoted In op.cit,, p,lO. 
3. r w y IX -•a^ nair^  1063--^ uty t)r. 
by setting up m array of obstacles",'* The saise note also 
Indicate'! tb'it China was not intepesteif. In tho ^ i^sctisslofis -
on tbe basis of the Colombo proposals an^  categorically 
refused to submit th© aisputo either to th@ Ifitemstloniil 
Court of Justice or ljiterfj"tlonal arbitration. On 
16 October 1<^ 63f h^© Gowmisent of ^ndla sent a further nets 
expressing tbo hops that evtjfitually counsels would 
prevail tho Chinese CJovemra^ nt tjouI'I revert to the 
paths of peace. T s^ re Section by China of the vtsrlotis 
proposals restilte l^ in a long atalo^ nate contintJe^ 
up to date ana the Chinese, still occwpy nltitarlly I^ O^On sq, 
•nlles of Iniian territory In in the w©st, they 
have retired tjpto the ficHahon tine in tie Sr.gt only. 
CHIftESE ASGRE3STQW OH IHPIA MB THE iTOITED ST/jfHS FOLKYt 
fhe vital interests of the United States and Coccaunist. 
China clashed when India was att^ iclted, by China in 1962. 
Indians interest vass in accepting military and rsatc r^lal help 
froia "forever It cam, T^ e tJnttefi ^ates extenf^ erl isllltary 
ald^ and In<9ia accepted It without aligning herself wJ,th 
the V/estera bloc. At that tlis® Fal^ istan and Coiarnnlst China 
Ifh.itp Faggr l%3-^®f«iary 196V, pt5.«?-1i« 
p. 
Oe-oartfflent of ^Hate statenent on ^?ovewber 1*^ , 1€»6?>, " lUS. 
Extends H l i i ta ry to I n a l a , " , M e S » f vo l . XLVII, 
ifeccmber 3, 196?>, np. 
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went ehcad c r i t i c i s i n g the acceptance of the Hnited States 
M i H t e i y ©ici by Ina ie end the Indian po l icy of non-ollgnment* 
In s p l t « of the feet thet Indie liad gone out of her 
wey tQ "befriend China end hed defendeu and spoken f o r 
Chinese rlghtfc, in season end out and eleo thsw, in courting 
China we hod risked the d lsp leesure of the %ect but love 
turned into hate es Chine had been guOty of bsd f e i t h 
treacherous conduct* The question or i ses then why d id 
Chine siJ^rxt^ly 3eunoh en unprovoked, treacherous, mesJ>ive 
attack on Indian terr i tory? The neture end the \ieight of 
th is attack laede i t d e e r thet i t was mods only a f t e r long 
end ca re fu l planning. By now I t has become evident that the 
reason why Commtmlst China oc®mltted an^ression against 
India was thet i t wanted to secure posit ions on I n d i a ' s 
natura l f r on t i e r s so thet i t aslght make Indie completely 
vu lnerab le , in i t s eyee, India i s the only remaining 
democracy of 4s l e , end China f e e l s that i f India oo\ild be 
humbled and humiliated, i t would be e a s y ' f o r her to subjugate 
the rest o f the continent, to the threat from China i s not 
momentary aberrat ion. But I t I s a plcnned strategy to Impose 
Cofiiounist ideology on unwi l l ing people .^ 
A f te r 1967, the United States became e major f ac to r 
i.. touls Fischer: BUgSla, m^X VIgriat Bombay 1962, 
p.155. 5'hlE wes the view of Ashok Kehta, leader of the 
Socialist Party of India, sna a partisan of Nehru* s 
Foreign Policy of non»eli@ament as quoted by Louis Fisher. 
«.4S0«<-
in the rift between In-^ti an'! becmisr? at a 
CoitPBiniftt a tjolicjr nf intensifytr^ e? the 
struggle against the Unit<?<1 St-^ .tejs, tovrar'l a 
im e^rst'^ n-^ tng '^itl^  t^e States* jiM i^tat 
ehan^ o ha-^  eome ovf^ r both Vnite'^  i^ t^ t^ a 
iTime Mifilster tl^ at era of rigia 
polarisation in iHbe viorld was easing to an end| tlise 
States Oovom'^ ent was m wiwiner f row S^ e^ret-iry 
Dulles* o'' rf(?\itrallSf?j as Tvou^ tJ fihtinm 
was seen ^.Tf'Si^y tn thf list --r nf the -'•tBeny^m^er a-l'J'Inistm-
tlon, it t»©cafn© raarl^Qf! only aft©'* t>«e «r>f 
Ifosi^lefit iH'fia vni^  '^^ rsf^ f^ jl r»f the nnit^-' St to'i 
a liberal ••^ -^ li^ y towar*! the •T'^ ovpi^ rf^ '! 
emmtries in -^ n'i Afr1.ca,'' 
Chinese eo'-Hfl not hear t^ts also the ''•is^ h T^ a^i-g^ g^^ j^  
cshown <^ uring H^ t-njqi*;, to the "-nite^ ^^ tatfjs 
an^  his first w^ -citing vith President Kenne^ 'y in ^^ ovoiiiher 
t^ the f^fleial welc^ ning at Air-lrews H^r Force 
Net^ rli id.th l*lncoln, IVanVlln 
anf^  Ganrlhi and 'lescriho'l Mcr as ''a If^ o^ fer pxars^ le 
c jused not Jusst his own country hut all; tho peoples of the 
1. I'nllcl.fTS, .XroF!, .^ lyt,, , 
•^-'fitei hy p. 309. 
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to lo^ .K up to fiiffl.®'*' also spok'' of '^^ nne^ .y that l^ e 
the i^ reatflst r«5Bw>R9ibillt^  In tills wofl'^", 
and ad^ed, ''so WP look vv to ron to jmtir conntrjr an^^ 
to iR-am froti y^^t' an^ l also that Kermedy stoo'^  f^r 
ppac®. 
Bv;t these rautual tritsute@ n-Tt B\»i?3bo1ii3€? in my 
way til© s> 1^ft ^rom their fe-^sie st.m^ rolnto In re^av^ to 
forpign ijollcjr* Ififita '^ ntte^ 
StitOvg enntlmif<1 to Ica^ a tnilltapy sm?! roll tic 
'^ p^ signei to ofTosfj t^e snr@a<^  of t^ or© 
was r^eaSt'T at^^rncl'itim of oach ot^ Q '^f? tso^ ot of vlw an^^ 
less innoyafie® tine 0K:istlrsg bf^ twe^ n tb r^?, 
Against tills Fmng fell foul of the gro^ -^ mg frlon i^sMt^  
botws^ n '^ -nite^  frow 195® onvar^ fs, 
Hew i3eibi and rfsVing f!oa«1e<f in cp'-ojr't^ 
on<=^  l-an^ t tho iMneai? ha-^  conclu'lei^  t^ s t thoir national 
Intorests wre not served by a tt^ ra cover-Soylet-%erlcjim-
detente, wlillo on the otbp;r Iniians felt that th©y stoof' 
to gain by stjcb a ^uHng s^ Interests lay in 
heightening the tonsion; New continued to boll eve th3t 
its interests were better SGrvad by a lessoning of th» 
tensions. 
1. a Hovetnbor 1^61. 
The teLJork-Tijass, f'ov^ tnber 
•482-
India's niinalignmont was an attempt in the dir'?ction 
of better relations with both the? IFnited t^at-^ s and the 
(l.ii.JSJu, a siraultan©'>us a-rorjach toward the leaders 
of the two blocs rather than hotillty toward th© two 
blocs or ono of the two blocs. But the relations of 
Coijiiminist China with both the r^nited States and the a.S.S.E. 
deteriorated on the political ami idelogical levels, 
^^ hlna attacked IndiSf bocause India's friendship 
with the ^^ited States was evidence of her betrayal to 
the imperialist carap. Th© heart of the matter was that 
this friendship clashed with Peking's pursuit of its own 
nati >nal goals. The Chinese leaders vranted to create 
a militant, anti-^ Tnited States front and became sworn 
enesiies of those who tried to cultivate close friendly 
-rslatiins with the tJnited Sfjtes and soften'th<® "Struggle, 
India becaiae suspect because it did not go alongwith these 
Chinese plans,^ 
In accordance wito its plans China also pressed the 
'^ oviet :Jni.on to heighten t3ie tension and not to flinch 
from a head-on confrontation with the United States, The 
Chinese were gravely disturbed by the Soviet attempts at a 
tQward Ch^ nat yjiey frpa gpntlyentc^ f 
Edited by A.M. Iialpern, op.cit,, p.210« 
raporocheraent with the ifnltecl States designed to eliiainate 
or at least to reduce th® chances of a world war. The 
Chinese advocatf?d a "tit for tat" struggle no laatter 
what the consequencas, China's fins belief was that only 
a policy of struggle and not nagotiati^ns and aceoianiodationi 
would help achieve Chinese gosls • big power status, a 
seat In the Security Council, recovery of Taiwan, etc. 
Though China left no stone unturned to change course 
of oavict Foreign Policy, Premier Khurushchev refused to 
follow the China way and fulfil the Chinese demands, 
India did not f it lnt.> the picture? «hich China had 
drawn. The plcturc was an "sntl-Imperialist frint" of 
Afro-Asian countries and stich l«atin American and Comiminist-
bloc nations as were prepared to go along w&h it lender 
its leadership and which would function as an independent 
force in world affairs, Indetsendent of as well as hostile 
i ^ 
to both Washington and i^oscow. As India was non-aligned 
and friendly t3 both the U nited States and the U.S.S.IU, 
the non-aligned world appeared haiastr;ing in Peking's eyes, 
by India's masterly inactivity. In September 1961 the 
laeptlng of the mn-allgned nations at Belgrade seemed to 
provide a fair indication, 
Xhe real crisis in India's foreign policy started 
with the maesiva Uhlnes© attack on India during Septembar -
November 196?. A full scale war was not regarded as a 
seri^'is possibility, nor was India prepared far it iBilitarily. 
It shocked and shaok tho nation as nothing else had done 
before* The reason was that nell^er the governraant nor 
its critics had any precise idea of the strength and 
combat readiness of the ^^ hinese forces on tho border, The 
subsequent ^hinrse attack demonstrated hov fatalty oar 
int. lligonce was and still mora vividly how wrong the 
Govamsjont's political assumptions were,^  
Aware of all thes® factors and interested in its 
own world strategy, the linited States came atonce to the 
resell© of India and extended massive military aid against 
the ^Inf^se aggression. Th>ugh India resiainRd non-aligned, 
the United states did not press India to accept the 
rj©"raber3hip of " the Western" bloc. "India sought^railltary 
assistance frora the ?;ntted States, the ignited Kingdom, 
and other countries to met the threat of renewed 
Chinese aggression which ruled out a policy of Isolation. 
ConKaunirt China has been the great rival of tho Tnited 
4itat<»s in the Far Kaat as well as in the i>outh-Kast Asia 
and to deter it was the najor policy objecti^ ^e of the 
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United States* %ines€ aggresalon on Indian territory 
was the time when the United States could do something 
so as to influence India and to subjugate Goraauniats^  
Previously also the American Military Aid pact with 
Pakistan in 195^ + was to strengthen Pakistan against the 
snread of Gotaounlsm, though, obviously Pakistan was 
Interested in its defence against India rather than Coisrainist 
coimtrii's. At that time President Sisenhovfer offered^ 
Afflerican military aid to India also bu* e^hru disudssed^ 
the American offer because of India's policy of non-alignraent 
with either of the two blocs. This offer might have 
increased tension in Asia rather than estafclishlng pBac«9 
and sectiTity, India was against any military pacts then 
how could she accept the American offer. 
As far as the India China border dispute v/as concerned, 
the tJnited States had been sympathising with India and 
offering milit'sry assistance. Eisenhower had backed Uehru*s 
China policy and condemned tim use of force by China 
against the borders of India.^ 
Walter Llpi^ann, the noted American columnist, described 
1 . BiMsMjt.% vol. 30 (76&), March 15, 19^, 
2. vol. i, pt. i i , Ho.12, 
col. 970, 
3. The limes of India, December 3, 1959. 
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China fss th^  most dangerously eTpandlog pwer. 
Mghest problora, he said, was to contain GMna not only 
on the Indian border but also in other parts of Asia.^ 
r ut Prime Minister Nchni's stand was that "^ under present 
circufsstances India is not to seek United States aid to 
*s 
resist Chinese aggression",'^  l^ he fact was that India 
could not anticipate that ^hina would attack India^ and 
she would have to accept the United States militaiy aid. 
1. The Hind lis tan Times^  I5th Tlovember 1959* Uppaann 
was answering questions at a reception held under the 
gusnices Of the Press Guild of India, Lonsbay, 
2. The Delhi Hindusthan 4>tandard 13 December 1959. 
3. In an interview with the noted Journalist Jay?! l^inkin 
after the ^hinese aggression in i^akh, Nehru said 
earnestly about Chlnai "They let TO down, they deceived 
- m~i I had no idea that they would do somf^ thing which 
really was not in their own interests. We have boon 
their strongest advocates in Asia, and also at the 
'^ Jnited fJations, But of course they do not want to be 
represented at the "Jnited Nati >ns, so perhaps we are 
not so useful to them." Mnkin, A'aya, 
iondon, 196<;, pp,217-l8. It was the general feeling 
that he believed blindly in tho slogan Hindi-Chini 
Bhai-Bhai, It was not the case. politician of the 
status of Nehru, was not so ignorant about this. When 
Taya 2inkin asked him in 195»f, »I>id he really believe 
that China had no territorial ambitions and believed 
in coexistence?* lie replied, "I do nottiink that they 
are ready for expansion, Yju must remeaber that they 
have a lot of work to do in China pr3p«r, i^ ut in say 
twenty years* time, when they are -Jtrong and modern, 
then the picture will be quite different and they will 
orobably be a menace*. Ho went on to sayt 'wr- ar? far 
^ead of them in economic terras, in comraunicati >ns and 
all that, but the thing that worries m is that their 
rate of progrpsa will be greater than ours,* Ibid., 
pt). 208-209. Actually Nehru was busy with the economic 
development of^thc nation and did not pay much attention 
to the fflilitary-mako-up of India. 
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the i^ tate a^partment of tho iJnltPd States made a 
detailed study of Indians border problem during 1959-60. 
Itu stand was that It trusted India's legal position ii^ hich 
is clear fr^ m the fact that, while speaking before a news 
conference on Moveiaber 12, 1959, the Secretary of State 
Herter saidi "We naturally preauroe that the claims made 
4 
by the In?^ ians are entir.^ly valid claims". It waa not 
before the first week of February i960 that India made a 
request to the United tetatoa for the purchase of De-"enc® 
stores. The reqiuesi was conveyed by the Indian Ambassador, 
M.G. Chagla, to I.'i. Secretary of .^tate. Christian A, Iferter. 
1. m y^rgim j^ ^MUpr^ s ,1,9^ 9, 
"^ Secretary Herter on November 13 called in th« Indian 
Charge'd'^  Affairs*, B.N. Chatterjee, to clarify any 
possible misconception regarding ^ e statements he 
sade at his news conference on Movember 12, concerning 
the India-China border situation. 
^^The Secretary raade it clear to Mr. Chatterjee that his 
statementa weTO not meant to imply any condoneraent by 
the J^nited States Government of the jse of force by 
the Chinese Oomniunists. In fact, the Chinese Communist 
actions in this respect ere a reflection of the brutal 
disregard of normal internati >nal procedures which 
hnve characterised Hed Chlnase act!ms fortbe past 
decade. They have not hesitated to use aggressive, 
j?nned action, including the killing of Indian policeiuen, 
in en apparent attempt to establish a de facto oosltion 
of strength in relation to India. Their actions are 
wholly abhorrent to the II.3. Government. 
'^The Secretary also made it clear to Mr. Chatterjee that 
the 5Jnited States strongly sympathizes with Indians 
attempts to resolve the present issues with Conuminist 
China peacefully." D.S.B.. vol. M (November 30, 1959)f 
p. 786. 
- Mss-
The Administration's assumption was that not only the 
IJnited States but i^ ussia too would b© on Indian side 
if China extended hor aggression.^ 
»^®nator Kennedy said on May 5f I960, while speaking 
bftfors th® EeanopJLc Growth Gcsmroittee that Am@Tican help 
should be designed to enable India "overtake th® challenge 
of CoramtAnist China". ^ emphasized thi-t IMia followed 
a route in keeping v?ith human dignity and individuial 
2 
freedtM. Senator Kennedy's view about the border disiiute 
was-' that "the real battle is not the recent flare-up 
over Chinese troop ooveraents around disputed boundaries. 
Hor is it the war of words over China's annihilation of 
3?ibet. The real India-China struggle is equally fierce 
but less obvious"• He had gone deep into the matter and 
said that it is the struggle between India and China for 
the economic and political leadership of the East for the 
respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate 
whose way of life is better", and added that "we want 
India to win that race with Eed China. We want India to be 
a free and thriving leader of a free eurad thriving Asia." 
i^ntes of India, ^eihi, 13 February 1960. 
2. The Indian Express. 10 November 1960 
3. yhQ t^at*?,Affiant December I960. 
Thus it is clear that the 0nit®d States was willing 
to help India against China, 
In January t961, President ®^nn®dy took the charge 
of White House and sent Harriraan*s Mission to New Delhi 
in March 1961 to know vi©wa of "ehru on World problsms, 
John F, Kennedy was a great friend of India and it was 
during his administration that th© Chinese aggression 
took place in On the Sino*Indian dispute, Harrimsm 
said\ "We feave made it dear that we are absolutely 
opposed to the Chinese aggression against India. The 
Indian o f f i c i i team has submitted its renort snd we 
will Btn&y Te-)ort and after the completion of our study 
we will have a clearer view of the situation. Xhe people 
and the Government of the United States are appalled by tie 
Chinese aggression in Tibet and gravely concextied about 
the aggressive attitude of the Chinese towards the 
Republic of India." 
In Ihdiat Harriman made a very good impression. One 
of the press cororaents was " . . . Mr. Harriman*s visit should 
be regarded in both countries as the beginning of a new 
chapter in Indo-U.S. relationship in ttie comwon quest 
for peace 
1. Hindu. 19 March 1961. 
2. The Indian y.xt»re8ST (Tiew i>elhi), 21 %rch 1961, 
Sditorial, "Indo-'J.ii. Relations^. 
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JJuring his visit ts the »Jnlted States in Koveatser 1961 
Hehru said that the crisis in Slna-Indian relations could 
not be r©s3lved t i l l the Chinese vacated tie fairly large 
terrltaiy of Indln which they at the moment occupied. 
In course of tli^, he thotighti the Chinese revolution 
u'ouid "to^o down". but it did not hapoen. >ne of ths 
factors, eiaerged aa a result of the ^^ hru-Kennedy talks, 
wms the realization of India's special position vis-a-vls 
the Soviet tJnion. Ha© '^ericans began to realize thiit 
"while world Coarmmisra is the objective of the ^^ ovlet 
Union, in the immediate future, the iiovlet ^nlon is 
interested in seeking India build up as a counter-poise to 
China."^ 
i^ ehru's point was appreciated in the '^Ited States 
that "Obviously vw are not Comrwinlsts. I'M do not want 
a Coroiunist Country in India." Furthermore questioned 
about his Government's attitude towards the Indian 
Corataunist party, he said the Sovernraent followed a policy 
of giving every party a relatively freo hand, Civil liberties 
and the like, "Unless tiiey over step certain limits. Ihen 
IhP StatgAmOt 7 iJovember 1961. 
2. Ibid, f 3 November I96I. 
we take action against It whether they are Coasnxnists or 
others."^ ^^ctually the ^^ oerlcana toecara© confident that 
India would not go the Cotmunist way and thiis they started 
taking more interest in India and it® dispute with 
Comiaunist China, When asked about the raising up of the 
question of boundary dis^ u^t© in the T^nited %tions Mshru 
said India did not propose to raise tho question at th© 
United Nations even if China were admitted to that organi-
zation. "1 t?iiink w® prefer to deal with the Chinese 
o^verliTBent ourselves.""^ ^ 
She noted newspaosr, Hindustan T^ mes rewrted that 
the Jnit-^ d sitates became so rauch interested in India that 
it wns ready to provide militafy equipment at low cost in 
d.'^ 'fenc© '>f India against Chinat if a request was received.^ 
And India was assured of the 'Jnited States sunoort in case 
- if of Peking attack on hor territory, 
Henry Kissinger, Special Assistant to President 
Kennedy on International Affairs, made it clear during hiSA/\sii 
to India in January I96J? that his firm conviction was that 
The lllndustan Time^ i. fJovembor I96I. 
Ibid.. 12 IJoveaber 196I. 
3. Ibid.. 7 Decerabor 1961, 
'I^es of India. 7 December I96I. 
the United States w u^ld suonort India agsdnat an Invasion 
from CoBKBunist Chlna» because "There woul<l l)e disaster 
for the vm l^e world^if we pernit Comunlst %ina to destroy 
India."^ ;|uestioned why his co'intzy had not given ana® 
aid to India for vacatinfg Chinese aggression, he said 
'J«S. Military aid was ^nly for use in a general war and 
not for tx^rdfr disputes, Howev^ r^, he agreed tb t China 
not only posed a threat to India, but also to !aany Western 
countries, including the United States,^ 
On the quest! m why the United States remained 
comparatively silent on Ladakh, the fJ.S. Ambassador in 
India) Frof. Galbraith, sneaking on relations at 
Constitution Club, said that in fact in %959$ ^imn the 
Balai Laiaa fled fron Tibet and Chinese hostility became 
more laenifest, the Administration had sought the advice 
of two former ambassadors, Chester Bowles and J.S. Cooper. 
They had urged "a policy of reticence" as procloaations 
of 'Tnited States^ support woul<a make the Chinese think that 
the Cold war had spread to the subcontinent aijd that the 
1 . The Hindustan Times^  7 January 1963, 
2, Ib^ -d^ f 10 January 1962. Later, the O.S. tJtate Department 
issued a statenent as c-talling Kissinger's views 
"personal". The Statesman, January 12, 1962. His belief 
was that Pakistan woulo not align with China against 
India. (But it was in 1963 that both co^mtries were 
aligned). The Hindu,. 16 January 196S. 
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tfnlted States vms iiwolvod with India agfiinst th©a. H© 
went far to say th^ st as a result of this suspicion of 
Great Power Involveiaent, settlement would be made more 
difficult all round. 
In spite of the fact that India had been supporting 
o^rammist China on two issues against the llnlted States 
stand, seat in tiiB TInlteci Nations and its recognition by 
the Ufnited i^ tates and other countrjteB, the flnited States 
2 
Departflient of t^ tate Hjado a statement on November 17, 1962 
by which military aid to India was eictendp-d and on 
November 20 President '^ ennedy issued his st-iteiSBnt^  in 
this coni^ction, 
Ifairriman, afte-' his 10 day lalssion to India ahi 
Palclstan, told f^ resident i<^ ennedy that the conflict between 
India and Communist China over their 2,*f00-iaile comroon 
border would be long and hard and that the Onited Sta^s 
would have to make major decisions on the degree ajd natui^  
of military aid to be given to India. Meanwhile the United 
states would continue the emergency asms aid shipaents that 
L started a month ago. 
1 . the Hindustan j^lm g^, 9 August 196?. 
2. Full Text in B.S.B.. vol. XIATII (1223), December 3f 1962, 
pp. 837-838. 
3. Full Text in Ibid.^ 10 Pocenber 1962, p^. 87^. 
lork 'Tiroes, h Oeceiaber 1962. 
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Th@ Aoericajj press coraraented bitterly s "The Chinese 
CoBiraunlst attack .'as complicated and intensified 
American involveiaent in India." And a l so that 
"^ omiaunist 4ihina*s adjectives ar® more than territorial, 
i'he Chines© also aim at political and economic disruption 
in tndia, the erosion of India's special position in the 
Himalayan border States and an undercutting of India's 
ties and prestige elsewhere in Asia."^ 
%e ap:^ arance on the world scene of a d^nasiic China 
with an expansionist policy was one of the snoat iisportsnt 
post war world-detrelopaents Caster Bowles called it . 11© 
said that if ^hina w®:© to atteiapt to ed\'3nce into the 
fertile valleys of i^outh-Blast Asia, a direct conflict in 
between China and the Western world would most likely be 
the result; therefore, counter-balance must be created.* 
His vie.f was thit if India and Pakistan could find an 
acceptable agreement on Kashmir, the defence against 
Communist China, he said, would b e % lot easier if those 
2 
two countries would pull together." Instead Pakistan 
was among the bitter critics of the Iftiited states military 
1 . ^ i d . . h April 1963. Editorial "Mr. Bowles to Delhi". 
^ e Hindu. 2 May 1963. 
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aid to India, Its argument was that India wauld uso 
this military equirsaent against Pakistan th;;t was why 
she accepted this military aid, although she had opposed 
United States silita:^' pact with Pakistan in 
Pakistan did not realize the emergency in India caused 
ty Chinese aggression. 
i^ i ecus sing Chines© aims, in th@ invasiaa of India, 
President Radhakrishnan, during his visit to the JJnited 
States, said, "It is not merely a question of Imposing 
military defeat on us, of defeating us on the battle field, 
but of disrupting our way of lif© and mailing people feel 
that Coisaunist ^hlna makes mor& rapid progress, that 
democracy is alow and cumbersome."' Tho Hindu" wrote 
editorially, "Th© Chinese threat to India is a threat to 
the whole democratic world and the United States, as the 
world*® cilghttest democracy, has a sptcla?. responsibl 1 1 ^ 
to stand shouldor to shoulder with India, the world*s 
largest democracy, in facing this challenge," 
This is the fact that as a result of the Chinese 
aggression and the United States military assistance to 
India, Indo-American relations improved a lot and were 
very cordial, ^ t India's policy of non-alignment became 
1 . The ft^ndus^an 7 June 1963. 
2. Ttie Hindu, 7 Juno 1963. i^ditorlal "The Presidents Agree," 
the isstae of the attack frora various countries and leaders 
inside India itself • , 
Staff Gorr©sr>oncient wrote s is this * Chinese presence* 
which has forced the new Iiidian-O.S» Relationship. India 
will henceforth reiain *unaligned* dejure but she has 
•1 
been forcibly laigned, 'defacto' with the West."' £ut 
actually India was not aligned with the West, India and the 
United States shared a mutual defensive concern to 
thwart the designs of Chinese aggression against the Indian 
suhcontinent. 
The prevailing rsoad in India was best reflected by 
the editor of the Indian ^irsress. who wrote s 
"War teaches a coimtry many valuable lessons. 
One of the useful lessons i4iich Chinese aggression 
has highlighted is to demonstrate to the Indian 
people who theiT real friends and foes are . . . 
Xo pretaid that our policy of non-aligniaent has 
not received a jolt by. recent ©vents and develop-
sisnts is to continue to live in what the Piime 
Minister ri^tly labelled as an "artificial 
atmosphere of our own creation*\.. Let th'' 
Prime Kinister, therefore, give a lead to the 
country by impleinenting hie own advice that 
the mas Give invasion of Intiia by China should 
laake us realise that we were getting out of 
touch with reality in the nodem vorld."^ 
In one of his own statements i^ ehru had himself 
1. "^ he Christian Scjenff^  ? May 1963. 
Indian Kxpres.'^ t Hovember 1, 1962. 
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confessed that the invasion "has brought us, made ua 
realise, that we were, shall 1 say, getting out of touch 
with realities in the modern world. We were living in 
an artificial atmosphere of our own creati jn and we have 
shocked out of it , all of u®, whether It is the Government 
or the people."^ 
There was another comiaent from a coltimnlst of the 
Indian '^ ^oressj Mankekars 
'^ At this stage, it is pointless to bltame any 
particiilar person or pass the buck, Indeed, 
who can cast the first stone? For the 
opposition parties must accept their share 
of the blaase inasmuch as it waa they who had 
iioadsd the Govemiaent into premature action 
on the northera frontier when it was a fairly 
well known fact that we were fflliitail2^ not 
yet prepared for fruitful action on that Ijorder 
'^ '/et another, a Sijllesian, truth brought home to 
us in that in this world sharply divided 
between the Comunist and-non-Coiainunist blocs, 
there is no room for neutr j^ls - not when th® 
chips are down. 
'Vith the enemy now fighting right insided our 
territory, there is no time to lose. Vie 
sruGt raako up the deficiency in our weations here 
aiKl now, and from whatever source possible. 
When the threat to our freedom is right on our 
soil it is dangerous quibbling to insist that 
we Shall not incur any country*3 obligation by 
accepting military aid and that we would go it 
alone however difficult tjje task of repulsing 
the aggression might be."^ 
1. Address to State Information Ministers' Conference, 
New Delhi, October 25, 1962. India, iSxternal Affairs, 
(Ministry of-), jixim^mnjlst^y n^, 
External Publications Division, Hew Delhi, p.2o. 
2. Indian Teresa,. Haveraber 1, 1962. 
Tte -f/nlted States military assistamc® to India 
was aji unwritten alliance wMoti proved very useful as 
far as India's defence agaimt China was concerned, Xh® 
United States Gov©rnraent's initial handling of the crisis 
on the Himalayan frontiers showed great Political skill 
and diplomatic dexterity and left a deep impression in 
India* The United States is not interested in whether 
India is aligned v^ ith it or not Isecause th© increasing 
Mttarness of the Slno-Soviet dispmte and Moscow*® open 
denunciation of th© Chines® attack on India knocked the 
bottom out of the proposition that there could he no 
neutrality in this sharoly divided world. 
The United States isilitary aid also affected fie 
Indij-Pakistan relations with regard to Kashmir. Pakistan 
tried to counter halaneis the situation created by this aid 
by putting pressure on the ifeited States so as to make 
India to solve the Kashmir problem. Certainly the limited 
States got success in initiating directs negotiations 
between India and Pakistan on the Kashsiir dispute. 
Unfortunately, the rainisterisl talks between the 
cs^untries, held during December 1962 and May 1963, failed 
and no agreeiasnt could be reached for the settlement of 
the problem cf Easteair.^  After that i'aklstan moved towards 
1. For details see Chapter IV, pp. 
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Cominunlat China for Its h®lp and friendship against 
India and iiicxs giving lesson to the Ohited States „ 
Communist China has continued border violations. 
The border agreement between Pakistan and Cosssmnist China 
in 1963 and their open wooing of each other have hardened 
opinion in India and earlisr suspicions that Pakistan 
had never intended to fight ConanuniSfa as such, Pakistan 
did so so as to threaten both the United States and India 
thJit Comsiunist China may help Pakistan* i>urlrjg Indo-Paklstan 
war in 1%5» the United States stopped assistance to both 
India and Pakistan «nd Pc^istan used sillitary equipiaent 
agAlnst India which it got fro® the Iftiited States to 
deter Comimmlst expansion* Pakistan also blamed India 
of using the i^iited States tailitary hardware. But the 
United States did not questi->n-Pakistan even about the 
use of its military weapons by Pakistan against India* 
The principal objective of China in respect of India 
was not only the territorial aggrandisement, obviously 
there was some strategic advantage gained by China by 
occupying largo areas in ladakh and by establishing Itself 
deep inside Indian territory. The principal objectives 
of China, of which the United States was aware, werei 
1. To demonstrate to Asia and the world that China 
was the only power to reckon within Asia and correspondingly 
-SOO" 
to demolish or weaken India's influence, prestige and 
economy; 
2, To BhoM that the policies of peaceful co-existence 
and non-alignment followed by India were unsound and 
transitory and thus to prove the falsity of Khrushchev's 
thesis regarding the importance of non-nligned co^aitries 
and finally, 
« 
3. o^ topple Kehru^ s Governntent and eventually to 
establish in India one or more subservient or satellite 
states. But it was because of the assistance of the United 
States that the invasion remained only a partial success 
in so far as it demonstrated to India and other South-East 
/ 
Asian countries that China was a big military power and 
failed in its aims either of disrupting the Government of 
India or denigrating the policy of non-alignaent. Its 
refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 5 August 1963, 
which was signed by 107 Nations of the wor33 weakened 
its international position still further. 
Since the invasion of 1962, China has laenifested its 
global ambitions more clearly. Militarily it continues 
to threaten India, liepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Laos, Vietnam 
and indirectly Malaysia, Ideologically, it competes with 
iaoviet Union. Diplomatically, it flirts, with different 
degrees of Intimacy with Pakistan, Cambodia, Indonesia and 
various other countries in Asia, Africa Surope and America, 
Its final world strategy is to confront the iJnited States 
of America in Asia and Africa and foment subversion ai»S 
its own brand of "revolution". 
The 'Mitp'd States will have to face China without 
time lifliit for tijaes to come, the possibility of a 
peaceful settlement of the border problem has been obstructed 
by China. Even China is threatening the lives of Indian 
diplomats and continues to build up its lailitary strength 
on Indian border, China now has become one of the nuclear 
powers of the world and now the nuiber is five, as it 
v/as on October 16, 1 9 ^ that China carried out its first 
nuclear explosion and has now recently exploded Hydrogen 
Boab. By doing so she has flouted the world opinion and 
increased the danger of prolifiration of nuclear weapons. 
The declaration of Marshall Chen Xl, China's Foreign 
Minister, after China siKJceeded in detonating a nuclear 
device in 1965* tB noteworthy heres "v^ e are fully prepared 
against aggression . . . tot the Indian reactionaries, 
the British imperialists and the Japanese militarists 
come also with thesi. Let the Modem (Communist) revisionists 
act in co-ordination with them from the North. We will stil l 
win in the end."^ In fact the main instrument in the hands ' 
of -^'hina for solving worli problems in war. Ihia is the 
greatest and gravest challenge to both the super powers -
the United States and the Sovi«^ t l3iiion. 
I- Peking Re^ew. October 8, 1965. i^lso soo uanbair Vohrai 
"China's Hegenonic Aaslbltions not Abandoned", The Statesman 
(riew Delhi), ?6 April 1966. 
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From above account and analysis of the India -
United States relations on particular issues and their 
foreign policies In general It is obvlsus - the relations 
between the two countries have gone through a zig-2i8C 
vay, sometlmas very cordial and soEistiraes bitter. Despite 
the facts that the objectives of their foreign policies 
have been soiaewhat similar, differences have arisen over 
the v?ay to implement theo. the reason for such differences 
is not far to seek; the national interests of the two 
countries differ. 
i^ he J^hited States is one of the ti^ /o ma^ or rivals in 
the cold war world strategy, ^t is, therefore, coaraitted 
to defence against '^osaaunism in Asia, and elsewhere 
and is the leader of the "'estem bloc* India, on the 
contrary, is an underdeveloped country aaid is naturally 
interested in its economic devalDpment and in securing its 
l^ orders with Falclstan and ^hina. Asian solidarity, peace 
and security are of utmost ImportDnce to her. The policy 
of non-nllgnment has enabled India to play an Important 
and independent role in international affairs and also to 
preserve her identity in a sharply divided world, though 
with a few failures. India is too big, and too proud, to 
submarge Itself totally in a foreigfn-donlnated alliance. 
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Indta-tJnlteiS Statss cJifferences have been mainly on 
the following issuess mi^ litary alliances, J^ ashrair, 
^I.S, ffillltaiy eid Pact with Pakistsnj China, Arab-Isra®! 
dispute. How the situation in tte world has recently 
chsng@<i beyand rscogrsitl^n frojs wl^ t it was like just 
aftei* the end of the Second World War» vJith the changing 
tiises, values also change, lvalues in international politics 
which were valid during th® last two decades have little 
significance today, fheise is a thaw in tte cold war as 
old animosities no longer sv/ay peopl^ t to the saaie extent. 
She cold'j^ fes been frosen. Ideaiagical rigidity on both 
aides hfts ssellowed into a ssor© sober ap'r^ raisfil of the 
realities of the' world, v^ hen the world is moving away 
from bipolarity, Indian movement toward alignment is not 
generally considered a realistic course of action and the 
policy of non-alignment and friendship with both the 
tTnited States and the iioviet t^ion should be considered 
as consistent with India's vital national in^rests, 
c^ one ar® thp days when the United States' belief 
in and policy of sailitary pacts had sosie meaning. In the 
present day world, when there is split even in the two 
blocs ana there i3 bet ©r understanding between the two 
sup-^ r powers, there is not much sense in regional arrangements 
for defence and security, ^^ ather there laust be cosperative 
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efforts for world peace ana security. The Jnlttd states 
Should realize that in the past years Ita policy of 
military pacts has been denounced by India which aroused 
great suspicion and distrust in both ttie countries and 
added fuel to the Indi-H.^ j. differences. The Republican 
Ad'ninistration in t)m 'Jnited States also now seeras to 
have come round the view that there is no need for a 
r'^ gisnal nlliance for Asian peace aatid security. It is sJLso 
interesting to find that the Soviet Onion, on the other 
hand, is in favour of such an arrangement,^  Aiign-rient 
or non-alignment t^ ith th® .'"St is often discussed in a 
vacuum without reference to th© situation obtaining in the 
world today. The advocates of alignsient with the '^est 
ignore the fact that the United States is hardly eager 
for India's aligntnent, rather there is a better appreciation 
of the policy of n >n-alignment in the United iitates which 
is a si®!i of better understanding between the two countries. 
In keeping with her pragmatlo ap roach it would be worth 
While for the Indian policy makers to review the policy 
? of non-alignment because, as observed by Prof. Bimal Prasadi 
1. Ambassador to India, ^nneth Keating was reported 
by the Hindustan Times,. 30 Septemb'-r 1969, to have said 
that does not favour" the breannev Plan for Asian 
3ec.>rity if it invoked ''any military pact among the 
Asian countries or with the Soviet «JhlonJ' 'and with the 
United States also. Kather he saids/' .e are in favour 
of econonic cootieration between various Asian nations'*. 
J.o. President iJlRon and Secretary of Jitate Jiiogers favour 
the sane view. 
2. Ibid.. ^th J'ily 1969, "The Future? of :^ on-aliennsent". 
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"The loosening of the nillltery e lHsnoe 
systGin and the emergence of polyoentrlsffi 
in Motld po l i t i c s ©r® factors in favour 
o f , and not egeinst, non-alignment. For 
they mean thet the n o n « s l i ^ e d stetes are 
no longer under constant pressure to ^oin 
this bloc or thet , as was the case be fo re . 
The problem face^ by ncm-aligneent, 
therefbre, i s not that i t hes ceased to 
be relevant, but thet i t haslo reSefln© 
i t s p ^ r l o r i t i e s . " 
The United f.tates should accept this f a c t thot i t s 
part icipation in the cold var has brought i t s involveaent 
in China, Korea, Pekietan, Vietnam and Middle hast, which 
is not considered by I n d i e s in the Interest of Asia. 
Undoubtedly, much of the trouble in £outh Bast Asia has 
been created by the United etatfes po l ic ies : of non-
recognition of China, U . t . mll ltery aid to Pakietan, U.S. 
presence in 3outb Vietnam, etc . This demands that the 
G'>vomaient of the united S|8tes should abandon i t s coinrnitment 
in Asia and Middle G®st. Unnecessary inter f^ f^nce in the 
Asian a f f a i r s of ma^or powers cannot be considered to le rab le . 
Kashmir i s the m^ior problem in Indian foreign po l icy . 
i:lnce independence this problem has been obstructing the 
way of Ind ie ' s f r iendly r ^ a t i o n s with the United states end 
Pakistan fo r th© l e s t 21 years and no body knows ho« l<mg Keahmlr 
and m 
v i l l remain a sore point between Indie and Pakistan on one hand/ 
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irritant to the Indo-TJ.S. relations on the other h^a. 
Perhaps i^t would have been solved by now if the anited 
cstatea attitude to this particular issue had not been 
pro^Pakisten. Host of the responsibility lies with the 
United States* policies with regard to Kashmir, H could 
have ratl^r adopted a conciliatory role and thus narrowed 
the gulf between India and Pakistan. Instead the iJ.S, 
military pact with Pakistan gave ilse to misconceptions, 
suspici ons, misui»3orstandings, distrust in India making 
Kashmir problem more intractable. 
Indians are unable to understand - how the I^.S.A* -
which has been the laeetlng place of peoples professing 
diff^jcent faiths and of diverse racial origin can believe 
in the two nation theory, based purely on religion, India 
also is a multi-racial and laulti-lineual country. The 
thinking in the United States has been that Kashasir should 
go to Pakistan because of its being a Muslim majority state. 
It seems an over-simplification of the problem of Kashmir 
and it was impossible to divide India entirely, on the basis 
of religion, i'he Americmis, perhaps, had no knowledge of 
the fact that partition was confined to the region that 
constituted the old British India, It had also been made 
clear by the British Government that the decision about 
partition referred only to i^ritlsh India and that the 
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decision of Indian States, if they acceded to either of 
the states, should be based on geographical, contigtiity. 
Co in India's iriew the Ameirica's belief in two nation 
theory is quite wrong. 
Why the J.G. has been reluctant to consider tJ® 
right and obligations of India to defend a State vihich 
has lawfully acceded to It, while accepting the unlawful 
presence of Palcistajri in Kashmir. The ifeited States seems 
to ha-\re been lending its support to the Palcistani charge 
that there had ti^ cin Indian aggression in Kashjnir for the 
purpjSQ of securing Kashmiris accessi m by "'fraud and 
violencni" and ignoring the cruelty and terror, arson and 
murder used by the tribal and other invaders in Kashoalr. 
India thinks that, instead the JInited States should have 
sup-iorted the Indian charge of Pakistani aggression. 
It is very difficult for Indians to understnnd why 
the Americans gave so raueh Importance to the rights of 
the British or Turks in Cyprus and on the other hand why 
they have not recognised the legal rights of India In 
Kashmir as a constituent state of the Indian Union. 2'he 
Indian Independence Act shviuld be accepted as it is, and 
the Security Council has no right to abrogate, to nullify 
or modify It and It can be altered only by negotiation or 
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agreeiTsent of all the parties viz., the India and 
Pald.stan or in accordance with its terns. The United 
States has ap-^ared, obstinately, to have chosen to ignore 
the l©gal effects of the Instnmient of Accession signed 
by th© then Kaaianir mler, though the accession was made 
In accordance with the Indian Independence Act of 
This does not mention anything like such as conditional 
accession or the ascertainment of tai© will of^e people 
before the accession can be maao final. 
The United States has always been supporting 
Pakistanis plea for plebiscite in Kashmir, fcut i t 
ignores the fact that in the world of today, consisting 
of multi-lingual, laulti-religious, multi-communal ana 
multi-racial countries, an application of the principle of 
Self detfsrmination may lead to DOlitical chaoa in Asia, 
Africa and other parts of the? world, e.g., in the dis-
integration of Sud^, Kei^a, Ethiopia, Omroon, Thailand, 
Iran and Iraq, Then, to quote Bansal and SingJ, "The 
world will turn topsy turvy the laoraont Pakistan's invidious 
plea for plebiscite in Kashmir is translated into action. 
It will be a triumph of barbarism over civillaation, of 
despotism over democracy, of mediaevalisra over modernisin. 
1. Baikal and Gingh, » 
p. 
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and of religioua fana&lGi^ over socularisia. P^iatan 
may rest assured that will neirar come," 
But MOW w© see a shift in the United States attitude 
towards t'm pi-r>bi©a of Kashmir which is a bright story and a 
Should be appreciated "by the Indian GoiremrasfJt BMdt people, 
There is no hope at present that 'Jnited States will ai^ore 
support Pakistan's case on Kasteir in the Security Council 
as she had Son® in the past. Instead the United States 
officios have started to emphasise that the prdblera should 
be solved through bilateral negotiations and mutual 
discuss!-ins between the two partiea.indla and Pakistan, 
Xhe United States seems to believe that Kashialr problem 
should be solved, so that there can be friendly relations 
between India and Pakistan, Then Pakistan would not 
like to be friendly with Coiamunist China. But ftie United 
States ignores one i?aportant possibility that other 
problems may arise as Pakistan thinks otherwise. 
Any way Kastoir was, has been, and will be an integral 
part of India, Pakistanis claims are false, The peaceful 
setfclenjont of the Kashmir probleia can only be brought 
through bilateral and mutual discussions between India and 
Pakistan themselves. Until and unless the Kashmir problem 
is solved there will be no peace and security in Asia and 
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the United States 3hcml<3 keep this fact In mind while 
taking a decision with ragard to Kashmir as It involves 
f^nlted States interest also. 
The Partition of In<lla gave rise to the problsra of 
Kashmir, India and Pakistan are two Asian coiintrdtes and 
veiy close neighbours (related by ties of blood, language, 
and even religion). There aust be friendship, mutual 
understancling and gotJd-will between the two countries, 
Instead of onmityt hatred and il^-will. )nly then they 
will be able to do something for themselves and for peace 
and security in Asia, atlieiwise, the nore powerful coantries 
would try to make the best use, for thd. r own sake, of 
their mutual enraity, e.g., Coraraynist China is trying her best 
to befriend Pakistan against India and one day she may grab 
both India and Pakistan. The only solution is that the 
two«countries, India and Pakistan, should be on frieiSdly 
terras and have peaceful relations so that they can become 
powerful enough to face any eneiny on their borders. And 
certainly, " i t will bo our effort to work with the inter-
nati>nal coranunity", said Olnesh Singh ,^ India's External 
Affairs Minister, "to establish new bonds of friendiihip and 
1 • iipeaking before the General ivssombly. New York, on 
October 3f 1969. The Hindustan Times. October 1969-
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cooperation and stsnengthen the ones that exist. I offer 
to Pakistan the same hand of friendship. Lot us work 
together, step by step to solve our difff»r0nces, remove 
th© barriers that prevent the people of the two countries 
to come together to strengthen the age-old ties, -^e hope 
we shall receive full cooperation fro® Pakistan in thijs," 
As far as Indo-Aaerican relations ar® concerned, 
the U.S, Biiiitary aid Pact with Pakisten has been t i l l 
1965 the ao.^ t rffective irritant in the way of their 
ftiendly relations, India's assumption that Pakistan had 
asked for American aims aid priraarily for use against India 
and not against ar^ y of the Comwunist countries, i .e. , the 
Soviet Unijn, was proved true and the assurrjiices given by 
Presi^ ertt Eisenhower in 195^ proved quite illusory when 
American supplied tanks, super-sonic planes, air-to-air 
fiiissiles and other sophisticated weapons were freely used 
hy Pakistan in its war ag&inst India in April as well as in 
August and September 1965* Ift vain did India remind the 
American Administration of these assurances, liany Indians 
could appreciate; that the Americans were hardly in a 
position effectively to prevent the abuse of the weapons 
already given to Pakistan as military sLd, What irritated 
them, however, were statements emanating fr:Ka high American 
quar ters to the effect that both ln«iia and Pakistan were 
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using Amerleaii weapons. This was another attempt to 
equatfe India and Pakls tan which annoyed the Indians• 
India did not use,any Ajsarican jailitaiy did against Pakistan. 
In fact, the type of military aid that was received by 
India- would have been of little use in the fight against 
Pakistan, if'hil© iimerican railitary officers were given 
ample opportiinitMs by India to satisfy th®aselves on 
this, ?9aklstan refused to offer any such facilities to theia,^  
It is very difficult for Indiana to believe that with 
so isany i^rican offlciels - civil and military « l iv ing 
in Pak^an, and having so jsany sources of infonaatlon 
ava i l ab le to them, the Aaerlean Adteinistration could 
really have been so ignorant of PaklAani intentions • o^ 
the Indians drew the conclusi;>n that the U.S.A. built up 
and is still helping Pakistan to build up it^ \sna0d 
strength knowing fully well that AsKsrican anas were more 
likely tote us«sd against India and possibly against 
Afghanistan than against China, or the Soviet Union. 
Generally Aoericans still belltJvo that Pakistan is genjiinely 
anti-CouBBunlst and potentially a reliable any of the 
U.S.A. in its struggle against Comnjunisa. If it Is now 
moving into the arras of China, it is through fear of India 
1 . Ghakrav'irty, B.N., pp.139-1^0. 
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( fn l3 iter i ly the strongest countjpy In touth As l e ) , md thet 
the united ttptes of America loiit the frimdfehlp ma godciwll! 
of Peklsten in the w&e of the A9ts5 c o n f l i c t . r.mericmB 
St 113 l ike to bel ieve thnt once ihB Kesiimir problem Is 
solved Fakiistm would jo in Indin. in the defenee of t^e 
subcontinent « e b e l i e f which Inaianfc cannot share, in view 
of the c lear steteraents to the contrary by Pakistani leaders , 
inaien reection, on th© otherband, Is that i f the \inited 
j^tetes of (m&rlGB is b i l l i n g to be bleckmailed by peKlsten 
thfit i s no doubt i t s own bui iness , but the United i tates of 
A merlee has no right to expect indie to pey the price 
deoenued by Pakistan. 
Ihough India ree l l^es thet driving Pakistan Into the 
©rms of Goramunist China would not be to her interest e i ther , 
but y ie ld ing to bleckcaail is not the way to meet thisd Ciintlngent 
threet . India Is going to give neither the Kashair Velley 
to Pakistan nor the Aksai Shin to China thereby mj^klng Ladekh 
inaefent-ible. 
In f ac t , i i seecas i ronical thet the iTniteU tates 
ml l i tery aid to Pekistan, which was intended to help in 
conteining Uommuni&m, ehould heve bem used against Indie* 
I t would Indeed be t rag ic I f Pakistan, 0 £ ..ATO e23y of the 
1. For deta i l s see , I b i d . ^ pp. 136-137. 
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United States of iSraerica, were to ufce Arawrlcen eras 
©gainst Indie, l a concert with Coaaunlst China. 
I h l s hes been e l l beceuse of the fact that Indls 
vXey^ Pefclsten ss an imSiecJiete anJ eoatlauing threat to 
I t s security end vice-versa vhi le to the United stetea , 
national Interest hes requlrea the contetoment of CosMunlsia 
(whether in the for® of i^ovlet o r Chinese inf luence) in 
Asia. Although, now Pe&:lst&a i s getting mllitery eld both 
from Coicmunlsi China ma the £.ovlet llnicai, end there i s eve»y 
llkelyhodd of American erms being onoe again supplied to 
Paklsten trnfiv be on e l i isited scale enc? orj a oofflmerclaj bes is ) 
there Is very l i t t l e l lkelyhood of Inaie being pressurieed 
to accept 0 solution which runs counter to her nationeJ 
interest* Besides, aa r ightly observed by p r o f . Vrnketsraaenis 
"V.hst Pekistanls f e l l ed to r ea l i se was that 
in the geaie of international po l i t i cs India 
would ever remain a greater pr ise in comparison 
with Paiastan enu that the r^leaing of a treaty 
with the United States dla not represent the 
beginning of the ena of /^erican interest in 
retaining Indian t-oodwill ,"* 
Ihough, there have been di f ferences between India 
md the united L^ates over the Isnue of non.recognition of 
VenKatarempni, "/imerlca* a K i l l ta ry Al l iance with 
Pakistani The hvolut^on and course of an uneasy partnership 
InternetionflA ^l^^di^st o p . c i t . , p . i ^o . 
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Gommuniyt Chine and i t t seat In the United NstSons. i t 
¥©s the Chinese Invasion of Indian terr i tory ttist brought 
Indie c loser to the United i tates ea I t extended Immtjcilete 
tallltary aid to Iaa ie » ihe United t tates i s snore concerned 
obout Ind ie ' s rol© l a Asle than ai/out the recovery of her 
l o s t areas in ladekh. The Onlted i j fetes authorit ies favaur 
e l imit©! bul la up f o r mountain warfare to contain further 
Chinese aggresslcan. In any wa^^ t^e Onltea btates Is not 
prepared to g rmt massive miXltery assistance to put Indian 
railitety potentlel^ on a l eve l with that of the Chinese. 
I t wants that India; should play a central ro l e in the 
anti-CorEflsunlst Etrugg!® in uoutheast /isio, anS shoulo aiopt a 
more posit ive attitude toward United states' aioves agaSnst 
Peking* Moreover, i t seems that United fetates*expert opinion 
favours to dismiss the chances of another Chinese attack 
in the near future. 
But now India has becosie fflilitarlly strong end may 
defend herse l f . I t i s primarily concerned with her t e r r i t o r i a l 
integr ity and her ab i l i t y to face China on hei f r on t i e r s . 
Her ro le in /isis aad anti-Chinese isovea In i.outheast Asia 
are of secondary Importance* t,he i s going along ulth her 
defence preparations on that assumption and whether China 
w i l l attack again or not i s another matter, 'ihe Indian 
Govemment shonla not presume that In case thtre Is another 
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©egi^ es&ion by China, the llnjteci Spates would Immediately come 
to her reeoue* 
far as the Xnaia-Ohlne boraer dispute is coficorned, 
It vil3 go 3ong* In indifa, there is general agreement that 
she awst be veil prepared to aefend hi.rself end not be caught 
napping again, anci a vigorous i^ rogrcawie to strengthen the 
armed foreea is unaer way. resistance would be far moi^  
re:.<Slute and organised should the Chinese ettacK ©gain. The 
fact ifa that, Indifi's refusal to accept Chinese supremacy in 
Asia has been pertly respmslMe for the Ghinjese anxiety to 
expose India's military weakness and there by, her Inability 
to I'unction as a ma^ or power In ^sia« 
India doeb not want to force the Soviet Union on to 
the sSise of Peking through ellgnment with the West. Loviet 
vlllin^ess to provide economic md limited mllitai^ assistance 
is valuable both in reducing the threat from across the 
ilimelayas and in enabling lndif> to pley a balancing role 
against the Chinese detiire for hegetnonj^  in Asia. 
Peaceful co-existence, non-^lgnta^t, Afro*Aslan 
eolldarity, peace and security have no meaning for militant 
China. The policy-malcers of countries interested In world 
peace, cannot ignore the world strategy of China. Thet is 
why the United States hat not recognised China and does not 
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support its C38,1JB for th® seot in the Halted nations. The 
thinking In the imited bjates has been that Chins was end 
is of extresKi irsportanoe in relation to the conflict between 
DQ£QOCPaclee and the Kreralln, beeause China is in the position 
of a buffer, both geoEraphically end politically, between 
the peoples of the Pacific area - Including Americans • 
and the maJn base (ftoscow) from which Consnunist operations 
are conducted, to t^i-Goimnuni: t China would be at least a 
barrier • to the advantage of the free peoples. A Coiamunist 
Chins day well be a highway by which loviet Influiance will 
move and a base from uhlch Conamunist armed forces will strike 
southward and eastward, i .e. , toweru Australia srui towards 
the United States. Politlca23y, China vab end is of Iraportenc© 
because she has vast potential it and she l^s a permanent 
seat on the fcecuHty Council of the United Rations, m 
anti*Coni2iuni£t Chine votes there m the American side, while 
0 Coauaunigt China would, in all probability, go against 
America.^  Ihc?5e tv-o considerations are among the deterraSnants 
of U.L. China policy. 
1 . GoldWi'n- itobert A. with Lerner, lialph end Strouzh, 
Gerald (i^d.), j^ gadImp I n , f9lXW.t 
Oxford University Press, Wew Yoric, 1969, pp.299-300. 
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The tl..-* policy ia Ghlae, unlike Indl®, is of 
cositeinment* 2here is virtually no line of separation 
between U.w. policy in China and • {>'ar F.sstern Policy* 
Kov it ehouia he noted thst e shll't hes hem seen. The 
United tpBZeB is trying to improve its ties i«ith Pekiai^  and 
the Soviet Union along vdth Formosa whieh heve been the 
determining md uns'^ oiciabla factors of Amerloan foreign poliey 
find diplomecy. Vhe united dearsite the Chine .-so 
ettitude of hostility towards it, hai> attempted to maintain 
end develope e dialogue with the Ghinfese Gomtminlsts through 
talks in war&ew. But "this has not been easy since the 
•jFiif^ ese have deojineu to <Jiseu»s, or even aalsnoi^ ledg® la 
some instances, our proposals aimed at bringing about Increased 
contacts and exchanges", announced the nov U.fc. iecretary 
of &|ate, yilllam P. Bogers, in his first mejor foreign policy 
stateRsnt^ on 27 March 1969. ab far as the bino-Boviet 
rift increases, the United j>$ateE tries to iBprove its 
real tIons xdth Cozsaiunist Ohlne. 
India belii-ves that the imited states and other countries 
who h6Vo not recognised Chine shou3u recognise It and 3t 
1. Text of the statement in I^ ussber S^xty-two in B continuing; 
nn^^ Qt.mnQm PPltgy u.t . i . i . , ^ev Delhi, p«21. 
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should be given its membership in the United Nations. 
iSveiywhere In the woria the United states the Soviet Union 
end Goamunist Chine are involved, 'iherefore Cooimuiiist China 
should be given its due place. 0||ly then there may be some-
what peaceful, and mutual agreements on the problems of the 
present day world snd ©specially that of Asia, e.g., Vietnam, 
Kest sAsiai Fortnosa and others, aa Coiomunist China have 
to abide by the ruJes of international conduct and may change 
its warlike attitude by \ihich it haj* threatened all the 
countries of the world with the objective of world domination. 
Indian diplomacy did not reacted wisely during the 
•west Asia crisis tn June It sided with Egypt while 
the United Jitates was on the side of Israel. Sgypt did not 
support India against Pakistan during I^do-Pakistan war in 
1965. India could have taiien a neutral stand thus avoiding 
the vehen^nt Governmmt and public criticism in the United 
b|at®s. Hecently at fiabat bunimit also, the Indisn diplomacy 
failed, though its stand was justified. 
Xf peace and security are to be had in Asia and the 
world, the United States should lessen its commitment in 
Vietnam, '"'est Asia so that power politics may leave these 
places for, free development. The anno«Kicement^  by President 
i* i^me megazine's ,(14 December 1969, news weekly) report 
was quoted by the Hindustan Times, December 16, 1969. 
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nixoa thfit by the end of 1973. elmost all American troops 
will be wlthdravaa except 40,000 from £outh Vletnens should be 
welcomeiS in Indie* 
Ihe United utete^j one of the tvo sup©x powers 
of the world end India it the largest democrscy of Asia® 
Most of the time In the history of their rel?tl«s they 
have been on friendly terms. India hes received large scale 
United states economic^ ena for its neti n sl development 
plans end the United states hes played an important role in 
raising the standsiPd of Inalan life through this ala. ahls 
is the unchallenged fact thi^ -t the united L%B%es is interested 
in the eeonomlo build up of Inula becsuae a strong m a l a ean 
spesk with strength and affect the decision in international 
erganiseticns and conferences* 
as they are io democratic Ideals end the 
princlplec md purfioses of the.y.K* Charter, inula end the 
United States both have a staKe in peace, development, end 
higher standards of living* There are no fundamental clashes 
of national interest but the usual determinants of foreign 
policy - histozy, geography, econoalc resources, etc* • make 
the policy mekers see the world problems dlffer©nt3,y* v^ het 
is needed to bring the relations of the tvo countries to © 
more even keel is the realisation of the basic unity that 
« 621 . 
characterizes their political systems and goels of foreign 
policy father than the oocasionel differmees that one 
finds in their handling of a problem. It is, thereJbre, 
e welcome developssent that armngements hove been made for 
a rfigulor dialogue between the policy mekers of the t«o 
countries-^ This could very well leea to a better mutual 
und era tending md friendlier reeltions between the largest 
democrecQr of the East and the aoost jJo^erfal one in the 
World todey. 
i . First tollt& were held at New Delhi from 
26 July to as July i9«58 to discuss matters of cosBBon 
interest. The Indieaa delegation was headed by Minister 
of fctete l-.A. iihagati the aelegatlnn wes led by 
the then Under Secretary of Stete Nicholes Ketaenbach. 
The 29 July 1969. tfery recently, another 
round of India-O.^ :. bileterel telks took piece at 
fcveshliigton during io-i? october 1969. The Indian delegation 
was led by Foreign Secretary, T.H. Kaul, while the 
U.i-. team was headed by tinder Secretary of j:tate £l1iot 
Hichardson, The tiindustiaa Tiniest 18 October, 1969. 
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